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contents
Once again, this year’s State of Civil Society Report makes for bittersweet reading. The following pages 
are full of glimpses into the amazing work being done by our colleagues in civil society to address some 
of the most urgent global issues. From humanitarian response to long-term peacebuilding, civil society 
is often at the frontline of the world’s challenges.  But the pages are also full of worries, especially 
when it comes to the political space in which civil society operates and vital resourcing for its activities. 
When I talk to CIVICUS members about their concerns, civic space and resource base almost always 
feature, regardless of where they come from (we have members in 165 countries) or how big they are 
(from the biggest international NGOs to the smallest community organisation). This year’s report is 
aimed not just at mapping the nature of the challenges in these two areas but also acts as a guide for 
our members – and others – to come up with their own responses. You will see that we have made 
actionable recommendations after each section. 
Defending our space
The scale of the threats to civic space should not be underestimated. CIVICUS’ analysis suggests that, 
in 2014, there were serious threats to civic freedoms in at least 96 countries around the world. If you 
take these countries’ populations into account, this means that 67 years after the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights guaranteed our freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly and association, 6 out 
of 7 humans live in countries where these freedoms were under threat. And even the most mature 
democracies are not exempt. In the United States, there were heavy-handed responses to protest, 
environmental groups in Australia and Canada have come under attack from their governments, and, as 
I write, friends in Indian civil society are trying to resist a cynical raft of measures to shut them up and 
shut them down.
For me, these developments suggest a renewed period of contestation about the acceptable bounds of 
civil society, the latest manifestation of the battle to protect citizens against state power.  It would be 
foolish to see this phenomenon as somehow about the ‘West versus the rest’ or indeed that civic space 
can be saved or funded from outside. Instead, every polity needs to arrive at its own settlement about 
the role of and acceptable limits on civil society. And all of us who believe in a healthy, independent 
civil society have a responsibility to make our case again and again, whether it is in stressing the 
universal principles around civic freedoms or rolling up our sleeves to win hearts and minds in the 
political debate. It is our space; we need to reclaim it.
As the global civil society alliance, CIVICUS is busy working on a series of measures to defend our space. 
On the research front, we are developing new tools – notably the Civic Space Monitor and Civic Pulse 
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be ready to go live when next year’s State of Civil Society Report is published. On the international front, we are working within a number 
of mechanisms – from the Community of Democracies to the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation – to make sure that 
global commitments to protect the enabling environment for civil society are adhered to. CIVICUS is also involved in the design of a series of 
new regional hubs aimed at supporting civil society. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we are working with our own members to build 
solidarity across civil society. Only by standing together – regardless of whether we are service deliverers or change-seekers – can we be 
effective in the contestation for civic space. 
Less money, more problems
This year’s thematic essays make for required, albeit sometimes depressing reading, for anyone interested in the future of civil society. You 
will not find a fundraising toolkit with all the answers, rather, taken together, these essays paint a strategic and provocative picture of the 
challenges and opportunities around resources. If you’re pressed for time, have a look at the CIVICUS essay and then dig deeper into the 
guest essays. 
As for me, I drew one scary conclusion: those of us who work in change-seeking civil society organisations, especially in the Global South, are 
facing a triple whammy. 
First, many of our donors are suffering from ‘logframitis’. They want us to package the long-term and systemic change we are passionate 
about into neat little fundable projects that fit their programme and timelines. They work through complex chains of ‘fundermediaries’ who 
channel ever-smaller chunks of money with ever-larger relative reporting requirements. Many in civil society are good at playing this game 
but many of the most innovative, most ambitious initiatives rarely involve project proposals.
Secondly, in many countries civil society is caught between measures that make it more difficult to access foreign funding and the fact that 
domestic funders are not yet able or willing to support change-seeking activities. And the situation is most acute in countries that have 
apparently ‘graduated’ into middle income status and have therefore fallen off donors’ priority lists. 
Thirdly, despite all the promises about ‘funding the front line’ and investing in the capacity of Southern civil society, very little resource 
actually reaches those who need it most and, arguably, could spend it best. Out of the $166 billion spent on official development assistance 
(ODA or aid) by OECD-DAC countries in 2013, only 13%, or $21 billion, went to civil society.  Although current data is hard to obtain, the 
latest estimate from 2011 suggests that Southern-based NGOs get only around 1% of all aid directly. The rest of civil society’s allocation 
goes to Northern organisations that pass on an unknown share of their funding to CSOs based in developing countries.  The picture is even 
bleaker when it comes to humanitarian activities, where the proportion of funds that go to local civil society organisations has actually fallen 
from 0.4% in 2012 to 0.2% in 2014.  Private funders are generally better but I would argue that they are nowhere near where they should be 
in terms of funding the frontline. 
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Go brave
What is also striking in this year’s report are the links between civic space and resourcing trends. It is not surprising that domestic civil 
society does not have the capacity to defend itself against attacks on civic space if donors have systematically underinvested in local 
organisations. In my experience, the situation is particularly woeful when it comes to support for civil society platforms, the ‘scaffolding’ that 
helps strengthen civil society’s collective voice when it is threatened. 
At CIVICUS, we will work with donors where we can to encourage them to be braver; to curb the excesses of what one of our contributors 
calls the ‘tyranny of donors’. One practical way we will do this is to add a new category for ‘brave philanthropy’ to our Nelson Mandela - 
Graça Machel Innovation Awards. From next year, our members will be able to nominate examples of donors who have been prepared to 
take risks to support civil society, particularly in the Global South. We will then take the nominees to a vote and announce the winners at our 
next International Civil Society Week, to be held in Bogota, Colombia in April 2016. 
The onus is also on civil society to change some of its behaviours, from weaning ourselves off grant/contract funding, to exploring new ways 
of raising resources, to designing activities that do not need financial support. We also need to be braver when it comes to speaking out 
when others in civil society are targeted. Many of us have been too busy filling out forms that we have failed to notice that the science of 
delivery is killing the art of social transformation. Ultimately, we also need to be brave enough to go beyond our log frames and work plans, 
to engage in the politics of social transformation and protecting our space. 
Throughout this report you will see examples of civil society challenging political and economic elites, of people making their own politics. 
I hope you are inspired to think about how we in civil society can work together to protect our civic space and create a more sustainable 
resource base.
Dr Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah
1  Baobab, Civil Society Aid Trends 2015, Baobab Briefing No. 3, January 2015, http://bit.ly/1FtGLRF
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introduction ...these stories tell us that only civil society, in its broadest 
sense, is taking a 
stance against the 
concentration of 
power in the hands of 
a tiny, global, super-
rich elite, and against 
the attempts of many 
political leaders and 
corporate interests 
to undermine 
human rights and 
the value of people’s 
participation. 
It has been another year of hard work and high achievement for civil society. The story of the year since the 
2014 State of Civil Society Report was published has partly been one of a continuing series of attacks on civil 
society in the many countries where, when civil society asks difficult questions about power, the powerful seek 
to silence it. But is has also been a story of impressive and sustained civil society response, in a world that has 
become more turbulent and contested.
As we show below, civil society faces challenges - of lack of space, under-resourcing and limited access to 
decision-makers. Civil society also needs continually to prove its connection with and relevance to citizens, 
and it needs to demonstrate its ability to stay ahead of trends and innovate. When civil society groups do not 
do these, they fail. But so often, we see civil society leading the response to crisis, taking on difficult issues, 
contributing to change, and winning arguments for social justice.
This year in review section of the 2015 CIVICUS State of Civil Society Report is complemented by our report’s 
special thematic section on the resourcing for civil society, and the 27 guest contributions, from civil society 
activists and experts, on the resourcing theme. This year in review looks back at the twelve months since the 
last report was published, from June 2014 to May 2015. It seeks to identify the major stories around the world 
where civil society has made an impact, and where civil society has been challenged, and to draw learning 
from these about what needs to happen next to better enable civil society to promote positive change. It is 
necessarily a selective overview, and a snapshot of a volatile and changing world, but we think that, combined, 
the stories below tell us something compelling about the power of civil society to address the multiple 
challenges of today, ranging from political crises to humanitarian emergencies.
Together, these stories tell us that only civil society, in its broadest sense, is taking a stance against the 
concentration of power in the hands of a tiny, global, super-rich elite, and against the attempts of many 
political leaders and corporate interests to undermine human rights and the value of people’s participation. 
Civil society, in the examples we offer below, is trying to give voice to the marginalised, grow democratic space, 
hold decision-makers to account and reinvent governance, from local to global level. But because civil society 
challenges powerful interests it often comes under attack and, in some contexts, rather than play an expansive 
role, civil society must instead focus on combating existential threats – and needs your help to do so.
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This review is a product of the rich and diverse global civil society that CIVICUS exists to serve. In compiling this 
review we have drawn from the  invaluable insights of the members and stakeholders of the CIVICUS alliance, 
which have been shared with us over the last year, and carried out a range of special interviews with civil 
society activists and experts involved in the major issues of the day. We thank them all for their contributions.
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One way that civil society demonstrates the difference it makes is by responding to emergencies and 
humanitarian crises. As explored in depth in the 2011 State of Civil Society Report, civil society is often the 
first responder, being more nimble than governments and intergovernmental bodies, and more trusted by 
communities than other agencies. At the same time, the need to respond to emergency can bring challenges of 
prioritisation and coordination, particularly between local and international CSOs.
Civil society in the frontline: 




These issues were brought to the fore in the world’s biggest 
public health crisis in years, as Ebola struck Guinea, and 
then spread to Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2014, costing over 
11,000 people their lives.1 Ebola was a health problem that 
exposed, and became, a development problem: countries 
with limited resources and strained health services were 
simply unable to deal with an epidemic heaped on top 
of existing challenges. Ebola exposed major failings in 
governance, and demonstrated the value of civil society 
response, along with the challenges it faces when doing so.
As the contribution to our report from Sharon Ekambaram of 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) makes clear, the Ebola crisis 
was largely avoidable. It was something that was allowed 
to happen because of institutional failures and structural 
weaknesses in health systems:
1  ‘The toll of a tragedy’, The Economist, 10 May 2015, http://econ.st/1RaGxqQ.
West Africa
State of Civil Society report 2015: THE YEAR IN REVIEW
12
The inefficient and slow response from the international health and aid system, led by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), which saw a months-long global coalition of inaction, provided ample 
opportunity for the virus to spread wildly, amid a dearth of leadership and the urgent action that was 
required.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) programmes that bankrolled redevelopment placed priority 
on debt and interest payments, rather than social welfare and health spending. These conditionalities 
attached to IMF and World Bank loans forced Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone to cap the number 
of health workers they employed and what they could be paid.
Only in August 2014 did WHO declare the outbreak an international public health crisis, six months after it 
had started and civil society had responded in Guinea. MSF locates Ebola failures within a broader pattern of 
a failing intergovernmental system, noting that the lessons from the last large-scale public health crisis, Haiti’s 
2010 cholera outbreak, were simply not learned. Funding cuts in international health institutions also eroded 
ability to predict and plan for response, suggesting similar challenges for future epidemics.2 This is consistent 
with our analysis in the 2014 State of Civil Society Report, which found that global institutions are insufficiently 
able to address contemporary challenges. Also noteworthy was the limited response of regional institutions, 
such as the African Union (AU), while poor governance at the national level further hindered effective early 
response: the government of Sierra Leone was accused of initially denying the existence of the outbreak and 
withholding information.3 Put simply, if the international system worked more effectively, and if governments 
were more open and democratic, fewer people would have died.
In the face of this inaction, civil society did its best to step up to the challenge. Civil society personnel found 
themselves unable to turn away, voluntarily risking their lives to fight a disease that put first responders at 
strong risk of contagion.
Moriah Yeakula, a member of Citizens Organized for the Promotion of Transparency and Accountability, a 
Liberian CSO, best summarised the need to respond that those in civil society felt:4
2  Global Health Technologies Coalition, ‘Ebola Was the Wake-Up Call for Global Health… Are We in Danger of Hitting the Snooze Button?’, 23 March 2015, 
http://bit.ly/1CVEm37.
3  AIDS Accountability International, ‘African Civil Society Response to Ebola’, http://bit.ly/1Bu96pn; Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Pushed to the Limit and 
Beyond: A year into the largest ever Ebola outbreak, 2015, http://bit.ly/1G6xqny.  
4  Quotation taken from: Kelly Ann Krawczyk, Community and Citizen Engagement: Liberian Civil Society Advances the Battle to End Ebola, http://bit.
ly/1POeS0P.  
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Government is clearly overwhelmed. We cannot sit and wait for the international community. We 
don’t know when they will arrive, and at the end of the day this is our problem… Civil society can 
step in and do what government cannot because… people trust civil society more… Grassroots 
organisations have better insight into the wants and needs of communities.
Civil society’s response was recognised when TIME magazine named ‘the Ebola fighter’ as its 2014 Person of 
the Year, commenting:5
Governments weren’t equipped to respond; the World Health Organisation was in denial and 
snarled in red tape... But the people in the field, the special forces of Doctors Without Borders/
Médecins Sans Frontières, the Christian medical-relief workers of Samaritan’s Purse and many 
others from all over the world fought side by side with local doctors and nurses, ambulance drivers 
and burial teams.
It’s sobering to compare the committed, responsible work of civil society in West Africa with the hysterical 
over-reaction seen in some global northern countries, where a handful of cases provoked an ill-informed 
media frenzy. At the height of the hysteria, parents in the US pulled children out of school because a staff 
member had travelled to Zambia, while in Spain #VamosAMorirTodos (we’re all going to die) trended on 
Twitter after a nurse contracted Ebola.6 This suggests that much development education work still needs to be 
done amongst global north publics.
The problem was that the Ebola outbreak was an overwhelming challenge, far exceeding the capacity of civil 
society alone. If there is an assumption that civil society’s emergency response capacity will pick up the pieces, 
this suggests complacency and expediency, rather than a systemic approach. The rapid response capability 
of organisations such as MSF, International Red Cross/Red Crescent and Samarian’s Purse, while formidable, 
may be taken for granted; a shift in emphasis by other international CSOs, away from humanitarian response 
and into policy and advocacy work, while having strong logic behind it in terms of how lasting change can be 
achieved, has also been noted as a factor.7 
Civil society also faced the obstacle of an initial lack of government willingness to cooperate, fuelled by 
government distrust in civil society. For example, in Liberia, CSOs were not originally included in the national 
5  ‘Person of the Year: The Ebola Fighters’, TIME, 10 December 2014, http://ti.me/1yxi0oC. 
6  ‘The Ebola Hysteria’, The New York Times, 29 October 2014, http://nyti.ms/1tGqG8S; ‘The Quiet End to the U.S. Ebola Panic’, The Atlantic, 11 November 
2014, http://theatln.tc/1Fc6InA; ‘Panic: the dangerous epidemic sweeping an Ebola-fearing US’, The Guardian, http://bit.ly/1FCgh2Y; TIME, 10 December 2014 op. cit.
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Ebola taskforce set up by President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, even though civil society was doing crucial community 
engagement work.8 The need to build trust cost precious time. 
A further challenge was that of accountability over resources: many governments committed resources, but 
there was little transparency over where money went and, as in the case of Gaza, discussed below, there were 
time lags between resource commitments and resource flows, suggesting that the global aid machinery cannot 
work quickly enough.9 There were additionally some difficulties in coordinating between different CSOs, but also 
examples of good practice. For example, in the West Point district of Monrovia, Liberia, local CSO More Than 
Me led the formation of a multi-sector community response group that brought together local and international 
CSOs and medical centres, and worked alongside government health officials. Their outreach was judged so 
successful that the government asked them to expand to other areas.10
The example of More Than Me reminds us that, although much of the initial rapid response to Ebola came from 
international civil society, sparking questions of ownership and sustainability, effective local civil society plays 
a crucial role in successful response. For youth-led development agency Restless Development, the leadership 
of local volunteers who understood their communities was crucial for breakthrough in Sierra Leone, as Jamie 
Bedson relates:
Restless Development responded by drawing on the agency’s decade-long Volunteer Peer Educator 
(VPE) programme, designed to support large-scale social mobilisation activities. The VPE 
programme places young Sierra Leonean volunteers in rural communities, across all districts, for 
eight months every year. With 2,000-plus ex-volunteers providing the primary cohort, Restless 
Development designed a series of trainings and support structures for large-scale social mobilisation. 
Social mobilisation focused on supporting communities to recognise and act on the risks of Ebola 
transmission themselves, in two-way communication, rather than the one-way message-focused 
communication that dominated the initial months of response. 
Some communities were resistant to the work of volunteer social mobilisers and did not trust the 
Ebola response overall; this was especially the case if they had yet to experience Ebola and did not 
consider themselves at risk. Overcoming community resistance was dependent on discussion with 
community leaders, working with communities to make the role of social mobilisers clear and 
following through, with the objective of ensuring programmes were community-led. 
8  Prince Kreplah, Civil society engagement can help win the fight against Ebola, Devex, 9 September 2014, http://bit.ly/1lVz9U1. 
9  TIME, What Ebola Taught the World One Year Later, 24 March 2015, http://ti.me/1Ktk0Rm. 
10  Krawczyk, op. cit. 
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International CSOs 
that were able to re-
spond strongly tended 
to be those that were 
able to use resources 
flexibly, in order to 
act rapidly.
There were also barriers in getting buy-in from leading actors, such as UN agencies, on what 
effective social mobilisation looks like. There was resistance to moving from the more visible signs, 
megaphones and t-shirts approach, focused on health messaging, to deep community engagement. 
Continued advocacy at all levels - national, district and towards individuals and in coordination 
meetings - played a fundamental role in shifting understandings of what constitutes best practice 
social mobilisation. 
International CSOs that were able to respond strongly tended to be those that were able to use resources 
flexibly, in order to act rapidly. Restless Development found that flexible use of resources was critical for 
response:
Restless Development was able to work within existing programming, led by volunteers in rural 
communities, to focus on Ebola social mobilisation. This meant utilising existing donor resources 
through consultation with partners. This also demonstrated early on the applicability of Restless 
Development programming to the wider Ebola response.
At the time of writing, the Ebola outbreak was showing signs of dramatic slowdown. Concern must now shift 
to rebuilding damaged health systems, and strengthening the preparedness of other countries for the next 
outbreak. If the 11,000-plus lives lost are to count for something, the lessons of this crisis need to be learned 
and institutionalised, so that the next time Ebola, or another fast-moving epidemic, spreads across borders, 
response can be better and faster. It should be clear that the provision of a more enabling environment for 
civil society, and stronger working relationships between governments and civil society, are essential pieces of 
learning that must shape future capability for rapid response.
Civil society responding to conflict
As well as the Ebola crisis, civil society has, in the last year, been called on to respond to a range of conflicts, 
including in Syria, Yemen, Ukraine, Gaza, Central African Republic and South Sudan, and in turn has been 
affected by those conflicts. A record number of people, 33.3m, are now displaced by conflict and violence, 
with UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, reporting that 5.5m people were newly displaced in the first half of 2014 
alone.11 The only conclusion that it is possible to draw is that there is an on-going failure of governance at 
international and national levels, which is driving people from their homes. 
11  International Displacement Monitoring Centre, ‘A record 33.3 million displaced by conflict and violence worldwide, with Nigeria in the top 5 countries most 
affected’, 14 May 2014, http://bit.ly/1KqOdAy; UNHCR, ‘War stokes further growth in forced displacement in first half 2014’, 7 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1wOep5Z. 
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A civil society interviewee, who asked to remain anonymous, noted an increasing sophistication in civil 
society’s response to conflicts:12
Civil society has become more adept than ever at responding to conflict. Almost nowhere is it the 
case now that policy makers are unaware of conflict. Civil society has also become much more 
global in its responses. Whereas it was previously heavily focused on Western policy-makers, it’s now 
common for civil society to target South Africa, India or any other country to seek their effective 
response on conflicts around the world. Each country’s foreign policy on conflict is now being more 
heavily scrutinised by CSOs, not just their own domestic human rights response.
12  Interview with an experienced worker in advocacy for people affected by conflict, who asked to remain anonymous. We are indebted to this interviewee’s 
overall inputs in shaping this section on conflicts.
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Syria: the crisis of a generation
One of the most difficult environments for civil society now is Syria, where the civil war that started in 2011, 
when the government violently cracked down on a popular uprising, continues to bring scenes of everyday 
brutality. The rapid advance of Islamic State (ISIL) forces across Syria and Iraq in 2014, to the point where ISIL 
is estimated to control around a third of Syrian territory at the time of writing, has introduced a new note of 
barbarity into an already desperate situation. Some 6.5m people are now internally displaced in Syria, giving 
Syria the world’s largest displaced population:13 this should make clear that Syria, a huge regional and global 
failure, presents the worst crisis of recent times.
The role of non-state actors such as ISIL in conflicts is a trend that has been noted since the late 1990s,14 but 
perhaps one of the new aspects of groupings such as ISIL, and Nigeria’s Boko Haram, is their enthusiastic and 
13  International Displacement Monitoring Centre op. cit.
14  See, for example, Mary Kaldor, New wars and old wars: Organized violence in a global era, 1999 (Cambridge: Polity).
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professional embrace of social media as a bedrock of their method, in which spectacular acts of terrorism 
are performed and broadcast. Actions are designed to play to sensationalist news and social media agendas, 
and even mimic popular internet memes, games and Hollywood films, such that they gain power from public 
revulsion. The grisly execution video has become sadly commonplace.15 Later in this report, we discuss how 
civil society has used social media, in imaginative and creative ways, to encourage change, but it is sobering to 
note that regressive forces can make social media work for them too.
A trend that Syria seems to conform to is that combatants in conflicts are becoming less respectful of 
international human rights and humanitarian laws and norms, with medical staff and aid workers seemingly 
now seen as legitimate targets by some: ISIL has carried out several executions of aid workers and journalists.16 
This is an assault on civil society, and has had the impact of forcing some CSOs to halt or limit operations in 
Syria or Iraq.17
At the same time, it needs to be noted that, beyond the ISIL-dominated headlines, the Syrian crisis remains 
principally one where a state is at war with its people, and where rival states, Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
are backing different sides in a fight for regional superiority. Far more people have died at the hands of 
government forces than any other party: in December 2014 alone, of the 1,851 people estimated as killed in 
Syria, state forces were responsible for around three quarters of these.18 Syria’s government is also misapplying 
anti-terrorism laws to silence human rights defenders (HRDs).19
In these conditions, the very existence of civil society is threatened, at precisely the point where it is most 
needed to defend life and rights. We asked Mansour Omary, of the Syria Center for Media and Freedom of 
Expression, to assess the current state and needs of civil society in Syria:
The situation for civil society in Syria now can be divided into four, depending on the ruling power 
in each area.
Assad forces controlled areas: 30% of Syria
The Assad regime has not allowed free or independent civil society activities or organisations in 
15  DEMOS, The performance of terrorism, http://bit.ly/1FegnKo; ‘Inside the ISIS Social Media Campaign’, Newsweek, 6 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1zXj4gN; 
‘How Isis is spreading its message online’, BBC Monitoring, 19 June 2014, http://bbc.in/1lExJuq.
16  ‘Red Cross workers deliberately targeted in Syria’, DW, 17 September 2013, http://bit.ly/1HNwSEj; ‘Kayla Mueller And The Impossibly Dangerous Job Of 
Providing Aid To Syria’, Think Progress, 12 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1eD8oRC.
17  ‘As risks multiply, NGOs reassess security in Middle East’, Reuters, 24 September 2014, http://reut.rs/1J3NurG. 
18  ‘In Syria’s Civilian Death Toll, The Islamic State Group, Or ISIS, Is A Far Smaller Threat Than Bashar Assad’, International Business Times, 7 January 2015, 
http://bit.ly/1d0QTtr; ‘Brutal Acts By ISIS Eclipse Reports Of Violence By Syria’s Assad Regime, NPR, 10 March 2015, http://n.pr/1LLx1Xc. 
19  CIVICUS, ‘Syria: Free Prominent Rights Defenders’, 5 September 2014, http://bit.ly/1AzxP09. 
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decades, and has interfered in every activity, no matter how small. There is a total absence of 
basic rights, including freedom of expression, opinion and media, and no one is allowed to express 
concerns or criticisms about the regime. Even organisations such as the union of students or union 
of journalists are under the control of the regime. The Assad regime is fighting with a hand of 
iron every attempt to conduct free or independent activity, unless it is monitored by and with the 
participation of the government. There is no sense of national belonging, and in place of this there 
is obligatory allegiance to the governing regime, and also some sectarian belonging, which is not 
helping people to believe in their society or homeland.
ISIL controlled areas: 30%
Simply, ISIL has ended every aspect of civil society independent action by blocking freedom of 
media, finance and association, and restricting any activity to its governing establishments.
Kurdish-controlled areas: 10%
Kurdish-controlled areas are relatively free of the war zone, although Kurdish forces are fighting 
ISIL in adjacent areas. In Kurdish-controlled areas there is more safety and there are more chances 
for civil society activities and action. In these areas civil society is developing and is very active. 
There are many organisations, and civil society activities are directed towards all parts of society, 
including children, women and older people, and including all ethnic groups. Kurdish ruling 
powers are allowing freedom of civil activities and associations, and have opened the doors widely 
for international funds and support for civil society promotion. Some organisations are trying to 
become independent from funders, but others depend totally on international funding and support. 
Although civil society is prospering in these areas, it’s still at the beginning, and needs to gain more 
experience and have more freedom in some fields: the Kurdish ruling powers restrict some activities 
relating to criticism of some of its actions. For example, the ruling powers are recruiting children to 
fight, and no activities are allowed that raise awareness of this human rights violation.
Areas controlled by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and local councils of the opposition: 30%
Opposition-controlled territories offer open areas for civil society activities and association, and 
civil society is playing a fundamental role in substituting for a functional government: civil society 
groups and organisations are doing the jobs and providing the services that would normally be 
done by the government, as there are no strong or agreed upon governing bodies. Those who 
are governing those areas are not interfering with civil society, being more engaged in war than 
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organising society, except for a few  incidents of interfering in some cases, but interference is not 
systematic or vast. Much of civil society activities in the opposition-controlled and Kurdish areas are 
directed at mitigating the impact of war and Syria’s catastrophic situation, including promoting the 
care of children and seeking to alleviate the impact of war on them.
We also asked Mansour what needs to be done to support Syrian civil society:
It is obvious that the first need of Syrian civil society, if it is to prosper, is the ending of the war 
and adoption of a democratic government, but civil society’s immediate need is to have more 
international interest and organised support. There is total neglect in its coverage of civil society in 
Syria. The media publishes news of war, military actions and other horrible events in Syria, and 
is not shedding light on civil society activities in Syria. Foreign support is also needed for training, 
organising, and establishing a stronger base for civil society. 
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Yemen: a growing crisis
At the time of writing, a further humanitarian crisis is unfolding in Yemen, where conflict has built since the 
2011 people’s uprising. In January 2015 President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi was forced into exile in Saudi 
Arabia; at the time of writing, the capital Sana’a is occupied by insurgent Houthi forces and battle rages for 
control of the city of Aden. In a three-sided conflict, Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsular also hold significant 
territory. While a nascent Yemeni social media campaign demands #KefayaWar (enough war), a particular 
challenge is that this conflict comes in a country with a weakened civil society, and where the population is 
already very poor, with huge development challenges.20 The UN has warned of an approaching humanitarian 
crisis and is trying to promote a negotiated political solution, but Oxfam has described Yemen as a ‘forgotten 
crisis’, where two-thirds of the population will need help, and spiralling food and fuel prices suggest looming 
food and drinking water crises.21
As the conflict worsened, aid agencies were forced to scale back their work. Many aid workers left, while 
insecurity, port blockades and the reluctance of transport companies to help bring in supplies, make it hard 
for those remaining in Yemen to reach communities that need help.22 Illustrative of the dangers faced by 
20  ‘Yemen’s home grown anti-war movement’, BBC Trending, 13 April 2015, http://bbc.in/1IX3bgB; ‘Four reasons the crisis in Yemen is so dire’, IRIN, 10 April 
2015, http://bit.ly/1DqUTO2. 
21  ‘Civilians in Yemen ‘wilfully abandoned to misery,’ says Ban, urging immediate political solution to crisis’, UN News Centre, 9 April 2015, http://bit.
ly/1EEaLbI; Oxfam, ‘Yemen is on the brink of humanitarian disaster with millions of lives at risk’, 23 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1dz4AAT; Oxfam, ‘Prices rocket as Oxfam 
warns of a major food and fuel crisis in Yemen: Oxfam gives cash to 4,000 families affected by the war’, 8 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1yk8uGy.
22  ‘Fighting in Yemen is creating a humanitarian crisis’, The Washington Post, 6 April 2015, http://wapo.st/1CYGIyg; ‘Yemen’s humanitarian crisis worsens as 
aid delayed’, Al Jazeera, 7 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1ac2kx1; ‘Yemen slides deeper into humanitarian crisis amid Saudi-led airstrikes’, LA Times, 8 April 2015, http://lat.
ms/1FhUpan.
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humanitarian workers in Yemen was the killing, in an attempted rescue mission, of kidnapped South African 
teacher, Pierre Korkie, and American photographer, Luke Somers, in December 2014.23 
As in Syria, conflict in Yemen is driven by the regional power battle between the Iranian and Saudi Arabian 
governments, which back the Houthis and the Yemeni government respectively; they are using Yemen as a 
proxy battleground to fight a battle for regional supremacy, demonstrating frequent and unpunished breaches 
of international human rights laws. This suggests that the international community, and allies of the states 
involved, need to pressure the leaders of Iran and Saudi Arabia to resolve the crisis responsibly, and push 
combatants to commit to ensuring the safety of aid workers who are playing an essential humanitarian role. 
Further, the many wealthy states that surround Yemen need to step up to commit increased aid to their 
beleaguered neighbour. Governments in the region, and the international community, need to show the world 
that another Syria is not inevitable, and demonstrate that they take international law seriously.
Ukraine and Russia: civil society 
caught in the middle
The 2014 State of Civil Society Report documented the self-organising Euromaidan protests, which resulted in 
the ousting of President Victor Yanukovych in February 2014, followed by Russia’s annexation of the Crimea in 
March 2014. Since then, conflict between Russia and Ukraine, around the question of whether Ukraine pivots 
east or west, has become entrenched, particularly in eastern Ukraine, where Russian forces and pro-Russian 
rebels are concentrated.24
The shooting down in July 2014 of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine, with the loss of all on 
board, brought to renewed global attention the deadly reality of the conflict. The difficulties investigators faced 
in accessing the site to identify and recover the dead, and continuing attempts by the Russian government 
to blame Ukrainian forces, demonstrate how polarised and contested the situation is. After a year of conflict, 
eastern Ukraine now presents a humanitarian crisis. By April 2015 it was estimated that 6,000 people had been 
killed and a million people displaced, with many more facing shelter, food and healthcare emergencies.25 A 
ceasefire that was agreed in March 2015 remains fragile, and at the time of writing there are fears of further 
23  ‘Obama sends condolences to family of murdered Korkie’, Mail & Guardian, 6 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1LLxb0O.
24  ‘Russo-Ukrainian War Now a Reality’, Huffington Post, 29 August 2014, http://huff.to/1AzAgQv. 
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escalation.26 The scale of the humanitarian crisis threatens to overwhelm the best attempts of local and 
international civil society to respond, as noted by Vanoo Noupech of UNHRC:
The response by civil society has been extraordinarily good for the last year, but there is also already 
a certain fatigue, especially because of the general economic situation, so that is quite worrying.
Loïc Jaeger of MSF highlighted the overwhelming and unexpected nature of the crisis:27
…whatever humanitarian organisations might do here, it will remain a drop in the ocean. It’s 
not a refugee camp of 30,000 people that we can handle as humanitarian organisations. We are 
talking about three million people… The main aid providers so far have been local organisations, 
which are doing a great job, but they don’t have the capacity to scale up to big volumes. They used 
to collect clothes for the people of Africa before the war, and they now collect food and clothes for 
displaced people in their area… We are not talking about people who have been living in a conflict 
environment for 20 years.
In this contested context, key freedoms, including the freedom of expression, are under challenge from both 
sides, as pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian forces fight a propaganda war.28 In eastern Ukraine, news outlets and 
journalists have faced a series of attacks, pro-Russian forces have detained Ukrainian journalists, and media 
workers have been killed in the crossfire of conflict. Ukrainian authorities have in turn detained Russian 
journalists and barred them from entry.29 There are targeted attacks on and censorship of ethnic minorities 
in Russian-occupied Crimea, where Russia has extended its domestic policy of repressing civil society and the 
media.30
At the same time, the crisis has created opportunities for civil society to demonstrate its ability to respond: 
partly because the government realised it needed to access the legitimacy enjoyed by civil society in the wake 
of Euromaidan, and partly in recognition of its own limited capacity, the temporary cabinet that governed 
Ukraine from February to October 2014 delegated a role to civil society groups in crucial areas, such as 
organising self-defence, policing and developing election monitoring capacity; some 750,000 Ukrainian citizens 
26  ‘Russia Expected to Escalate War in Ukraine Soon’, World Affairs, 2 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1bTlitl. 
27  Both quotations taken from: ‘Fragile truce brings limited respite to war-weary people of eastern Ukraine’, The Guardian, 25 March 2015, http://bit.
ly/1BIWHh7.
28  ‘Ukraine’s media war: Battle of the memes’, The Economist, 12 March 2015, http://econ.st/1L2U1Va. 
29  Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘Ukraine: Press in Ukraine face attacks and raids’, http://bit.ly/1QfknjU. 
30  Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Rights in Retreat’, 17 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1SGDRSI; ‘In Crimea, it’s a crime to talk about returning to Ukraine rule’, 
Kyiv Post, 5 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1G1IH9C.   
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were estimated to be active in volunteering in late 2014 (although there can also be a troubling aspect of this, 
with the formation of volunteer militia units, some of which have alleged connections to extremism.)31
To some extent, this cooperation has challenged the anti-civil society views customarily held by Ukraine’s 
political and economic elites.32 In more recent times, however, the relationship between government and civil 
society has somewhat soured, as it has become harder to assert the freedoms the Euromaidan movement 
demanded in a context where a government sees itself as fighting a war: in October 2014, for example, 
representatives of the new Cabinet rejected an invitation by civil society groups to discuss human rights abuses 
in Ukraine.33
Despite this, CSOs continue to try to establish democratic reform dialogue with the government, and a 
delegation of Ukrainian human rights activists took their struggle to the UN General Assembly in October 
2014.34 The self-organising spirit of the Euromaidan movement has also continued, for example in May 2014, 
when Euromaidan SOS, a volunteer-led initiative, was formed to try to track down the many people who went 
missing in protests.35
In Russia too, people still mobilise against the actions of their government: in September 2014, over 20,000 
people marched in Moscow to protest against Russia’s involvement in eastern Ukraine, and tens of thousands 
marched in March 2015, some carrying Ukrainian flags, following the assassination of opposition activist 
Boris Nemtsov, who opposed the conflict with Ukraine and sought to expose the extent of Russia’s military 
involvement.36
However, many in Ukraine still feel that the potential of Euromaidan is yet to be realised. As one participant, 
Halyna Trofanyuk, put it:
31  Mykhailo Minakov, Changing Civil Society After Maidan: Report at the Danyliw Seminar, Ottawa, October 30, 2014, http://bit.ly/1GFGqzx; ‘Ukraine Doesn’t 
Have a Warlord Problem’, Foreign Policy, 26 March 2015, http://atfp.co/1E3n4xX. 
32  Mykhailo Minakov op. cit. 
33  Association of Ukrainian Human Rights Monitors on Law Enforcement (Association UMPDL), ‘News bulletin’, October-December 2014, http://bit.
ly/1RpOnMB.  
34  Association UMPDL, ‘Human Rights Day – the sad results’, 10 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1EEb5Ya; Association UMPDL, ‘Member of the Association 
UMPDL became a delegate from Ukraine to the UN General Assembly in New York’, 26 October 2014, http://bit.ly/1d0WWy6. 
35  ‘In Kyiv, Anguish and Uncertainty Over Maidan’s Missing’, Radio Free Europe, 19 March 2014, http://bit.ly/1SDBf86; Euromaidan SOS, 
http://bit.ly/1FkgKEl. 
36  UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, 2014: The Year in Assembly and Association Rights, January 
2015; http://bit.ly/1LLxp87;  ‘Boris Nemtsov murder: Tens of thousands march in Moscow’, BBC, 1 March 2015, http://bbc.in/1K3dNPZ; Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, ‘Eastern Europe’s Civil Society After Nemtsov’s Murder’, 2 March 2015, http://ceip.org/1HNCZ8I. 
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There could be another Maidan if the politicians don’t understand the chaos they are creating… 
People are getting ready for the worst, and they have become disillusioned even with the Maidan.
Against this, it may be the case that, as discussed in previous State of Civil Society Reports in relation to the 
great civic mobilisations of this decade, part of Euromaidan’s impact will ultimately be in the way it developed 
people’s activism skills and confidence, as Nazariy Boyarskyy, a human rights activist, suggests:37
You can see it in the eyes of the volunteers who come in to help, beginning with the talented lawyers 
who work for us for free to help detainees and going all the way to the wonderful woman who 
comes to us to make us lunch… You can feel from these examples that people are ready not just to 
sympathise, but to pitch in. And that is the most vivid impression of the last year for me.
In contrast to that activist spirit, Russia’s continuing unilateral occupation of the Crimea, in the face of an 
international outcry, and the entrenched conflict in eastern Ukraine, demonstrate again the impotence of the 
current international system. Not least it shows the inability of EU countries to intervene decisively, and perhaps 
its unwillingness to pay the economic price of detaching Ukraine from Russia, given the rise of anti-European 
politics in many EU countries, as discussed further below. In the face of this, civil society will remain crucial in 
voluntarily responding to crisis and pressuring the two governments for an outcome in which human rights are 
respected. Civil society needs more support to be able to play these roles.
37  Both quotations taken from: ‘Ukraine’s Maidan protests – one year on’, The Guardian, 21 November 2014, http://bit.ly/11rs1Fo. 
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Gaza: international challenges, local 
response
In July 2014, the state of Israel launched a new offensive against the people of Gaza. In seven weeks of fighting, 
over 2,100 Gaza citizens were killed, mostly civilians, and 70 Israelis, mostly soldiers, while around a third of 
Gaza’s population was displaced.38Although the Israeli offensive has paused, it leaves huge challenges. First of 
all, it demonstrates the inability of the international community to resolve the crisis and hold the protagonists 
to account for the possible commission of war crimes. The intergovernmental response has been stymied by 
continuing deadlock at the UN Security Council (UNSC), while the UN Human Rights Council’s (UNHRC) enquiry 
into the Gaza war has run into difficulties: in February 2015 William Schabas, head of the enquiry, had to 
resign after receiving personal attacks for previous work involving Palestine, and Israel’s government denied 
the enquiry access to Israel and the West Bank.39 These demonstrate the difficulty of making multilateral 
38  Humanitarian Response: ‘Gaza Strip: Humanitarian Dashboard’, November 2014, http://bit.ly/1JWqMB0.
39  CIVICUS, ‘Gaza represents a failure of global governance: international community must insist on accountability for war crimes’, 3 September 2014, http://
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headway in an environment where a state acts with impunity, and raises the fear that there will not be proper 
accountability for crimes committed during this latest aggression.
Reconstruction is made more difficult by the longstanding Israeli economic blockade, which also caused 
major problems with the import of essential humanitarian supplies during the bombardment.40 Further, the 
official intergovernmental response reveals an all too common contrast between the making of high profile 
commitments and the painfully slow flow of real resources: while in October 2014 over US$5bn was committed 
to the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism at a headline-grabbing intergovernmental conference in Cairo, Egypt, 
as of February 2015, only 5% of the promised funds had been delivered which, if sustained, would mean that 
reconstruction would take decades.41 A lack of transparency about the detail of commitments makes it hard 
to exercise accountability over those commitments, but there is suspicion that at least some pledges were 
repackagings of existing commitments. There is a repeat pattern, in the wake of emergencies, of high level 
intergovernmental pledging events failing to result in delivery of resources.
During the offensive, both international and local civil society was crucial in responding to the devastation. 
We asked Najla Shawa, an aid worker in Gaza, to describe the impact of the bombardment, and civil society’s 
response:
Hearing everyday about neighbours, relatives or friends being injured or even killed made me feel 
that this time was like none before. I work for an international charity, so I worked every day from 
home, helping collect information about those displaced. I was in touch with non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and many ad hoc community initiatives, where people did so much work 
while not holding any kind of position or being part of any organisation. New small networks 
started to form. A relative, a friend, a building guard, many, have worked without recognition: 
giving people water, distributing food, getting in touch with aid organisations. It was amazing, day 
and night. People, ordinary people, were very active. Hundreds of displaced people were hosted by 
families for many days. There was a lot of quick civil society action. There were also many small 
Islamic NGOs that worked silently, without working much through government institutions. Local 
NGOs were supported by bigger international NGOs, and were spread across affected areas. The 
government was very weak, and depended on aid agencies.
bit.ly/1nyl36d; ‘Former Head of Inquiry Into Gaza War Says He Faced Pressure and Threats’, The  New York Times, 11 February 2015, http://nyti.ms/1FPFnMO. 
40   ICCO, ‘Humanitarian aid in Gaza is impossible’, 2014, http://bit.ly/1eyMaA8; Oxfam, ‘Gaza Update: Three months on, vital reconstruction has barely begun 
as winter arrives’, http://bit.ly/13eOBl7. 
41  ‘Only five percent of pledged aid reaches Gaza’, IRIN, 16 February 2015, http://bit.ly/17LGwI7; Oxfam, December 2014 op. cit.
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When asked about what support international civil society can give to local civil society and communities, Najla 
adds: 
Now, it should be clear that the support needed is mainly political. The Israeli blockade is the 
problem. The economy is dead. More support for strong civil society that should stand up against the 
harmful policies, and agreements such as the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism, are a top priority. 
Psychological support to affected children is also a big need.
Civil war and civil society in Central 
Africa
The past year has seen sustained conflict in both the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan. Conflict 
forced almost a million people to flee their homes in CAR and displaced 1.5m in South Sudan.42 Civil society 
has proved a vocal advocate for peace, demanding more inclusive political dialogue and mobilising community-
led efforts to respond to crisis. Civil society’s efforts remind us that lasting peace is only possible with the 
participation of civil society: stability requires inclusivity, which means that peace-building cannot be left only to 
political or military parties.43
42  Data from UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Central African Republic, http://www.unocha.org/car and South Sudan, http://
www.unocha.org/south-sudan.
43  David Kode, Conflict Resolution in the Central African Republic: What Role for Civil Society, 2014, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of 
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Sectarian violence erupted in CAR in December 2012, after a loose coalition of Islamic rebel forces, known 
collectively as Seleka, accused the predominantly Christian government of contravening peace agreements. 
After staging a coup in March 2013, aided by mercenary forces from Chad and Sudan, Seleka rebels sought 
revenge for decades of marginalisation. The result was a continuous cycle of reprisal violence between Seleka 
forces and the Christian militia, known as anti-balaka.44 A new Head of State of Transition, Catherine Samba-
Panza, was appointed in January 2014, but this did little to contain the chaos. In 2015 alone, after an upsurge of 
violence, tens of thousands of civilians were forced to flee to escape the militia on both sides.45
In this difficult situation, civil society groups and religious networks are working together to rebuild trust 
amongst communities, and laying the groundwork for reconciliation from the grassroots. 
In 2014, after churches sheltered thousands of Muslims from revenge attacks,46 an inter-faith forum was 
formed, comprising the head of the CAR’s Islamic community, Imam Omar Kobine Layama, and leader of 
the Evangelic Alliance, Nicolas Grekoyame Gbangou. The forum has organised regular prayer meetings and 
gatherings to discuss peace and reconciliation, and the organisers have appealed for funds to create inter-faith 
schools, hospitals and a national radio station to preach peace, in an effort to bring divided communities back 
together. In June, the forum launched an inter-religious campaign for social cohesion. The campaign has held 
debates, sporting and cultural events, and organised visits to internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and 
reconciliation training for 400 religious leaders.47
Sport has played a huge role in civil society’s outreach. In December 2014, residents of the Muslim district of 
PK5, where a series of sectarian attacks had been carried out, played a football match with the predominantly 
Christian neighbourhood of Fatima. In the same month, a reconciliation camp, dubbed ‘It’s Enough’, culminated 
in former Seleka fighters facing off against an anti-balaka squad, in the capital Bangui’s Municipal Stadium. In a 
bid to support the government’s efforts to achieve national reconciliation and restore peace, the Bangui Peace 
Marathon, organised by CSO Point d’Appui and the CAR Athletics Federation, included young people from both 
sides, alongside government officials, politicians and athletes.48
Civil society in CAR has also been vocal on the international stage, urging intervention from regional and 
multilateral actors, and highlighting human rights abuses by both sides. Meanwhile, international CSOs were 
44  ‘Crisis in the Central African Republic, Parallax World, 20 March 2014, http://bit.ly/1JYZBFI.
45  ‘Central African Republic profile – Timeline’, BBC, 22 May 2015, http://bbc.in/1t9Xl3u.
46  ‘War-torn churches shelter Muslims in Central African Republic’, The Washington Post, 20 February 2014, http://wapo.st/1edT99G. 
47  ‘Central African Republic clerics lobby for peace’, IRIN, 31 January 2014, http://bit.ly/1J8gYEQ; ‘Striving for peace in CAR’, IRIN, 7 January 2015, http://bit.
ly/1wTTwzq.
48  ‘CAR holds semi-marathon Sunday in Bangui to foster peace’, StarAfrica, 8 December 2014, http://oran.ge/1GFMd8r. 
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active in alerting policy-makers, at early stages, to atrocities, helping to convince France and then the UN to 
commit peacekeeping troops, resulting in a decline in casualties.49
In neighbouring South Sudan, which won independence from Sudan in 2011, violence broke out in the capital 
Juba in December 2013 and has since spread nationwide, reflecting deep fissures within the ruling party, the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Competition for power amongst the ruling elite exacerbated long-
standing tensions between the two largest ethnic groups, the Dinka and Nuer. Following a series of political 
manoeuvres instigated by Salva Kiir, the country’s Dinka President, to exclude the Nuer Vice President, Riak 
Machar, from power, Dinka and Nuer soldiers within the armed forces collided. Both leaders were quick to 
manipulate ethnic tensions for political gain, leading to widespread ethnically targeted killings. After more than 
a year of peace negotiations between the government and rebel factions, mediated by regional parties, at the 
time of writing a deal appears no closer, and an escalation of fighting is feared.50 
Shortly after the start of the crisis, civil society came together on the Citizens for Peace and Justice platform. 
The forum has actively sought representation for civil society in the peace negotiations, successfully lobbying 
the South Sudanese presidency and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional 
body mediating the negotiations, to acknowledge that civil society needs to be included.51 
Though their role in the peace discussions taking place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, has been limited and in some 
instances controversial, with the opposition rejecting the IGAD civil society nomination process after they failed 
to secure a seat for CSOs from opposition-held areas, civil society has continued to demonstrate its solidarity 
with the peace efforts. 52 Lobbying efforts have persuaded negotiators to incorporate the need for a national 
reconciliation commission, including CSO representation, into the peace agenda. 
However, after almost 18 months, faith in the ability of IGAD talks to find a solution to the crisis is fading. As an 
alternative, citizens and community leaders are turning to local, community-led attempts to build peace from 
the ground. Emeritus Bishop Paride Taban leads the Kuron Peace Village peace-building project, which was 
conceived as a model community bringing together people of different ethnicities and backgrounds. Through 
the Peace Village, different pastoralist groups, who share a long history of enmity have been encouraged to find 
means of peaceful co-existence.53 Despite the continuing conflict in the rest of South Sudan, Eastern Equatoria 
49  International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Civil Society and UN Officials Urge Security Council to Authorize a United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operation in Central African Republic’, March 2014, http://bit.ly/1BqzmRj; Interview with an experienced worker in advocacy for people affected by conflicts.
50  ‘South Sudan: Failure to Launch?’, Parallax World, 9 January 2014, http://bit.ly/1GJuoFv.
51  ‘S. Sudan civil societies push for inclusion in peace talks’, Sudan Tribune, 16 March 2014, http://bit.ly/1fCXqEv; ‘ Government Welcomes Civil Society 
Participation In Peace Talks’, Gurtong, 21 February 2014, http://bit.ly/1LLfUV4; Citizens for Peace and Justice Facebook page, http://on.fb.me/1SGEmfs.
52  ‘S. Sudan stakeholders nominate representatives for peace talks’, Sudan Tribune, 9 June 2014, http://bit.ly/1AzHJ1Q.  
53  Kuron Village information, available at http://www.kuronvillage.net, http://bit.ly/1G7kIFV.
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state has remained notably stable, which can in no small part be attributed to the efforts of Bishop Paride and 
the Peace Village. 
There are also national efforts at community-led reconciliation. Frustrated at the lack of progress in 
negotiations, a National Peace Conference of South Sudan Tribes convened in February 2015 on the theme 
‘Peace Now! South Sudan Tribes Unite Against War’. Participants were drawn from each of South Sudan’s 
65 ethnic groups, and included religious and community leaders, traditional chiefs and government officials. 
Among the resolutions signed by the participants was a call for international sanctions against parties or 
individuals who refuse to sign or respect a negotiated peace deal.54 
The examples of CAR and South Sudan are showing that civil society actors can play a critical role in inter-
community peace processes. This is particularly true in instances where internationally led political initiatives 
are failing to address local needs and interests. Grassroots projects can help build bridges between opposing 
communities and close gaps between local, national and international bodies, but in order to achieve these 
aims a diversity of civil society initiatives must be recognised as a necessary component of sustainable peace, 
and adequately supported.
Civil society responding to and 
preventing disaster
During the time this report was being prepared, Vanuatu’s infrastructure was devastated by Cyclone Pam in 
March 2015, and over 8,000 lost their lives after a powerful earthquake struck Nepal in April 2015.
Civil society was quick to act: over 100 CSOs were reported as responding in Vanuatu, and over 200 
international CSOs were said to be delivering emergency aid in Nepal.55 But debate quickly moved to questions 
of the coordination of civil society, and international CSOs’ lack of contextual understanding; Vanuatu’s 
government criticised CSOs for lack of coordination, with each other and the government, and accused CSOs of 
being overly concerned with visibility, while issues of international CSOs not understanding local context were 
raised in both Nepal and Vanuatu.56 Nepali CSOs called for an inclusive response, in which the government’s 
54  ‘S. Sudan tribes declare support for federalism, call for end to conflict’, Sudan Tribune, 22 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1AChCYe; ‘South Sudan’s 64 tribes 
propose rotational presidency’, The New Nation, 3 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1FPGBrm. 
55  ‘Cyclone Pam: disaster response teams travelling to Vanuatu as dozens feared dead’, The Guardian, 15 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1HxMHcC; ‘Tropical 
cyclone Pam: Australia sends humanitarian aid to Vanuatu’, The Guardian, 15 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1PPwn0B; ‘The Predictable Disaster in Nepal’, Huffington Post, 
6 May 2015, http://huff.to/1J84ETi.  
56  ‘Red Cross responds to criticism from Vanuatu government over NGO response to Cyclone Pam’, ABC News Radio, 20 March 2015, http://ab.co/1JWu7jq; 
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responses did not limit human rights, while the government was also accused of blocking the flow of aid, 
consistent with a pattern in which disasters expose governance and accountability deficits.57
These questions are ones commonly raised in the aftermath of humanitarian response; international civil 
society undoubtedly has an important role to play in Nepal and Vanuatu, but needs to be able to address these 
criticisms and demonstrate that they are building local civil society capacity, using resources responsibly and 
helping to improve on the governance and accountability issues that disasters reveal.
In Serbia, which experienced severe floods in May 2014, domestic civil society’s response was seen in a 
generally positive light. Floods led to 51 deaths and around 32,000 evacuations, in an event described by 
Serbia’s Prime Minister as their “worst natural disaster in history.”58 Serbian civil society network, Civic 
Initiatives, in their input to this report, describe the domestic civil society response:
Civil society showed its potential, including in volunteering resources, and its capacity for fast and 
efficient response, strategic thinking in the field and partnership with the state. In some cases, local 
authorities delegated part of their operations to local CSOs, due to their own inability for efficient 
delivery and their lack of coordination with national authorities. CSO activities were particularly 
significant for the most vulnerable groups, such as Roma people, children and mothers with small 
children, and people with disabilities. More than 200 local and national CSOs were engaged 
in activities of support in flooded areas. CSO flood responses can be divided into three main 
areas: urgent efforts to help citizens; coordination, including support to the work of local CSOs, 
and participation by Serbian civil society in international humanitarian meetings; and helping 
institutions to help, by advocating for changes on national and international levels.
The Serbian experience corresponds to a pattern noted in the 2011 State of Civil Society Report, in which 
effective civil society response to emergency helps lead to the opening of more opportunities for civil society: 
Civic Initiatives has noted new opportunities for CSOs to have a consultative voice in the time since the floods.
In the Philippines, meanwhile, civil society is starting to realise its responsibility to help reduce vulnerability to 
natural disasters, as our contribution from CODE-NGO indicates:
‘Agencies ‘holding up’ Vanuatu response, Otago Daily Times, http://bit.ly/1EzkkZz; ‘Cyclone Pam: Vanuatu slams aid agencies’, stuff.co.nz, 19 March 2015, http://bit.
ly/1Go2prL; Development Policy Centre, ‘After the storm, the deluge’, 24 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1FEI0jj; Huffington Post, 6 May 2015 op. cit.
57  The International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism, ‘Nepali civil society organizations demand the Government for inclusive 
disaster responses’, 4 May 2015, http://bit.ly/1FccPZi; ‘Nepal government criticised for blocking earthquake aid to remote areas’, The Guardian, 2 May 2015, http://bit.
ly/1J45wtU.  
58  Reliefweb, ‘Balkans: Floods – May 2014’, http://bit.ly/1lyw3yO; ‘Prime minister calls Serbia floods ‘worst natural disaster’ in country’s history’, Euronews, 16 
May 2014, http://ab.co/1JWu7jq. 
The Serbian expe-
rience corresponds 
to a pattern noted 
in the 2011 State of 
Civil Society Report, 
in which effective 
civil society response 
to emergency helps 
lead to the opening of 
more opportunities 
for civil society.
State of Civil Society report 2015: THE YEAR IN REVIEW
33
A major challenge faced by CSOs in the Philippines has to do with the impact of climate change 
and natural disasters, which increasingly present socio-economic and environmental risks to the 
Philippines. The World Disaster Report 2013 ranked the Philippines as the third highest risk country 
in terms of exposure to natural calamities, next only to Tonga and Vanuatu. Typhoons hitting the 
country in the past 10 years have become more frequent and drastic, bringing damage that we 
have never seen before.  Since the impacts of these events adversely undermine any development 
intervention being implemented in the areas affected by the calamities, it has become a necessity for 
development CSOs in the country to mainstream disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) 
and climate change adaptation (CCA) in our interventions.  It is also important that we reinforce 
our advocacy towards influencing our government at national and local levels to fully implement our 
DRRM Law and ensure citizen participation in our local government units’ crafting of local DRRM 
plans and budgets.  
Conclusion: civil society and 
emergency response
The above has offered just a few examples of the ways in which civil society, from local to international levels, 
is often the first responder in situations of emergency, including public health emergencies, natural disasters 
and human induced humanitarian crises, including those caused by conflict. International civil society can be 
effective in rapidly mobilising flexible resources, including from public donations, while local civil society often 
has crucial trust and understanding of context. When they work together they can be particularly effective. 
In comparison, governmental bodies are often unable to offer a similarly strong response. This may be 
because governments are implicated in conflicts, or poor governance has exacerbated the emergency, while 
intergovernmental agencies are stymied by bureaucracy and deadlocked international politics that play out at 
the multilateral level. However, sometimes, despite its best efforts, civil society is overwhelmed by the scale of 
the crisis too. This is when closer collaboration between all parties is most needed.
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Five key points for future action:
•	 Civil society response to emergency works best when it builds upon existing and deep track records of 
engagement with local communities.
•	 A history of disenabling conditions for civil society is a huge barrier against effective civil society 
response to crisis; long term work needs to be done to improve the conditions for civil society, including 
in the follow-up to emergencies, to develop future emergency response capacities.
•	 Civil society often finds itself caught between different parties in conflict, and more must be done to 
assert and adhere to a norm that all sides in a conflict should respect civil society’s political neutrality 
and independence, and uphold their right to deliver essential humanitarian services and report on 
human rights violations, where they encounter them.
•	 Issues of coordination and cooperation, including between local and international CSOs, are inevitable; 
relations need to be built on mutual respect, while mechanisms need to be put in place to anticipate and 
resolve any conflicts that may arise.
•	 Flexibility in the use of resources is crucial and so needs to be built in, but at the same time, issues of 
transparency and accountability in the use of resources, which are likely to arise, need to be anticipated.
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As CIVICUS has consistently maintained, civil society is much more than a collection of organisations. Civil 
society mobilisation happens whenever people come together to seek change and call decision-makers to 
account, whether on the streets or online. In the past few State of Civil Society Reports, we have observed 
that people are rejecting models of governance that they see as failed, and the established forms of political 
participation that they see as irrelevant to their lives. The patterns of protest that erupted in 2011, when people 
demanded that broken models of governance and politics change in many Middle East and North African 
(MENA) countries, and in Europe and the US, have persisted, and spread to different contexts.
In some countries, such as Greece and Spain, the momentum of anti-austerity protests has translated into new 
forms of electoral politics that have challenged established parties: Syriza in Greece capitalised on a support 
base galvanised by the protests since 2011 to win control of government in 2015, and in Spain the anti-austerity 
Podemos (‘we can’) party, which explicitly takes inspiration from 2011’s Indignados movement, made gains in 
the May 2015 municipal elections, including taking the mayoralty of Barcelona.59
Meanwhile, fresh protests have come in Brazil, where we reported how people took to the streets in 2013 
and 2014 in the 2014 State of Civil Society Report. In March 2015, hundreds of thousands of people marched 
in cities all over the country, against President Dilma Rouseff, following a corruption scandal at Petrobas, the 
state-owned oil company.60 Those who marched in Brazil were, however, very different to those who did so 
in previous years: this was an older, wealthier crowd, and some expressed support for reactionary politics 
and the return of military rule, causing some pro-government supporters to dismiss the marches as a coup 
attempt, although President Dilma recognised people’s right to protest.61 But what this did have in common 
59  ‘Spanish politics: Restless and resentful’, The Economist, 3 January 2015, http://econ.st/1HNWwIU; ‘Spain’s ‘Yes we can’’, DW, 8 April 2015, http://bit.
ly/1Ayukrj; ‘Left Coalition Wins Barcelona, Spain’s Main Parties Lose Ground’, Telesur, 24 May 2015, http://bit.ly/1SDI75x. 
60  ‘Big protests in Brazil demand President Rousseff’s impeachment’, BBC, 16 March 2015, http://bbc.in/1CkmTnD. 
61  ‘Brazil’s Right Wing’s Undermining of Democracy’, Telesur, 14 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1BIxS74; ‘Update: Brazil’s Right Wing March for Impeachment of 
President’, Telesur 15 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1ckI3pO; ‘Damage control: Brazil’s government reacts to protests’, BBC, 16 March 2015, http://bbc.in/1Feh1rw.
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with previous protests is that it too suggested a withdrawal from conventional politics and a loss of trust in 
established politicians, creating a legitimacy crisis for political elites.
One thing we might conclude from the past few years is that it is hard to predict where mass mobilisations 
might break out next. A year ago, Burkina Faso and Hong Kong did not stand out as potential protest hotspots. 
What does seem to be holding true, however, is the pattern of how protests spread, as characterised in the 
2014 State of Civil Society Report: protests tend to mushroom from an initial focus on small, local issues 
into addressing larger, national level issues, often connected with frustration about lack of voice and visible 
corruption; they generally involve young, often well-educated people; they are usually marked by a high degree 
of self-organisation and a lack of hierarchical structure, with heavy use of social media; they tend to look to 
previous protests as sources of inspiration; and they often flare up more intensely when initial protest is met 
with heavy handed security force response.
Hong Kong: “Pain is temporary. 
We are fighting for a permanent 
democracy”62
Many of the above characteristics could be seen in Hong Kong in 2014, even though, partly in response to 
accusations of being foreign led, protest leaders were keen to focus on domestic issues, and deny currents or 
inspiration or learning from elsewhere. For example, one of the protest leaders, Joshua Wong, said, “no one 
has inspired me,” although others were prepared to acknowledge that much had been learned, at least in 
terms of tactics, from the Occupy movement and previous protests in Taiwan.63
In Hong Kong, a key protest demand was that the election of the Special Administrative Region’s next Chief 
Executive in 2017 be held under universal franchise. Currently China’s proposal is that candidates will be 
selected and vetted by a nominating committee. Protests quickly outgrew their initial intention, and ran away 
from the organisers. What started out as Occupy Central with Love and Peace – a plan to occupy one site 
– burst its banks and spilled into three sites, under the banner of the Umbrella Movement. The movement 
62  Quotation taken from: ‘Hong Kong police drive out pro-democracy protestors in violent clashes’, The Guardian, 1 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1tuJFQb. 
63  ‘Hong Kong’s students want you to stop calling their protest a ‘revolution’, The Washington Post, 4 October 2014, http://wapo.st/1yF0nnv; ‘Umbrella 
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gained early public support, with some initial heavy handed policing, including the use of tear gas and pepper 
spray, fuelling further participation in protest.64 
Umbrellas became the visual symbol of the movement, starting out as practical protection against tear gas, 
and then finding form in sculptures and other protest art. As in previous protests, online means were used to 
plan protest and communication messages, including high use of the HKGolden forum. This helped protests to 
spread: at their peak, an estimated 100,000 people were taking part.65
Another characteristic of the Hong Kong protests, which they share with other recent movements, is that 
demands and responses were multiple and complex, and resist easy analysis. Underneath the umbrella, 
there was considerable diversity, in both tactics and goals. The movement remained loose, encompassing 
different students’ groups, such as the Scholarism movement, formed in 2012 to resist state attempts to make 
education more ‘patriotic’, but also reaching across other movements and opposition parties. The tactics 
were mostly non-violent, civil disobedience tactics, but not entirely: the Civic Passion group did not adhere to 
these principles when they carried out forced entry to the Legislative Council Complex, while police violence 
produced some violent protestor reactions in December 2014. An element of xenophobic, anti-mainland 
Chinese sentiment among some protestors must also be acknowledged.66
Ultimately, the protests can be seen as having petered out. Heavy handed initial police tactics became more 
careful, as the state seemed keen not to have a Tiananmen Square moment, and to some extent protest 
became a war of attrition. Protestors acknowledged feeling fatigued, and given persistent disruption to daily 
life, initially supportive public opinion swung towards wanting the protests to end, although this should not be 
conflated with public opposition to democracy.67
Given this, the question arises again of how protest success is defined. Protests may not achieve all their aims, 
but this does not mean they are wholly unsuccessful. As in previous cases, including Ukraine, as noted above, 
part of the value of protests is in connecting previously disconnected people and increasing their awareness 
of and commitment to action. Protests act as schools of active citizenship, as an anonymous Hong Kong civil 
society activist we interviewed attests:
 
64  ‘Here’s what’s next for Hong Kong’s embattled democracy movement’, Global Post, 5 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1LLxSr6; Brookings, ‘Hong Kong: 
Examining the Impact of the “Umbrella Movement”’, 3 December 2014, http://brook.gs/1GFTQf8. 
65  ‘Occupy Central leaders surrender to Hong Kong police’, 3 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1PPALNi. 
66  ‘Tracing the history of Hong Kong’s umbrella movement’ ABC RN, 28 October 2014, http://ab.co/1wKm4ky. The Guardian, 1 December 2014 op. cit.
67  ‘Hong Kong’s Summer of Love and the Umbrella Generation’, The Huffington Post, 3 December 2014, http://huff.to/1FPKGfi; ‘Hong Kong protests have 
produced no real winners’, The Guardian, 1 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1BqIANF. 
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The protests cannot be described as a success with regard to their demands, but one major impact is 
that they have awakened a certain part of civil society, the younger generation in particular, that used 
to be passive and indifferent to social and political issues.
Most protestors did not belong to any organised group, becoming involved as individuals, and many were 
young: research published by the Ming Pao newspaper found that over three quarters of protestors were aged 
between 18 and 39, and 37%  were under 24. Further, many were new to any kind of protest movement.68 A 
further encouraging aspect is the strong role women played in the protests, including in organising protest 
and being on the frontline. Stereotypes of women as submissive and oriented towards good careers or 
good marriages were challenged.69 We have perhaps seen the birth of the ‘umbrella generation’ who have 
been brought out of relatively affluent individual isolation into collective action, while previously disparate 
opposition groups may have identified common ground.70 A generation has identified a fundamental point of 
disagreement,on which  their rulers evidently do not want to give ground. A protest march, with umbrellas 
prominent, of around 10,000 people in February 2015 showed that the commitment to seek change has not 
gone away.71 
Another key impact of the Hong Kong protests could be that they have focused global attention on an issue 
that was receiving little notice. A second interviewee, also anonymous, draws attention to the value of 
internationalising the issue:
The international community must stand in solidarity with the people of Hong Kong and put pressure 
on the government to listen to the voices of its people. Civil society groups around the world should 
continue campaigns calling on the Chinese government to respect the autonomy of Hong Kong and 
to stop interfering in its political processes. The people of Hong Kong have a right to decide on how 
their leaders are elected. International civil society should also amplify the voices of local civil society 
groups in Hong Kong and report on the restrictions imposed on freedom of expression and assembly, 
and raise human rights concerns in gatherings of civil society groups and meetings with governments 
and United Nations representatives.
68  CIVICUS, ‘Hong Kong Activists Calls on Government to “Listen to the Voices of its People”’, 8 October 2014, http://bit.ly/1QclWz7. 
69  ‘The Umbrella Movement marks a coming of age for Hong Kong’s “princess” generation, Quartz, 14 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1x4NHDR. 
70  The Huffington Post, 3 December 2014 op. cit.; ‘We’ll be back, vow defiant Hong Kong democrats as main protest is broken up’, The Guardian, 11 December 
2014, http://bit.ly/1LLy2P4. 
71  ‘Hong Kong democracy protestors return to the streets’, The Guardian, 1 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1HFbtx9. 
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Citizens spark transition in Burkina 
Faso  
In October 2014, Burkina Faso saw a ‘Lwili Revolution’ (named after a local bird), when widespread protests 
broke out, stirred by a controversial bill to extend President Blaise Compaoré’s 27 years in office. On 30 
October, protestors stormed Parliament, demanding the President’s resignation. Within days, Compaoré had 
stepped down and the military had suspended the constitution. These dramatic events left commentators 
asking if the ‘Arab Spring’ had finally swept across the Sahara.72
It’s important to note, however, that Sub-Saharan Africa has never been a protest-free zone, and these were 
not the first protests in Burkina Faso’s recent history: 2011 saw demonstrations over the death of a student 
while in police custody, which quickly developed into protests against rising food prices and unemployment. 
Discontent was subdued only when Compaoré dismissed his government and replaced top military leaders. 
More broadly, over 90 ‘popular uprisings’ have been recorded in over 40 African countries since 2005.73
As in so many African countries, despite a decade of largely positive economic growth, citizens have seen 
precious little trickledown effect. Many saw the move by Compaoré to extend his tenure as an effort to protect 
72  ‘The Fiery Fall of Burkina Faso’s ‘Beautiful Blaise’’, Foreign Policy, 5 November 2014, http://atfp.co/1LLy49z. 
73  ‘Student’s death triggers Burkina Faso unrest’, Financial Times, 18 April 2011, http://on.ft.com/1PPDkic; ‘Burkina Faso’s uprising part of an ongoing wave of 
African protests’, The Washington Post, 2 November 2014, http://wapo.st/10Lx57Z. 
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the corrupt business interests of his inner circle. With 60% of the population aged under 25 and facing poor 
employment and income prospects, popular resentment towards political elites finally boiled over.74 
International complacency and calculations of self-interest had also played a part in maintaining elite power. 
This is also the case when it comes to Ethiopia, discussed in the next section. Burkina Faso and Compaoré were 
viewed by many international partners as bastions of stability in a volatile West Africa. Compaoré garnered a 
reputation as a regional peace-maker, through his mediation in various West African crises, including in Côte 
d’Ivoire, Mali and Togo, although Compaoré’s alleged involvement in conflicts led others to draw parallels with 
the French notion of a ‘pompier pyromane’, a pyromaniac fireman gaining credit for extinguishing fires he 
helped start. 75 
The government of France, a long-standing friend of the government, was forced by the ferocity of the protests 
in October 2014 to recognise Compaoré’s defeat, ushering the deposed leader into exile in Côte d’Ivoire.76 But 
with the intervention of the military, what started as a popular uprising began to resemble a military coup, 
as Lieutenant Colonel  Zida proclaimed himself head of state. Demands by citizens for political and economic 
reforms seemed to have ended with Burkinabe citizens swapping one dictatorship for another. 
The people, however, would not be denied, and on 3 November 2014 thousands gathered in the same 
revolutionary square where they had protested against Compaoré, La Place de La Nation, to call for the military 
to hand power to a civilian government. These popular demonstrations, alongside pressure from the AU, 
prompted the army to announce the creation of a unity government, with the promise that it would operate 
for one year, to be followed by a general election in November 2015.77 The interim cabinet draws from civil 
society, different political parties and the military. Former Ambassador to the UN, Michel Kafando, a civilian 
leader with no clear political affiliations, was appointed interim transitional President.78
But February 2015 brought further protests, over the unresolved issue of the army’s role in politics. Mass 
protests sparked again in the capital Ouagadougou, against the influence of the Regiment of Presidential 
Security (RSP), following calls by the RSP to remove the transitional Prime Minister, Isaac Zida.79 Seen as 
74  Afrobarometer, Policy Brief No. 1: After a Decade of Growth in Africa, Little Change in Poverty at the Grassroots, October 2013, http://bit.ly/1KrljQN; ‘Power 
struggle in Burkina Faso after Blaise Compaoré resigns as president’, The Guardian, 1 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1wNcPwp.  
75  Institute for Security Studies, ‘West Africa after Compaoré’, 12 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1wGYFRN; Foreign Policy 5 November 2014 op. cit.
76  ‘France helped Compaoré flee Burkina Faso unrest, Hollande says’, France 24, 4 November 2014, http://f24.my/10o9dX7. 
77  ‘African Union gives Burkina Faso two weeks to end military rule’, France 24, 3 November 2014, http://f24.my/1Qcoai9; ‘Army promises unity government 
as thousands protest in Burkina Faso’, France 24, 3 November 2014, http://f24.my/1d19Zj7. 
78  ‘Transitional government appointed in Burkina Faso’, France 24, 24 November 2014, http://f24.my/1ckMvos; ‘Burkina Faso declares Michel Kafando interim 
president’, BBC, 17 November 2014, http://bbc.in/1uGXbUS.
79  ‘Protestors demand scrapping of Burkina Faso presidential guard’, Reuters, 7 February 2015, http://reut.rs/1KrnCmN. 
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MEXICO
a hangover from the Compaoré regime, the RSP was also accused of using lethal force against the largely 
peaceful protests of 2014, when at least 24 people were killed and 600 injured after security forces opened 
fire without warning.80 The attempt by the RSP to remove Zida raised concerns that security forces were 
planning a further coup. After several days of protests, the people won out once more, as the guard pledged 
not to interfere further in the transition. This does not appear to have placated protestors, with civil society 
continuing to call for the RSP’s dissolution.81
The transitional government remains precisely that – transitional – and civil society must play a critical role if 
Burkina Faso is to be brought to democratic transition and military takeover averted. Civil society now needs to 
be supported to play this role.
Mexico: from the 43 to 4 million
Something stirred in Mexico in 2014 that seemed new. Mexico’s US-backed ‘war on drugs’ has for years come 
at a heavy price in human lives. The US has long given financial support to try to combat drug trafficking 
across the border, and under the Mérida Initiative, which has run since 2008, the US government provides 
resources for anti-drug law enforcement and some related human rights work, to an estimated tune of 
US$3bn since 2008. Successive Mexican governments have ramped up the rhetoric about getting tough on 
drug trafficking. The result has been an egregious and sustained assault on human rights: it is estimated that 
100,000 people have been killed in the drug war, and a further 25,000 ‘disappeared’; under current President 
Peña Nieto, between December 2012 and June 2014 alone, 57,899 died in drugs-related violence.82 And yet 
80  Amnesty International, ‘Burkina Faso: Military shooting of protestors must be investigated’, 14 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1PPEAlC.  
81  Reliefweb, ‘The changing of the guard: Burkibabé civil society says no to coup by stealth’, 25 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1ez5eyn; ‘Thousands protest 
Burkina Faso’s presidential guard’, France 24, 8 February 2015, http://f24.my/1AvyY9p.  
82  Drug Policy Alliance, ‘Bill Clinton Apologizes to Mexico for the Drug War, Now It’s President Obama’s Turn to End It, 12 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1Fcl1ZA; 
#USTired2, ‘Drug War, Militarization, Violence and Human Rights Violations under the Peña Nieto Government, http://bit.ly/1FEQx5A. 
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the war on drugs has had no discernible impact on the circulation of drugs in the US: the US State Department 
acknowledges that 90% of cocaine in America still comes through Mexico and Central America.83
In 2013, the US State Department acknowledged concerns about human rights abuses, and impunity, by 
government and military officials.84 These concerns were loudly echoed in March 2015 by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture:85
Torture and ill treatment during detention are generalized in Mexico, and occur in a context of 
impunity.
Mexico’s war on drugs impacts most adversely on its poorest communities,86 and activists, human rights 
defenders and journalists put themselves at risk of death or ‘disappearance’ when they come into contact with 
the webs of corruption that link local politicians and security forces with organised crime gangs.
Despite its 2013 expression of concern, the US government has continued to back Mexico’s approach. Although 
some Mérida Initiative funding is supposed to be linked to human rights performance, support has not been 
reduced and in 2014 the US gave Mexico a positive human rights assessment. In any case, Mexico’s government 
has pushed back against human rights concerns as an incursion on sovereignty.87
So perhaps when 43 students from a teacher training college ‘disappeared’ en route to a protest in the city 
of Iguala in Guerrero state on 26 September 2014, it could have just presented one more distressing statistic 
to add to the tally. To this day, what happened to the 43 is not known: the version of events that the state 
presented, that the 43 were killed and their remains found, is disputed, but it seems clear that, after being 
arrested by police they were handed over to members of the Guerreros Unidos drug gang, highlighting the 
collusion that exists at the local level between police and organised crime, and the connections of both with 
the local mayor, since removed from office, against whom the 43 intended to protest.88
83  US Department of State, 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) – Honduras through Mexico, 5 March 2013, http://1.usa.
gov/1c96kPc.  
84  #USTired2, op. cit.
85  UNIFEED, ‘Geneva / HRC Torture 2’, 11 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1EzzrST. 
86  ‘Britain’s welcome for Mexican president is worrying’, The Guardian, 25 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1EhU8aX. 
87  HRW, ‘Mexico/US: Obama Should Press Peña Nieto on Justice’, 5 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1DACkVm; ‘Obama meets Mexican counterpart amid calls to 
act tough on human rights abuses’, The Guardian, 6 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1FERjja; ‘Obama backs Mexican government amid calls to suspend military aid’, The 
Guardian, 7 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1Iqdfxk. 
88  ‘What has happened to the missing Mexican students, and why does it matter?’, The Telegraph, 4 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1FPP0Lu. 
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But for many, the disappearance of the 43 proved a tipping point. Mass protests were held across Mexico in 
November and December 2014, with December protests provoking police violence.89
As with other mass protest events, social media offered a vital arena for dissent. When, in December 2014, the 
Attorney General, Jesús Murillo Karam, who has since resigned from office, ended a press conference about 
the 43 with the expression “Ya me canse” (I am tired) he inadvertently started a meme: #Yamecanse became 
the main protest Twitter hashtag, trending over a sustained period of time and being mentioned over four 
million times. Murillo had inadvertently echoed the thoughts of millions of Mexican citizens, tired of everyday 
corruption and violence. The spread of the hashtag, while viral, was no accident. A group of activists set up 
the http://yamecanse.mx website, used the hashtag to call for protests, and ensured that it kept trending. 
When the Yamecanse hashtag stopped trending, they started another hashtag, #Yemecanse2, which also went 
viral. The activist group brought together the expertise of professionals from broadcast media and advertising, 
and shot videos in English as well as Spanish to reach an international audience. The group saw themselves 
as involved in a cyber battle with the government that called for constant effort, as the government tried to 
promote alternate hashtags to push Yamecanse down, suggesting a model of how a civic movement can form 
around skills that give them an online advantage in promoting action.90 Online dissent was backed by offline 
protest: protest caravans took the message from town to town, and were frequently flagged down by people 
who wanted to express their support.91
The action went international, spreading to the large Mexican diaspora in the US, where protests were held 
during the President’s January 2015 visit, calling for the end of the Mérida Initiative.92 The march of thousands 
in Mexico and the US on the four month anniversary of the ‘disappearances’ suggests that momentum has 
been sustained.93  On the President’s visit to the UK in March 2015, Amnesty International staged a protest, 
as did UK-based groups of Mexican citizens, including the London branch of the Yo Soy 132 social movement, 
established in 2012 and inspired by Occupy and the Spanish 15-M movement.94
In common with other movements, the focus of protests grew, encompassing the larger underpinning issues 
of corruption and state failure in the provision of key public goods, such as education and healthcare: the 
89  ‘Mexico missing students: Capital sees mass protests’, BBC, 21 November 2014, http://bbc.in/1FERQ4I; ‘Mexico missing students: Thousands march in 
protest’, BBC, 2 December 2014, http://bbc.in/1J4nix6; ‘Mexico missing students: Protestors clash with police’, 15 December 2014, http://bbc.in/1zYj4ku.
90  ‘‘I am tired’: the politics of Mexico’s #Yamecanse hashtag’, BBC Trending, 9 November 2014, http://bbc.in/1vzhAHe.
91  ‘Mexico missing students: Travels on the protest caravan’, BBC, 20 November 2014, http://bbc.in/1BqSCy7.  
92  ‘43 Cities Stage Symbolic Protest Demanding U.S. Stop Funding Mexican Drug War’, The Huffington Post, 3 December 2014, http://huff.to/1BqSYoD; HRW, 
5 January 2015 op. cit. 
93  ‘Mexico marks four months since 43 Ayotzinapa students disappeared’, Al Jazeera, 26 January 2015. http://alj.am/1FcmxL9. 
94  Amnesty International, ‘Mexico state visit to UK: ‘Stop torture piñata’ stunt at Mexican embassy – Mon 2 March’, 26 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1BqTaEk; 
‘UK Must Confront Mexico on Torture, Activists Say’, Newsweek, 3 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1AvCTD2. 
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‘disappearance’ of the 43 became a symbol of a broader vacuum at the heart of the state. Protests had a huge 
impact on the President’s popularity, but there was also strong resistance to attempts by opposition politicians 
to co-opt protest momentum to their own ends.95 In Guerrero state, the protests led to calls for popular local 
government, as an alternative to a government seen to have failed to fulfil its part of the fundamental social 
contract, of guaranteeing the safety of citizens; this was followed by the direct occupation of a number of 
town halls, with some local mayors forced to vacate their offices. These actions should not be idealised: in a 
number of places, militias formed to defend local populations, and while some of these placed emphasis on 
local self-organising and building resilience against organised crime, others were more akin to vigilante groups, 
with links to drug gangs.96 But the fact that a number of local protest groups are seeking to prevent National 
Congress elections taking place in July 2015 suggests an attempt to make a decisive break with failed politics. 
Local alternatives may be closer to the essence of democracy than a politics centred around the performative 
function of elections, in which elites compete to secure personal and lucrative shares of resources.
So, what happened next in Turkey?
Turkey saw one of the recent high watermarks of civic action in 2013, discussed in the 2014 State of Civil Society 
Report, as a campaign to defend a rare public green space in central Istanbul turned into a much wider show of 
defiance against an increasingly autocratic government. As discussed in the next section, Turkey’s government 
responded by making it harder to demonstrate in public, giving police new powers and closing down large 
swathes of the internet. But this does not mean that the momentum of protest has dissipated. The Third Sector 
Foundation (TUSEV) suggests that Turkey is following the pattern noted above, of people moving from high 
profile protests to sustained, alternative engagement:
95  ‘Are the missing students protests turning into a Mexican spring?’, The Week, 19 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1JWHu3g. 
96  ‘Mexican firebrands call for self-rule: ‘It’s time for the people to take power’’, The Guardian, 16 January 2015, http://bit.ly/14IOFKW.  
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The Gezi Protests of 2013 were arguably the largest wave of protests in recent Turkish history. After 
Gezi, new forms of mobilisations have emerged to counterbalance and challenge power. Local 
neighbourhood assemblies were established throughout Turkey following the Gezi protests, solidifying 
the resistance in neighbourhoods and providing living examples of face-to-face direct democracy. 
Citizens encountered new modes of activism to raise their voices over their concerns and put pressure 
on decision-makers, outside of the formal modes of civic participation.
In the presidential and local elections held after the Gezi protests, citizens have made demands 
that elections be more accountable and transparent. Oy ve Ötesi Girişimi (the Vote and Beyond 
Initiative) was formed, and regardless of political affiliations and ideological backgrounds, volunteers 
of this initiative mobilised via social networks. After receiving training, these volunteers acted 
as independent election observers. They have relied on personal networks and used the power of 
technology and communications to do so. During the local elections held in March 2014, over 26,000 
volunteers took part and covered almost 95% of the votes cast. The Vote and Beyond Initiative has 
now registered as an association, and for the 2015 Turkish General Election, they aim to reach 
120,000 volunteers in 45 cities throughout Turkey to observe 62% of the total vote.
Hakan Atam, of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, adds:
During the 2013 protests a large number of young people in Turkey have shown that they will not 
tolerate the repressive policies of the conservative government and they will defend their rights and 
secular way of life, even though the government wants to impose its conservative policies… It has 
shown that there is still a social dynamic against repression, which was seen as defeated and lost 
after the 1980 coup d’état. One face of the 2013 protests is hope that protests have created. 
The response to the murder of Özgecan Aslan in 2015, discussed in the section on gender activism below, 
further demonstrates that the potential for civic mobilisation in Turkey remains strong. 
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A civic response to black 
marginalisation in the US
Large scale protests are not confined to the global south. The US saw an apparent epidemic of deaths of young 
black men at the hands of the police in 2014 and 2015, provoking outrage among many, and exposing deep-
rooted inequalities, lack of accountability and impunity. Outrage was seen on the streets and, following the new 
established trajectory of modern protest movements, protests grew from one location to many, and matured 
from a focus on immediate issues to raising more profound questions about the nature of American society and 
democracy. 
The present wave of outrage was sparked by the deaths of Eric Garner, killed when held in a chokehold by 
five police officers in New York in July 2014, and of Michael Brown, shot dead by police in Ferguson in August 
2014.97 This disturbing trend continues to the present day, with the police shooting in the back of Walter Scott 
in North Charleston fortuitously caught on camera in April 2015, and later that month, the death in custody of 
Freddie Gray in Baltimore, sparking riots.98 That these were not the only examples in the period covered by this 
report suggests a sustained, disturbing pattern of human rights abuses: campaigning group We, the Protestors’ 
interactive map highlights that over 300 black people were killed by police in the US in 2014.99
The response, as in Baltimore, and initially in Ferguson, has sometimes been violent, on both sides. We see time 
and again around the world that the mishandling of protest situations by security forces only serves to heighten 
tensions and recruit protest supporters. So it proved in Ferguson, where police responses included apparent 
arbitrary arrests,  the crass destruction of an impromptu memorial and violent handling of initial protests, 
including police violence against journalists.100 The imposition of a local state of emergency, with nightly 
curfews, extended pre-trial detention, and deployment of military reserve forces, was disturbingly similar to 
the reaction to protest seen in Thailand in 2014, falling short of the example we might expect a democratic 
superpower to set.101
97  ‘Eric Garner and the NYPD’s History of Deadly Chokeholds’, The Atlantic, 4 December 2014, http://theatln.tc/1RqhShn; ‘Why Did Michael Brown Die In 
Ferguson?’, The New Yorker, 11 August 2014, http://nyr.kr/XdOgxd. 
98  ‘The Shockingly Familiar Killing of Walter Scott’, The Atlantic, 8 April 2015, http://theatln.tc/1ckRohg; ‘Baltimore riots: Looting, fires engulf city after Freddie 
Gray’s funeral’, CNN, 28 April 2015, http://cnn.it/1J8w2AF. 
99  Mapping Police Violence, ‘The National Police Violence Map’, http://mappingpoliceviolence.org  
100  CIVICUS, ‘CIVICUS Condemns Crackdown on Peaceful Protests in Missouri, USA, 14 August 2014, http://bit.ly/1Fco04d; ‘Ferguson Police Use Tear Gas On Al 
Jazeera America Team’, Huffington Post, 14 August 2014, http://huff.to/1qaf9J5; ‘Police to Al Jazeera journalist near Ferguson: ‘I’ll bust your head’, Al Jazeera, 19 August 
2014, http://alj.am/1lfig6A.
101  CIVICUS, ‘CIVICUS Condemns Judicial Harassment of Baltimore Protestors’, 30 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1EUrlee.
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Civil society, in various forms, has been active in the US in seeking to prevent protests turning violent, and to 
try to channel the outrage into participation oriented towards meaningful change.
It’s notable that international civil society, more used to responding to human rights abuses in the global south, 
was part of the reaction in the US. Human Rights Watch documented the use of excessive force, while Amnesty 
International brought human rights observers to Ferguson, gave training in non-violent protest and reminded 
justice officials of their human rights obligations.102
 
At the same time, that response by large scale CSOs may have highlighted an initial absence of local level civil 
society. It has been argued that the case of Ferguson in particular revealed a profound dysfunction, with the 
city essentially organised as an economic operation in which white-dominated justice officials extract excessive 
fines from black citizens, but where the black community was not strongly organised in response, with a lack 
of local civic leadership and institutions.103 This can be argued to have left a leadership vacuum, filled partly 
by opportunists and well-meaning but not always well-informed celebrities, which does not offer a good basis 
for either nuanced discussion or reasoned response.104 It perhaps says something about how marginalised a 
community is, if it is initially incapable of mounting its own response without external help.
However, as protest continued, and spread to multiple sites across the US, action was sustained mostly by 
informal, grassroots groups, who worked hard to keep protest mostly peaceful. Some of these were long-
established, such as the Organization for Black Struggle, founded in 1980, but many were set up in response 
to recent events, particularly following the acquittal of George Zimmerman in 2013 for shooting dead Trayvon 
Martin in Florida, such as Black Lives Matter and the Dream Defenders, and after the Michael Brown killing, 
such as Hands Up United and We, the Protestors. These are now in the process of consolidating as campaigning 
groups.105 Interestingly, Hands Up United have made connections that are not normally brought out, with 
their leader locating them within a broader movement of oppressed and marginalised people, including 
LGBTI people and people living in poverty.106 There have also been collaborations between community groups 
and faith groups, for example, on the Hands Up Sabbath campaign, which brought people of different faiths 
together in protest and solidarity.107 These groups and collaborations built towards an organised weekend of 
102  HRW, ‘US: Respect Rights of Ferguson Protestors’, 19 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1yr0zlY; Amnesty International, On the Streets of America: Human Rights 
Abuses in Ferguson, 2014, http://bit.ly/1wtRZlC. 
103  ‘A City Where Policing, Discrimination and Raising Revenue Went Hand in Hand’, The New York Times, 4 March 2015, http://nyti.ms/1Gn8Kaf; ‘After 
Ferguson: No, the US is Not ‘Congenitally Racist’’, Spiked, 28 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1KAJMWO; ‘Ferguson shows failure at every level’, CNN, 28 November 2014, 
http://cnn.it/1HOfX4z. 
104  Spiked, 28 November 2014 op. cit.
105  ‘Eric Garner: Why #ICantBreathe is trending’, BBC, 4 December 2014, http://bbc.in/1QcxsKZ. 
106  ‘Why do you march? Young protestors explain what drives them – Part 2’, PBS Newshour, 8 December 2014, http://to.pbs.org/1GbZdhy. 
107  Gamaliel, Hands Up Sabbath: A Toolkit Remembering Ferguson, http://bit.ly/1BqWTSc. 
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resistance in October 2014. What was significant here is that the potential for violence was largely averted: 
what had started as a violent reaction became a deeper, peaceful, organised protest.108
As for protest tactics, as might be expected, social media was important, with the use of the #blacklivesmatter 
and #icantbreathe hashtags, this latter relating to Eric Gardner’s death.109 Offline tactics included public ‘die ins’, 
in which participants pretend to fall to the ground dead, a visibly striking, low budget tactic first used during 
Vietnam War protests, along with the adoption of the slogan ‘Hands up, don’t shoot’, in the wake of Michael 
Brown’s shooting, and tactics borrowed from the classic non-violent disobedience of the civil rights protests of 
the 1960s, such as when 100 different religious leaders linked arms and marched in step until arrested.110
A further intriguing aspect of the civic response was how social media enabled the making of unexpected 
connections of international solidarity. Palestinians used Twitter to show support with protestors, and shared 
practical advice, such as how to deal with tear gas, using the hashtag #palestine2ferguson. This support was 
reciprocated, with Ferguson protestors visiting Palestine in early 2015, making explicit connections between 
oppression in very different contexts.111 People also turned to the international arena for redress: Trayvon 
Martin’s mother testified to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in August 2014, and 
Michael Brown’s parents to the UN Committee Against Torture in November 2014. A delegation from Ferguson 
also took a report on human rights violations to the UNHRC that same month.112
This emphasis on social media and low budget, easy to imitate protests does not mean that grassroots 
organising worked without resources: it seems that the support of the Gamaliel Foundation, an institution 
supported by global philanthropist George Soros, played a critical role in developing community organising 
capacity. Even though it has been operating for almost 30 years to build participation and accountability 
capacities, its support became controversial when seized upon by right-wing commentators, who accused 
108  ‘‘We say no more’: Protestors kick off 4 days of ‘resistance’ over Ferguson case’, CNN, 10 October 2014, http://cnn.it/1J8yvv3; ‘Thousands to gather in 
Ferguson for ‘weekend of resistance’’, The Guardian, 10 October 2014, http://bit.ly/1xznJGF. 
109  ‘Protestors use hands-up gesture defiantly after Michael Brown shooting’, LA Times, 12 August 2014, http://lat.ms/1pqTRdM.  
110  ‘The Power of Die-in Protests’, Political Violence @ a Glance, 24 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1C7g2uD; ‘Protests in US over chokehold death case’, Al Jazeera, 
4 December 2014, http://bit.ly/15PvVu8; ‘Clergy among dozens arrested on final day of ‘Ferguson October’ protests’, The Guardian, 14 October 2014, http://bit.
ly/1HOdjZI. 
111  ‘Palestinians share tear gas advice with Ferguson protestors’, Al Jazeera, 14 August 2014, http://bit.ly/1l74rqL; ‘Palestinians tweet tear gas advice to 
protestors in Ferguson’, The Telegraph, 15 August 2014, http://bit.ly/1pz1v5A; ‘Twitter-savvy Palestinians express solidarity with Ferguson protestors’, HAARETZ, 27 
November 2014, http://bit.ly/1KrDndk; ‘The Fascinating Story of How the Ferguson-Palestine Solidarity Movement Came Together’, AlterNet, 18 February 2015, http://
bit.ly/1J7Lpro. 
112  ‘Sybrina Fulton and Ron Davis Discuss Policing and Race at UN Review in Switzerland’, The Root, 19 August 2014, http://bit.ly/1n5JiIA; ‘Michael Brown’s 
Parents Advocate For Human Rights To U.N. Committee Against Torture’, The Huffington Post, 11 November 2014, http://huff.to/1LLyJYL; #FergusonToGeneva website, 
http://fergusontogeneva.org.   
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Soros of funding people to foment riots.113 This is consistent with a pattern discussed in the next section of this 
report, where attempts are made to delegitimise sources of funding to attack civil society movements. 
Looking forward, support for grassroots organising will remain important in building capacity to renegotiate 
power relations in cities where majority communities feel marginalised. International solidarity and support 
can play a role in helping to develop that local civic capacity, in the US, just as elsewhere. 
A year on from #BringBackOurGirls
As noted earlier, Boko Haram, Nigeria’s jihadist network, have built their reputation by carrying out spectacular 
human rights abuses, feeding on the resulting media coverage.114 On 14 April 2014, Boko Haram committed 
one of the most outrageous of their recent series of high profile crimes, kidnapping at least 300 schoolgirls in 
north east Nigeria. This sparked widespread, international outrage, expressed through the #BringBackOurGirls 
hashtag, which became one of the top trending hashtags of 2014, used in over five million tweets, with the 
support of major figures such as Michelle Obama, Hillary Clinton and Nobel laureate Malala Yousafzai, and 
globally known celebrities.115
But the #BringBackOurGirls campaign, a year on, seems a failure: while some kidnapped girls have escaped, 
no coherent rescue operation appears to have been mounted, and there is a lack of clear information about 
the conditions in which the girls are being held. Not only have the girls not come back, but worse, Boko Haram 
continued its war on human rights, with an estimated 2,000 women and girls kidnapped between the start of 
2014 and April 2015.116 Also problematic is the thought that, if media coverage is a key part of how Boko Haram 
projects itself as a threat, its leadership may have been delighted with the international infamy they gained.
Apart from the marking of the one year anniversary, social media’s gadfly attention moved on elsewhere, and 
it’s hard to resist the conclusion that we can overestimate social media’s power: that superficial ‘clickitivsm’, 
while giving the retweeter a sense of fulfilment, may not lead to sustained engagement, a more educated 
public and real change, something we discuss further below.
113  ‘George Soros funds Ferguson protests, hopes to spur civil action’, The Washington Times, 14 January 2015, http://bit.ly/156OZUj; ‘Billionaire George Soros 
funded Ferguson riots’, Communities Digital News, 30 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1KALYh5. 
114  See also Chatham House, Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis, September 2014, http://bit.ly/1pDsEGf.
115  ‘Nigeria’s Stolen Girls’, The New Yorker, 29 April 2014, http://nyr.kr/1eztErE; ‘What happened to #BringBackOurGirls?’, BBC, 24 September 2014, http://bbc.
in/Y2fxCf; ‘Abducted Nigerian girls still missing, a distracted world must remember’, LA Times, 7 January 2015, http://lat.ms/1s8pGvr.
116  ‘Report: Boko Haram Has Abducted More Than 2,000 Since Start of ‘14’, PBS, 14 April 2015, http://to.pbs.org/1PIVIHa; ‘Remember #BringBackOurGirls? 
This Is What Has Happened In The 12 Months Since’, The Huffington Post, 14 April 2015, http://huff.to/1EzOhc7; ‘#BringBackOurGirls, one year on: ‘We should all feel 
shame’’, CNN, 14 April 2015, http://cnn.it/1H3pxy7. 
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The campaign also posed some disturbing questions about how people think about global politics: why should 
it be assumed that an external intervention would be the best way to solve the problem? Couldn’t a campaign 
rather have focused on the question of how international support could better enable Nigerian civil society to 
strengthen its ability to act on the problem? And if presidents and prime ministers hold up Bring Back Our Girls 
signs on social media, what does it say about the superficial nature of their response, and their lack of power or 
inclination to do something more meaningful?
However, while internationally these criticisms hold some validity, the agency of civil society in Nigeria, where 
the Bring Back Our Girls campaign started, was something that was easy to overlook from the outside. Long 
after the international spotlight faded, Nigerian grassroots activists have kept going, protesting about the issue 
day after day.117 The Voice and Accountability Platform organised a series of town hall meetings to promote 
non-violence, and Nigerian civil society worked from the grassroots to the international level: in November 
2014, four civil society groups combined to petition the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on states that 
do not do enough to stop financing to Boko Haram.118 Women who have experienced sexual violence have 
become more able to speak out, and women have been shown to be capable leaders of campaigns, across 
ethnic or religious divides.119
The campaign in Nigeria has fuelled public anger about deep-rooted issues of government corruption and 
ineffectiveness. The inadequacy of Nigeria’s military response, and the way this has enabled Boko Haram to 
grow, which is linked to corruption, became a scandal in Nigeria.120 Notwithstanding a badly backfired attempt 
to hijack the hashtag in a campaign to get President Goodluck Jonathan re-elected, (proving once again that 
political elites often clumsily fail when they try to co-opt social media campaigns), the issues exposed in the 
wake of the kidnapping were thought by many to be a factor in the President’s defeat in the March 2015 
elections.121 Meanwhile, campaigners faced a range of physical and verbal attacks from government sources, 
which itself suggests that they rattled the government.122
117  ‘Boko Haram: Oby Ezekwesili says Nigerian Army has violated Human Rights’, Daily Post, 28 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1Br4TCO; ‘Did the #bringbackourgirls 
campaign make a difference in Nigeria?’, The Guardian, 14 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1PIxKf3. 
118  Insight on Conflict, ‘The rise of Boko Haram and the response of civil society’, 12 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1J8GFDN; ‘Civil society groups ask UN to 
sanction Boko Haram sponsors’, Vanguard, 19 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1FPV3Qi. 
119  ‘#Bringbackourgirls hasn’t brought back Chibok’s girls, but it has changed Nigeria’s politics’, The Guardian, 14 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1as79SO. 
120  ‘Parents Of Chibok Girls Describe Pain of Abduction, Slam Federal Government’, Sahara Reporters, 15 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1dzDDwT; Insight on Conflict, 
12 February 2015 op. cit.
121  ‘Nigeria’s faltering response emboldens Boko Haram’, Al Jazeera, 31 January 2015, http://alj.am/1SDZX8m; ‘How Goodluck Jonathan lost the Nigerian 
election,’ The Guardian, 1 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1xyxsBw.  
122  ‘The campaigners who won’t forget the schoolgirls kidnapped by Boko Haram’, The Guardian, 17 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1Hy6VTQ. 
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Boko Haram now seems to be in retreat, with the military campaign having been stepped up with regional 
support; around 700 of the 2,000 kidnapped women and girls are, at time of writing, thought to have been 
freed.123 While social media did not manage to bring the girls back, it still should be understood that a military 
solution alone cannot end the corruption that enabled Boko Haram to thrive, or the poverty and sense of 
marginalisation that serves as a recruiting sergeant for the network.
As a result of the movement, Nigeria’s civil society campaigners, including women campaigners, have developed 
skills, profile and confidence in calling their government to account, and expose the failings of government. 
International focus should be on sustaining this to win the peace, rather than on either enjoying the feel good 
moment of the next campaign, or lamenting the lack of impact of a hashtag.
The ice bucket challenge: the 
complexities of online success and 
celebrity support
The ice bucket challenge was another social media-based campaign that commanded widespread attention 
in the past year. As is not unusual with such campaigns, its origins are somewhat obscure, but it started in the 
US, and went viral in July 2014, when Pete Frates, a college baseball player diagnosed with the condition called 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) in the US and motor neurone disease (MND) in the UK, poured ice water 
over his head and challenged others in his social network to do so. The campaign quickly became huge, gaining 
widespread celebrity support.124
We asked Niel Bowerman, of the Centre for Effective Altruism, to explain what enabled the ice bucket challenge 
to grow so quickly, and whether it was part of a trend:
One of the reasons why it worked well is that it used ‘growth hacker’ techniques: each person who 
took part would then recruit the next three people to take part. This was done in a way that was very 
visible and social, so that everyone on social media would know that someone had been challenged, 
123  ‘Nigeria launches ‘final onslaught’ against Boko Haram’, Al Jazeera, 17 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1wXsuhw; ‘Boko Haram Hostages Are Finally Being Freed’, 
Think Progress, 5 May 2015, http://bit.ly/1G2AqlV; ‘Nigeria’s Boko Haram in disarray, say freed captives’, The National, 5 May 2015, http://bit.ly/1HOsqFd. 
124  ‘How the Ice-Bucket Challenge Got Its Start, Wall Street Journal, 14 August 2014, http://on.wsj.com/1Fiz00O; ‘Tom Ford, Rihanna, Victoria Beckham, and 
More Do the Ice Bucket Challenge, Elle, 26 August 2014, http://bit.ly/1Breh9u; ‘Watch Kim K do the Ice Bucket Challenge – it’s great’, Glamour, 9 September 2014, 
http://bit.ly/1G2KEm1.
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and they would appear weak if they were not to take part. It used social pressure to get people to take 
part in it.
You can use social media, and viral marketing techniques, to get huge amplifiers on the impact that 
your campaigning and fundraising can have. This is something we’ve had the technology to do for 
quite a long time, but only recently have we learned how to do it really well. We will probably see 
more of this happening in the future.
 
Support soared through August, and by September 2014 the challenge had reached a staggering 60m social 
media accounts, over 3.7m ice bucket videos had been shared on Instagram, and in the US over three million 
people had donated to ALS causes: between the end of July and the end of August, US$98.2m was donated to 
the US ALS foundation, while in one week in August, the UK MND Association received over US$4m, more than 
ten times the amount it would normally expect in that period. Smaller amounts were raised in Australia and 
Hong Kong.125
On the face of it, and relevant to the theme of this report’s other components, on civil society resourcing, 
the campaign might seem to offer a model of an efficient, low cost approach to fundraising for CSOs. The ALS 
Association didn’t even initiate the campaign, and needed do little to encourage it.126 A further positive aspect 
was the campaign’s ability to reach young people, who we might not normally expect to mobilise for this 
particular cause: young people embraced it, donated, and made it go viral by recruiting friends.
However, the campaign raised questions, around three issues: fundraising, online activism and the role of 
celebrity support in civil society.
One early controversy was around ownership. The ALS Association caught a social media backlash when it 
attempted to trademark the phrase ‘ice bucket challenge’, before being forced to back down; they were seen 
as trying to control the trend, and the funding coming in response to it.127 The lesson here is that, when a trend 
goes viral, a loss of control must be conceded. This does not mean that others own a trend; rather, that nobody 
does. In the UK, cancer charity Macmillan was accused of trying to hijack the trend for its own fundraising, 
bringing to social media gaze the sometimes ugly reality of fundraising competition between causes: it may be 
that Macmillan tried to capitalise on the challenge because they felt they had missed an opportunity to benefit 
125  ‘How much has the ice bucket challenge achieved?’, BBC, 2 September 2014, http://bbc.in/1rKcfkT; ‘Ice bucket challenge fails to dampen the spirits of 
British charity’, The Observer, 30 August 2014, http://bit.ly/1rGBlxU.   
126  ‘The Real Ice Bucket Challenge’, TIME, 28 August 2014, http://ti.me/1oqQxKP.  
127  ‘ALS Association withdraws controversial applications to trademark ‘ice bucket challenge’’, The Washington Post, 30 August 2014, http://wapo.st/1AvVzTe.
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from the preceding no make-up selfie trend, which started in a similar way and was capitalised upon by Cancer 
Research UK.128 
There were also some puzzling aspects to how the challenge was constructed. Initially, it looked like a forfeit: 
people could either donate, or experience discomfort. While in practice people did both, there may be 
something troubling in the notion that donating to a cause might be a way of avoiding personal discomfort, 
rather than a means of demonstrating commitment to its ideas. There was no thematic link between the 
challenge and the cause: there is no obvious connection between the activity and the debilitating symptoms 
of ALS, and indeed, the challenge could be seen as insulting, given the years of struggle people diagnosed with 
ALS endure, and the inability of people in the advanced stages of ALS to perform the task themselves.129
Related to this, with many countries experiencing water poverty, some found the challenge’s waste of water 
distasteful, and a handful of public figures refused to join on this basis. WaterAid even experienced some 
upturn in donations as a consequence.130 This connects with another critique: that campaigns such as this 
derive their momentum from the global north, mostly involving global north citizens and celebrities acting in 
ways that people in other contexts might find insensitive.
The viral nature of the ice bucket challenge, and other such campaigns, meant there was no clear link between 
the fundraising ask and the use of resources: it was not clear what the money would be used for. This prompts 
the question of whether there might be challenges in expending large, unbudgeted funding promptly, 
efficiently and on outputs that those who donated see as legitimate: in the past, failures to do so have caused 
backlash against CSOs.131
There’s a still more difficult issue here, which is the question of whether the money raised from this campaign, 
and others like it, came as an addition to money that people might have donated to causes, or whether 
it drew from the overall amount of resources people might have given, a practice referred to as ‘funding 
cannibalism’.132 This raises the question of whether people were making sound and well-informed choices: in an 
ideal world, people would weigh up the different potential causes that are closest to their concerns, and make 
decisions on the basis of where their giving was likely to have the greatest impact. In reality, the causes that 
have the most need, where funding can make the most difference, and where there are efficient CSOs best able 
128  ‘Cold war: charity defends itself against ice-bucket challenge criticism’, Third Force News, 26 August 2014, http://bit.ly/1Hyd6qN.  
129  ‘Before you copy the ice bucket’, Hilborn, 10 September 2014, http://bit.ly/1GGs95T; ‘We Need To Do Better Than the Ice Bucket Challenge’, TIME, 13 
August 2014, http://ti.me/1pAmBB5. 
130  BBC, 2 September 2014 op. cit.; The Observer, 30 August 2014, op. cit. 
131  ‘Here’s What’s Happening With the Ice Bucket Challenge Money’, TIME, 4 November 2014, http://ti.me/1FiB6O5.  
132  ‘The cold, hard truth about the ice bucket challenge’, Quartz, 14 August 2014, http://bit.ly/1GGt9a0.  
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to absorb funding and spend it effectively, are not necessarily the causes that attract the most attention or offer 
the most fun campaigns.
The need, according to Niel Bowerman, is to enable people to make better informed decisions about how they 
give. While the ice bucket challenge did not look like this, there is some hope for the future:
These are debilitating diseases that heavily affect people’s quality of life, and which are unfortunately 
incredibly expensive to tackle. Within public health there’s a metric, the ‘quality adjusted life year’, 
which measures length and quality of life, and is used throughout public health to compare different 
interventions and different decisions, to compare where we can best improve people’s length and 
quality of life for a given amount of money. The most effective treatment for ALS is very expensive.
Let’s compare this to other things we could do with this money. In the ice bucket challenge, people 
raised over US$100m. For example, we could spend this money on bed nets to tackle malaria. This 
would be at least 100 times cheaper per year of additional healthy life. If we were to allocate resources 
within civil society to maximise impact on people’s quality and length of life, we would be funding 
things like malaria nets. If as a donor you have money to spend, you could have much more impact 
here.
The viral nature of this campaign meant that giving is not on the basis of where it’s going to have the 
most impact, but instead on the basis of which viral campaign has taken off on social media. Viral 
means should not dictate our giving. Instead we should be using evidence-based sources of analyses. 
There is a rapidly growing body of evidence of where giving can have the most impact. We are likely 
to see a trend towards more evidence-based giving in the future. As our techniques and ability to 
analyse a growing body of evidence improve, we are able to say much more about what is working, 
and this can inform our giving.
The success of such campaigns may create additional pressure within other CSOs to imitate these hits and 
invent the next viral fundraiser.133 But an uncomfortable truth is that it is hard to predict what will go viral, and 
what will fail; we are still in the early days of understanding these trends, and can only really do so in hindsight. 
Attempts to mimic the ice bucket challenge mostly failed. There is also a potential danger of ‘channel fatigue’: 
that people will grow bored with donating by this method, causing future campaigns to fail.
133  ‘Viral campaigns like Ice Bucket Challenge hurts other charities’, The Guardian, 14 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1PKUBXr. We’re also grateful to insights from our 
interview with Neil Bowerman, conducted in March 2015, in shaping this section.
State of Civil Society report 2015: THE YEAR IN REVIEW
55
Turning to the online nature of such campaigns, and also those, covered elsewhere in this report, that 
have heavy social media presence, CIVICUS has long argued that online activism is a valid form of people’s 
participation that should be taken seriously. With a wide range of online participation platforms, it has never 
been easier to express support for a cause. Online activism matters partly because the numbers are so big: 40m 
people have an Avaaz account.134 It also matters because online activism enables young people, in particular, to 
forge alternate ways of connecting, including internationally. Past State of Civil Society Reports have noted that 
young people in particular, in many contexts, are rejecting conventional forms and arenas of participation, as 
reflected in declining rates of participation in most elections, and indeed, disengagement from formal CSOs. In 
its most optimistic assessment, online activism could offer the potential to build a global cadre of committed, 
active citizens through alternate means.
There are indeed examples of online campaigns achieving impact. Global platform Change.org claims that 6,000 
victories have been achieved through its user-generated campaign platform.135 
At the same time, there is a need to acknowledge the criticism, renewed in the light of the #BringBackOurGirls 
and the ice bucket challenge, that much online activism can be shallow; it may not necessarily lead to long term 
or committed engagement. Social media and civil society fit together well because people want to connect and 
share, but this can be seen as most likely to lead to change when learning and political commitment is built into 
sharing. Otherwise, participation may be fleeting, and the danger is that donating money and acting to advance 
change become conflated, perpetuating the idea that civil society is about charity rather than advancing 
change. If people feel they have ‘done something’, they may even be less likely to take further action.
A further critique that can be advanced is that online campaigns essentially promote a free market approach to 
activism: there are many campaigns, and they must compete through hard-selling,136 which can lead towards 
simplification to suit a marketplace in which the most sellable issues succeed. When the edges are smoothed 
on complex issues, the risk is that issues may become reduced to simple endorsement or donation asks, 
without leaving people who endorse or donate having learned more and developing potential for action. When 
they concern countries of the global south, they may reproduce patronising notions that global south countries 
are to be helped as the passive recipients of global north support.
Many of these difficulties can be seen with the ice bucket challenge: there was no public education or advocacy 
ask embedded in the message.137 All people were asked to do was carry out the stunt, donate, and publicise 
134  Open Democracy, ‘Beyond clicktivism’, 17 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1ezKmae.
135  Open Democracy, 17 November 2014 op. cit.
136  Micah White, ‘Clicktivism: the pollution of activism with the logic of Silicon Valley, http://bit.ly/1HWPaQA. 
137  Hilborn, 10 September 2014 op. cit. 
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it. This meant that the campaign was not oriented towards change, apart from a change in charity revenues. 
Ultimately the ice bucket challenge could be seen as 2014’s version of the Kony 2012 campaign, which also 
generated huge publicity and caused those who participated to feel virtuous, but which didn’t lead to change, 
and ultimately harmed the CSO involved.138
It can also be argued that the metrics of judging the success of online activism are too narrow, relying heavily 
on indicators such as numbers of hits, follows and forwards. These indicators, of themselves, tell us little about 
whether real social change is being advanced.139 There is also a challenge that many campaigns are reactive, 
with the petition as the default response, as this suggests being event-driven. While civil society’s ability to 
mobilise rapidly in response to emerging challenges is one of its great strengths, we should not lose sight of the 
need to be strategic, and the importance of civil society defining its own agendas, rather than only reacting to 
the agendas of others. 
Perhaps it is better to see much of online activism as an indicator of potential: it suggests that there is a willing 
audience who have taken a positive first step, some of whom could be reached and worked with to have their 
activism capacity further developed so that they can be enabled to take pathways to deeper participation. 
This also suggests that CSOs running campaigns need to campaign across the spectrum: to employ a joined-up 
mixture of outreach methods that combine online and offline approaches. Progress in educating citizens about 
social justice issues could be established as an indicator of success in online campaigning, as well as the number 
of clicks and amount of dollars raised. 
Connected to viral, online campaigns is what seems to be a rise in celebrity involvement in civil society causes. 
In many countries, we live in cultures that fascinate over celebrities, and celebrities now have unmediated 
access to huge audiences on social media to reproduce their fame. Given this, it’s not hard to see why civil 
society causes might seek celebrity endorsement. If all causes compete for visibility and resources, then 
celebrity support offers a shortcut to audiences. There is also evidence that, while celebrity support may not 
have much impact on fundraising, it can bring other impacts, such as reassuring a CSO’s existing supporters that 
their cause is important, and opening doors to corporate and political leaders that a CSO alone can’t access, 
because leaders like to associate with celebrity glamour.140
Among many celebrities prominently involved with civil society in the last year were George Clooney, who in 
May 2014 announced the expansion of the Satellite Sentinel initiative, which he co-founded, from monitoring 
138  ‘The ‘Kony 2012’ Effect: Recovering From A Viral Sensation’, NPR, 14 June 2014, http://n.pr/1qyxuRb.  
139  Micah White op. cit.
140  ‘Celebrity Advocacy Has Its Limits’, The New York Times, 26 August 2014, http://nyti.ms/1JX0QVU; ‘Who celebrity advocates are really targeting. And it’s not 
you.’, IRIN, 13 February 2015, http://bit.ly/17t5QSM. 
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conflict build up in Sudan and South Sudan, to also investigating funding flows around human rights abuses; 
Angelina Jolie, who worked with the UK government and others, including civil society groups, to hold a global 
summit on sexual violence in conflict, and open a new centre on sexual violence, in June 2014; and Emma 
Watson, who launched the HeForShe campaign, which seeks to get men and boys to commit to gender equality, 
in a speech at the UN in September 2014.141 There was also huge celebrity involvement in the climate change 
march, discussed further below, #BringBackOurGirls and the ice bucket challenge.
While examples offered above suggest a substantive commitment among those named, stretching further than 
a reflex re-tweet, in general, there is a need to probe whether celebrities always have a deep and a nuanced 
understanding of the causes they endorse; otherwise the danger is that celebrity support plays to the issues 
identified above: of potentially reinforcing stereotypes about the global south, simplifying causes to make 
them more sellable, or being framed around charity rather than social justice.142 For example, Bob Geldof’s 
latest revival, in 2014, of the Band Aid charity tune to raise funds to fight Ebola, involving the usual panoply 
of UK music stars, drew criticism for being patronising and perpetuating global north stereotypes of Africa as 
somewhere that can only be saved by external, charitable intervention.143 Perhaps partly in response to this, it 
seems we are now seeing a move towards campaigns working more with national-level celebrities who come 
from and therefore resonate better in different global south countries.144
As we concluded in the 2014 State of Civil Society report, one of the key problems with global governance 
is that an insufficient diversity of opinion is able to obtain access and influence, and there is insufficient 
accountability about who has influence in global governance processes. Given this, the opening of UN and other 
global platforms to Hollywood stars, as well as billionaire philanthropists, can be read as a symptom of, rather 
than an adequate response to, dysfunctional global governance. Of course, such concerns may overestimate 
the power of glamour: the public may lack a strong understanding of causes celebrities support, wanting 
escapism rather than deep engagement. This then leads back to the question, hard to answer, of what impact is 
generated by celebrity engagement in civil society causes. 
A further practical challenge, for CSOs seeking to enlist celebrities to a cause, is the potential for backlash 
against a celebrity to cut across a message. George Clooney, for example, won praise for his committed and 
141  Satellite Sentinel Project, ‘George Clooney Announces Expansion of Satellite Sentinel Project, 21 May 2014, http://bit.ly/RUnWVo;  UK Government, ‘Global 
Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict’, June 2014, http://bit.ly/1c7csaM; ‘Emma Watson’s He For She UN Speech On Gender Inequality, Conscious Magazine, 2014, 
http://bit.ly/1KCB3n4.
142  ‘Transnational Celebrity Activism in Global Politics: Changing the World? A Review by Susan Froetschel’, YaleGlobal Online, 2011, http://bit.ly/1SEaVL2; New 
York Times, 26 April 2014 op. cit.
143  ‘‘We got this, Bob Geldof, so back off’’, Al Jazeera, 18 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1wP58o2; ‘Band Aid 30 backlash: Celebrity charity model losing lustre, 
CBC News, 20 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1vsntf4; ‘Ebola Survivor Calls Band Aid 30 Song ‘Cringeworthy’’, TIME, 9 December 2014, http://ti.me/1FFbqxL.
144  IRIN, 13 February 2015, op. cit.
...there is a need to 
probe whether celeb-
rities always have a 
deep and a nuanced 
understanding of the 
causes they endorse.
...one of the key 
problems with global 
governance is that an 
insufficient diversity 
of opinion is able to 
obtain access and 
influence, and there is 
insufficient accounta-
bility about who has 
influence in global 
governance processes.
State of Civil Society report 2015: THE YEAR IN REVIEW
58
sustained involvement in raising awareness about Sudan’s atrocities in Darfur, and his support for South Sudan’s 
independence, but he then became a scapegoat for criticism in the US when people associated him with 
South Sudan’s descent into civil war.145 Celebrity-led fundraising also risks disrepute when less of the money 
raised goes to causes than the public might expect. Some CSOs have caught criticism when exposed as paying 
celebrities for endorsement, which, in the public mind, sends the wrong messages about the voluntary nature 
of civil society.146 This can be seen as a consequence of the competition between causes, and the premium 
placed on celebrity involvement to give a cause an edge.
What seems clear here is that celebrity support can help civil society. Given that civil society starts at a 
disadvantage, in terms of access to power and resources, compared to governments and the private sector, 
celebrities can offer a short-cut, but they need to be well integrated, and well-informed. Celebrity support is 
no magic bullet, and is unlikely to compensate for a lack of strategy, or a poorly designed message that fails to 
connect with the public. 
145  ‘Confronting George Clooney’s Critics on South Sudan’, The Daily Beast, 7 October 2014, http://bit.ly/1cl9Y9c.  
146  ‘Celebrity Charities: Good For Image, But What About Good Works?’, Forbes, 30 June 2010, http://onforb.es/1FQ1NgU; ‘Eva Longoria, Two 
“Philanthrocapitalists” and the Dangers of Hollywood Charity: THR Investigates’, The Hollywood Reporter, 4 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1za2tWm; ‘Barnado’s criticised 
for £3,000 payment to Made in Chelsea star’, Third Sector, 16 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1zHpikF.
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Scottish civil society gets out the 
vote
The story of the large-scale civic mobilisations of the past year is not merely one of protest or social media 
activity. One place where democratic politics were firmly embraced by an active civil society was Scotland, 
where on 18 September 2014, voters, including newly enfranchised 16 to 17 year-olds, went to the ballot box 
for a historic referendum on Scottish independence. Voter turnout of 84.5%, in a referendum that produced a 
vote of 55.3% against Scottish independence, set a record for any UK election since 1918, when the franchise 
was first extended to women. 147
Part of the referendum’s significance was that the huge upsurge in political engagement was particularly 
prominent amongst young people, a generation frequently believed to be politically apathetic. The youngest 
category of voters, aged 16–24, had a confirmed turnout rate of 68%, remarkably high compared to recent UK 
elections.148 Young people not only voted, but were active in political debate. In a 2014 survey conducted by 
the Economic and Social Research Council, over 70% of 14 to 17 year-olds reported that they had discussed 
the referendum with friends, classmates and family, and 64% had followed the debate on social media.149 Billy 
Hayes, General Secretary of the Communications Workers Union, commented:
147  ‘Scottish Independence Voter Turnout Breaks UK Records’, International Business Times, 19 September 2014, http://bit.ly/1tx0M6Z.
148  Intergenerational Foundation, ‘How did young people vote in the Scottish referendum?’, 4 October 2014, http://bit.ly/1tCyTpE; ‘General election turnout 
1945-2015, UK Political Info, http://bit.ly/1y2RqnN. 
149  Applied Quantitative Methods Network, Briefing: Results from the 2014 survey on 14-17 year old persons living in Scotland on the Scottish independence 
referendum, http://bit.ly/SrJDMs.  
SCOTLAND
State of Civil Society report 2015: THE YEAR IN REVIEW
60
What the Scottish Referendum has shown is that young people are more than willing to get involved 
in political debate if what they are voting on means something to them, and we must seize this 
opportunity for engagement.
This high level of engagement, particularly amongst a group conventionally seen as politically disengaged, 
suggests that, while traditional, party-based politics may be being rejected, people want to engage with issues 
that they care about, and not just around issues of identity, but on social justice, which was the ground the 
Scottish nationalist cause claimed.150 The Scottish referendum can be located in a trend where groups that feel 
peripheral and marginalised are seeking greater autonomy, including the Catalan independence movement, 
Somaliland’s self-determination campaign and the Quebec sovereignty movement. In a more globalised 
world, a quest for local identity and self-determination can be seen as a response to globalisation’s transfer of 
democracy away from citizens to transnational elites, and to be making use of the communication opportunities 
globalisation creates.
It is not surprising that civil society groups were heavily involved in the Scottish referendum debate, given 
that one of civil society’s roles is to help amplify the voices of the otherwise marginalised. The success of the 
‘Yes’ campaign, in developing momentum, if not in winning a vote that was always unlikely, was down to the 
participation of a broad spectrum of grassroots campaigners, including people knocking on doors after work; 
the organising of a Radical Independence Conference to demand a new social contract; and the Third Sector 
for Yes campaign, a vocal participant in the debate, which united many civil society personnel in the belief that, 
although independence represented an unknown quantity, it also presented an opportunity to construct a more 
socially just Scotland.151 Across Scotland, citizens have demonstrated that they do not merely have a place in the 
political arena: they want to help shape that arena.
The votes have been cast, but the energy of a freshly motivated population has been sustained. After two years 
of grassroots campaigning, an unprecedented 97% registration of eligible voters,152 and an upsurge in youth 
activism, a lapse into political apathy seems unlikely, as a surge in the vote for the Scottish nationalist cause 
in the subsequent UK election of May 2015 suggests. Civil society is helping to sustain this civic energy and to 
take forward concerns raised by the referendum debate. Following the referendum, the Smith Commission 
was established to develop plans to realise commitments on further devolution of powers to Scotland. Many 
CSOs came together to develop common inputs from this, and hundreds of inputs came from CSOs.153 Further, 
150  Georgia Gould, Wasted: How Misunderstanding Young Britain Threatens Our Future, 2015 (London: Little, Brown)
151  Waging Nonviolence, ‘The Radical Independence Conference’s promise of “another Scotland”’, 27 November 2013, http://bit.ly/1Aw4kwJ; Waging 
Nonviolence, ‘Grassroots campaigning turns Scottish independence vote into a cliffhanger’, 18 September 2014, http://bit.ly/1HOGYEK; ‘Scottish independence could 
make space for charities’ principles’, The Guardian, http://bit.ly/1ATapgt. 
152  ‘97% of eligible Scots registered to vote in independence referendum’, The Scotsman, 11 September 2014, http://bit.ly/1AAfYWS. 
153  Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations’ response to Affinity Group of National Associations (AGNA) questionnaire.
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many political activism and civil society groups continue to capitalise on the dynamism engendered by the 
referendum, including So Say Scotland, a democracy project, which has redoubled its efforts to make Scotland 
‘a global hub for democratic innovation’; the artists for ‘Yes’ group, National Collective, which have continued 
“the Yes campaign’s legacy of a politically engaged electorate, regardless of the result” of the referendum; and 
Common Weal, a movement with a political and economic vision of a better Scotland, which gained over 1,000 
members following  the vote.154 The Scottish referendum shows that civil society groups can play a healthy role 
in growing and underpinning democracy, when they are enabled to do so.
Civil society and elections: updates 
from Malawi and Sri Lanka
In the very different context of Malawi, the positive roles civil society can play in elections was also seen, as 
described in our interview with the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR):
Though operating on limited funding, CSOs managed to conduct voter and civic education in many 
parts of the country. The Malawi Electoral Support Network, an umbrella of CSOs with a stake 
in elections, played a remarkable role during the vote counting through setting up a parallel vote 
tabulation mechanism that sampled a number of polling centres across the country to ascertain the 
credibility of results.
Similarly, Sri Lanka saw a potentially landmark election in January 2015, in which President Mahinda Rajapaksa 
was voted out after ten years in office. Rajapaksa led the brutal conclusion of the long-running conflict in 
northern Sri Lanka, in which government forces killed tens of thousands of civilians in the final months, leading 
to accusations of war crimes and the setting up of a UNHRC enquiry.155 Under Rajapaksa, conditions for civil 
society grew gradually worse. To give just two examples from many, in June 2014, a government spokesperson 
issued threats against anyone intending to give evidence to the enquiry, while in July 2014, CSOs were told not 
to hold press conferences, issue press releases or help train journalists.156 
154  So Say Scotland, ‘A Scotland where Everyone has A Say’, http://www.sosayscotland.org/story; National Collective, http://nationalcollective.com; Common 
Weal, http://www.allofusfirst.org.
155  ‘Who is Mahinda Rajapaksa? Hero or war criminal? Sri Lankan leader stands accused’, The Independent, 14 November 2013, http://ind.pn/1GGFniY; UN 
Human Rights Council, ‘OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka, http://bit.ly/1BUQ110. 
156  CIVICUS, ‘Sri Lanka: Worrying Developments for Civil Society’, 31 July 2014, http://bit.ly/1d1I0zG; CIVICUS, ‘Submission on Sri Lanka to the Commonwealth 
Ministerial Action Group (CMAG)’, September 2014, http://bit.ly/1JX81NR.
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Despite this pressure, civil society groups were active, in educating voters and observing the election.157 CSOs 
that engaged ahead of the election, and coordinated their approaches, included the Campaign for Free and 
Fair Elections, the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence and People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections, 
supported by a regional network, the Asian Network for Free Elections.158
The Centre for Monitoring Election Violence ran a social media campaign, #IVotedSL, which included clear 
information on how to vote, produced infographics and podcasts in different languages, and ran an election 
day violence map, providing real-time information on election-related incidents.159 On election day, hundreds 
of people replaced their social media avatars with #IVotedSL images and posted pictures of their ink-stained 
fingers to prove they had voted. Meanwhile People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections produced locally 
disaggregated reports on election violence, while the Campaign for Free and Fair Elections tracked abuse of 
state resources in the election. One strong piece of evidence that voter education was successful was a decline 
in the number of rejected ballots.160
Civil society also played a vital role in observing the election, a contribution recognised by the Commonwealth 
observer group.161 On election day, the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence deployed 4,500 field monitors, 
risking intimidation and violence, while for the first time, People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections was 
allowed to observe vote counting. 162 
A key piece of learning from the Sri Lankan elections is that civil society’s efforts built on years of preparation: 
the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence has worked on elections since 1997. It is still too early to say, of 
course, whether the new presidency will make good on promises to improve the space for civil society, given 
that the new President only split away from President Rajapaksa shortly before the election, and a Rajapaksa 
comeback cannot yet be ruled out.163 But what the example of the Sri Lankan election shows us is that resilient, 
committed and expert civil society engagement can make a difference; it now falls on Sri Lankan civil society to 
continue to exercise vigilance over the new regime, and to seize what opportunities arise.
157  Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM), ‘CaFFE, CMEV and PAFFREL Mobilize for Milestone Sri Lanka Election, 30 January 2015, http://bit.
ly/1RqL3Rh. 
158  GNDEM, ‘Sri Lanka: Monitors Urge Gov’t Action Against Post-Election Violence’, 26 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1AAhKY1. 
159  Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV), ‘Presidential Election 2015: Election Day Violence’, on Google Maps, http://bit.ly/1Aw79xN. 
160  GNDEM, 30 January 2015 op. cit.
161  Commonwealth Secretariat, ‘Sri Lanka Presidential Election 2015 Interim Statement’, 10 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1Ksl7k6. 
162  CMEV, ‘Presidential Election 2015. Statement at the Conclusion of Polling’, 8 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1FcNtun. 
163  CIVICUS, ‘Sri Lanka: Put Civil Society at the Heart of the New Presidential Agenda’, 27 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1J9253A; ‘Maithripala Sirisena Sworn In As 
Sri Lanka’s New President After Stunning Election Upset’, 9 January 2015, http://huff.to/1eA0gS2; 
‘Sri Lanka’s Mahinda Rajapaksa Hopes for Comeback’, The Diplomat, 24 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1FFjApD. 
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The dark side of identity politics: a 
rise of the far right?
In many European countries, and in contrast to the progressive experience of the debate on Scotland’s future, 
identity-based politics is coalescing around far right positions. In Europe, dissatisfaction with established 
political arrangements is expressing itself partly in growing antipathy to the European Union (EU), and to 
immigration and Islam. The May 2014 European Parliament elections saw the EU rocked by a ‘Eurosceptic 
Earthquake’, with the far right Danish People’s Party (DFP) gaining the greatest number of votes, France’s far-
right National Front claiming victory with 24 seats, and Eurosceptic party UK Independence Party (UKIP) placing 
first in the UK. Neo-Nazi affiliated parties, including the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) and 
Greece’s Golden Dawn (XA) entered the European Parliament.164
At its peak, Germany’s far right Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West) movement 
commanded the headlines, with large numbers of people taking part in weekly demonstrations. Following 
the Charlie Hebdo attacks, discussed further below, an estimated 25,000 people marched in Dresden in 
January 2015.165 Pegida, which started as a Facebook page in October 2014, quickly transitioned into a formal 
organisation, registered in December 2014.166 Part of what was disturbing about the rise of Pegida is that it 
offered a more respectable and mainstream face for previously isolated far-right groups, for which Pegida 
acted as a coalition, and it is notable that alongside the public protests came a sharp rise in violent attacks 
against hostels for asylum seekers.167 A danger when the far-right rises is that mainstream parties can take more 
extreme positions to shore up their vote, as France’s UMP has been accused of doing in response to continuing 
support for the once marginal National Front,168 risking the normalisation of regressive discourse.
There is, however, a danger of over-stating the impact of Pegida. While it spread from its Dresden base to 
be reproduced in other German cities and further afield, these iterations were always smaller than those in 
Dresden.169 There are several instances, in Germany, Norway and Sweden, of Pegida protests being vastly 
outnumbered by protests opposed to them, while an attempted protest in response to terrorist shootings 
164  ‘Eurosceptic ‘earthquake’ rocks EU elections’, BBC, 26 May 2014, http://bbc.in/SDmdoe; ‘The far right in the 2014 elections: Of earthquakes, cartels and 
designer fascists’, The Washington Post, 30 May 2014, http://wapo.st/1jBFKLt. 
165  ‘Record turnout at Dresden PEGIDA rally sees more than 25,000 march’, DW, 12 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1RqOLdy. 
166  German companies, organizations and businesses index, http://bit.ly/1PQfqmQ. 
167  ‘The End of Tolerance? Anti-Muslim Movement Rattles Germany’, Spiegel Online International, 21 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1sZIs9f; ‘Prying into Pegida: 
Where Did Germany’s Islamophobes Come From?’, Spiegel Online International, 12 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1ybdkWh.
168  ‘Front National set for large gains in French local elections’, The Guardian, 29 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1PQfW4p. 
169  ‘Estimated 15,000 join ‘pinstriped Nazis’ on march in Dresden’, The Guardian, 15 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1BOMTWN. 
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in Copenhagen, Denmark in February 2015 attracted only around 50 people, in contrast to thousands who 
marched to mourn the victims and support free speech.170 With the loss of its leadership, Pegida appears to be 
following a trajectory familiar to far-right organisations, of fragmentation: February 2015 saw a marked decline 
in protest participation in Dresden, with only around 2,000 attending, and only 500 participating in the rally of 
a splinter group.171
Notwithstanding this, such movements seem to be tapping into a growing corner of public concern about 
immigration and Islam. In 2014, a poll found that 34% of Germans shared Pegida’s view that Germany is 
becoming increasingly Islamic, and a 2015 poll stated that 57% of non-Muslim Germans see Islam as a threat.172 
Views expressed by Pegida supporters and protestors that they feel unrepresented by mainstream politics and 
the mainstream media, with their highest stated motivation being dissatisfaction with the current political 
system,173 connect with those expressed by followers of more progressive causes.
While progressive nationalism in Scotland differs from the Islamophobic backlash in Germany, they seem to 
share some common impulses: people, even if misguidedly, are responding to globalisation when they see 
themselves as on the wrong side of it, and rejecting established political elites, perceiving that formal political 
competition among traditional parties masks a fundamental agreement on the large issues. Islamophobic 
backlash can also be seen as fallout from the failure of the international system over Iraq and Syria, and the 
corresponding burgeoning of conservative political Islam in those countries, which has produced an increase in 
the numbers of people from Iraq and Syria seeking asylum, particularly in Germany.174 The European politics of 
austerity, which have seen the poorest people pay disproportionately for the mistakes of financial elites, which 
have instead received state support, have also stoked feelings of marginalisation: if people see their states as 
unilaterally renegotiating the social contract, for example, by reducing the social safety net, they will make their 
own alternatives, or look for alternatives beyond the mainstream. Civil society needs to offer a response to 
these politics of failure.
170  ‘Anti-racists swamp first Pegida rally in Sweden’, The Local, 10 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1ARX9ha; ‘Pegida sees ‘complete failure’ in Norway’, The Local, 
10 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1Bry9cG; ‘German anti-Islam protests: Biggest Pegida march ever in Dresden as rest of Germany shows disgust with lights-out, The 
Independent, 5 January 2015, http://ind.pn/1wRHiHz; ‘Copenhagen shootings: thousands march in solidarity with victims – pictures’, International Business Times, 
http://bit.ly/1Ksqb87. 
171  ‘German anti-islam group PEGIDA loses second leader in a week’, Reuters, 28 January 2015, http://reut.rs/1FFpirN; ‘Pegida Anti-Islam March In Germany 
Only Draws 2,000 Hopefully Signalling Their Demise, The Huffington Post, 11 February 2015, http://huff.to/1FQbhZJ. 
172  ‘The End of Tolerance? Anti-Muslim Movement Rattles Germany’, Spiegel Online International, 21 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1sZIs9f. 
173  ‘Politisch heimatlos’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 17 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1Awdj0H; ‘Wort im Mund umdrehen’, Der Tagesspiegel, 18 December 2014, 
http://bit.ly/1J5bcE2. 
174  The Independent, 5 January op. cit.
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Millions march after Paris attacks
The response in France to the Charlie Hebdo shootings also shed light on these evolving complexities, not least 
around freedom of speech. The terrorist attacks on the French satirical magazine left 12 people dead, and 
resulted in an extraordinary show of public strength as millions took to the streets across Europe and further 
afield, and the solidarity hashtag #JeSuisCharlie topped Twitter, becoming one of the most widely used in 
history.175 Public demonstrations came to a head on 11 January 2015, when over three million people marched 
in different locations in France, including an estimated 1.6m in Paris.176 The print run for the following edition 
of the magazine was an unprecedented seven million, as people queued to buy it to demonstrate solidarity.177
This public show of defiance for terrorism, and mourning of its victims, seems to have become a generalised 
response to terrorist attacks, seen in Copenhagen in February 2015, as discussed above, and in Tunis, Tunisia, 
in March 2015, when thousands turned out following a terrorist attack on a museum.178 These demonstrations 
have also consciously imitated and localised the Je Suis Charlie slogans.
But across the world, responses pointed to a troubling global faultline: while many Islamic organisations 
condemned the attacks, the publication of the magazine’s next issue, with a cartoon cover of the prophet 
Mohammed, saw people across a wide arc of West African and MENA states protest against the magazine. Five 
people died in protests in Niger.179 In the global north meanwhile, the far-right insisted on a redundant debate 
about whether mainstream media were prepared to republish cartoons many find offensive, and predictably, 
175  ‘Paris Charlie Hebdo attack: Je Suis Charlie hashtag one of the most popular in Twitter history’, The Telegraph, 9 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1xU6nHs.  
176  ‘Paris attacks: Millions rally for unity in France’, BBC, 11 January 2015, http://bbc.in/1C2Uo9L. 
177  ‘Charlie Hebdo now printing 7 million copies’, CNN Money, 17 January 2015, http://cnnmon.ie/1BrBGYv. 
178  ‘Tunis Bardo Museum attack: Thousands join protest march’, BBC, 29 March 2015, http://bbc.in/1D5WRDz. 
179  ‘Five killed in second day of Charlie Hebdo protests in Niger’, Reuters, 17 January 2015, http://reut.rs/1BlTkAH. 
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attacks on Islamic soft targets ensued.180 Others were uncomfortably caught between condemning the attacks 
and deploring the target of the magazine’s satire, finding themselves unable to say ‘Je Suis Charlie’, sparking a 
continuing debate about whether there is a ‘right to offend’, regardless of target, and whether the movement in 
response to the attacks was inclusive or divisive.181
It is in difficult and polarised times, when nuances become crowded out, that civil society groups can play an 
essential role of building and maintaining spaces for encounter and dialogue about difference, and encourage 
respect for difference. But the irony is of course that the response to the threat of terrorism, whether real or 
exaggerated, often entails restricting the essential civil society freedoms of association, assembly and expression 
that need to be upheld for civil society to play its full role. That some of the world leaders who marched in 
solidarity in Paris also repress the media at home was an irony not lost on Reporters Without Borders,  
amongst others.182
Reclaiming space: civic 
response to terrorism 
in Pakistan
Both these trends –a positive civic response to terrorism that brings civil society together, and a state response 
to terrorism that disables rights, can be observed in recent events in Pakistan. In December 2014, the Taliban 
attacked a school in Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, leaving an estimated 145 people dead, 132 
of them children.183 The Taliban claimed that the attack, on an army school (which educates civilian children as 
well as the children of army members) was in retaliation for military attacks, including drone attacks, on their 
network.184
180  ‘Dozens of Hate Attacks Target French Muslims’, OnIslam, 13 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1HypWoX.  
181  Open Democracy, ‘On Charlie Hebdo, freedom of speech, terrorism, and the value of lives, 8 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1xWM3VO; Open Democracy, ‘No, 
we’re not all Charlie Hebdo, nor should we be’, 9 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1I40tGy; Open Democracy, ‘Charlie Hebdo and the Right to Offend’, 21 January 2015, http://
bit.ly/1JXhggQ; ‘What Je Suis Charlie Has Become’, The Atlantic, 30 January 2015, http://theatln.tc/1BzCIRe. 
182  Reporters Without Borders, ‘RWB Condemns Presence of “Predators” in Paris March, Calls for Solidarity with “All Charlies”’, 11 January 2015, http://bit.
ly/1w8zYY3.  
183  ‘Children massacred in Pakistan school attack’, Al Jazeera, 17 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1A2WS8W. 
184  Global Voices, ‘In Between Images of the Peshawar Attack, a Thought About Pakistan’s Army Public Schools’, http://bit.ly/1wZFh2I.  
PAKISTAN
State of Civil Society report 2015: THE YEAR IN REVIEW
67
Ahead of the attack, it was already clear that Pakistan’s civil society was caught between hard-nosed 
government and intolerant fundamentalists, as Mohammed Ismail of the Pakistan NGOs Forum told us in 
August 2014:185
Islamic fundamentalists are threating civic space as they continuously attack human rights defenders 
(HRDs). Many HRDs relocated to Islamabad from Peshawar as they feared their lives were under 
threat. Nobel award-winning women’s rights activist Malala Yousafzai was not acknowledged by the 
Pakistani government; CSOs from various political backgrounds gathered and paid their tributes 
to her. Malala was subject to a smear campaign in the social and electronic media, where she was 
accused of being a ‘Jewish spy’ and a ‘Western agent’ attempting to destroy Pakistan and Islam. 
There is no doubt that the civic space for CSOs and HRDs is shrinking… The right wing policies 
of Prime Minister Sharif ’s government and his favourable stand towards Islamic fundamentalists 
are encouraging him to take actions that oppress civil society in Pakistan. Imran Khan [a former 
cricketer and divisive political figure] is also providing space for religious extremists and the Taliban 
in the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where his party is in power.
Pakistan’s citizens and civil society are, unfortunately, no strangers to extremist attacks that seek to make 
political capital out of soft civilian targets. CSO staff, particularly female staff, are often the target of threats and 
attacks from extremists and militants.186 But even people apparently hardened to violence were shocked by the 
December attacks. Widespread public revulsion spread quickly through social media.187 In the words of Qamar 
Naseem, of women’s organisation Blue Veins:
People called it the 9/11 of Pakistan. This incident is one of the defining moments in the history of 
Pakistan, where the Pakistani government, civil society, militants and Islamist apologists have to 
define where they stand, and have to shift their policies and look back at attitudes, behaviours and 
actions. Civil society was the first to come out and condemn the attack, hold demonstrations, and 
ask government to take responsibility for their failure to protect innocent children. Civil society across 
Pakistan have reinforced their demand for government action to bring these people to court and 
bring them to justice, and asked government to put an end to fundamentalism within government, 
185  Full interview available at: CIVICUS, ‘Nawaz Sharif Must Provide Support to CSOs Instead of Disenabling the Environment they Operate in: an Interview with 
Professor Mohammed Ismail’, 11 August 2014, http://bit.ly/1AAqAVM. 
186  From the Pakistan AGNA questionnaire response.
187  ‘Liberals rally to ‘reclaim’ Pakistan after Peshawar school massacre’, The Times of India, 17 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1HOZH3d. 
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and make efforts to deradicalise this society once again. Civil society has started campaigns on non-
violence. 
One such campaign was the Reclaim your Mosques movement, which saw people travel from across Pakistan 
to stage demonstrations and sit ins outside the Red Mosque, a large, state-supported  mosque in Pakistan’s 
capital, Islamabad, where a prominent imam, Maulana Abdul Aziz, was seen as an apologist for extremism 
and had refused to condemn the attack, while the government was seen as weak for not taking action against 
him.188 The movement grew, with demonstrations spreading to other cities, and people making public and 
social media statements condemning the attack and calling on the government to exercise zero tolerance for 
extremists. Aziz eventually apologised and condemned the attack, while the government issued a warrant 
for his arrest. 189 Protests continued in February 2015, including in response to the slow progress of official 
investigations, and the Peshawar Bar Association demanded a judicial probe.190
The attacks, and the response to them, provoked a period of self-questioning within civil society, but also 
helped to galvanise shared civil society action, amongst a civil society that is often divided, according to Qamar 
Naseem:
Civil society was always active, but the impact of these attacks on civil society was double edged: 
civil society realised their failures in promoting inclusion. We cannot only blame government, but 
civil society’s failures as well. Civil society has failed to play its watchdog role. Our activities and 
initiatives did not affect government policy as they should have. These attacks have united civil 
society. There needs to be more working in collaboration. All civil society actors, as well as CSOs, 
have a role, and there should be more platforms where people come together. 
However, the governmental response to the Peshawar attacks sought to limit civil society space, at precisely 
the moment when civil society could best play a role in fostering pluralism and demonstrating civic alternatives 
to terrorism, given that many in civil society had long called for action on extremism.191 The formulation of a 
188  ‘Reclaim Your Mosques’, The Nation, 20 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1clu6Ic; ‘Following warrants: ‘Reclaim your mosque’ activists press for Aziz’s arrest’, 
The Express Tribune, 27 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1FQg7pP; Global Voices, ‘From #ReclaimYourMosques to #ReclaimPakistan, Pakistanis Call for an End to 
Extremism’, 31 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1PQmi3M.
189  ‘Rendering apology: Maulana Aziz bows to society’s pressure’, The Express Tribune, 21 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1zMxxir. 
190  ‘Parents protest at Army Public School in Peshawar against ‘sluggish investigation’’, The Express Tribune, 7 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1KB9Ilk; ‘Parents 
protest slow probe into Peshawar school attack’, The Hindu, 9 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1EArj4v; 
‘Peshawar Bar demands judicial probe into APS attack’, The News, 25 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1Qd4GKi. 
191  CIVICUS: Anti-Terrorism Measures in Pakistan: Authorities Urged to See Civil Society as Partners not Opponents, 20 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1LMZNGu. 
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national plan of action in the wake of the attacks included plans to monitor and restrict funding to CSOs. The 
situation is undoubtedly complex in Pakistan, which has a large number of faith-based CSOs, some of which 
conceal extremist identifications behind a mask of humanitarian work, and where religious schools, some 
of which inculcate extremism, register under the same regulations as CSOs. But the perverse fact that non-
extremist CSOs are the most transparent and visible parts of civil society counts against them, as it makes 
it easier for the state to regulate them and interfere. In December 2014, the state government of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa deregistered 3,000 out of 4,000 registered CSOs without providing any reasons why. Many CSOs 
know that they are under observation.192
The Pakistan NGO Forum also draws attention to a related danger to the funding of CSOs, a common challenge 
that will be returned to in the next section:
The government has started to introduce new laws to take control over CSOs’ funding. The main 
target will be rights-based and advocacy organisations. Some CSOs’ foreign currency accounts have 
already been closed down by the State Bank.
In the wake of the attacks, CSOs are ready to work with the government to eliminate extremism. But they also 
need to know that the government is serious about doing this, which implies that the government needs to 
work with civil society’s forces of moderation. As Qamar concludes:
Civil society has to be partnering with others – nationally, internationally and locally. Our role is 
not only to criticise government; civil society has to work in a strategic manner. We should be telling 
government that it is our government, it is our country. I love my country more than a paid soldier.
Conclusion: civic mobilisation
As the above shows, people are mobilising in the most unexpected places. Protest is not a luxury: in many 
places around the world, people are rejecting established politics and modes of participation in which they are 
denied real voice and power. People are far from apathetic; rather they are looking for, and forging, new ways 
of mobilising, and causes to rally behind that are being ignored by political elites. Citizens are reaching tipping 
points, and once the tipping point has passed, protest is going viral. But the viral nature of many protests does 
not mean that these are out of control. In the above examples, violence is rare, and far more common is for 
citizens and civil society groups to take responsibility to limit violence, self-police and develop demands.
192  Text in this paragraph draws from an interview with Qamar Naseem, conducted in March 2015.
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Online activism is an essential and growing part of how people are mobilising to seek change, but it still needs 
to be understood better, and seen as the start of a participation journey that leads to change, rather than 
an end in itself. At the same time, even when progressive movements fall short of their aims, the impact on 
developing the future participation and activism capacities of citizens and civil society groups is important and 
should not be underestimated. Most people are engaging in ways that are instinctively inclusive, and embrace 
principles of solidarity and collective action. But the methods and tools available for mobilisation may equally 
be taken up by regressive forces that seek to undermine human rights, in the many societies where inequality 
is increasing and communities are polarising: the purpose of mobilisation, and who is mobilising, are more 
important than the method. 
Five key points for future action:
•	 We need to come up with new and better indicators for predicting and anticipating civic action tipping 
points, so mobilisations can be supported and tap into available learning earlier. As part of this, we need 
to research, understand and document better the breakdowns in the social contract, and the failures in 
governance, that lead to people mobilising.
•	 The connections between online and offline activism need to be better understood and more strongly 
connected, so that people can be encouraged to deepen their participation. Better connections are also 
needed between new civic mobilisations and existing CSOs.
•	 We need new metrics for assessing the impact of mass civic action, and be better at capturing and 
sharing the learning from success stories. 
•	 Civil society has a crucial role to play in encouraging tolerance, reducing prejudice and winning the 
argument against regressive voices, but it can only do so fully if the conditions for civil society are made 
more enabling.
•	 Resourcing support for mass civic action needs to be carefully handled, to avoid the accusation that 
protest is something being fomented from abroad.
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Worsening relations between 
governments and CSOs
Pakistan is, alas, not the only country in which civil society finds its ability to respond to the major challenges 
of the day constrained by government suspicion of its activities. We believe that in many countries relations 
between the state and civil society are getting worse. As part of our research for this report, we carried out an 
annual survey of members of the Affinity Group of National Associations (AGNA), a peer-learning network of 
national-level CSO networks convened by CIVICUS. It is striking that of the 22 responses received, only in one 
country – Poland – is the relationship between civil society and government assessed to have improved in the 
last year, with a new law on association currently before parliament that CSOs worked with the Office of the 
President to develop. It is hoped that the law will make it easier to establish and register CSOs, and reduce 
government interference over CSOs.
Much more common, unfortunately, are reports of worsening relationships between government and CSOs.
Argentina, for example, has become politically more polarised as the presidency is in conflict with other arms of 
the state. Corruption allegations have surrounded the highest levels of government, while the suspicious death 
in January 2015 of Alberto Nisman, a prosecutor who accused the President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of a 
cover-up, sparked protests of 400,000 people in the capital, Buenos Aires.193 In this context, and with elections 
approaching in October 2015, it is sadly predictable that the government has become less tolerant of civil 
society’s right to ask difficult questions. The Argentinian Network for International Cooperation (RACI) reports:
There are tensions from state agencies, especially at the national level, towards some CSOs that 
present different ideas and criticism of government actions. The year has seen the closure of some 
CSOs, as a means by the state to silence some critics, as well as certain speeches aimed at discrediting 
193  ‘Who Killed the Argentine Prosecutor? 400,000 March for Justice in Buenos Aires as Controversy Grows’, Democracy Now!, 19 February 2015, http://bit.
ly/1FkbGjp; ‘Argentine politics: Silent, but seething’, The Economist, 21 February 2015, http://econ.st/1zTf9Bi.
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civil society. This situation is generating mistrust by society towards CSOs, something that didn’t 
exist in the period immediately before, where CSO-state relations were more fluid.
An enduring paradox of civil society repression is that, while elections are supposed to be an occasion where 
democracy is asserted, they often become moments when nervous governments strengthen their grips on 
civil society. In Nicaragua, approaching elections are seen by civil society as less an opportunity to celebrate 
democracy than a driver of state pressure, as noted by Kepa Nicaragua, who point to:
…a hostile context, where spaces for citizen participation have been reduced, and for CSOs, the 
ability to exist as autonomous organisations with capacity to fulfil their role is getting more difficult 
than ever. General elections will be held in 2016, and therefore political hazards might increase. The 
main challenge is to keep alive autonomous CSOs.
In Jordan, there is a sense that the legal environment for civil society is tightening, a familiar indicator of 
worsening relations, in the view of Partners-Jordan:
We cannot speak about the challenges for civil society in Jordan without mentioning the legal 
processes. The registration procedures and regulations and forms of registration are becoming harder 
and complicated. The procedures to get approvals for funding have changed recently. Approval to 
receive funding now needs to go to multiple ministries, including the Ministry of Planning, and 
then the Prime Ministry, a process which can take three or four months. Governmental employees 
responsible for registration, approving funds or following up on the work of CSOs lack knowledge of 
the laws, and experience in working with CSOs, and the laws are also broad and vague. Government 
employees judge according to what they think and feel and decisions are not based on clear 
procedures, which makes processes not clear for CSOs.
In India, where beneath official rhetoric about the role of CSOs as partners in development, lies an often testy 
and difficult civil society-state relationship, particular attention is also being paid to the funding that CSOs 
receive. This is consistent with a broader international trend where states seek to interfere with the receipt of 
funding to limit the independence and functioning of CSOs, or use the receipt of foreign funding to paint CSOs 
as agents of foreign powers. Voluntary Action Network India (VANI) relates that:
There have been systematic attacks on civil society through threats, notices and selective leaks to 
the media. The Reserve Bank of India has recently sent ‘secret circulars’ to banks asking them not to 
process inflows of certain organisations unless the donations have the ‘prior approval’ of the home 
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ministry. A leaked Intelligence Bureau report to the Ministry of Home Affairs revealed the targeting 
of some CSOs for receiving foreign funds and being blamed for undertaking anti-national activities. 
The report stated that civil society has stalled the gross domestic growth of India by 2-3%. This was 
not just a blow to some organisations, but to civil society as a whole, as it showed that the state 
apparatus can use its machinery out of resentment towards genuine rights-based work. Further, this 
secret report was selectively leaked to the media, which blew the issue out of proportion by negatively 
tarnishing the image of civil society. Such unnecessary attacks on civil society take away from the 
crucial role we play in national development, curbs civic participation in India, and violates our 
freedom of expression. 
Bolivia demonstrates a different challenge: that in an environment of limited funding, CSOs that receive state 
funding risk being instrumentalised by the state, as UNITAS describe:
The largest challenge for Bolivian civil society is to keep, or perhaps retrieve, a level of independence 
from state agencies, as there is a high level of co-option of civil society by the government. Civil 
society needs to reaffirm the liberty of expression and freedom of association, and articulate bigger 
and better channels for citizen participation.
The above themes are ones that recur in the case studies below of countries where civil society is facing 
particularly heavy attack. But it doesn’t have to be this way. Uruguay has attracted widespread praise for 
its implementation of progressive social policies, and the grounded approach to governing of its President, 
until February 2015, José Mujica.194 We asked Anabel Cruz and Analía Bettoni of the Communication and 
Development Institute (ICD) whether this progressive approach to social policy had also improved the 
conditions for civil society:
We can say that, in general, the relationships of CSOs with the central and local governments in 
Uruguay are free of tensions, and CSOs work in an enabling environment in terms of freedom of 
association, assembly and expression. People are free to form their own organisations according to 
common interests, and there are no limitations to peaceful assembly. Different organisations have of 
course different degrees of relationship with the state: while trade unions have traditionally strong 
influence, other smaller CSOs may not have the same capacity of exerting pressure.
194  ‘Jose Mujica: The world’s ‘poorest’ president’, BBC, 15 November 2012, http://bbc.in/1mZL7uG. 
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The national government has been in the hands of the Broad Front Party since 2005. Since then, a 
series of reforms have been implemented in the economic and social field, including the establishment 
of new mechanisms for relationships with and participation of civil society. Participation in 
the planning and execution of public policies has taken on new forms and responsibilities, and 
organisations have been convened to integrate new mechanisms for consultation, or to execute social 
policies traditionally in state hands. 
This is not to say, however, that some challenges do not remain:
Although there have been important steps forward, many difficulties are also acknowledged by CSOs 
in terms of getting a real voice, influencing public policies, presenting proposals and being heard in 
decision making processes.
At local level, we can find cases of genuine collaboration between CSOs and local governments, 
while in some cases, disagreements between CSOs and the national government have been present in 
recent years, such as legislation to legalise abortion, for which women’s groups have been striving for 
25 years. The disagreement saw the veto of a law approved by Parliament by Tabaré Vázquez during 
his first term and the approval of a more conservative law during the presidency of José Mujica.
The example of Uruguay, while not perfect, shows that positive relations between government and civil society 
can be built and strengthened over time in countries of the global south, even when there is disagreement 
on critical social issues. Progressive governments respect and enable the fundamental civil society rights of 
assembly, association and expression. Other countries have much to learn from the Uruguayan model, and 
more must be done to document and share this progressive practice in the global south.
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Civil society in 
polarised contexts: 
spotlight on Bangladesh
In politically polarised contexts, civil society often finds itself torn between two political camps, accused 
of disloyalty by both, and struggling to maintain and assert its independence and party political neutrality. 
Previously we’ve reported on this situation in Venezuela, where democracy suffered a further setback in March 
2015, when the President was given the power to rule by decree for a period.195
In Malawi, colleagues at CHRR discussed earlier civil society’s constructive role in recent elections, but they also 
note how polarised, highly contested elections have impacted on civil society:
Tripartite elections emerged as the key issue in 2014/15 on the part of Malawian CSOs. The much-
disputed results revealed the divisions of Malawian civil society along political lines. While some 
CSOs described elections as free, fair and credible, others punched holes in them due to their 
associated irregularities, and went on to demand a presidential vote recount. There was no common 
ground on which CSOs could stand as regards the poll results.
Another context where civil society must work in conditions of political polarisation currently is Bangladesh, 
which saw renewed political violence in early 2015, including the murder of three bloggers who challenged 
religious conservatism: Avijit Roy in February 2015, Washiqur Rahman in March 2015 and Ananta Bijoy Das in 
May 2015.196
Adilur Rahman Khan, of Bangladeshi human rights organisation Odhikar, reports on the difficult situation civil 
society faces:
195  ‘Venezuelan Assembly gives initial approval for expanded presidential powers’, Al Jazeera, 12 March 2015, http://alj.am/1JaUamo. 
196  ‘Third Bangladeshi blogger hacked to death’, Al Jazeera, 12 May 2015, http://bit.ly/1JFH7HY. 
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Bangladesh’s recent political confrontation has two ingredients, both of which have their origins in 
the recent past.
Firstly, on 30 June 2011, the present Awami League-led grand alliance government, holding an 
absolute majority in Parliament, passed the 15th Amendment Bill to the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh, without any referendum or public consultation, and ignoring protests from 
various sectors of society, including the main opposition grouping and other political parties. Before 
the 15th Amendment, a Judgment passed by a majority of the Judges of the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court had concluded that the next two general elections could be held under a caretaker 
government, something that had been a normal political procedure in Bangladesh, but this is no 
longer possible after the passing of the 15th Amendment.
Secondly, flawed 10th Parliamentary Elections were held on 5 January 2014. These elections were 
rejected by most registered political parties, including the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party (BNP) and its alliance, the Left Democratic Alliance and others. The opposition alliance called 
for boycotting and resistance of these elections. As a result of the boycott, 153 candidates from the 
ruling alliance were elected uncontested, out of 300 constituencies, even before elections were held. 
This is unprecedented in a democratic electoral system.
Given this high level of political polarisation, Odhikar and other civil society groups, which are 
struggling to survive by keeping their independent position, are repeatedly urging the government 
and the (out of parliament) main opposition alliance to reach a negotiated settlement, including 
an agreement to hold fresh elections under a neutral government. Civil society groups are also 
organising roundtable meetings and press conferences, monitoring human rights violations 
committed by both sides, and demanding that they stop violence and state repression, including 
extrajudicial killings, custodial torture and enforced disappearance.
CSOs that work on civil and political rights and monitor human rights violations by the state are 
facing pressure from the Prime Minister’s Office through the NGO Affairs Bureau (NGOAB). The 
government is also concerned about CSOs that work with human rights defenders and the families of 
victims of violence, and is creating obstacles for CSOs that address workers’ rights and the condition 
of workers in the ready-made garments sector. For example, the NGOAB has stopped giving 
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clearance to Odhikar to operate our EU funded project on the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture, and has stopped those of our activities that are funded by the Embassy of the 
Kingdom of Netherlands and the Finnish NGO Foundation for Human Rights. When the responsible 
persons at the government level call civil society a ‘cancer’ and ‘traitor’, and move to curtail our 
capacity to criticise the government in power, it becomes very difficult to continue to operate ‘legally’ 
and ‘openly’.
The restriction of the receipt of civil society funding is an increasingly common tactic used by governments to 
limit the voice and role of civil society, as discussed further below.
Civil society under attack, but 
fighting back
In some countries, we believe we are seeing a full-on assault on fundamental civil society rights. In 2014, 
CIVICUS documented significant restrictions of civil society rights in at least 96 different countries. Past State of 
Civil Society Reports have analysed that there are particular regional clusters where the attack is most severe: 
broadly, MENA, Sub-Saharan Africa, post-Communist states in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, and South East 
Asia.
The report of Maini Kiai, UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of freedom of peaceful assembly and of 
association, published in January 2015,197 gives a comprehensive breakdown of challenges faced in the exercise 
of fundamental civil society rights in 2014. Particularly worrying is the Special Rapporteur’s conclusion that 
the world is seeing a “democratic recession”, indicating an increasing gap between governments that deny 
democracy and publics that continue to demand and expect it. This suggests that repressive governments are 
trying to normalise a climate of debate where the rights of assembly and association are seen as dangerous, 
and something that needs to be reined in.
While attacks on civil society are nothing new, we believe we are now seeing a conscious, mutually-reinforcing 
attempt by repressive states to create and propagate repressive norms about people’s participation, in which 
the notion that human rights are a barrier to stability and development is being made more acceptable. We 
believe an arc of repressive states is sharing tactics and inspiration to support each other. Notable here is the 
comment from Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, in July 2014, that Hungary seeks to become an “illiberal 
197  UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, January 2014 op. cit.
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state”, citing approvingly the examples of China, Russia and Turkey.198 President Orban has practised what he 
preaches, by borrowing the Russian approach of demonising as foreign agents CSOs that receive funding from 
abroad, with the government raiding the offices of CSOs receiving funding from Norway in September 2014, as 
part of a wider crackdown on civil society.199 
What attacks on civil society tell us as a whole is that civil society, in too many countries, is still only at best 
something that is tolerated, provided it stays within narrow confines, where it delivers services and adds value 
to government activities. The argument about the full roles and rights of civil society has yet to be won. We 
also believe that, in many cases, there are strategic political and economic reasons why other, ostensibly more 
liberal states, are tolerating abuses in these countries: some of the states below are seen as regionally strategic 
by powerful states, and some of them provide oil and other important resources.
The methods of attack on civil society vary, but a typical typology of civil society repression includes: 
•	 the introduction or more intensive application of laws that limit freedoms of assembly, association 
and expression, including anti-terrorism laws, which can assert a chilling effect even in draft form;
•	 the tightening of registration requirements, which consume civil society energy and resources in 
compliance, and which proscribe some activities, or give governments powers to make some types of 
CSOs illegal;
•	 controls on the receipt of funding for CSOs, most usually funding from foreign sources, and related 
rhetoric that paints CSOs receiving such funding as agents of foreign powers; and
•	 verbal and physical attacks by politicians and other powerful figures that can escalate to detention, 
imprisonment and assassination.
Below we offer nine short case studies – on Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cambodia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, 
Turkey and Thailand - where members of the CIVICUS alliance have reported on or experienced attacks and 
constraints in the past year. We believe it is demonstrable that the conditions for civil society have worsened in 
these countries, and that the main agency that is worsening conditions, in these cases, is the state.
At the same time, there is a need to note that central governments are not the only aggressors. Attacks come 
from a range of sources, and it is important to disaggregate these. As the example of Mexico, above, suggests, 
local politics can be as deadly for civil society as national politics, and often it is from the shadowy nexus 
between unaccountable and corrupt politics, security forces and businesses and organised crime, that threat 
198  ‘Orban Says He Seeks to End Liberal Democracy in Hungary’, Bloomberg Business, 28 July 2014, http://bloom.bg/1G5I2DZ.
199  CIVICUS, ‘Global Civil Society Alliance Condemns NGO Crack-down in Hungary and Calls on New European Commission to Act’, 9 September 2014, http://bit.
ly/1JaV567; Amnesty International, ‘Hungary: Authorities must end unprecedented crackdown on NGOs’, 2 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1G7ng77. 
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comes. Civil society activists most often come under threat when they challenge interests that need access 
to land and resources, such as energy companies, extractive industries, large scale agriculture and property 
development, and illicit concerns such as drug trafficking. For these interests, local populations and the exercise 
of their rights is a problem, and so CSOs and activists that try to defend those rights are a threat to be tackled. 
The CSOs, activists and journalists most at risk are those that challenge these interests, expose corruption and 
raise difficult questions.
Activists for land rights, for example, often come under attack because they confront commercial interests. 
Recent killings of land rights activists have been reported in Honduras, Indonesia, Peru, the Philippines and 
Thailand,200 to name but a few. Overall, Global Witness reports that 116 land rights activists were killed in 2014, 
87 of them in Latin America, with Brazil accounting for the most killings.201 In some countries, the attack comes 
from extremist religious groups, as the examples given earlier of Iraq, Pakistan and Syria suggest, and women 
HRDS and LBGTI activists come under particular threat, as discussed further below.
Azerbaijan: conditions worsen ahead 
of elections
In Azerbaijan, where the presidency was passed from father to son in dynastic fashion over a decade ago, 
and where the economy depends heavily on oil export, little dissent is tolerated. Although parliamentary 
elections are padded by pseudo-opposition parties and nominally independent candidates loyal to the ruling 
elite, Azerbaijan seems to be conforming to the pattern where repression increases ahead of elections, due in 
November 2015.202 
Azerbaijan also corresponds with the trend of governments targeting the financing of civil society as a way of 
cutting off the viability of CSOs that raise difficult issues: since May 2014, the government has frozen the bank 
accounts of at least 50 CSOs, and in many cases those of their staff members as well. In early 2015, the NGO 
Law was amended, and now systematically impedes the access of CSOs to domestic and foreign funding; CSOs 
must now apply to the government to licence foreign donors or approve any funded project. The aim of this 
200  Amnesty International, ‘Attacks Continue against Honduran Rights Activists’, 20 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1J77o4V; Rights and Resources Initiative, ‘RRI 
Condemns the Murder of Indra Pelani, Land Rights Activist Beaten to Death by Guards Contracted to Asia Pulp and Paper (APP)’, 4 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1SFRQrP; 
Global Witness, ‘Peru’s Deadly Environment’, 17 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1d2W24f; CIVICUS, ‘Allegations of Corporate Complicity in Attacks on Activists in 
Philippines’, 10 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1JaWqda; GRAIN, ‘Thailand: Farmers and rights groups decry land activist killing’, 16 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1Btd5Co. 
201  Global Witness, ‘How Many More?’, 20 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1yK1seH. 
202  This section draws from ‘Joint letter re: Addressing the human rights situation in Azerbaijan at the 28th Session of the UN Human Rights Council’, signed by 
CIVICUS and other international CSOs, 23 February 2015, available at CIVICUS, http://bit.ly/1wjJZbG.  
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is to make the funding of any work critical of the government impossible. Several international CSOs with long 
track records of working in Azerbaijan have been forced to leave or suspend operations.
As in other repressive states, laws around treason, tax evasion and violence are also being misused to arrest and 
imprison civil society activists. The past year has seen numerous spurious arrests and detentions, including the 
arrest of nine members of the youth activist group, NIDA Civic Movement, in October 2014. Founding member 
of the movement, Turgut Gambar, tells us:
The latest crackdown, which began in 2013, and has dramatically escalated in recent months, has 
been unprecedented in its magnitude and scope. Scores of people from different politically and 
socially active groups, including youth activists, political party leaders and members, CSO leaders, 
religious activists, journalists and bloggers, have been subject to imprisonment and harassment. 
In addition to the escalating persecution of activists, the authorities have adopted a number of 
restrictive laws to regulate the activities of NGOs.
Azerbaijan is also a country where civil society activists face repercussions when they try to claim their rights 
in international arenas: some activists have been detained and imprisoned in apparent retaliation for taking 
appeals to the Council of Europe and European Court of Human Rights.
Turgut Gambar suggests the motivations behind the state’s crackdown, and gives us hope that the young people 
of Azerbaijan will overcome repression:
The authorities do not want young people to be active; they feel it threatens their current 
monopolisation of power and politics… The government understands that people in the country 
are frustrated due to ubiquitous corruption, high levels of unemployment, poor quality of social 
services, constant violation of human rights and generally low living standards. They also see that 
around the world, including in the former Soviet Union, people are taking to the streets to protest 
against corruption and authoritarianism and oust dictatorships in their countries. The government 
of Azerbaijan thinks instilling fear in the people will help to keep them in power. But they should 
understand that only by addressing the grievances of the people can it help to reduce growing popular 
dissatisfaction in the country.
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Bahrain: the crackdown continues
The crackdown on civil society continues in Bahrain, where activists have been jailed, and abused while in 
prison.203 Bahrain occupies a strategic position in the Middle East for the US and its allies, and its ruling minority 
enjoys the support of Saudi Arabia’s monarchy, and by extension, the reluctance of global north powers to 
criticise. However, notable recently was some evidence of US-Bahrain friction in 2014, with US Congressman 
James McGovern refused access to Bahrain, and an apparent move by Bahrain to cultivate closer ties with 
Russia as an alternative, indicative of the danger posed by an emerging network of repressive states.204
While the government established the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) in 2011, in response 
to the supressed people’s uprisings of that year, there has been no action in 2014 or 2015 on its findings 
of torture and mistreatment of people in detention, and as of August 2014, we estimated that at least 13 
people who had been noted by BICI as suffering mistreatment remained in jail. Nabeel Rajab, President of the 
Bahrain Centre for Human Rights, is one person amongst many who has experienced persistent repression and 
harassment. After completing a two year sentence in May 2014, during which he experienced mistreatment, 
Nabeel was handed another six month sentence in January 2015 for insulting public institutions on Twitter. As a 
result of these draconian acts, Bahrain’s prisons are now dangerously overcrowded.205
203  This section draws from: CIVICUS, ‘Bahrain: Free Nabeel Rajab Immediately and Unconditionally’, 10 October 2014, http://bit.ly/1cmLtIv; ‘Joint letter to King 
Hamad of Bahrain’, signed by CIVICUS and other international CSOs, 25 August 2014, available at CIVICUS, http://bit.ly/1M5btUh; CIVICUS, ‘16 NGOs Urge International 
Community to Pressure Bahrain to Drop Charges Against Nabeel Rajab’, 20 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1AyvWBd.
204  ‘US congressman refused access to Bahrain’, The Hill, 23 August 2014, http://bit.ly/1LPEfsM. 
205  Bahrain Center for Human Rights, ‘Bahrain: Bahrain’s Prisons At Their Breaking Point’, 23 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1PRWWlU.  
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Bahrain is now finding new ways to repress citizens, moving from direct attacks to more subtle forms, including 
by tightening the legal framework to give a veneer of legality to its acts. For example, a new law has been 
introduced imposing a seven year sentence for the crime of publicly insulting the king, and in February 2015 the 
government revoked the citizenship of 72 people, including blogger Ali Abdulemam, who lives under political 
asylum in the UK.206
Under such circumstances, how could any election be free and fair? But Bahrain, in common with many 
autocratic states, continues to perform the rituals, if not the substance, of democracy. With the king holding 
executive powers, parliament has no real say, and a career in politics is more associated with seeking a lucrative 
lifestyle than pursuing change, while citizenship requirements mean that the large migrant populations that 
prop up Bahrain’s economy are denied the franchise.207 Elections remain important to the government to 
project an international image of normality, but those held in November 2014 instead revealed the rulers’ 
paranoia. The main opposition coalition, Al Wefaq, boycotted the elections, and prominent civil society activists 
encouraged voters to boycott. Very few candidates from political societies, which take the place of political 
parties in Bahrain, were elected: most of those elected were independents, perhaps reflecting public discontent 
with the failure of political societies to provide alternatives, as well as the impact of the Al Wefaq boycott.208 
The response of the government has been to suppress even the once-tolerated Al Wefaq: its leader, Sheikh Ali 
Salman, who was arrested in July 2014 after meeting the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, was arrested again in 
December 2014 as a result of making political speeches, and at time of writing is on trial.209
The long term challenge for Bahraini society is that sectarian divisions, between the Sunni minority from which 
the ruling elite is drawn, and the country’s Shia majority, marginalised as a result of the rulers’ divide and rule 
approach, are only likely to worsen, given the resentment that is being stored up against the ruling minority, 
and the lack of open platforms to negotiate differences. 
But if external political pressure on Bahrain remains weak, perhaps the alternative from those outside the 
country would be to target the businesses that continue to work with Bahrain: there is already evidence that 
financial businesses are switching to other locations in the region, while government debt has increased and its 
credit rating been downgraded.210 Greater economic pressure could hasten political change.
206  ‘Bahrain’s elections are just a red herring’, Al Bawaba News, 24 November 2014; Index on Censorship, ‘Bahrain revokes citizenship of 72 critical voices’, 3 
February 2015, http://bit.ly/1KrvjrP; Global Voices, ‘Ali Abdulemam: ‘I Have Not Lost My Identity. I Am Bahraini’’, 20 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1dBerGj.
207  Al Bawaba News, 24 November 2014 op. cit.
208  ‘Bahrain opposition groups announce elections boycott’, BBC, 11 October 2014, http://bbc.in/1eC1Naj; Citizens for Bahrain, ‘Bahrain elections – what 
happened to the political societies?’, 27 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1ECKRFe. 
209  ‘Bahrain arrests opposition leader over U.S. diplomat meeting’, Al Bawaba News, 10 July 2014, http://bit.ly/1ABxBWr; 
Bahrain Center for Human Rights, ‘Bahrain: The Beginning of the End for Bahrain’s Tolerated Opposition’, 26 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1PRXEzB. 
210  Bahrain Center for Human Rights, 26 February 2015 op. cit.
Bahrain is now 
finding new ways to 
repress citizens, 
moving from direct 
attacks to more subtle 
forms, including by 
tightening the legal 
framework to give a 
veneer of legality to 
its acts.
...if external political 
pressure on Bahrain 
remains weak, per-
haps the alternative 
from those outside 
the country would be 
to target the business-
es that continue to 
work with Bahrain.
State of Civil Society report 2015: THE YEAR IN REVIEW
83
Cambodia: life after the 
international spotlight 
moves on
The situation for Cambodian civil society has worsened since the government won contested elections in 
June 2013. In 2014, three draft laws affecting the independence of the judiciary were promulgated and 
rapidly approved, with little transparency. Further, while in past years, civil society has successfully mobilised, 
domestically and internationally, to delay a repressive draft Law on Associations and Non-Governmental 
Organisations, it is expected that a new draft will soon be reintroduced.211 
In June 2014, in a move that underlined the weakness of the international governance regime, Cambodia 
rejected key recommendations of the UNHRC’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process, including those on 
media freedom, pre-trial detention and investigation of excessive violence against protestors.
Chak Sopheap, Executive Director of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights, draws attention to threats that 
emanate from connections between the private sector and key government figures:
The overall environment for civil society in Cambodia remains critical, especially for grassroots 
organisations that work in the provinces. Throughout Cambodia, CSO representatives, human 
rights defenders and other activists continue to be threatened and harassed by local authorities and 
private security guards as a result of their work. Judicial harassment, including through the misuse of 
criminal charges, as well as the abuse of provisional detention, also remains a serious concern and a 
challenge for independent civil society in Cambodia. The situation is aggravated by the high level of 
corruption and collusion between the authorities and influential private actors. Secrecy and lack of 
transparency continue to characterise the law-making process in Cambodia.
211  This section draws from: CIVICUS, ‘CCHR and CIVICUS Condemn the Cambodian Government’s Rejection of Key Recommendations During its 2nd Universal 
Periodic Review’, 2 July 2014, http://bit.ly/1FdSS4a; CIVICUS, ‘Cambodia: Human Rights Situations Remains Critical – CIVICUS Interview with Chak Sopheap (CCHR)’, 23 
January 2015, http://bit.ly/1GJvTDI. 
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There is also a sense that, with other countries in the region experiencing difficult conditions or transition, such 
as Myanmar and Thailand, the international spotlight has moved on from Cambodia:
Due to the improvements registered in the country over the last few years and the worsening situation 
in other countries in the region, international attention on Cambodia is slowly fading.
International civil society needs to respond to the situation in Cambodia by bringing the spotlight back onto the 
country, and being on high alert to mobilise in the face of any attempts at reintroduction of the restrictive draft 
law.
Egypt: Tahrir Square hopes crushed
The last year in Egypt has seen one dismal experience for civil society follow another, as the heady days of 
Tahrir Square are now a distant and hollow memory.212 The public and state backlash against the brief period of 
Muslim Brotherhood government that followed the toppling of former President Mubarak has led to a heavily 
polarised environment. Undoubtedly there is some public support for strong government, translated as military 
government, but in this climate, the risk is that opposing voices are demonised and protestors seen as disruptive 
of stability.
In polarised circumstances, it is particularly important that the law is applied impartially, but in Egypt, laws and 
trials are clearly being used to stifle dissent. The last year offers a litany of people active since the 2011 uprising 
who are now jailed, including, to name a few of many, women’s human rights defender Maheinour El-Massry, 
jailed for two years in May 2014, prominent blogger and Tahrir Square activist Alaa Abd El Fattah, sentenced to 
five years in February 2015, and youth activist Ahmed Douma, handed a life sentence for anti-military protests, 
also in February 2015, along with 200 others tried in absentia.213 This is indicative of another troubling trend, of 
mass trials and speedy verdicts. 
212  This section draws from: CIVICUS, ‘CIVICUS Interview with Amal Elmohandes, Director of the Women Human Rights Defenders Program at Nazra for Feminist 
Studies’, 18 June 2014, http://bit.ly/1d2ZmMI; ‘Joint Letter to Permanent Representatives of members and observers of the UN Human Rights Council re: Universal 
Periodic Review of Egypt, signed by CIVICUS and other international CSOs, 22 October 2014, available at CIVICUS, http://bit.ly/1JYsyS0; CIVICUS, ‘Call on Egyptian 
Government to End All Human Rights Violations – CIVICUS Interview with Hussein Magdy’, 19 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1Rtx6C7. 
213  Nazra for Feminist Studies, ‘Confirmation of the Verdict against Mahienour El-Massry: A New Episode in the Series of Incarcerating Women Human Rights 
Defenders (WHRDs)… The Verdict Must be Renunciated and the Law Needs to be Revised’, 21 May 2014, http://bit.ly/1pfdseC; ‘Prominent Egyptian Youth Activist Gets 
Life In Prison’, Voice of America, 4 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1cmNDbc; ‘As Egypt Sentences More Activists, Rights Groups Speak Out’, Voice of America, 26 February 
2015, http://bit.ly/1FdTGWG. 
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There is currently a game of cat and mouse between government and CSOs regarding the laws that regulate 
civil society activity. The government gave all CSOs until 10 November 2014 to register under a repressive 
associations law.  In response, many registered as not-for-profit companies or law firms, covered by different 
legislation, only for even more restrictive legislation to be proposed, along with new limitations on the receipt 
of foreign funding. The proposed new law would make peaceful association in the name of human rights 
essentially impossible in Egypt, giving the state the power to close down CSOs, choke off their funding and 
jail their leaders. That this law was proposed even as Egypt was being reviewed by the UNHRC’s UPR process 
indicates the government’s contempt for external opinion.
Hussein Magdy of the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms describes the situation:
Currently the overall operating environment for civil society in Egypt is dire. The current regime 
exercises full control over political liberties enjoyed in the public sphere and orchestrates an 
intensified crackdown on CSOs and HRDs. The authorities have institutionalised arbitrary 
restrictions on civil society operations by proposing legal provisions that contradict Egypt’s 
international human rights obligations. In the past months there have also been a considerable 
number of cases where authorities have threatened to close down CSOs. They have also issued harsh 
prison sentences and pecuniary fines on HRDs for their peaceful advocacy activities. In its current 
state, it is fair to say that Egyptian civil society is going through a severe human rights crisis.
Egyptian civil society feels that the Egyptian government is at war with freedom of assembly, despite 
its national and international human rights obligations. Any form of public assembly critical of the 
government is violently dispersed, sometimes at the expense of mass murders and severe injuries 
to protestors. Security officials responsible for the death of peaceful protestors continue to enjoy 
impunity, which only further reinforces police brutality. The case of Shaimaa el-Sabagh, who was 
shot in the back on 24 January 2015 while holding flowers in her hand during a peaceful protest 
commemorating the 2011 Revolution, is symptomatic of the police’s relentless attacks on citizens 
merely exercising their freedom of association.
Another disturbing aspect of the post-2011 experience of Egypt has been that, regardless of who is in 
government, a consistent theme has been the targeting of women HRDs (WHRDs) and women who are active 
in public space: the election of President Sisi in June 2014 was marked by a spate of gang rapes. In the words of 
Amal Elmohandes, of Nazra for Feminist Studies:
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Violations targeting WHRDs and women in the public space have been systematic and uniform 
throughout the different governments in the past three and a half years.
There has also been a sharp rise in state surveillance, as Amal goes on to tell us:
The government and the security sector in particular have been involved in surveillance of activities 
and behaviour of citizens at least from 2008. New plans will involve more sophisticated methods 
to monitor the online activities of citizens, and conversations and messages exchanged on mobile 
phones. These tactics will be extended to target dissenters and those who criticise the actions of the 
authorities. Such actions by the government will inevitably lead to self-censorship in certain cases 
and will usher a significant and widespread assault on freedom of expression and on the privacy of 
citizens.
It is hard to find many causes for optimism about the state of civil society in Egypt. Those in jail and those 
silenced need international support and greater exposure of the conditions under which the heroes of Tahrir 
Square now languish.
Ethiopia: bloggers and journalists in 
the firing line
Ethiopia remains a highly repressive state, where civil society activity that would be regarded as legitimate 
elsewhere is criminalised, the government conflates criticism with terrorism, and where journalists and 
bloggers are a particular target: at the time of writing, at least 17 journalists and bloggers are known to be 
imprisoned,214 and another 20 are said to have fled the country. To give a handful of examples from many, in 
October 2014, Temesgen Desalegn, journalist and former editor-in-chief of Feteh magazine was sentenced 
to three years in prison, while three other magazine owners were handed sentences of over three years in 
absentia, and in August 2014 the government accused six weekly newspapers of crimes against the state.
214  This section draws from: CIVICUS, ‘Oral Statement by CIVICUS, Human Rights Situation in Africa, to the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights’, 
28 April 2014, http://bit.ly/1LNenOR; CIVICUS, ’41 African and International CSOs Call on the Ethiopian Prime Minister to Release Detained Journalists and Zone 9 
Bloggers’, 28 July 2014, http://bit.ly/1dBgYQP; CIVICUS, ‘Ethiopia: Crackdown on Dissent Intensifies as Journalists Convicted’, 31 October 2014, http://bit.ly/1KsQHyj; 
CIVICUS, ‘“Push for the Repeal of the CSO Proclamation” – CIVICUS Interview with Solryana Gebremichael (EHRP)’, 12 February 2015, http://bit.ly/19vt4bH. 
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In the words of Hassan Shire of the East and Horn of African Human Rights Defenders Project:
In Ethiopia over the last five years we have seen the wholesale disappearance of the human rights 
community, with countless human rights defenders forced into exile due to heavy-handed and 
manifestly unlawful state tactics aimed at undermining their work. Throughout 2014, the risks 
facing journalists and independent human rights voices have reached unprecedented new heights. 
It seems that, consistent with the pattern described above, the conditions for civil society became still worse 
ahead of the ritual of the May 2015 elections. Soleyana Gebremichael, of the Ethiopia Human Rights Project, 
comments:
In the run up to national elections, the increasing trend of arbitrary arrest and detention, politically 
motivated prosecutions, and intimidation of independent voices within civil society is deeply 
concerning. Similar trends were notable in the run up to the 2010 national election, in which the 
ruling party won 99.6% of parliamentary seats.
Among those currently experiencing the reality of state repression are the Zone9 collective, a group of young 
bloggers to which Soleyana belongs. At the time of writing, six Zone9 bloggers are facing trial on terrorism 
charges, along with three independent journalists. Soleyana faces trial in absentia. Some charges carry the 
death penalty. The group have faced repeated delays in legal proceedings, including long delays in knowing 
what they were charged with, and have complained about mistreatment while in detention, including torture, 
sleep deprivation and withholding of food, while family visits have been limited.215 As part of the justification 
for the charges they face, the public prosecutor pointed to the collective’s involvement in digital security 
training organised by international human rights groups, demonstrating once again the dangers of civil society 
being seen as ‘foreign agents’ in highly repressive contexts.
As with several other countries covered in this report, part of the challenge for civil society in Ethiopia is the 
relative lack of interest in promoting change of external powers, who see Ethiopia as a stable state in a region 
where instability, linked to conflict and Islamist terrorism, is a concern. Ethiopia, along with some other African 
countries such as Rwanda, also shows the limitations of current approaches to development: they achieve 
strong progress on some development indicators, but largely through a state-led development approach that 
emphasises economic development, in imitation of the China model.216 Such models are suspicious of the 
215  Ethiopia Human Rights Project (EHRP), ‘Court Grants the Police More Days to Further Investigate Ethiopian Journalists, Bloggers’, 17 May 2014, http://bit.
ly/1LPRj1j; EHRP, ‘Third Adjournment for Bloggers, Journalists; Still No Evidence’, 3 June 2014, http://bit.ly/1cmOCrW; EHRP, ‘Facts and Documents on Case of Zone9 
Bloggers and Journalists’, 26 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1FH4Eye. 
216  ‘Ethiopia and Kenya: Doing it my way’, The Economist, 2 March 2013, http://econ.st/1LNfpKF.  
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independence of civil society. As in other states, the restriction of civil society’s access to foreign funding, 
through the application of the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation Act, is an indicator of repression.217 
Such states may promise democracy later, and the argument that democracy can be delayed until everyone has 
enough to eat may seem seductive, but the experience of China’s model suggests that democracy is something 
that repressive rulers endlessly seek to defer.
Soleyana Gebremichael draws attention to the shortcomings of the state-led development model:
In Ethiopia, which has only one opposition party member in parliament, virtually no independent 
media and civil society and a highly politicised judiciary, there is very little accountability for the 
vast sums of money entrusted to the federal government to support democratic and economic 
development. The maintenance of the status quo in Ethiopia through the provision of huge amounts 
of donor aid without adequate and effective support for democratic consolidation is a waste of the 
taxpayers’ money.
Ethiopia’s government, like Egypt’s, has shown itself to be contemptuous of the international human rights 
system: it has refused to accept key recommendations of the UPR process, on revising its anti-terrorism 
measures and on releasing imprisoned activists and journalists. If pressure is to be more successfully exerted, 
then outside donors need to be pressured to take a new approach to development, including under the 
forthcoming Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), that puts human rights and citizen-led accountability at 
the centre, and powerful governments need to be pressured by their domestic civil society to develop more 
nuanced understanding of what constitutes stability.
217  ‘In Ethiopia, Protecting Yourself Online Is a Crime’, The Huffington Post, 22 July 2015, http://huff.to/1FH4TSZ. 
Ethiopia’s government, 
like Egypt’s, has 
shown itself to be 
contemptuous of the 
international human 
rights system.
State of Civil Society report 2015: THE YEAR IN REVIEW
89
Kenya
Kenya: international exposure 
drives national crackdown
The conditions for civil society in Kenya have worsened appreciably since the present government was formed 
in April 2013.218
The suspension of 510 CSOs, many of them working on rights-based issues, by the NGO Coordination Board 
in December 2014 was in violation of Kenya’s constitution, and rightly brought national and international 
condemnation. The subsequent reinstatement of 179 CSOs, in January 2015, can be seen to result from this 
scrutiny and pressure, but it remains the case that the attempt contributes towards fostering a climate of 
insecurity and fear among CSOs.
The Security Laws (Amendment) Act, seeking to amend 22 other pieces of legislation, and extending state 
powers over public demonstrations and the publication and dissemination of information, was hurriedly 
passed in December 2014, in the face of opposition and civil society protests, only for parts of it to be ruled 
as unconstitutional by Kenya’s High Court. This act was preceded by attempts, documented in the 2014 State 
of Civil Society Report, to limit CSOs to receiving no more than 15% of their funding from foreign sources, 
establish a central body through which foreign funding would have to pass, and extend state powers over CSO 
registration and regulation. Attempts were made to introduce these through three series of amendments in 
2013 and 2014, with a strong local and international civil society campaign against them, but the fear remains 
that attempts will be made to introduce such laws again, given the government’s track record. Here, the danger 
is that, even when they fail to pass into law, these attempts exert a chilling effect and encourage a climate of 
218  This section draws from CIVICUS and National Coalition of Human Rights Defenders ‘Attacks on Civil Society Undermining Democracy and Development in 
Kenya’, March 2015, http://bit.ly/1ak4Sty. 
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self-censorship, as could also be said of attempts to pass laws to limit media freedom, halted by the High Court 
in January 2014.
As well as these restrictions emanating from the state, the environment for civil society activists and HRDs 
seems to be growing more dangerous. Activists are being threatened as they go about their work, and attempts 
to protest are being disrupted. For example, in September 2014, chair of the Law and Social Development Trust, 
Wendy Wanja Mutega, was threatened and warned to stop working with an environmental rights groups by 
unidentified people, while in January 2015 two activists, Irungu Houghton and Bouz Waruku, were arrested 
and charged with incitement as they staged an ‘occupy playground’ demonstration to advocate for the rights of 
schoolchildren. Protestors who attempted to march to parliament in December 2014 were dispersed by security 
forces, and eight protestors detained on charges of unlawful assembly and incitement to violence.
The difficulties faced by potential witnesses in the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) now aborted proceedings 
against President Uhuru Kenyatta are discussed in the next section. Sensitivities about these proceedings being 
brought against the people in power would seem to be one driver of the government’s increasingly negative 
attitudes towards civil society and the media. 
Another influence is concern about al-Shabaab terrorism, emanating from extremist Islamist networks founded 
in neighbouring Somalia. These concerns naturally run high in Kenya, which has experienced shocking acts of 
terrorism, such as the attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in September 2013 that left at least 67 people 
dead, the murder of 36 quarry workers in northern Kenya in December 2014, and the killing of 147 students at 
a university in Garissa in April 2015.219 But again, the point must be made that civil society can be a priceless 
ally of the government in responding to such attacks, yet civil society’s response to terrorism is made harder in 
climates of repression and restriction. Civil society can play a role in bringing communities together at times of 
heightened risk of ethnic or religious division, and indeed was quick to react to the April 2015 attack, calling a 
night vigil to show solidarity, while the power of a free media was demonstrated by an open-source social media 
initiative that set out to tell the stories of every person killed in the attack.220 To a government sensitive about 
its international standing and concerned about terrorism, the argument that civil society can help address these 
needs to be made more strongly.
219  ‘Kenya marks anniversary of deadly Westgate mall attack’, BBC, 21 September 2014, http://bbc.in/1wFqp5n; ‘Al-Shabab massacres non-Muslims at Kenya 
quarry’, BBC, 2 December 2014, http://bbc.in/1vJyuri; ‘Kenya attack: 147 dead in Garissa University assault’, BBC, 3 April 2015, http://bbc.in/1DrBXQW. 
220  ‘#147notjustanumber is the hashtag that gives life to each person slain in the Kenya attack’, Quartz, 6 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1FRovoN; email 
communication from Action2015/Kenya, April 2015.
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Sudan: space shrinks ahead of 
elections, as artists fight back
Sudan and South Sudan split in 2011, following an entrenched civil war which left key territorial issues 
unresolved in the South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions that border the two states, while conflict in the Darfur 
region has been going on for 10 years, with the situation appearing to be deteriorating again at the time of 
writing. Sudan’s highly centralised, single-party state, led by President Omar al-Bashir since a 1989 military 
coup, has faced civil society pressure to answer to its abysmal human rights record but, at the same time, 
outside powers, such as the AU, are weak. Not for the first time, there is a sense that outside powers prefer 
autocratic relative stability to the potential instability they fear could result from a change of government.221
In response to pressure, in January 2014, al-Bashir called for a national dialogue process, but progress was 
minimal, and in January 2015 almost all opposition parties withdrew from the dialogue.222 Most opposition 
parties also boycotted the April 2015 elections, and some key opposition leaders were arrested, further 
demonstrating the government’s unwillingness to have genuine national dialogue ahead of elections. To no 
one’s great surprise in such circumstances, al-Bashir claimed around 94% of the vote in April 2015.223
In the run up to the election, in January 2015, the constitution was amended to give al-Bashir and the National 
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) new powers, which were quickly demonstrated in February 2015, when 
221  International Crisis Group, Sudan: The Prospects for “National Dialogue”, 11 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1EHiRRC.  
222  ‘Sudan opposition to boycott national dialogue’, Al Jazeera, 21 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1CAIRhH.   
223  ‘Sudan’s political opposition unites under new call for democracy’, The Guardian, 11 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1J7mg3q; ‘Sudan elections – what 
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restrictions were increased on print media, encroaching further on already severely limited space for freedom 
of expression.224 On 16 February alone, NISS forces seized an entire print run of 14 newspapers in an effort to 
prevent the dissemination of news deemed critical of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Previous months 
had seen journalists detained for reporting an opposition leader’s speech and newspaper staff beaten in an 
armed raid on their offices: all told, in 2015 alone, Amnesty International estimates that at least 21 journalists 
have faced state interrogation.225 This is despite Sudan’s government having agreed in 2011 to accept UNHRC 
UPR recommendations on freedom of association, assembly and expression.
In these conditions civil society is finding itself squeezed, as Abdel-Rahman El-Mahdi, of the Confederation of 
Sudanese Civil Society Organisations (CSCSOs), explains:
 
Over the last 12 months, relations between civil society and the Sudanese government have worsened. 
This is reflected in the increasing number of closures of CSOs, the arrest and harassment of civil 
society leaders, and a negative portrayal of CSOs in the media by leading members of the ruling NCP. 
The current conditions for civil society in Sudan can be characterised as extremely restrictive, with a 
high level of personal risk for individuals working within civil society. The degradation and shrinkage 
of space for civil society is unprecedented. CSOs in Sudan are facing increased closures and their 
leaders subjected to harassment and oftentimes detention by security forces.
Dr Amin Mekki Medani, a well-known human rights defender and President of CSCSOs, was 
arrested in December 2014 following his return for a meeting in Addis Ababa held under the auspices 
of the African Union High-Level Implementation panel. Dr Amin continues to be held in detention. 
In January 2015, three CSOs, the Sudanese Writers Union, Mahmoud Mohamed Taha Center and 
the National Civic Forum, had their licenses revoked and were informed by national security agents 
to cease their activities. All three were members of CSCSOs. Restrictive and unconstitutional articles 
in the 2006 Voluntary and Humanitarian Works Act are increasingly being enforced, curtailing and 
obstructing the work of independent CSOs that may be perceived as a threat to government and its 
policies and priorities. This law has become a tool for exercising control over and obstructing the 
activities of CSOs, especially those that are deemed a threat or non-aligned with government and its 
policies. The most notorious articles within this law relate to incorporation and registration, receipt of 
foreign funding, dissolution and control of assets.
224  ‘Sudan: ‘Clamp-Down On Civil Society As Polls Approach’ – Sudan Hrs Monitor’, All Africa, 10 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1ABCOxu; Amnesty International, 
‘Sudan: Entrenched Repression – Freedom of expression and association under attack’, 1 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1AxRXjD. 
225  Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), ‘Sudanese journalist held without charge’, 13 June 2014, http://bit.ly/1FkenkJ; CPJ, ‘Armed men raid Sudanese 
newspaper, beat editor’, 22 July 2014, http://bit.ly/1BtoVMP; CPJ, ‘Sudan security agents confiscate print runs of 14 newspapers’, 18 February 2015, http://bit.
ly/1AxSpOR; Amnesty International, 1 April 2015 op. cit.
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This has come as a backlash to increasing recognition by prominent parties, national and 
international, of civil society as a principal stakeholder in the future of Sudan and the importance 
of its inclusion in future consultations regarding a comprehensive solution to the problems facing 
Sudan. As elections neared, CSOs that called for a delay of elections found themselves persecuted 
by national intelligence. The government is also aware that the national dialogue, which has been 
derailed, might still come into play over the coming period. CSOs should have a role to play in 
shaping how an inclusive national dialogue process may be structured as well as voicing the issues 
and priorities of their constituents, if any meaningful dialogue is to be realised.
The attack on cultural spaces and platforms described by Abdel-Rahman comes in response to a fresh wave 
of civic dissent, in which Sudan’s artists and writers were at the forefront. But al-Bashir’s cultural crackdown 
is nothing new: in the early 1990s the regime shut down Khartoum’s libraries and destroyed books. It was not 
until the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement with South Sudan that the Sudanese Writers Union was able 
to regain its legal status; now it finds itself targeted again, alongside the monthly used book sale and gathering, 
Mafroosh, which has been credited with reviving Sudan’s literary scene.226 Mamoun Eltlib, a prominent 
Sudanese writer, who restarted and managed the Union and spearheaded Mafroosh, has led the effort to 
nurture cultural, discursive space. Eltlib also founded the arts and culture collective Work Culture Group and is 
an active political critic and commentator, who has in the past paid personally for his work, having experienced 
a year’s detention.227 
Among other examples, the 2014 Toronto International Film Festival showed the film Beats of the Antonov. 
Antonovs are the Russian-made planes used by the Sudanese government to bomb rebel held areas. Hajooj 
Kuka, the Sudanese filmmaker, presents the perspectives of those affected by war as they navigate the conflict 
and reaffirm their existence through dance, music and storytelling.228 Meanwhile, with their collaborative 
campaign Art vs. War, Nabta Culture Centre and the National Group for Cultural Policies have tried to raise 
awareness of the devastating cost of conflict.229 Their campaign compares government expenditure on arts 
and war, juxtaposing images of soldiers, camouflage and Antonovs with art supplies and musical instruments. 
Beginning on social media, the campaign has grown to posters and t-shirts, and works in refugee camps to 
encourage cultural exchanges between people from the centre, and from conflict-affected border regions.
226  ‘Against the Writers Union Shutdown, Read Stories and Poems from Sudan’, Arabic Literature (in English), 9 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1C9UieI; ‘Long live 
the struggle of the Sudanese Writers Union’, Sudan Tribune, 16 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1LNiOJr. 
227  ‘Where are the libraries?’ The literary radical fighting Sudan’s crackdowns’, The Guardian, 12 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1CZhgL8. 
228  ‘‘Beats of the Antonov’ Tells the Story of the People of the Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains in Sudan’, Indiewire, 29 July 2014, http://bit.ly/1KsTLdM. 
229  ‘Sudanese arts centre stands up against war’, Africa Review, 28 August 2014, http://bit.ly/1QeHU4u. 
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The government’s recent assault on cultural centres is, in a perverse way, a recognition that cultural activism 
could be the spark that ignites social movements in Sudan. Activist groups, such as Sudan Change Now and 
Girifna, have campaigned against the three civil wars Sudan has experienced, but these campaigns have never 
gained real traction or attracted the popular support necessary for impact. With cultural activists battling to 
open space for dialogue and engendering a culture of political engagement, young people in particular may be 
able to find innovative ways to express political discontent.
It needs to be understood that the government’s campaign against Sudanese civil society reflects not strength, 
but the ruling party’s fragility and defensiveness toward independent voices. Given this, Abdel-Rahman 
suggests what the outside world could do to nurture Sudanese civil society:
The international community must take vigorous political and diplomatic measures to support 
CSOs that come under threat, and get around government restrictions designed to isolate national 
organisations from the international community. Opportunities need to be provided to young 
civil society leaders and activists to participate in capacity building and training opportunities 
organised outside the country, to provide the space and time to reflect and exchange information and 
experience.
Thailand: in the shadow of the junta
In the 2014 State of Civil Society Report, we reported on protests then under way in Thailand. One year on, the 
situation for civil society has worsened.230 In May 2014 the introduction of martial law was quickly followed by 
a military coup, the 11th such coup in the past 80 years.231 Immediately after the coup, the military junta, the 
National Peace and Order Maintaining Council (NOMC), suspended the constitution, imposed a nightly curfew, 
banned political gatherings of over five people and imposed strict media controls. The army moved in to clear 
protest sites and detained protest leaders. Under martial law, which applied until April 2015, the military was 
allowed to hold people without charge for a week, and more crimes were brought under the jurisdiction of 
military courts. Over 400 protestors, activists, journalists and academics were questioned in army bases, and 
many of those detained were only released once they agreed to cease activity.232 The replacement for martial 
230  This section draws from CIVICUS, ‘CIVICUS Brief – Thailand: End Crackdown on Civil Society and Restore Democratic Freedoms’, 20 August 2014, 
 http://bit.ly/1JbgwUR.  
231  ‘Thailand coup: Army seizes control of government to restore ‘peace’’, ABC News, 22 May 2014, http://ab.co/1FdX6sx.  
232  UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, January 2014 op. cit. 
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law, introduced from April 2015 is, if anything, even more draconian and continues to give broad powers to the 
military.233 
In the aftermath of the coup, the junta also warned that calling for protest on social media would bring sedition 
charges, and military panels were established to monitor media, including social media. By July 2014, all critical 
reporting and commentary was banned; in August 2014, two people were arrested merely for acting in a play 
deemed critical of the government. Since the coup, the number of convictions being brought under the ‘lèse 
majesté’ law, in which criticism of the monarchy is banned, had also substantially increased.234
In the face of the crackdown, people have continued to try to find new and imaginative ways to express 
themselves, for example, by borrowing the three finger salute of rebellion from the Hunger Games film series, 
or by holding public readings of George Orwell’s 1984, but in turn these harmless acts have been criminalised 
and made subject to the judgement of military courts. So sensitive is the climate about potential criticism 
that in November 2014 a cinema chain pulled screenings of the latest Hunger Games instalment, fearing it 
would catalyse protest. Students have continued to try to stage protests, but they report seeing little hope at 
present.235 
The protests that preceded the coup, between two distinct camps, demonstrated that Thai society is polarised 
and, as in Egypt, there is undoubtedly a part of society that sees strong government as being synonymous with 
military government. This polarisation makes it hard for civil society to hold onto positions of neutrality in order 
to claim their rights. As Chalida Tajaroensuk, of the People’s Empowerment Foundation, told us:
Civil society is polarised, between support for the military government and those not supporting 
military government. It is difficult to bridge, because of the different political opinion, different 
analyses and different strategies.
But ultimately no one, apart from those who want to avoid being held to account, benefits when civil society’s 
independent voice is repressed, and civil society is unable to play its proper accountability role over those 
who hold power. Chalida confirms that military rule is greatly restricting the conditions for civil society, with 
little space for freedom of expression, assembly or association and scant respect for human rights, with rulers 
drafting complex mechanisms and systems to protect their power and strengthen their ability to control 
society. 
233  ‘Thailand’s New Law Could Be Worse than Martial Law’, The Diplomat, 5 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1Btt8QG.  
234  CPJ, ‘Thai junta expands media controls’, 21 July 2014, http://bit.ly/1FHdhly; HRW, ‘Thailand: Theater Activists Jailed for Insulting Monarchy’, 20 August 
2014, http://bit.ly/1w8FSyd; HRW, World Report 2015: Thailand, http://bit.ly/1d35jcD.
235  UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, January 2014 op. cit.; HRW, World Report 2015 op. cit.; ‘Thai 
students the ‘last group standing’ in protesting army coup’, Reuters, 16 February 2015, http://reut.rs/1FHdV2A.
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Typically, Thailand’s military government has experienced little international pressure to allow civil society to 
play a proper role. The regional intergovernmental organisation, the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), has clung to antique notions of non-interference and said nothing about the military crackdown; 
worse, it even insulted those who are in detention and gave the military a chance to claim false legitimacy by 
holding a media forum in Thailand’s capital, Bangkok, in March 2015.236 While the government of France has 
condemned the coup, and the US has scaled back its support, China has played its customary regressive role in 
continuing to support Thailand’s military government.237 
International civil society needs to help Thailand’s civil society to bring their issues to international attention, 
and Thai CSOs need to work together, including in regional and UN level platforms, to build unity and rise above 
polarised national politics. As Chalida concludes:
There is no choice for us but try to continue our work, and look for something that we can do.
Turkey: pressure follows protest
Following the 2013 protests, discussed in the previous section and in the 2014 State of Civil Society report, 
Turkey’s government is trying to make it harder for dissent to break out again. We asked Hakan Ataman what 
has changed in the conditions for Turkish civil society since the protests:
The government’s response to the protest has had negative implications for CSOs. The government 
uses subtle ways to inhibit the activities of CSOs that documented widespread human rights 
violations during the Gezi protests and delivered health services and legal aid to victims and 
survivors. For example, the Social Security Institution imposed an administrative fine on the Human 
Rights Foundation of Turkey after the foundation’s efforts to provide medical help to wounded Gezi 
protestors in 2013. Recently, the government adopted a new security package which almost abolishes 
the right to peaceful protest, among other drastic measures.
The widespread human rights violations during the 2013 protests demonstrated that Turkey has not 
complied with its responsibilities under international human rights law. It showed that the rule of law 
and democracy is under threat.
236  ‘Muted response to Thai coup hints at other nations’ limited options’, The Conversation, 27 May 2014, http://bit.ly/1JYyr1D; ‘Thailand’s Coup – Will 
ASEAN Answer?’, The Diplomat, 30 May 2014, http://bit.ly/1ABH53O; ASEAN, ‘“Reporting ASEAN” Media Forum to Tell the ASEAN Story’, 16 February 2015, http://bit.
ly/1HzXZgD. 
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TUSEV concurs with this analysis:
Throughout 2014/2015, arbitrary implementations of the legal framework regarding the freedom 
of association, and irregularities between legislation and implementation, have been observed. The 
vague clauses in legislation, such as ‘general morality’, ‘Turkish family structure’ and ‘public order’ 
create inconsistent and arbitrary interpretation and implementation by different state institutions, 
and even within the same institution. Some state institutions continue to request court cases for the 
closure of LGBTI CSOs, basing their legal thesis on the clause of ‘general morality’.
Although there is no such limitation or restriction in the relevant laws or regulations, the 
Department of Associations, via administrative orders, or legal opinions issued by the Ministry, 
restricts freedom of association in some cases. In June 2013, shortly after the Gezi Park Protests, the 
Department of Associations issued an administrative order to its provincial offices that associations 
that want to use certain words such as ‘platform’ or ‘council’ in their names will not be accepted. 
Freedom of assembly remains one of the most problematic areas. Throughout 2014/2015, severe 
measures were taken to restrict freedom of assembly in Turkey, especially when assemblies could 
turn into anti-government demonstrations. During 2014, thousands of people were on the streets 
demanding the then Prime Minister Erdogan resign because of a corruption probe that includes three 
ministers, their sons and high-profile businessmen. In Istanbul and Ankara, police used tear gas, 
water cannon and plastic bullets to disperse demonstrations. 
 
On 13 May 2014, 301 miners died in an accident in Soma. Immediately after the accident, protests 
started to take place all over Turkey, including in Soma. Across Turkey, extreme measures were taken 
by the police to prevent protests turning into anti-government demonstrations. Turkish police fired 
water cannon and tear gas to prevent thousands of protesters from defying the ban and reaching 
Istanbul’s central Taksim Square, the focal point of the 2013 protests. Public transport was halted 
in Istanbul and Ankara, and 25,000 police officers poured into Istanbul ahead of 31 May 2014, the 
anniversary of the Gezi Park events. On the anniversary, police officers used water cannon and tear 
gas against demonstrators, again preventing them from reaching Taksim Square, and shutting off 
Gezi Park. According to the Progressive Lawyers Association, 126 demonstrators were detained. 
During the same period, the government introduced new proposals to further restrict freedom of 
assembly and give extra powers to the police.
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Internet censorship by the government is also common and has increased in the last couple of 
years. On 10 September 2014, extraordinary authority was granted to the Telecommunications 
Communication Presidency, extended its TİB to ban websites and remove web content if there 
are instances of violation of privacy and, if deemed necessary for matters of ‘national security, 
the restoration of public order and the prevention of crimes’, without a prior court order. The 
government continues blocking web content and applications, and prohibits access to websites with 
opposing views. According to Engelli Web’s database on blocked websites, over 67,683 websites were 
blocked as of March 2015. On 20 March 2014, Twitter was banned throughout Turkey, and a week 
later YouTube was also banned without a court decision. The reasoning of court decisions to block 
websites and relevant rulings are not easily accessible. Such non-transparent procedures bring further 
challenges for those who seek to appeal against decisions. 
The response to the killing of Özgecan Aslan, discussed in the section on gender activism below, suggests, 
however, that people’s protests can still break through these restrictions when there is sufficient public anger 
focused on a particular issue. The challenge is to identify those moments of potential to break through, and to 
work to connect and support those who become active at such moments, and to continue to demand positive 
change and essential freedoms.
Attacks on the media coincide with 
attacks on civil society
People who work in CSOs are not the sole focus of attacks from autocratic governments, corrupt politicians, 
venal security forces and ruthless business interests. Wherever CSO activists are being attacked, you can be 
sure that journalists are too. Of course, to some extent, any distinction is arbitrary: many civil society activists 
are targeted for blogging and using social and traditional media in their work. The worst 10 countries in the 
Committee to Protect Journalists’ (CPJ) 2014 Global Impunity Index,238 based on the number of unsolved 
murders of journalists proportionate to population, are Iraq, Somalia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Syria, 
Afghanistan, Mexico, Colombia, Pakistan and Russia: these are countries where it is dangerous for civil society 
to ask difficult questions of those who hold power. Impunity occurs in the same countries year after year, telling 
us that media repression is entrenched and systemic. CPJ research also shows that more journalists were in 
238  CPJ, ‘Getting Away With Murder’, 16 April 2014, http://bit.ly/1peMXd2.   
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jail in 2014 than in 2013, with China, Iran, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Vietnam having the highest number of jailed 
journalists.239
An analysis of the previous year’s CPJ reporting of incidents against journalists reveals several common themes, 
similar to the ways attacks are made on civil society activists, as noted above. These include:
•	 the frequent misuse of laws, such as incitement, spreading false information, terrorism, defamation 
and encouraging protests, often applying either archaic laws, such as criminal as opposed to civil, 
defamation laws, or new laws introduced under the rubric of fighting terrorism;
•	 crackdowns coming ahead of elections, and during debates about potential changes to presidential 
term limits to allow presidents to run again, or on the president’s health, both of which are sensitive 
issues in countries with autocratic presidents;
•	 journalists being caught between radical Islamist groups and state agencies using anti-Islamist rhetoric.
The subjects that journalists who are attacked, harassed or imprisoned commonly cover include: corruption; 
connections between politicians, officials, police, organised crime and businesses; economic interests; national 
security; public protests; and radical Islam.
Further, CPJ analysis confirms the need to focus not only on the central sources of power; CPJ finds that 96% 
of murdered journalists, in their past year of analysis, are local reporters, typically covering corruption, conflict 
and politics: it is when media workers unsettle local lucrative power bases and webs of corruption that they risk 
murder. 
The response this suggests is that there need to be more closely coordinated working, joint campaigning and 
mutual support between CSO workers, individual activists, HRDs and media practitioners, both traditional and 
local, and stronger international connections. These are not easy to achieve in practice, but such connections 
will not come about without conscious effort, and resourcing to support them.
The battle for the internet
In past State of Civil Society Reports we have alerted that the internet is now a key frontier in the battle for the 
freedom of expression, and one that requires committed, sustained civil society engagement. States that highly 
restrict the internet are those where conditions are worse for civil society as a whole: Freedom House’s 2014 
239  CPJ, ‘2014 prison census: 221 journalists jailed worldwide’, 1 December 2014, https://cpj.org/imprisoned/2014.php. 
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Freedom on the Net report240 tells us that internet restriction is worst in China, Iran and Syria, and has recently 
declined most in Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. These are, sadly, states that are not new to State of Civil Society 
Reports.
On the whole, Freedom House reports that internet freedom has undergone a further decline, but something 
is changing: governments are now being more blatant about imposing repressive laws, in a trend that connects 
with the notion of democratic recession, discussed earlier, where repressive leaders are trying to normalise 
the rollback of fundamental rights. Freedom House also draws attention to a particular trend of increasing 
harassment of people who defend women’s and LGBTI rights online, and attacks on the cyber security of civil 
society activists.
Malaysia, for example, is a country we featured in the 2014 State of Civil Society Report, where a long tradition 
of state repression is meeting an enthusiastic government commitment to new technology.241 This means that 
the state now strongly polices social media, which once offered a relatively free space for discussion, compared 
to the offline world. Malaysia’s Inspector General of Police now uses Twitter to warn critical voices to be quiet 
and threaten them with arrest. Zunar, a well-known cartoonist, was detained in February 2015 for posting 
critical cartoons on Twitter.242 Oddly, this patrolling of social media combines with an increase in the application 
of archaic laws of sedition.
Along with visible crackdowns, repressive governments are taking a leaf out of China’s book by hiring armies 
of paid trolls whose job is to argue in support of the government, and shout down opposing voices: Russia, 
for example, enlisted these to complement its war with Ukraine, and Israel uses trolls to counter criticism of 
its violations of Palestinian human rights.243 Elsewhere, while one of the big internet news stories of the year, 
the mass leaking of Sony Pictures data, has given rise to conspiracy theories about North Korean involvement 
that are hard to prove, there can be little dispute that Bahrain’s repressive government is up to dirty tricks: 
the government is using fake identities, phishing links, malware and spyware to try to unearth the identities of 
activists who need to stay anonymous to avoid detention.244 Hackers linked to the state have employed similar 
tricks against exiled Ethiopian activists.245
240  Freedom House, Tightening the Net: Governments Expand Online Control: 2014 Freedom on the Net Report, http://bit.ly/1zooC5C.  
241  Eldis, ‘E-Governance and Service Delivery Innovations in Malaysia: An Overview’, 15 March 2013, http://bit.ly/1PS4l4A.  
242  ‘Malaysian Police Use Twitter in Crackdown on Dissent’, The New York Times, 11 February 2015, http://nyti.ms/1Afaq3R;‘What is Malaysia’s top cop doing on 
Twitter?’, BBC Monitoring, 6 April 2015, http://bbc.in/1GgS98g; ‘Malaysia cartoonist charged with sedition over tweets’, Al Jazeera, 3 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1J7zwFk. 
243  Global Voices, ‘China Beefs Up ‘50 Cent’ Army of Paid Internet Propagandists’, 16 October 2013, http://bit.ly/1Btyj3e; ‘Salutin’ Putin: inside a Russian troll 
house’, The Guardian, 2 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1Ir2oEi; ‘Israeli students to get $2,000 to spread state propaganda on Facebook’, The Electronic Intifada, 1 April 2012, 
http://bit.ly/1mJEyvJ.
244  Bahrain Watch, ‘The IP Spy Files: How Bahrain’s Government Silences Anonymous Online Dissent’, http://bit.ly/1JbpMZ5.  
245  ‘Hacking Team Reloaded? US-Based Ethiopian Journalists Again Targeted with Spyware’, The Citizen Lab, 9 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1C20vPQ. 
Along with visible 
crackdowns, repres-
sive governments are 
hiring armies of paid 
trolls whose job is to 
argue in support of 
the government, and 
shout down oppos-
ing voices: Russia, 
for example, enlisted 
these to complement 
its war with Ukraine, 
and Israel uses trolls 
to counter criticism of 
its violations of Pales-
tinian human rights.
State of Civil Society report 2015: THE YEAR IN REVIEW
101
What this tells us is that governments see the internet as a key site of contestation for human rights. They 
are not the only ones. Shadowy hacktivist groups have continued to use the power of embarrassment against 
unaccountable decision-makers by leaking things we were never meant to see. Sometimes hackers’ intentions 
are noble, but sometimes they’re murkier. In Russia, Anonymous International, also known as Shaltai Boltai, 
hack into state sources to expose state control and freedom of expression restrictions, for example, by leaking 
the pre-prepared news scripts the government disseminates to TV stations, but their stance is complicated by 
the fact that they also do paid data-gathering work.246
Reactionary terrorist groups are another part of the landscape: in the most high profile recent case, in April 
2015, the French TV network TV5Monde was taken off air by hackers claiming connection to ISIL.247 A further 
camp in the battle for the internet are the private sector owners of internet infrastructure and gateways: in the 
US, for example, a handful of large companies have a stranglehold on the speed and flow of information on the 
internet, and being a small group, are always potentially vulnerable to government pressure.248 The question of 
who owns the internet explicitly connects to the question of who gets to restrict it, and also who gets to invade 
our privacy, which chills freedom of expression.
The light that American whistle-blower Edward Snowden shed on the extraordinarily wide range of the US 
National Security Agency’s (NSA) invasion of privacy, and its previously secret sharing of data with like-minded 
governments, has given civil society a rallying point. The revelation, in 2015, that South Korean intelligence 
agencies had asked their South African counterparts for confidential information on Greenpeace International’s 
Director prior to a G20 Summit in Seoul offered an example of why civil society needs to take these issues 
seriously.249
Civil society campaigns used the first anniversary of Snowden’s revelations, June 2014, to call for internet 
governance to be freed from heavy US influence, be internationalised, and made accountable.250 The Fight for 
the Future organisation led the launch of the Reset the Net campaign to encourage people to adopt encryption 
methods to reclaim their internet privacy. It should be noted, however, that the campaign also drew criticism for 
targeting government surveillance but saying nothing about the private sector’s harvesting of data, something 
246  Global Voices, ‘‘Anonymous International’ Leaks Kremlin’s Instructions to Russian TV, 28 March 2014, http://bit.ly/1dBrwiN; ‘Meet Anonymous International, 
the hackers taking on the Kremlin’, The Guardian, 7 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1c5aNTQ. 
247  ‘French TV station TV5 Monde taken off-air by pro-ISIS hack’, Computing, 9 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1HA4pMC. 
248  ‘So, who owns the Internet?’, Harvard Gazette, 7 January 2014, http://bit.ly/1aHvRbw. 
249  ‘Spy Cables: Greenpeace among intelligence targets’, Al Jazeera, 24 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1LAu6z4. 
250  ‘US Government Cedes Control of the Internet’, Forbes, 15 March 2015, http://onforb.es/1gmneEY. 
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made problematic by data behemoth Google’s role in backing the campaign.251 Broad-based alliances need to be 
built, but in a highly contested arena, decisions about who you choose to work with are political.
Another active civil society coalition is the Global Network Initiative, which brings together globally-oriented 
CSOs, such as the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Committee to Protect Journalists, Human Rights 
Watch and the World Press Freedom Committee, along with companies that are members of the Reform 
Government Surveillance coalition. They are campaigning for internet surveillance reform in the US, on the 
basis that the US government’s disproportionate role in internet governance means that it sets precedents 
that others imitate.252 Meanwhile, the Electronic Frontier Foundation has led the development of the Manila 
Principles, established through an open, collaborative process, which seek to provide a framework where 
internet intermediaries (access providers, social networks and search engines) can be protected from undue 
government interference, a key building block for internet freedom of expression.253
There are rare examples of governments taking a more progressive approach to the internet, notably Brazil, 
where in April 2014 a new law, the Civil Rights Framework for the Internet, was passed. The law, long advocated 
for by civil society and internet freedom activists, introduces new protections for online freedom of expression 
and neutrality of the internet.254 Its importance may reach beyond Brazil, offering an example of good practice 
for other countries. 
There will always need to be some regulation on how we use the internet, not least because of the platform it 
offers to terrorist forces such as ISIL and Boko Haram, and far-right groups such as Pegida, as discussed earlier. 
But it is now clearly established that international public opinion wants a freer internet: Amnesty International’s 
#UnfollowMe campaign polled 15,000 people in 13 countries in 2015 and found that 71% were opposed to the 
NSA monitoring their internet use, and almost two thirds want the big internet companies to do more to secure 
their communications against government access.255
There are some recent examples of successful in-country civil society activism: in Argentina, activists defeated 
a government attempt to monitor social networking sites for potentially disruptive activity, while in Ecuador, 
the Internet Libre collective lobbied to defeat an amendment to the penal code that would have forced internet 
251  Reset the Net, ‘Edward Snowden’s statement in support of Reset the Net’, 4 June 2014, http://bit.ly/1cmYYI8; 
‘Reset the Net wants to end NSA snooping, is fine with Google snooping’, Pando Daily, 6 June 2014, http://bit.ly/1Kt0yE7. 
252  Global Network Initiative, ‘GNI Joins Diverse Coalition to Call for Significant Surveillance Reforms’, 25 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1Ay1Mho.  
253  EFF, ‘Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability’, 2015 http://bit.ly/1HWonnC; EFF, The Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability Background Paper, Version 
0.99, 22 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1FRw7aU. 
254  ‘Brazil: Learn More About The Brazilian Civil Rights Framework For The Internet (Law No. 12965 Of April 23, 2014)’, Mondaq, 10 July 2014, http://bit.
ly/1cmZoOR. 
255  Amnesty International, ‘Global opposition to USA big brother mass surveillance’, 18 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1AEhQbN.  
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access providers to store user data for six months.256 And citizens are fighting back by using national and 
international legal infrastructure, where these are strong: in one current case, Austrian lawyer and activist Max 
Schrem is taking Facebook to the EU Court of Justice over the storage and usage of users’ data.257 The court 
has already made its mark: in 2014, it ruled that a 2006 EU directive that users’ data could be retained for two 
years was illegal.258 In a further example, in April 2015, Amnesty International, Liberty and Privacy International 
announced that they are taking the UK government to the European Court of Human Rights to challenge their 
widespread surveillance practices, as revealed by Snowden’s leaks.259 Ahead of this, in February 2015, a special 
UK court ruled that UK security services acted illegally in concealing how they use NSA data.260
A further piece of potentially valuable international infrastructure came into being in March 2015, when the 
UNHRC appointed a special rapporteur on the right to privacy.261 It will be important for civil society to engage 
with and support this new office.
Attention is now focussing on how internet freedom connects to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
not least because there is a growing focus on the key role that open data could play in helping to realise, 
monitor and exert proper accountability over the SDGs. Some are pushing for the idea that internet freedom as 
a human right should be recognised in the SDGs.262
The internet should be something that helps us realise our rights and progress as a society, rather than 
something that makes us less secure, and the powerful less accountable. To help realise this, civil society 
needs to engage in consistent, sustained and committed ways as part of their mainstream practice. Alliances 
need to be built, private sector partners need to be chosen with care, and engagement needs to be made 
on multiple fronts – with governments, the internet business and intergovernmental platforms – on multiple 
issues – including privacy, self-expression and protection from attack – and using multiple levers, such as legal 
means, the new special rapporteur and the SDGs dialogue. The battle for the internet will continue. Civil society 
influence could be decisive.
256  Freedom House, 2014 op. cit.
257  ‘Facebook data row reaches top Euro court’, BBC, 24 March 2015, http://bbc.in/1OyIa0a. 
258  ‘ECJ declares data collection rules illegal’, The Parliament Magazine, 9 April 2014, http://bit.ly/1LNu34F.  
259  Amnesty International, ‘Amnesty International takes UK to European Court over mass surveillance’, 10 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1Kt1msC. 
260  ‘In historic ruling, UK surveillance secrecy declared unlawful’, The Intercept, 6 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1D6g0V0.  
261  EFF, ‘UN Human Rights Council Appoints Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy’, 26 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1CeLQhk.  
262  Internet Society, ‘An Open Internet Is Critical for UN Sustainable Development Goals’, 27 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1DWNHET. 
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Women fighting back
Today’s most repressive forces, such as ISIL and Boko Haram, are not the first groups in history to target 
women, but they are doing so with particular brutality, using rape, enslavement, forced marriage and murder 
as weapons of war.263 They are reminding us once again that forces that attack human rights usually reserve 
particular ferocity for women. Around the world, as in the example of Egypt cited earlier, civil society activists 
are being attacked on the basis of their gender, and, as discussed further below, sexual identity. Meanwhile, 
another way in which internet freedom of expression is being limited is by online attacks on women’s rights 
activists and prominent women: a recent study found that women, particularly young women, receive more 
extreme threats, and higher levels of online sexual harassment, than men.264
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Executive Director of UN Women, has drawn attention to the purpose of this wave 
of violence, which is to penalise and humiliate women, and deter them from being active. Activists also point to 
the inadequacy of the international system when it comes to protecting women, with the various instruments 
that governments have signed, and bodies such as the UNHRC, having insufficient power in practice to 
constrain attacks on women.265
But it is not a one way street. In response to ISIL attacks on women, grassroots activists are offering aid and 
counselling, and helping women to tell their stories.266 Women and men are fighting back in huge numbers.
In just one example of many recent attacks on women, in February 2015, Turkish student Özgecan Aslan was 
beaten to death for resisting a rape attempt. This is not the first such instance in Turkey; the murder of women 
by men has increased by around 45% over the last two years.267 Finally, patience snapped. Tens of thousands of 
people took to the streets in the following days to protest, and 5,000 people attended Özgecan’s funeral, where 
women defied the imam’s request to step back for the funeral prayer. Protestors wore black in mourning, and 
the hashtag #sendeanlat (you too explain), where women shared their experiences of being assaulted, became 
the third highest trending Twitter topic worldwide. Men showed solidarity, rejecting the notion that male 
identity should be based on subjugating women, by wearing miniskirts in protest marches, a visible protest 
263  HRW, ‘Iraq: ISIS Escapees Describe Systematic Rape’, 15 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1ytQJEY; ‘For ISIS, rape is a calculated strategy’, HAARETZ, 19 December 
2014, http://bit.ly/1HWrbB8. 
264  Pew Research Center, ‘Online Harassment’, 22 October 2014, http://pewrsr.ch/1rfpq7V; ‘Why Women Aren’t Welcome on the Internet’, Pacific Standard, 6 
January 2014, http://bit.ly/1DyRnPe. 
265  ‘Women’s human rights defenders under threat – podcast transcript’, The Guardian, 10 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1IQIeDX. 
266  ‘What will it take to stop Isis using rape as a weapon of war?’ The Guardian, 17 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1AhewVW.  
267  ‘Will #OzgecanAslan change Turkey?’, Al Jazeera, 16 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1B2wyPb. 
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symbol borrowed from other contexts.268 This was important: as the HeForShe campaign, mentioned earlier, 
makes clear, attempts to challenge gender inequality are much stronger when they have male support. The 
protests drew parallels with earlier mass anti-rape mobilisations, such as those seen in India in recent years.269 
As in India, the response to Özgecan’s death exposed deep rooted problems in society, and shed further light 
on faultlines between the political establishment and many citizens, and on President Erdogan’s increasingly 
dictatorial rule, given that in November 2014 he stated that women were not the equals of men, and initially 
criticised the protestors.270
The protests against Özgecan’s murder can be located within a broader, citizen-led response to resist violence 
against women. One Billion Rising, for example, is a global citizens’ campaign to demand justice for people who 
experience gender violence, and challenge impunity. In February 2015, the campaign entered its fourth year, 
with events taking place in over 200 countries. It seeks to build broad solidarity through community-based 
events, and crucially, can point to ground-level success stories in different countries, such as training rickshaw 
drivers in gender sensitivity in India, designating harassment-free construction zones in Peru and preventing 
coercion into sex work in the Philippines.271
Although progress may seem difficult, given the scale and breadth of attacks against women, ground is being 
gained. Recent years have seen a concerted push to raise awareness of and stamp out female genital mutilation 
(FGM), with civil society active. In the UK, The Guardian newspaper launched a new, global campaign against 
FGM in 2014, showing the potential for responsible media groups to be part of, and work with, civil society, as 
further demonstrated by a focus on the training of African journalists to improve reporting on FGM issues. A 
particular aim, as reflected in the theme of the 2015 UN International Day of Zero Tolerance for FGM, which 
aimed to mobilise health workers, was to inform and empower health workers not to practise FGM.272 A UK 
student, Fahma Mohamed, started a campaign to get more information about FGM into schools, attracting 
230,000 supporters on Change.org, including Ban Ki-moon and Malala Yousafzai, which resulted in the UK’s 
education minister writing to all teachers about FGM awareness.273 This campaign has now been taken up in 
268  ‘Brutal killing of Özgecan Aslan forces Turkey to face up to rampant violence against women’, Today’s Zaman, 21 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1eCGm90; 
‘Ozgecan Aslan’s rape, murder sparks Turkish Twitter protest’, news.com.au, 18 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1FRAbIc; ‘Turkish Men In Miniskirts Defend Women’s Rights 
After Murder Of Student Ozgecan Aslan, The Huffington Post, 23 February 2015, http://huff.to/1EDyYz1. 
269  ‘Analysis: Can India’s anti-rape moment change a culture?’, CBC News, 4 January 2013, http://bit.ly/1G6CeKs. 
270  ‘On Erdogan and Muslim Mothers’, Al Jazeera, 28 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1FRAmn5; ‘Turkish women post selfies wearing black as US condemns 
Ozgecan Aslan murder’, The Telegraph, 17 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1JYHy2u. 
271  One Billion Rising, ‘One Billion Rising Global Coordinators – Reports from 2015’, http://bit.ly/1LNCYTy; ‘One Billion Rising: how can public dancing end 
violence against women?’, The Guardian, 13 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1KCmuji.  
272  ‘UN calls for FGM zero tolerance after a year in which the world woke up’, The Guardian, 7 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1DlqGQ1; UN, ‘International Day of 
Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation’, 6 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1GJeyuv. 
273  ‘Anti-FGM activist Fahma Mohamed wins young campaigner award’, The Guardian, 13 October 2014, http://bit.ly/1HWxJQk. 
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the US, while in Spain health workers have committed to stepping up their scrutiny and reporting of FGM.274 
In December 2014, the UN General Assembly adopted a new resolution to intensify efforts to eliminate FGM, 
giving civil society another lever to exert advocacy.275 FGM is far from beaten, but the committed action of civil 
society, particularly when diverse civil society works together, is showing that seemingly intractable problems of 
gender inequality can be tackled.
Two diverging worlds for LGBTI 
rights?
We are seeing diverging trends in the realisation of LGBTI rights, and the concern must be that the world is 
dividing into two on this issue, with a global north where LGBTI people are largely becoming more able to realise 
their rights, and a global south where LGBTI people are experiencing increased repression. While this crude 
schematic doesn’t capture nuances on either side - for example, several Latin American countries are ahead of 
the curve in recognising same-sex marriage - the concern must be that two quite different worlds are emerging 
for LGBTI people. We need to resist the notion that rights are something only to be enjoyed in some parts of the 
world, and are somehow not appropriate in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific.
On the positive side, same sex marriage, which has become a key indicator for progress in the achievement of 
LGBTI rights, continues to grow in legal standing. In 2014/ 2015 same-sex marriage was legalised in Luxembourg 
and most of the UK, and is expected to become legal in Slovenia in 2015. In May 2015, Ireland became the first 
country in the world to approve equal marriage through specific popular vote, when 62% of voters approved 
a referendum on the issue.276 Same-sex marriage is now legal in 17 countries, and debates on legalisation of 
same-sex marriage and civil unions are at an advanced stage across a range of countries. In the US, where same-
sex marriage is now legal in most states, there has been a series of legal battles, in which states cross between 
banning same-sex marriage and allowing it, according to court decisions, but the direction of travel is towards 
wider legalisation, while US President Barack Obama signalled further progress in realising rights in July 2014 
when he passed an order banning LGBTI workplace discrimination.277 
274  ‘Spain asks parents to sign declaration to protect daughters from FGM’, The Guardian, 13 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1KIElDL; The Guardian, 6 February 2015 
op. cit. 
275  UN, ‘Adopting 68 Texts Recommended by Third Committee, General Assembly Sends Strong Message towards Ending Impunity, Renewing Efforts to Protect 
Human Rights’, 18 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1ABWMrP. 
 
276  Referendum Ireland results page, http://bit.ly/1d3Oa2l.  
277  ‘US: Obama will sign executive order banning LGBT workplace discrimination Monday’, Pink News, 18 July 2014, http://bit.ly/1HX08Wm. 
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The legalisation of same-sex marriage represents a remarkable shift in politics and public attitudes since the 
Netherlands became the first country to do so in 2001. Without sustained LGBTI activism, including through 
regular LGBTI pride rallies, the recruitment of high-profile supporters and willingness to engage in legal battle, 
such progress could not have been made.
We’re also increasingly seeing, in global north countries, the economic power of the LGBTI community being 
exerted politically, for example, in the high profile boycott of a hotel chain owned by the Sultan of Brunei, 
after the Sultan introduced the punishment of stoning for homosexuality.278 In addition, a number of high-
level politicians and heads of global businesses have recently come out,279 trends that once would have been 
unimaginable in the alpha-male world of top-level business and politics. Together, these trends suggest that, in 
some countries, LGBTI status is becoming normalised.
Globally, including at UN level, there is also a sense that institutions are becoming more aware of, and 
responsive towards, LGBTI rights, as evidenced by the passing of a UNHRC resolution condemning violence and 
discrimination on the basis of sexual identity and gender identity, in September 2014. Significantly, showing 
the potential leadership role of Latin American states, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay were among the 
states that sponsored the resolution.280 The UN’s Free & Equal campaign, which seeks to promote public 
understanding of LGBTI rights, claims to have reached over 1bn people with its positive messages in a year.281 At 
a regional level, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights passed a resolution in May 2014 against 
violence and discrimination, including in anti-gay laws, against LGBTI people.282
This does not mean, of course, that LGBTI people in these countries are free from inequality and attacks. Brazil, 
for example, where same-sex marriage is legal, also has the world’s highest LGBTI murder rate, while in Spain, 
one of the most LGBTI tolerant countries, 40% of reported hate crimes are committed against LGBTI people.283 
At the same time, the reactionary forces that are on the march, from ISIL to the European far right, target LGBTI 
278  ‘Hotel cancellations over Brunei ‘stone the gays law’ reach $1.5 million’, Pink News, 9 May 2014, http://bit.ly/1iz3S5e. 
279  ‘Xavier Bettel Is Luxembourg’s First Gay Prime Minister’, The Huffington Post, 4 December 2013, http://huff.to/1LO9rJC; ‘Latvia and gay rights: A minister 
comes out’, The Economist, 12 November 2014, http://econ.st/1eDoril; ‘Leo Varadkar, Irish Cabinet Minister, Comes Out As Gay, The Huffington Post, 19 January 2015, 
http://huff.to/1G7HYnf; ‘Apple’s CEO Tim Cook has these 7 openly gay leaders to thank’, Fortune, 30 October 2014, http://bit.ly/1LO9QeR; ‘Out at Work: Top 50 LGBT 
Executives’, http://bit.ly/1LO9QeR. 
280  International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), ‘Top UN human rights body condemns violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity’, 26 September 2014, http://bit.ly/1HSecTT; HRW, ‘UN: Landmark Resolution on Anti-Gay Bias’, 26 September 2014, http://bit.ly/1u5GXE0; ‘Things are getting 
better for LGBTI people’, Gay Star News, 13 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1PSGfa2.  
281  Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘United Nations Free & Equal: One Billion Rising’, YouTube video, 8 September 2014, 
http://bit.ly/1KCH7fx. 
282  ISHR, ‘African Commission adopts landmark resolution on LGBT rights’, 22 May 2014, http://bit.ly/1jwDREf.  
283  ‘Brazil has the highest LGBT murder rate in the world’, FourTwoNine, 11 March 2013, http://bit.ly/1BupJRH; ‘Spain: Anti-LGBT incidents make up 40% of 
overall hate crimes’, Pink News, 12 May 2014, http://bit.ly/1FIiFov.  
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people.284 It may be a case that LGBTI rights are becoming more visible, and that among some, this makes LGBTI 
rights more controversial and contested: each step forward creates a backlash. For example, France made same-
sex marriage legal in 2013, but then saw a 78% rise in attacks on LGBTI people.285 
We’re still far away from the full realisation of LGBTI rights. There is not one country in the world where 
LGBTI people have entirely equal rights. Five countries - Iran, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen - 
apply the death penalty for homosexual acts, and over 2.7bn people live in countries where their sexuality is 
criminalised.286
In countries that do not respect LGBTI rights, the same tactics that are used to stymie CSOs are applied to LGBTI 
activist groups. These include legal and regulatory measures. Until a landmark ruling in Kenya’s High Court 
in 2015, for example, LGBTI groups were not allowed to register as CSOs.287 LGBTI groups also receive heavy 
police attention: in Uganda in 2014, a US-funded HIV project was raided and threatened with closure for being 
accused of ‘training homosexuals’, an act that also shows the regressive impact of LGBTI intolerance on HIV 
prevention. In follow up, the government said it would introduce new laws to prevent CSOs from ‘promoting 
homosexuality’.288
Repressive governments are writing anti-gay prejudice into law, as the governments of Uganda and Nigeria did 
in early 2014.289 Uganda’s anti-gay law was overturned by its Constitutional Court in August 2014, but moves are 
afoot to restore it.290 Russia’s law, against spreading ‘homosexual propaganda’, combined with its law against 
civil society receipt of foreign funding, have already had an impact: the LGBTI CSO Coming Out has been fined 
for receiving Dutch and Norwegian funding, and the Side by Side LGBTI film festival fined under the propaganda 
law. In January 2015, Elena Kilmova, founder of the Children-404 CSO, which provides LGBTI advice to minors, 
was found guilty under the propaganda law, although this was later overturned on appeal, while in March 2015, 
284  HRW, ‘The Double Threat for Gay Men in Syria’, 28 April 2014, http://bit.ly/1nGRGm1; ‘Another man accused of being gay has been stoned to death by ISIS’, 
Pink News, 13 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1GJGlLp; ‘Spain: Gay couple hospitalised after ‘Neo-Nazi’ attack’, Pink News, 15 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1AyHzYP. 
285  ‘Gay rights around the world: the best and worst countries for equality’, The Guardian, 30 July 2013, http://bit.ly/1LOcP7l; ‘France: Watchdog reports 789 
percent rise in anti-gay attacks’, Pink News, 13 May 2014, http://bit.ly/1LOcSQy. 
286  ‘More than 27 billion people live in countries where being gay is a crime’, The Guardian, 16 May 2014, http://bit.ly/1szQhMg. 
287  ‘Court rules that Kenyan government can’t block gay rights groups’, Pink News, 24 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1JZdK5F. 
288  ‘Ugandan police raid US-funded project accused of ‘training homosexuals’, Pink News, 4 April 2014; http://bit.ly/1h1OZrP; ‘Uganda proposes new law to 
tackle NGOs promoting ‘very bad homosexuality’’, Pink News, 28 April 2014, http://bit.ly/1LOe2eA; ‘Everything you need to know about Africa’s anti-gay crackdown’, The 
Week, 30 March 2014, http://bit.ly/1ACB0UW. 
289  The Week, 30 March 2014 op. cit.
290  ‘Uganda: MPs to alter parliamentary regulations to allow vote on new anti-gay law’, Pink News, 7 August 2014, http://bit.ly/1FRWjSJ.  
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the LGBTI CSO Maximum was found guilty and fined for not accepting the ‘foreign agent’ label for receiving 
funding.291 Other trials are in progress.
As we have documented previously, one of the worst things about regressive laws is that other countries 
imitate them: Kyrgyzstan is introducing an anti-gay law essentially copied from Russia’s in 2013, and actively 
promoted by Russian anti-gay groups, while a law passed in The Gambia in November 2014 that introduces 
life sentences for homosexuality has sections apparently copied from Uganda’s law.292 There are also fears that 
another copy of Russia’s law will be introduced in Belarus.293 A draft anti-gay bill has been introduced in Chad, 
and in Indonesia’s Aceh province, a new law penalises gay sex with 100 lashes.294
One of the impacts of such laws is that they help to normalise a climate in which LGBTI people are attacked.295 
Amnesty International found that increased violence and discrimination followed the introduction of 
Uganda’s anti-gay law, and Human Rights Watch found the same in Russia. LGBTI activists and groups are 
sadly no strangers to violence: an LGBTI CSO in Kyrgyzstan experienced an arson attack in April 2015, while 
violence against LGBTI people increased in Liberia in response to Ebola, highlighting the connection between 
misinformation and stigma.296 Human Rights Watch documented 56 cases of violence based on sexual identity 
over a mere five weeks in Jamaica, while Transgender Europe reported that 226 trans people were killed in the 
last year.297 The use of the internet and social media to play dirty tricks against activists, as noted above, is also 
being applied to this sphere: in March 2015 Egyptian police used fake dating profiles to lure transsexual people 
to arrest, something the Electronic Frontier Foundation report as being practised against LGBTI people across a 
number of MENA countries.298
291  ‘The Crackdown on NGOs in Russia’, Radio Free Europe, http://bit.ly/1GJIbvB; ‘Russian LGBT Network, Elena Klimova is Found Guilty of “Propaganda of 
Homosexuality Among Minors”. Is it Illegal to Help LGBT Minors Now?’, http://bit.ly/1FImwlB; Russian LGBT Network, ‘Elena Klimova was Found Not Guilty Again’, 
http://bit.ly/1JZf88k; Russian LGBT Network, ‘Murmansk LGBT Organization Maximum has been Fined 300 000 Rubles for Refusing to Accept the “Foreign Agent” Label, 
http://bit.ly/1EEJHcx. 
292  Open Society Foundation, ‘Kyrgyzstan’s New Anti-Gay Law Is Even Worse Than Russia’s’, 17 December 2014, http://osf.to/1zCxlUb; ‘Moscow anti-gay 
conference plans spread of ‘gay propaganda’ laws across the world, Pink News, 14 September 2014, http://bit.ly/YLz7Uz; ‘Gambian president signs bill to punish gays 
with life imprisonment’, Pink News, 21 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1uUOCWZ. 
293  ‘Concerns raised that Belarus may enact anti-gay law similar to Russia’s’, Pink News, 27 July 2014, http://bit.ly/1AyRf5L. 
294  Amnesty International, ‘Chad: Proposed anti-gay law will fuel homophobia’, 23 September 2014, http://bit.ly/1Rvw8p8; ‘100 Lashes: New Law Reveals 
Indonesia’s Split Personality on LGBT Rights’, Advocate.com, 5 October 2014, http://bit.ly/1vIASx4. 
295  The Week, 30 March 2014 op. cit. 
296  ‘Arson attack on Kyrgyzstan LGBT Centre’, Pink News, 10 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1HXm83e; ‘Liberian gay groups ‘under attack’ over Ebola outbreak’, Pink 
News, 24 October 2014, http://bit.ly/1HAUs1q.
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Monitoring project reveals 226 killings of trans people in the last 12 months’, 30 October 2014, http://bit.ly/1OSaxpu. 
298  ‘Egypt arrests seven trans people for ‘debauchery’ using fake dating profiles’, Pink News, 6 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1G8bMjF; ‘Egypt: Grindr warns user 
‘police may be posing as LGBT’ after six men sentenced’, Pink News, 26 September 2014, http://bit.ly/1FSbbAP; EFF, ‘LGBTQ Communities in the Arab World Face 
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In response to such anti-gay laws and rhetoric, debate has grown about linking aid from global north countries 
to LGBTI rights in global south countries: in April 2014 the President of the European Parliament suggested that 
EU aid should not go to countries that imprison people on the basis of their sexuality, while in December 2014 
the US government ended The Gambia’s preferential trading status over its anti-gay law.299 Aid conditionalities 
are, however, a blunt instrument. The challenge is that they play to a global south critique of LGBTI rights as 
being neo-colonial impositions, and risk a closer turn towards donors from countries that turn a blind eye to 
repression, such as China.300 Russia’s government, for example, reportedly banned a number of US donors 
for supporting LGBTI projects.301 At the same time, anti-gay campaigners in the global south appear to have 
no qualms about receiving financial support from global north reactionary groups, particularly US far-right 
Christian groups.302
Nor is the intergovernmental environment as supportive as it could be: there was anger about reports that 
Russia’s government had banned trans people from driving, but this turned out to be based on an outdated 
list of WHO mental disorders, which includes trans-sexuality, highlighting the need to update the global 
architecture to drive more progressive norms.303
The civil society response must be to resist absolutely the notion that LGBTI rights are for the global north but 
not the global south, and to reject claims that global north countries are attempting to impose rights that global 
south citizens don’t want. Governments that repress LGBTI rights are governments that supress civil society and 
human rights in general. LGBTI repression is a key indicator of a wider disenabling environment for civil society 
and civic participation. For example, another new law being proposed in Uganda would give the government 
new powers to approve and close down CSOs that are not deemed to be in the public interest; this would 
cover groups working on LGBTI issues, but also those that seek to hold the government to account over other 
issues.304 The governments that voted against the 2014 UNHRC resolution - Algeria, Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Indonesia, Kenya, Kuwait, Maldives, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and United Arab 
Emirates – are mostly ones with a difficult relationship with civil society.305
299  ‘European Parliament President: Cut aid from African countries with anti-gay laws’, Pink News, 1 April 2014, http://bit.ly/1J8QSBv; ‘US: Gambia stripped of 
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In response, civil society needs to be inclusive, and CSOs working on other issues need to make common 
cause with LGBTI activists. This hasn’t always been the case: global south LGBTI CSOs often find themselves 
marginalised within civil society, while some international CSOs compromise on LGBTI rights: a decision by 
Christian international CSOs World Vision in March 2014 to reverse its ban on hiring gay staff lasted only two 
days before being withdrawn, after supporters threatened to stop donations.306
There is a need to share and promote positive examples of civic action from the global south, to tackle the 
notion that LGBTI rights are only a global north concern. There are inspiring examples, and these need to be 
documented and promoted to drive up norms of good practice. For example, in South Africa, the only African 
country with same-sex marriage, Africa’s first out black gay MP was elected in May 2015; in January 2015, 
for the first time in India, an out transgender person was elected as a mayor; and over 120 LGBTI CSOs came 
together in Taiwan in October 2014 to demand same-sex marriage.307 Indeed, there are several civil society 
mobilisations to demand LGBTI rights in the global south: there are gay pride events, there are attempts to 
change laws and there are victories, such as the Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals of Botswana CSO successfully 
appealing to the High Court to overturn a ban on their registration in November 2014.308
International connections of solidarity from global north to global south are valuable, but activists in the global 
north need to be careful not to play up to the notion that the global north is seeking to impose LGBTI rights. 
The emphasis must be on helping to enable spaces where LGBTI people in the global south can develop their 
voices, take on negative discourse and claim their rights. Deeper cultural engagement is needed to understand 
the potential local levers for change.309 Finally, given the impressive legal progress made in Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay and some states of Mexico, civil society and public figures from these countries in particular could play 
a crucial role in reaching out to global southern publics.
And Gender Identity At The United Nations Human Rights Council, 30 September 2014, http://bit.ly/1KhuKlF.
306  ‘World Vision, recovering from gay policy shift, tries to shore up its evangelical base’, Religious New Service, 26 June 2014, http://bit.ly/1FklE45.
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January 2015, http://bit.ly/1BuJTuL; ‘Taiwan: Thousands campaign for same-sex marriage outside parliament gates’, Pink News, 6 October 2014, http://bit.ly/1BuJXuK. 
308  UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, January 2014 op. cit.
309  ODI, ‘Can aid donors help support LGBT rights in developing countries?’, 7 July 2014, http://bit.ly/1jIQnxj.
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Conclusion: civil society space
Despite some hard-won success stories, including by gender, LGBTI and internet rights activists, civil society 
conditions are deteriorating in too many countries. The shrinkage of civic space is no longer something that 
can be dismissed as a coincidence, or the province of a small group of aberrant states. A fight is on to reverse 
civic freedoms and human rights that we once believed were firmly established. Regressive norms are being 
propagated, and hard won democratic rights are being contested and rolled back. Governments are not the 
only regressive force here: much of the risk to activists comes from sub-national forces, and comes when 
corruption brings together the interests of people working in politics, government and business. We always 
need to enquire into, and understand, the drivers of crackdowns on civil society, which are rarely ideological in 
origin, and more often to do with competition for resources, and a concern by elites to hold onto economic and 
political power.
We need to defend and argue for civil society to play all of its legitimate roles, including that of acting as a 
watchdog on power, improving transparency and protecting the rights of the marginalised, and demonstrate 
the added value that comes when civil society is enabled to do so. But while exposing abuses, civil society must 
be careful not to propagate a narrative of disempowerment, in which governments and global corporations 
are presented as all powerful and civil society can only ever be vulnerable to their whims. It is important in 
civil society to recognise and celebrate our own power, as CIVICUS’ annual Global Day of Citizen Action exists 
to do.310 The previous section, on civic mobilisation, tells us that opportunities come to expand civic space, and 
must be seized. 
Among response strategies identified is the formation of broad-based alliances between different civil society 
groups and activists. Many of our alliance members, who work in very difficult conditions, emphasise the value 
of international solidarity in their struggles, in knowing that they are not alone and that people in different 
countries are committed to supporting them. Further, while the intergovernmental sphere is dysfunctional, 
as we concluded in the 2014 State of Civil Society Report, and while working internationally can bring risks, 
as in the case of Azerbaijan, we believe that international arenas still offer some value for defending civil 
society, and need to be embraced and strengthened. This includes global forums such as the UN Human Rights 
Council and regional ones such as the Council of Europe. These offer opportunities for concerted international 
action between different civil society groups and more supportive governments, and should be embraced as 
310  Be The Change: Global Day of Citizen Action website, http://www.civicus.org/bethechange. 
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key arenas, not only for defending the rights of CSOs in challenging contexts, but also for strengthening and 
promoting international norms about the proper role and status of civil society.
Five key points for future action:
•	 International solidarity is critical for civil society when it is under attack, but needs to be exercised in 
ways that do not play to divides between global south and global north. Wherever possible, we should 
enable affected parties to speak for themselves in global forums.
•	 Progressive norms that lead to a more enabling environment for civil society need to be propagated, 
which implies documenting and sharing good practice where it exists, and campaigning to strengthen 
the role of international institutions and legal instruments to more strongly protect civil society rights.
•	 Research needs to shed more light on corrupt connections, which often occur at sub-national levels, 
between politicians, public officials, security forces, organised crime and businesses.
•	 Horizontal coalitions need to be formed and strengthened between CSOs of different kinds, and human 
rights defenders, journalists and internet freedom activists, to defend civil society freedoms.
•	 Resourcing needs to support both the rapid response of CSOs and activists to threats and attacks, and 
the longer term development of a more enabling environment for civil society.
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The above sections have focused largely on national level contexts where civil society has been active, or where 
the conditions for civil society have been affected. As part of this, international connections have been shown to 
be an important part of how civil society works and is supported. But there is, of course, also a need to assess 
the work of civil society on transnational issues, including the large, cross-border challenges of our time, and 
how civil society is engaging with, and trying to change, the institutions of global governance.
These issues are covered in more depth in the 2014 State of Civil Society Report, which looked at global 
governance challenges as its special theme. Our 2014 report laid out the challenges that make global 
governance dysfunctional: states with poor domestic governance, including those that repress civil society 
at home, export their democratic deficits when they convene at international tables, where national level 
political calculus usually prevails. A global governance system that has built up over time is now outdated and 
not fit for purpose, being characterised by gaps and inconsistencies. Big business has globalised, and uses its 
international basis to minimise its social obligations, while intractable problems, such as climate change, do not 
respect borders, but intergovernmental institutions do not reflect this. The most important bodies, such as the 
UN Security Council, reproduce the post-war power standings of a small group of influential countries, and are 
blocked because they have become forums for the rehearsal of entrenched differences between blocs of states. 
An international system that reflects and reproduces structural inequalities clearly cannot adequately address 
rising citizens’ concerns about inequality and the increasing concentration of wealth and resources in the hands 
of a tiny, transnational elite.311
Further, civil society is under-represented and marginalised in the web of global governance institutions, 
which are far more welcoming of large, transnational corporations, but in ways that are not transparent. The 
311  ‘World’s Richest One Percent Undermine Fight Against Economic Inequalities’, Inter Press Service (IPS), 19 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1GtZyxu.  
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international order can only become functional if it is reformed systematically, in ways that reach out to and 
include a wide range of civil society. But as the following example suggests, this is not to say that civil society 
should simply give up on engagement with global governance.
The Arms Trade Treaty: a child of civil 
society
Reform can only come, we suggest, if civil society self-organises, engages constructively and pushes for change. 
The Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force in December 2014 after receiving 50 ratifications, stands as a 
recent example of how civil society can engage to make a difference. The treaty introduces, for the first time, 
regulations and approval processes for international arms sales, with annual reporting to a treaty secretariat. It 
is intended to prevent arms exports to states where they are likely to be used in situations that seriously affect 
human rights.
Part of its significance is that the idea of the treaty came from civil society in the 1990s. Government officials 
have confirmed that civil society advocacy played a huge role in helping to bring the treaty about and move the 
debate relatively quickly, in international terms, from a position where it had almost no support to one where 
it exists as a new piece of international law: in 2003, only three states publicly supported controls on the arms 
trade, but just a decade later in 2013, states voted overwhelmingly for it.312
As with the Rome Treaty to establish the International Criminal Court (see below) and the Ottawa Mine 
Ban Treaty, from which the movement drew confidence and inspiration, civil society applied a multi-
faceted advocacy strategy.313 CSOs formed a broad coalition, the global Control Arms alliance, led by 
Amnesty International, Oxfam and the International Action Network on Small Arms. Control Arms coalesced 
international and national civil society from global south and north. The coalition brought in expert lawyers to 
help prepare credible drafts, and worked with sympathetic governments to establish regional champions to 
create a snowball effect, gradually growing a progressive group of governments and preventing the formation 
of regional opposing blocs. Advocacy was underpinned by dynamic and increasingly sophisticated power 
mapping to track governments’ changing positions on the treaty, and identify potential levers of influence.314 
Control Arms also brought international public pressure to bear, including by presenting a million citizens’ 
312  ‘UN passes historic arms trade treaty by huge majority’, BBC, 2 April 2013, http://bbc.in/1J7WXOH; ‘Arms Trade Treaty Gains Momentum with 50th 
Ratification’, IPS, 28 September 2014, http://bit.ly/1AybBfv; UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Civil society and the drive towards an Arms Trade Treaty: 
a background paper by Daniel Mack and Brian Wood, http://bit.ly/1JYJTdG; Oxfam, Power and Change: The Arms Trade Treaty, 16 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1G6KJoV. 
313  International Campaign to Ban Landmines, ‘Treaty in Detail: Frequently Asked Questions’, http://bit.ly/1FkfSPY; Oxfam, 16 January 2015 op. cit.
314  Oxfam, 16 January 2015 op. cit.
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petition to the UN Secretary-General in 2006, and holding shadow ‘People’s Consultations’ across a wide range 
of countries to mirror UN diplomatic processes, combined with high profile advocacy by Nobel laureates, 
celebrities and internationally respected leaders.315 
The process of drafting and approving the treaty, once it reached the UN, took seven years, calling for 
continuous campaigning, the development of expertise and a research base, and national level advocacy work 
to help develop and influence the positions of delegations negotiating the treaty: by the end of the process, at 
least 15 civil society personnel involved in the campaign had been brought into government delegations.316
The treaty is not without its critics: undoubtedly civil society did not get everything it wanted, and some 
criticised the treaty for being excessively watered down to achieve broad buy-in, while the lack of ratification 
by China, Russia and the USA means it does not apply to some heavy hitters.317 The Campaign Against the Arms 
Trade have complained that the treaty confers a legitimising fig leaf on arms sales, and notes the involvement 
of arms companies in national delegations.318 However, the treaty’s supporters assert that it introduces 
humanitarian and human rights discourse into an arena traditionally seen as the preserve of a self-interested 
security establishment, and that, as with the landmines treaty, it may stimulate a stigmatising effect against 
arms sales to repressive regimes. The treaty also implies that arms manufacturers now have some responsibility 
for how their products are used, and gives civil society a lever to shed more light on often murky deals.319
The treaty can be seen as an effective civil society response to a transnational problem in a globalised world. It 
certainly provides an opportunity for further civil society advocacy, and the challenge now for civil society is to 
stay engaged beyond the initial euphoria of agreement. Rapid progress to pass the minimum ratifications target 
suggests that some political will and momentum exist, but focus now needs to shift to advocating for ratification 
by those states that have not yet done so, an important issue, given that over half of the UN’s member states 
make and sell arms.320 Civil society also now needs to make sure that the treaty’s reporting provisions are used 
effectively to hold governments and manufacturers to account.
315  Control Arms, ‘The Story So Far’, http://bit.ly/1FkfSPY; UNIDIR op. cit.
316  Reaching Critical Will, ‘Arms Trade Treaty’, http://bit.ly/1HAgYYv; Oxfam, 16 January 2015 op. cit.
317  ‘Arms Trade Treaty’s fine intentions may founder on the realities of global conflict’, The Guardian, 23 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1Bcs5qC.  
318  ‘Arms trade treaty is just a fig leaf’, New Internationalist, 30 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1wHN6Ul.  
319  IPS, 28 September 2014 op. cit.; The Guardian, 23 December 2014 op. cit.
320  Amnesty International, ‘Q&A: Global Arms Trade Treaty enters into force’, 22 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1Kt9QAb; IPS, 28 September 2014 op. cit.
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Africa vs. the International Criminal 
Court? A new challenge to global 
governance
In comparison, another key piece of progressive global governance architecture, the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), found itself under assault from a large group of African states in the past two years. Civil society 
was instrumental in bringing the ICC about, and now civil society has been called upon to defend it from 
criticisms emanating from the global south.
The Rome Statute establishing the ICC, to try cases of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, was 
adopted in July 1998, after years of lobbying, involving over 200 CSOs and a coalition of 60 states known as the 
‘Like Minded Governments’ (LMG). As with the Arms Trade Treaty, the successful campaign served as a case 
study in how partnership between civil society and states could overcome powerful resistance. Many African 
states were actively supportive of the creation of the ICC, with 15 of the LMG being African, while it was also 
notable that the supportive coalition cut across the blocs that usually dominate international negotiations, 
preventing the discussions from degenerating into a global north vs. global south debate, and suggesting a new 
way of working globally.321 
The reality of the ICC’s working has, however, become fiercely contested, with the debate increasingly 
taking global north vs. south lines. The Court has found itself criticised for its overwhelming focus on African 
countries, and been accused of failing to investigate adequately serious cases elsewhere, although these 
failures may have more to do with the divisive and blocked politics of the UNSC, which has the power of ICC 
referral.322
Anger has focussed on proceedings against two incumbent heads of state, President Kenyatta of Kenya and 
President al-Bashir of Sudan. The indictment of Kenyatta, along with his deputy, was a particular catalyst, 
risking the accusation that the Court has been drawn into domestic politics, compromising its neutrality.323At 
an AU summit in July 2014, African heads of state were urged to “speak with one voice” against the indictment 
321  Chatham House, Africa and the International Criminal Court, July 2013, http://bit.ly/1JbPdto; William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal 
Court, 2011, 4th edition (Cambridge: Polity Press); HRW, World Report 1999 – Introduction, http://bit.ly/1dBE1uK.  
322  ‘International justice: Nice idea, now make it work’, The Economist, 6 December 2014, http://econ.st/1LQUPbJ; ‘Netanyahu’s wishful thinking: A world 
without the International Criminal Court, sott.net, 17 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1d3nnDs. 
323  Brookings, ‘Can the International Criminal Court Play Fair in Africa?’, 17 October 2013, http://brook.gs/1d3nuid; Chatham House, July 2013 op. cit.
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of sitting leaders, and concerns were expressed that ICC proceedings risk instability.324 Ahead of this, at an 
extraordinary AU summit convened solely to focus on the ICC, in October 2013 - something that can only be 
called with the support of two thirds of members, indicating widespread agreement - African leaders agreed 
to call on the ICC to defer the Kenyan and Sudanese proceedings, and grant immunity for serving heads of 
state; to do so would entail a rewriting of the Rome Statute and dilute its novel stance against impunity, given 
that it removes the immunity international law normally extends to state leaders.325 Not for the first time, it 
seems that autocratic leaders are trying to revert to narrow notions of state sovereignty, implying freedom for 
presidents to act without interference, rather than notions of popular, democratic sovereignty.326 
While it is true that the ICC has overwhelmingly focused on African situations, it is also the case that Africa has 
a large number of ICC members (63% of African states have ratified), compared to a low level of ratification 
in Asia.327 It can also be noted that three African countries (CAR, DRC and Uganda) voluntarily referred their 
situations to the Court, in an unanticipated development; the motivation, at least in the case of Uganda, 
seems to have been to instrumentalise the court as a weapon against the internal enemies of President Yoweri 
Museveni.328 
The workings of the Kenya process were characterised by the withdrawal of witnesses amidst allegations 
of intimidation, and in December 2014, all charges against Kenyatta were dropped, after a key prosecution 
witness refused to testify, while another admitted to lying. The prosecutor directly accused Kenya’s government 
of intimidating and harassing witnesses.329 The end of the investigation demonstrated the Court’s difficulties 
in bringing high-ranking officials to justice; some have argued that powerful states were not unhappy about 
this, given changing political calculus about the renewed importance of the Kenyan government as an anti-
terrorist partner in the light of the Westgate shopping mall attacks.330 Only a few weeks after withdrawing the 
case against Kenyatta, the Chief Prosecutor also formally suspended the Court’s investigation into war crimes 
in Darfur, blaming the UNSC for not more vigorously trying to overcome the Sudanese government’s refusal to 
cooperate.331
324  ‘African Union urges united stand against ICC’, Al Jazeera, 1 February 2014, http://bit.ly/1bTnRop.  
325  Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘The AU’s ICC Summit: A case for elite solidarity for self preservation?’, 15 October 2013, http://bit.ly/1d3nO0p.  
326  Royal African Society, Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, March 2008, http://bit.ly/1cnax2f. 
327  VU University Amsterdam, ‘International Criminal Court not biased against Africa’, 19 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1Ktc9mK.  
328  Schabas, 2011 op. cit.; Chatham House, July 2013 op. cit.; Adam Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda, 2011 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press).
329  ‘ICC withdraws charges against Kenyatta’, Al Jazeera, 5 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1rWo8Fa.  
330  ‘Africa Chooses to Stay Inside the Law on Kenya’, All Africa, 14 October 2013, http://bit.ly/1GJlAzf; ‘In a tangle: Kenya and the International Court’, The 
Economist, 19 October 2013, http://econ.st/1dBF4Lb; ‘ICC drops murder and rape charges against Kenyan president’, The Guardian, 5 December 2014, http://bit.
ly/1COjnCa. 
331  ‘In protest at inaction, ICC prosecutor stops investigating Darfur genocide’, Al Jazeera, 12 December 2014, http://alj.am/1HWEKQX. 
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John Ryle, of the Rift Valley Institute, a CSO focused on Eastern and Central Africa, summarised the challenge: 332
The ICC has unfortunately become a toxic brand in much of Africa. The vulnerability of the ICC to 
this backlash has been a blow for African civil society activists who seek justice and accountability 
from their leaders.
Civil society, however, fought against this negative campaign, and vitally, given the need to negate any notion 
that this was a global north vs. south argument. Global southern civil society was active in the response. Ahead 
of the AU’s October 2013 summit, 163 African CSOs based in 36 African countries called on their governments 
to support the ICC, while over 850,000 people from all around the world signed an Avaaz petition.333
At the 13th Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, held in December 2014, African and international 
CSOs, including the Coalition for the ICC, the International Federation for Human Rights and Human Rights 
Watch, presented a more positive portrait of Africa’s relationship with the ICC. Esther Waweru of the Kenya 
Human Rights Commission said:334
While a few vocal African governments are intent on portraying the ICC as anti-African and trying 
to undermine the court, the real picture is quite different. Just ask the president of the Central African 
Republic, who expressed deep gratitude to the ICC for assisting her country in the wake of serious 
crimes there, and the many other African countries that took the floor in support of the ICC.
Notably in December 2014, African governments reaffirmed their support for the ICC, a position they 
presumably must have felt more comfortable with, given the dropped and stalled Kenyan and Sudanese 
proceedings, although they repeated their call for an immunity clause to be introduced.335 
Plans have also been announced to develop a regional African alternative, by effectively relaunching the largely 
powerless African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights, but the AU-led process for drafting this is much less 
inclusive of civil society than the ICC process was, and there are many concerns about how this might be 
resourced, and whether it would reinforce narrow notions of sovereignty, with immunity already written into 
its protocol.336 Calls for the AU to become more active in this sphere, may, however, have led to a watershed. In 
332  Quotation taken from ‘Has Kenya Destroyed the ICC?’ Foreign Policy, 15 July 2014, http://atfp.co/1JYNJ6A. 
333  HRW, ‘Letter to Foreign Ministers on Support for the ICC in Advance of Extraordinary AU Summit, 4 October 2013, http://bit.ly/1HWF9mG.  
334  HRW, ‘ICC: African Countries Support Court’, 17 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1wjoFB7.  
335  HRW, 17 December 2014 op. cit. 
336  Chatham House, July 2013 op. cit.; HRW, ‘Joint Letter to the Justice Ministers and Attorneys General of the African States Parties to the International Criminal 
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September 2014, the AU’s Peace and Security Council established a Commission of Inquiry into human rights 
abuses and violations by all parties in the South Sudan conflict. African and international civil society now need 
to push strongly for real engagement with this regional initiative in order to make it meaningful, and to be 
involved fully in shaping the potential new regional mechanisms of international justice.337
Civil society action against the 
transatlantic trade treaty
Compared to some other major stories of the last year, trade negotiations can seem complex and arcane. They 
are rarely exposed to democratic oversight. But the free trade agreement currently being negotiated between 
the EU and the US, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), has attracted a growing civil 
society mobilisation. Supporters of the proposed arrangement assert that the deal will promote economic 
growth on both sides of the Atlantic, but the negotiations have generated a number of concerns, including 
that standards will be levelled down (with high EU consumer standards downgraded to harmonise with lower 
US standards), that EU public services will be more open to privatisation, and that the trade deal may make 
it harder for the EU to support developing countries to realise the coming SDGs.338 There are also significant 
process-related concerns, about the secrecy and lack of public input into the negotiations, compared to 
corporate input, and a particular worry about the power the TTIP might grant for corporations to take legal 
action against governments, which could inhibit corporate regulation. Motivated by these concerns, the civil 
society response arguably offers an emerging model for how multinational civil society coalitions, linking 
different types of civil society groups, can be built to encourage public engagement on complex issues. John 
Hilary, of War on Want, explains:
TTIP is set to affect almost all aspects of our lives, so there are many reasons driving civil society 
groups to oppose it. The threat to food safety and environmental regulations is one key factor 
alarming European citizens, including the danger that TTIP will fatally undermine EU restrictions 
on genetically modified ingredients entering our food. The new power that TTIP will grant 
multinational corporations to sue governments for loss of profits under an ‘investor-state dispute 
settlement’ (ISDS) mechanism is an outrage, and one of the reasons why politicians themselves are 
now recognising that TTIP is an affront to democracy.
Court Regarding the Proposed Expansion of the Jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights’, 3 May 2012, http://bit.ly/1FRGxaA; HRW, 17 December 
2014 op. cit.
337  ‘Accountability in South Sudan – the African Union Steps Up’, The Huffington Post, 25 April 2014, http://huff.to/1AyiEEV.  
338  ‘Could the TTIP deal undo development gains?’, The Guardian, 24 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1IIUzug.  
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Our first victory has been getting people to hear about a secret trade deal like TTIP, and to take 
an interest in it: we managed to secure over one million signatures on our self-organised European 
Citizens’ Initiative against TTIP within the record time of just two months. The second victory has 
been to turn that interest into political pressure, as parliamentarians now tell us that their mailbags 
and email inboxes are overflowing with constituents’ queries on TTIP. We have forced the European 
Commission to back down on several of its claims for TTIP, and we have also made them open up 
more access for parliamentarians to the negotiating documents than previously. As a result of our 
pressure, negotiations on the ISDS chapter of TTIP were frozen throughout 2014 while the European 
Commission conducted a public consultation on its future. We are winning the argument, but we 
still have to win the political battle against a system that is deeply anti-democratic and resistant to 
change.
There are now national platforms coordinating actions against TTIP in almost every single one of 
the EU member states, linking up trade unions with environmental, health, digital rights and other 
campaign groups in unprecedented coalitions. We are also coordinating with our sister organisations 
in the USA, which is important in showing that this is a common struggle for people on both sides of 
the Atlantic. The coordination is built on existing relationships that we have developed over the past 
15 years working on trade and investment issues, and it is working really well.
We also asked John how the movement is being resourced:
Some national platforms are better resourced than others, and a lot of the most important work 
is being done at a grassroots level with no resources other than the passion and commitment of 
activists. At the same time, there are a number of political foundations and trust funders that have 
provided vital resources to spread the word out into parts of civil society that would otherwise have 
remained untouched. Importantly, also, a network of trusts and foundations has been created to look 
over all the work being done on TTIP and to identify areas that are in danger of falling behind due 
to lack of funds. These funders have been actively linked in to the movement, consulting regularly as 
to what civil society needs in order to keep the campaign progressing. It’s been a remarkable example 
of what can be achieved by integrating all aspects of our work from the beginning, and a powerful 
model that we can build on for the future.
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In times when, as discussed above, far right and anti-European politics are winning increased support in 
many EU member countries, it may be no easy task to mobilise people in support of EU standards. But that 
mobilisation can be seen. For example, despite an EU public consultation system that was not easy to navigate, 
almost 150,000 responded, with 97% of them opposing the inclusion of an ISDS mechanism, while hundreds 
of protest events were organised across Europe on an international day of action on 18 April 2015.339 The 
campaign is tapping into rising concern in Europe, particularly in countries where people were hit hard by the 
consequences of the 2008 global banking crisis, about excessive transnational corporate power, and anger 
about large-scale corporate tax avoidance.
Further, the campaign has made links that are not always easy to forge, between advocacy CSOs and 
trade unions, and between online social media platforms and traditional protest methods such as public 
demonstrations and letter writing. After one such demonstration, Guy Taylor, of Global Justice Now, 
commented:
It’s unheard of to see so many people travelling to Brussels to lobby their MEPs [Members of 
European Parliament] like this, and that’s testament to just how hugely controversial and unpopular 
TTIP has become.
At the time of writing the TTIP remains under negotiation, and so the ultimate impact of the civil society 
campaign remains to be seen, but it can be observed to have scored some notable successes along the 
way. Some commentators have said that the reputation of the TTIP is now damaged, while Greece’s Syriza 
government has said it will not approve TTIP.340 The TTIP has declined in popularity with citizens of Germany, 
Europe’s biggest economic power, with more people opposed to it than supportive of it as of February 2015, 
while EU negotiators have felt the need to reassure critics that they are negotiating additional safeguards to 
meet public concerns.341 Civil society might just be changing the game here.
339  Stop TTIP, ‘ISDS Consultation Backfires Painfully’, 14 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1HWGAkZ; Stop TTIP, ‘Global Day of Action… and Inspiration!’, 27 April 2015, 
http://bit.ly/1cnd4t6. 
340  ‘Syriza Official Vows to Kill EU-US Trade Deal as ‘Gift to All European People’’, Common Dreams, 2 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1DxDC2N; ‘Guardian Live: 
What is TTIP and how does it affect us?’, The Guardian, 18 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1d3sH9S.
341  ‘Malmström: Germany’s TTIP debate ‘more heated’’, EurActiv, 24 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1D6o4BJ; ‘TTIP under pressure from protestors as Brussels 
promises extra safeguards’, The Guardian, 19 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1Bfq7s1. 
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A global response to climate change, 
a local response to fracking
21 September 2014 saw another global day of action, this time against climate change, with civic action at its 
most visible in New York when, ahead of UN climate talks, over 400,000 people joined the People’s Climate 
March, making it the largest climate protest in history. The march brought together climate change scientists, 
international figures such as Al Gore and Ban Ki-moon (in an unusually political act for a UN Secretary-General), 
trade unions, people with a long history in the climate change movement and people engaged on climate 
change for the first time.342 The intention of the march was to increase political pressure on governments, as 
May Boeve of 350.org made clear:343
Today, civil society acted at a scale that outdid even our own wildest expectations… Tomorrow, we 
expect our political leaders to do the same.
The New York march further highlighted the potential unlocked when different CSOs, citizens, and online 
campaigning platforms work together, with Avaaz, 350.org and Greenpeace amongst those cooperating. 
Further, around 1,500 CSOs were involved in global mobilisation, with the New York marches paralleled by an 
estimated 2,646 events in 162 countries. In London, UK, 40,000 people are estimated to have marched, and 
30,000 in Melbourne, Australia. Over two million people signed a petition, and there were over 630,000 posts 
on social media about the marches.344
The challenge for such large-scale demonstrations, once the thrill of protest is over, is of course to demonstrate 
that engagement can be maintained and made meaningful. 2014’s climate change summit, COP20, held in 
Lima, Peru, was judged by many in civil society as yet another failure in a dismal series stretching back for two 
decades, with divisions persisting between wealthy and impoverished nations, preventing the action required 
to tackle this transnational threat.345 COP20 was accompanied by a now familiar panoply of civil society side 
events, prompting the usual civil society frustration about lack of real voice, and prompting again the question 
of whether it is a good use of civil society’s scarce resources to participate in formal consultative events that 
342  ‘Taking a Call for Climate Change to the Streets’, The New York Times, 21 September 2014, http://nyti.ms/1qkVZzy.  
343  ‘Hundreds of Thousands Converge on New York to Demand Climate-Change Action’, TIME, 21 September 2014, http://ti.me/1rfEyWi.  
344  People’s Climate March, ‘More than 2500 Global Events, Join Hundreds of Thousands Marching in New York to Demand Action on Climate Change, 21 
September 2014, http://bit.ly/1q6UMf0; The New York Times, 21 September 2014 op. cit.
345  Women and Gender Constituency, ‘Women at COP 20 Blast Failure for Real Action in Lima’, 14 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1suNeeD; ‘At the Lima Climate 
Talks, It Was Groundhog Day All Over Again’, Foreign Policy in Focus, http://bit.ly/14bq2Hj; ‘More reactions to COP20 and Lima’s “Roadmap to global burning”’, 2 
January 2015, http://bit.ly/1FedDgd. 
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have a largely ceremonial status: this is the classic dilemma of whether it is better to be inside the conference 
room or outside on the streets, a question that ran through 2014’s State of Civil Society Report.
Our response to this dilemma was that civil society needs to try to do both, but to connect them: to take the 
legitimacy of the streets into the conference rooms, and to try to enlarge and enhance the available space, 
while maintaining the right to take confrontational positions and being careful not to legitimise ceremonial 
space. Civil society needs to engage permanently, and to build alliances with governments that are now 
experiencing the worst impacts of climate change.
The growing anti-fracking movement, meanwhile, is offering a potential model of how such connections might 
be made, by linking local environmental actions and national and international level policy debates.
Hydraulic fracturing, known as fracking, is a new method of extracting previously inaccessible gas and oil from 
shale rock. It offers countries with extensive shale gas reserves the tantalising prospect of reducing reliance on 
oil and gas imports, something which could even have a human rights pay-off, in reducing the political leverage 
of repressive high oil exporting states. However, environmental impacts can be profound: fracking requires huge 
amounts of water, which means making difficult decisions about water usage, and there are concerns about the 
process causing groundwater pollution and increased risk of earthquakes.346
Fracking is under way, or exploration of potential fracking has begun, in a range of countries, and in most 
of these it is being met with civil society opposition: community and national level civil society initiatives 
have sparked across such a variety of countries that the anti-fracking movement can now be seen as a global 
campaign built from strong local presences.347
In Bolivia, for example, the 2013 announcement by state-owned oil and gas company YPFB that it intended to 
investigate fracking sparked particular outrage, given that this clashes with Bolivia’s environmental protectionist 
‘rights to mother earth’ law, for which the government was internationally praised when it was introduced in 
2010.348 In response, a collective, the Anti-Fracking Movement in Bolivia formed, and Fundacion Solon issued 
a Declaration Against Fracking in Bolivia.349 In the UK, the village of Balcombe became an unlikely hotspot 
of political contestation in 2013 and 2014, when an Occupy-style camp was established, culminating in the 
346  ‘What is fracking and why is it controversial?’, BBC, 27 June 2013, http://bbc.in/1bsDjgR; ‘For The First Time, Scientists Prove Fracking Caused An Earthquake 
Strong Enough To Be Felt By Humans’, Think Progress, 6 January 2015, http://bit.ly/1AC0DTq.  
347  ‘Anti-fracking movement goals global, climate change mafia warns, LINKS, 10 February 2013, http://links.org.au/node/3224.  
348  ‘Bolivia’s Mother Earth Law Hard to Implement’, IPS, 19 May 2014, http://bit.ly/Rto0uM. 
349  ‘Is Bolivia going to frack ‘Mother Earth’?’, The Guardian, 24 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1wlpD1Q.  
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cessation of test drilling.350 In South Africa, which faces an energy crisis, frackers are eyeing the Karoo, a largely 
unspoilt vast tract of land.351 Concern focuses on the environmental impact, particularly given the water 
demand, in a particularly dry part of a country with scarce water, as well as the poor accountability record of 
extractive industries in South Africa.352
The civil society coalition that has formed in response in South Africa is broad-ranging, encompassing faith-
based and business groups.353 Similarly, in the US, a broad national coalition has been built, encompassing 
large CSOs such as Greenpeace, social media campaigns such as 350.org, and faith-based groups, farmers’ 
unions and some business groups.354 The campaign against fracking is also gaining global profile: an annual 
international day of protest, the Global Frackdown, has grown in scale since it began in 2012, and over 200 
partner CSOs came together to organise more than 300 events in the 2014 edition.355 
These campaigns have achieved some remarkable successes: fracking has been banned in Bulgaria and France, 
moratoriums imposed in Germany and the Netherlands, regulations tightened in Australia and the UK, and 
some local, state and province level bans introduced in Canada and the US.356 It is unlikely these would have 
happened without civil society campaigning making fracking an issue of national concern. Civil society has 
also pushed beyond a narrow environmental envelope, by raising connections with concerns about corporate 
governance and the lack of accountability and transparency in relationships between governments and the 
extractive industry. Indeed, the anti-fracking movement has been paid a unique private sector compliment: the 
gas industry has described it as sophisticated and “highly effective.”357
This is not to understate the challenges the movement faces. The city of Longmont in Colorado, US, serves 
as one case study of how hard it is for civic action to be sustained in the face of huge corporations. Fracking 
companies have brought wave after wave of legal actions, with the backing of state officials, to challenge a 
350  ‘Anti-fracking campaigners occupy Cuadrilla’s Balcombe drill site’, Drill or Drop?,19 January 2014, http://bit.ly/1FRJUye; ‘No fracking at Balcombe, says 
energy company Cuadrilla’, The Independent, 24 January 2014, http://ind.pn/1GJrhx7; 
351  ‘Energy crisis saps power from SA economy: experts’, Times Live, 18 February 2014, http://bit.ly/1LNW4Je; ‘Shale gas in South Africa: Fracking the Karoo’, 
The Economist, 18 October 2012, http://econ.st/1Fkgzc9. 
352  South African Government, ‘Water affairs’, http://bit.ly/1Jc1rCi; ‘Fracking could devastate South Africa’s water supply: WWF’, Times Live, 18 June 2014, 
http://bit.ly/1FkgDsv; Treasure Karoo Action Group website, http://www.treasurethekaroo.co.za. 
353  Friends of the Earth International, ‘South Africa – Fracking: another chip at our democracy’, 10 February 2014, http://bit.ly/1cnh7G1.  
354  Americans Against Fracking, ‘Coalition Members’, http://bit.ly/1HWLDSy. 
355  ‘Global Frackdown: October 11, 2014’, The Action Network, http://bit.ly/1Bh5FBH; ‘The Global Frackdown 2014: A Recap’, Food & Water Watch, 15 October 
2014, http://bit.ly/1FkgDsv. 
356  ‘List of Bans Worldwide’, Keep Tap Water Safe, 10 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1dhVvWC; ‘Worldwide: Countries Approach Fracking With Interest And Caution’, 
Mondaq, 6 January 2014, http://bit.ly/1GJtjh0.  
357  ‘Gas Industry Report Calls Anti-Fracking Movement a “Highly Effective Campaign”’, Yes! Magazine, 26 March 2013, http://bit.ly/1dqkTIZ; Control Risks, The 
Global Anti-Fracking Movement: What it Wants, How it Operates and What’s Next, 2012, http://bit.ly/1LRik4w.  
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2013 vote by residents to ban fracking. Businesses are seeking to use vastly superior resources to wage a war 
of attrition: fracking companies have spent 10 times the resources of the anti-fracking campaigning group to try 
to overcome the ban.358 In Longmont, and in cities and villages all over the world, battles will have to be fought 
time and again, local to global alliances will have to be maintained and tested, and civil society will have to 
continue to make up for the immense disparity in resources with imagination, expertise and passion.
Looking forward: the post-2015 
development goals: what role for 
civil society?
2015 will see another great test of multilateralism, with the agreement of the new, post-2015 development 
goals, the successor to the MDGs. At the time of writing, negotiations have recommenced on the 17 proposed 
SDGs drawn up by a UN working group in July 2014, and on the targets and indicators for these.359 There also 
remains in play the question of precisely how SDG negotiations will relate to the on-going global discussions on 
financing for development, with the Third International Conference on Financing for Development being held in 
Ethiopia in June 2015.360
The MDGs were a relatively unambitious set of goals, and yet delivery still fell short of targets in many 
countries. Further, civil society had little input into the setting up of the MDGs, and the MDGs did not give a 
clear mandate to civil society, which meant that civil society had to try to insert themselves into MDG processes 
owned by governments, donors and international agencies, rather than be in them as a right. Civil society’s role 
as a source of innovation and original thinking, as well as an effective agent of delivery, was thus inadequately 
recognised. The lack of civil society involvement in the MDGs was a key factor in the often acknowledged lack 
of public awareness about or sense of ownership of the MDGs, which can be identified as a factor in the MDGs 
falling short of their targets.361
358  Our Longmont website, http://ourlongmont.org; ‘Heavyweight Response to Local Fracking Bans’, The New York Times, 3 January 2015, http://nyti.
ms/1DqGYVS. 
359  ‘Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals’, Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, http://bit.ly/1EYw6i7.  
360  Social Watch, ‘Post-2015 and FFD3: Debates Begin, Political Lines Emerge’, 9 February 2015, http://bit.ly/1zU0D2N; International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development, ‘UN Post-2015 Talks Focus on Draft Sustainable Development Goals, 2 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1EEhoeh.  
361  Commonwealth Foundation and UN Millennium Campaign, Ideas for a new development agenda, 2013, http://bit.ly/WLk3W7; OHCHR, Open Working 
Group on Sustainable Development Goals (OWG) (2013), Statistical note for the issue brief on: Human Rights, including the Right to Development, 2013, http://bit.
ly/1KtmrDe. 
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Civil society’s lack of mandate in the MDGs further made it hard for CSOs to fulfil their vital role of exercising 
accountability, including over how decisions to commit development resources were made, and how efficiently 
resources were used.362 Rather, the MDGs marked a turn back towards top-down, target-driven approaches to 
development, an approach that privileged relationships between global northern donor states and southern 
recipient governments, which unwittingly may have fed off civil society repression discussed in the previous 
section: some states that performed strongly on MDG indicators, such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, did so while 
reducing the space for civil society. In such contexts, CSOs can come to be seen by governments as competitors 
for external resources that were highly linked to the MDGs, and civil society rights as inconvenient obstacles 
that get in the way of the efficient delivery of externally funded development projects. The notion that 
development is about the enabling of human possibility, for which the fundamental civil society rights of 
assembly, association and expression are essential, seems to have receded. We have to recapture this in the 
SDGs.
So far, the experience of civil society in being consulted about the SDGs seems more positive,363 and the UN 
Secretary-General’s Synthesis Report on the Post-2015 Agenda, published in December 2014,364 calls for an 
enabling environment for civil society, but at the time of writing, the finalisation of the SDGs remains in play 
and uncertain, as attention turns to targets and indicators.365
Key civil society campaigns to make the SDGs more expansive and inclusive include the Beyond 2015 coalition 
and the Global Call to Action Against Poverty. These are seeking to make the SDGs participatory, inclusive and 
responsive to the voices of those directly affected by poverty and injustice.366 
In January 2015, a new global campaign, Action/2015, was launched with a focus on encouraging citizen 
and community action towards influencing the SDGs, and also climate change negotiations.367 Action/2015 
connects large, international civil society networks with grassroots movements. It has the backing of 
government representatives and entertainment stars, and combines online and offline campaigning tools.
362  ‘Advocating for Civil Society Space in 2015’, The Huffington Post, 18 February 2015, http://huff.to/1zUugKV; ‘Civil society: only the clampdown is 
transparent’, The Guardian, 12 September 2010, http://bit.ly/1LO2dVW. 
363  ‘Civil Society Freedoms Merit Role in Post-2015 Development Agenda, IPS, 25 November 2014, http://bit.ly/1xSnQiH; ‘Opinion – Measurement Matters – 
Civic Space and the Post-2015 Framework’, IPS, 23 March 2015, http://bit.ly/1dCf1ng. 
364  UN, The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting the Planet. Synthesis Report of the Secretary-General On the Post-
2015 Agenda, 4 December 2014, http://bit.ly/1yKR1Wb.  
365  Targets in the proposed SDGs framework, Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, http://bit.ly/1G5SAkt.  
366  Beyond 2015 website, http://www.beyond2015.org; Global Call to Action Against Poverty website, http://bit.ly/1eDeSAb. 
367  Action/2015 website, http://www.action2015.org
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Civil society initiatives such as Action/2015 are placing special emphasis on reaching out to young people 
and helping them to voice their concerns about what they want from the SDGs. Most of the world’s young 
people live in countries of the global south,368 and the current young generation is the one that will grow into 
adulthood over the 15 years to be covered by the SDGs; they will be the generation that the SDGs either serve 
- by helping them to develop sustainable livelihoods, access healthcare, safely raise families, and enabling them 
to associate, assemble and express themselves without hindrance - or fail.
What is striking is that, when young people are encouraged to say what they want the SDGs to achieve, they 
do not limit themselves to asking for basic needs and essential services. For example, in a 24 hour tweetathon 
organised in 24 countries, from Fiji to the USA, in October 2014, what stood out was how often concerns 
about governance and participation occurred, including issues of internet governance and government 
transparency, and a desire for channels of genuine dialogue with governments, alongside an interest in issues 
of education, employment and inequality.369 Young people, when consulted about their development futures, 
have consistently identified better governance as a key priority.370 In the UN’s ‘My World’ survey, in which 
approximately 7.4m people identified their key priorities for the SDGs, over 5.7m of participants, more than 
three quarters, were aged 30 or under, demonstrating the massive interest of young people in having a say 
on their development futures.371 It can therefore be said that one test of whether the SDGs are good enough 
is that enough of the huge cohort of young people who took part in the My World survey feel that the SDGs 
adequately speak to their needs. 
For UN Volunteers (UNV), one of the UN agencies with the strongest relationship with civil society, the SDGs 
also ought to take account of volunteering as a resource, and understand that volunteering is an essential part 
of civil society. UNV tell us:
Governments cannot do it alone. In country after country it has been demonstrated that volunteers, 
as social mobilisers and community health providers, have been a key success factor in immunisation 
campaigns. In recent years, more governments have supported volunteering schemes to address 
poverty, education, climate change, disaster risk reduction, social integration and other national 
priorities, including most recently responding to the Ebola outbreak. However, much more can be 
done to recognise, research and integrate volunteerism so that it can reach its full potential to support 
implementation of the SDGs.
368  UN Population Fund, UNFPA, ’10 things you didn’t know about the world’s population’, 13 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1O7k0qA. 
369  ‘#YouthEngage: insights from a global 24-hour tweetathon’, The Guardian, 28 October 2014, http://bit.ly/ZYz4nY. 
370  Overseas Development Institute, Partners for Change: Young people and governance in a post 2015 world, 2014, http://bit.ly/1KtnGTc.  
371  My World data, http://data.myworld2015.org. 
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UNV also suggests that SDG indicators have to measure the contribution of volunteering, or an inaccurate 
picture will be given of development progress, and civil society’s contribution to it:
Volunteering measures can indicate progress in the SDGs. One proposed SDG indicator to be 
developed is on decent work. International Labour Organisation (ILO) statistics already incorporate 
volunteer work as one type of work. There is an existing methodology in the ILO Manual on 
Measuring Volunteer Work which can measure both economic value and decent work. A number 
of existing social well-being indicators also measure volunteering, including Gallup, OECD and 
the Bhutan Happiness Index, although it should be noted they all do this in different ways… 
Volunteering studies have reported large participation numbers and significant economic value (e.g. 
volunteering is estimated at 0.6% of GDP in the Philippines). However, measuring volunteering also 
should address its social value and its contributions to well-being and social cohesion.
Perhaps, similar to gender equality, there should be a cross-cutting theme of civic engagement or 
participation running across all the goals and targets. Volunteering would be a relevant indicator 
which can be disaggregated. This would enable research on the interrelationship between citizen 
participation and progress on specific SDGs and targets.
Kate Donald, of the Center for Economic and Social Rights, is one of many people in civil society who are 
working to try to make the SDGs more expansive and more strongly linked to human rights, including through 
the Post-2015 Human Rights Caucus, of which CIVICUS is an active member. We asked her what her hopes and 
fears are for the SDGs, how civil society could influence the SDGs, and what impact the SDGs might have on 
civil society:
My best hope is that we end up with a post-2015 agenda that in practice is able to move us closer 
towards realising human rights - civil, political, cultural, economic, social - for all, and tackling 
rampant inequalities. A crucial part of this will be in ensuring there is real accountability for 
progress, and lack of progress, towards these commitments; that people will have a voice and a 
platform to make states and the private sector answerable and responsible.
After all this investment of time and energy and resources, the biggest fear is that we end up with 
nothing, or with a re-tread of the MDGs, which could happen if states fail to agree over financing, 
or the fragile consensus falls apart on another unforeseen bump in the road. A close second worse 
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outcome would be an agenda that is pretty on paper but remains only at the level of window-
dressing and rhetoric, without any meaningful action from states to implement it.
To get to the best outcome, civil society voices need to be accepted not just as ‘stakeholders’ to be 
consulted occasionally, but as rights-holders and representatives of rights-holders, and people 
with experience and technical expertise that can be immensely valuable. For example, in the 
debate around indicators to measure progress towards the goals, the expertise of civil society was 
initially almost completely overlooked, in favour of an exclusive focus on national statistical offices. 
This is very short-sighted. For many years, civil society groups have been involved in monitoring 
and tracking a vast array of issues relevant to the post-2015 agenda - from illicit financial flows 
to civic space to women’s unpaid care work - and have developed innovative and participatory 
methodologies for doing so. The knowledge and expertise out there in civil society is vast, and it 
should be used.
If the MDGs are a good weather vane, then the SDGs will have a very big effect on the distribution 
of resources for sustainable development and human rights work, for better or worse. This is 
another, more instrumental, reason why a holistic agenda with strong financing commitments from 
rich countries is important: the issues we need to tackle are multiple and interlinked, and require 
sustained engagement. We are past the point where a narrow focus on, for example, extreme poverty, 
or getting girls into school, is acceptable. The evidence is now clear that no matter how many billions 
of dollars you pour into these narrow goals, you can’t end poverty without tackling inequality and 
environmental sustainability at the same time, and you can’t end pervasive gender inequality just by 
getting more girls into school. A diverse and well-resourced civil society is an absolute prerequisite to 
effective and empowering progress towards the goals.
While there remains broad agreement that it is useful to have development goals, because they focus efforts 
and create lobbying and advocacy opportunities,372 for CIVICUS, the coming SDGs must make a positive 
contribution to reversing negative trends in the conditions for civil society of the kind outlined earlier, which 
means that the measurement of civic space and whether it is expanding or contracting must be included in the 
indicators against which the success of the SDGs is judged. It also means that the precarious resourcing position 
of many CSOs, discussed in other sections of this report, needs to be addressed. In addition, it will be important 
that the SDGS have a strong focus on the issue of rising inequality in so many of our societies.373
372  ‘Governments are now negotiating Sustainable Development Goals’, The Daily Star, 2 April 2015, http://bit.ly/1d3JABg. 
373  IPS, 19 March 2015 op. cit.
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For CIVICUS, key tests for the SDGs, and the intergovernmental system that is producing them, will be how 
much involvement civil society has in the authorship process, and visible influence in the final agreement; how 
much the agreement accords a proper role for civil society, beyond a role in the implementation of the SDGs, in 
ways that connect development to human rights, which implies enabling fundamental civil society rights; and 
finally, how the resourcing decisions made to realise the SDGs impact positively on civil society. Civil society, 
including the campaigns mentioned above, need to engage constructively in the remaining months, applying 
the mixes of public campaigning and expert advocacy suggested in the examples given earlier in this section; 
and once the SDGs are agreed, civil society needs to push hard for its accountability role, alongside its delivery 
role, over the coming years.
Conclusion: reimagining global 
governance
A year on since our focus on global governance in the 2014 State of Civil Society Report, much work still needs 
to be done to address the dysfunction of international governance institutions. Civil society consistently 
and quietly engages in global forums, and much of that engagement comes with little influence and yields 
scant reward. But as the example of the Arms Trade Treaty shows, civil society is able, through constructive, 
permanent engagement, to play a role in establishing progressive additions to the global architecture, and 
developing progressive norms.
There is a need to ensure that civil society, when it engages internationally, does not lose its grounding 
in the reality of citizens’ concerns. In August 2014, CIVICUS’ Secretary General, alongwith several like-
minded civil society leaders, wrote an open letter to activists, urging civil society to take a back to basics 
approach. The letter argued that too many in organised civil society have become too institutionalised and 
professionalised, and thereby co-opted into systems and networks in which civil society is being outwitted and 
outmanoeuvred.374 It urged the need to put the voice and actions of people back at the heart of our work, with 
primary accountability being not to donors, but to all those struggling for social justice.
The global anti-fracking movement, and the movement against the TTIP, offer potential models for how the 
concerns of communities can be made global, and global matters can be made to resonate with citizens. 
They show how global elite interests can be challenged. Now the SDGs need to demonstrate that they 
374  Danny Sriskandarajah, Secretary General of CIVICUS, ‘Opinion: Put People Power Back at Centre of Citizen Action, IPS, 7 October 2014, http://bit.
ly/1d3Oa2l. 
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understand and help enable civil society’s proper role, not just in delivering development, but in contributing to 
development decisions and exercising accountability over those decisions. 
Five key points for future action:
•	 Civil society needs to ensure it makes strong connections between ground-level issues and global 
governance concerns.
•	 Alliances need to be built and maintained between CSOs, supportive governments and sympathetic 
intergovernmental officials.
•	 A broader range of civil society voices needs to be brought into engaging with global level decision-
making.
•	 Global coalitions need to be built that cut across existing power blocs and regional blocs, and that bridge 
divides between the global north and global south.
•	 Civil society, while continuing to engage constructively with global governance institutions, also needs to 
keep their fundamental reform on the agenda.
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As the above has demonstrated, the civil society canvas is vast. The civil society universe encompasses an 
incredible diversity of forms, working on a huge array of issues. This means that the civil society universe 
is messy, occasionally incoherent, even contradictory. But we believe that civil society’s vital contribution 
is being proved at all levels, in many different countries, on all kinds of issues. It is needed more than ever 
before. Governance is broken: conventional national politics is failing people, and international governance 
is demonstrably not fit for purpose. A tiny elite control most of the world’s wealth, and they have intimately 
woven themselves into the fabric of governance, rigging the rules in their favour, exacerbating global inequality.
Civil society is showing itself to be the alternative to this, offering a source of solutions and innovation. Yet civil 
society is constrained, by political restrictions, attacks and a lack of financial resources. Further, civil society 
has its own problems. Formal CSOs are also not always good at connecting with citizens. Looser citizens’ 
movements are sometimes superficial, and hard to sustain. Divides persist between large CSOs and small ones, 
and CSOs in the global south and global north. But a world without civil society, and its imaginative creativity 
and commitment, cannot be contemplated.
In the year that will pass between the publication of this report, and the publication of the 2016 State of Civil 
Society Report, billions of people will participate, and billions will benefit from the platform civil society offers 
to raise people’s voices, and the services civil society provides. Civil society will keep responding to crises, 
mobilisations will break out in unexpected places and civil society groups and activists will continue to fight 
back against restrictions and attack. International solidarity, coalition building and support to develop the 
capacity of civil society will be the key responses needed to support civil society.
Five key points for future action:
•	 The diversity and ecology of civil society is an important principle in its own right: a range of responses, 
by different organisational forms, at different levels, need to be supported.
•	 Connections that link civil society in the global north and the global south need to be supported, but 
these need to be forged in ways that enable equality, and the full contribution of both to be realised.
•	 More research and documentation is needed on working models of civil society cooperation that are 
potentially replicable.
conclusion
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•	 Civil society needs to develop its analysis of, and capacity to respond to issues of global elite power and 
control of resources by the global super-rich.
•	 There is a need for a new campaign that emphasises the overall value and contribution of civil society, 
and the importance of civil society rights being realised, that capitalises on and brings together the 
energy and imagination of campaigns on individual issues, involves high profile figures, and makes a 
point about the impact that civil society can achieve.
CIVICUS 
ESSAY
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About this essay
This thematic overview of the 2015 CIVICUS State of Civil Society Report, on civil society resourcing, draws from 
27 guest contributions commissioned by CIVICUS for the report. Guest inputs discuss a range of funding issues 
encountered by civil society organisations (CSOs) and activists, including with official development assistance 
(ODA) and other forms of support from governments, philanthropy, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
non-financial resources. This overview draws further from inputs contributed by members of the CIVICUS 
alliance, including responses from 22 CSO networks in our survey of members of the Affinity Group of National 
Associations (AGNA), and interviews with civil society activists and experts. This overview is therefore inspired 
by a wide range of voices, including donors, philanthropic funders, large and small CSOs in every global region, 
volunteering agencies and think tanks, providing fresh insight into current civil society resourcing issues. Except 
when stated otherwise, views presented here come from these inputs.
While our report’s Year in Review section assesses the conditions for a wide range of civil society, in this 
overview our focus is mostly on CSOs that have a strong element of engaging in advocacy, seeking policy 
change, exercising accountability over power holders or defending and realising human rights. For shorthand, 
we call these here change-seeking CSOs. This is not to deny the importance of other civil society forms, and 
we recognise that many CSOs offer both change-seeking and service delivery work, but we believe the change-
seeking work of CSOs is being hindered by a particular set of urgent resourcing challenges.





Our report’s Year in Review section demonstrates that civil society is often the first responder to major 
challenges, as exemplified in responses to the 2014/2015 Ebola crisis. Civil society is also the arena in which 
people who are denied justice and voice come together to demand rights, seek change and develop solutions 
to pressing challenges, such as climate change and rising inequality. In our 2014 State of Civil Society Report, 
we concluded that global governance institutions have failed, and are unable to address these challenges, 
meaning that civil society is needed more than ever before.
If civil society is important, then we must accept that it needs to be supported and resourced. But instead 
of that support, in many contexts we are seeing civil society, and change-seeking CSOs in particular, being 
attacked and restricted, by governments, and political, business and criminal interests. Part of that restriction is 
exerted through attempts to limit CSO resourcing. Change-seeking CSOs face a renewed assault on their ability 
to receive funding, particularly when it comes from foreign sources.
Douglas Rutzen, of the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), offers a typology of the different 
ways in which the receipt of international funding is being restricted, as part of a sustained decline in the key 
civil society rights of free association, assembly and expression.The restrictions on international funding he 
identifies are 1:
1.   Requiring government approval to receive international funding
2.   Introducing ‘foreign agents’ legislation to stigmatise CSOs that receive internationalfunding
3.   Limiting the amount of international funding that CSOs can receive
4.   Stipulating that international funding must be channelled through government-controlled bodies
5.   Restricting activities that can be supported from international funding
6.   Preventing CSOs from receiving funding from particular donors
7.   Applying broad anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering measures to restrict international funding
8.   Taxing international funding
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9.    Imposing high reporting requirements for international  funding
10. Using other laws, including treason and defamation laws, to criminalise CSOs and CSO personnel   
  who receive international  funding.
Our alliance offers many examples along these lines. The Pakistan NGO Forum reports that laws are 
being introduced to control CSO funding, with change-seeking CSOs the prime target. Some CSOs have 
had foreign currency accounts shut down by the State Bank. Partners-Jordan relates that changes 
in procedures to approve funds have made it harder and slower for CSOs to obtain funding, while a 
proposed new law would not allow CSOs to receive funding from more than two donors per year. In 
Argentina, the Argentine Network for International Cooperation (RACI) notes that CSOs are having to 
employ complex financial engineering methods to get around increasing restrictions on the use of foreign 
currency, in conditions where the resourcing of civil society has become more contested. In Bangladesh, 
the government withdrew clearance from human rights CSO Odhikar to run an EU-supported project on 
torture, and prevented Dutch and Finnish supported activities. Odhikar has observed CSOs moving into less 
controversial work areas, in order to assure continued funding.
In the highly repressive context of Sudan, the Confederation of Sudanese Civil Society Organisations 
(CSCSOs) reports a high level of state interference with CSO funding: funding and fundraising plans must 
be approved in advance by government commissions, and ministerial approval is required to receive 
foreign funding. Alleged breaches of strict regulations are selectively penalised: CSOs that seek to hold 
the government to account have found themselves shut down, with their assets seized. Under new 
regulations, any procurement for a project must be cleared in advance, and any assets procured be handed 
to the government following the end of a project, which prevents CSOs from developing capacity. 
Alan Fowler, Emeritus Professor at the International Institute of Social Studies, points to a further problem 
with such restrictions: even when they don’t prevent CSOs from receiving funding, they increase transaction 
costs and overheads, which diverts civil society time, money and energy away from core activity.
Together, these measures amount to a wave of restriction; further, all the above examples come from 
contexts of political and economic contestation, which suggests a general rule: when political or economic 
pressure on governments intensifies, governments are likely to increase restrictions on civil society’s access 
to funding. Restrictions impact on change-seeking CSO activity in the global south in particular because, as 
we examine further below, they struggle to resource this work domestically.
Given the focus of the 2014 State of Civil Society Report, on dysfunctional global governance, it is 
disturbing to note that repressive governments draw succour from intergovernmental measures to 
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prevent financing flows for terrorism. As Kay Guinane of the Charity and Security Network establishes, 
international anti-money laundering measures have unintentional consequences on civil society, but repressive 
governments are also misapplying these measures:
Authoritarian countries have abused the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) process to infringe on 
the rights of civil society, including its autonomy and ability to receive international support. Some 
governments have exceeded what is necessary or reasonable in their eagerness to get a compliant 
rating in the FATF assessment process.
Repercussions for CSOs also come from the application of anti-terrorism measures to the private sector: Kay 
Guinane suggests that, in result, some banks are closing or refusing to set up accounts for CSOs:
Banks have begun ‘derisking’ by dropping low profit customers such as CSOs. As a result, charities 
and grant-makers that need to conduct international financial transactions for their operations 
have experienced increasing difficulty getting access to financial services.
Nora Lester Murad, in her case study from Palestine, notes that anti-money laundering measures are making it 
harder to transfer resources into conflict areas, while in the UK and USA, civil society observes that pressure on 
money transfer services to Somalia is inhibiting the flow of diaspora giving.2
New government restrictions are more than accidental. In many cases, the language of anti-terrorism and 
anti-money laundering is only camouflage: in their joint contribution, Maina Kiai, UN Special Rapporteur 
on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, and Maria Leissner, Secretary General of 
the Community of Democracies, make clear that restrictions do not stand up to scrutiny as anti-terrorism 
measures; the real reason is the assertion of government control:
It’s political. Restrictions might be cloaked in terms of national security and good governance, 
but few pass muster under close scrutiny. They tend instead to be signs of a ruling government’s 
weakness - an attempt to assert control, reduce public criticism, consolidate power or hoard the 
benefits of economic development.
Vitalice Meja, of the Reality of Aid Africa (RoA Africa), similarly suggests that the international debate about 
the effectiveness, transparency and accountability of resourcing for development is being misapplied by some 
governments to justify restrictions on CSO funding:
In many cases, 
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Of late, governments in Africa have paid considerable interest to CSO funding. Issues of CSO 
transparency and accountability are often bundled around this to hide the true intentions of 
governments. When governments raise this issue, their main objective is usually to curtail resource 
flows to CSOs through legal and regulatory requirements.
Governments may see CSOs as competitors for resources, and this has been heightened during the past 
15 years of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As discussed in our 2014 report, the MDGs have 
made development resourcing more top-down and state-driven, and the concept of national ownership of 
development has been conflated with state ownership of development. Given this, governments may see ODA 
going to CSOs as resources that should belong to the state.
Maina Kiai and Maria Leissner expose hypocrisy about foreign funding: many governments, while trying to 
block civil society funding, and describing CSOs that receive foreign funding as agents of foreign powers, 
actively solicit funding, when it comes in the form of foreign investment for businesses, and provide enabling 
environments for that investment. The difference is that foreign business funding often benefits business 
concerns connected to political elites and offers opportunities for elite enrichment, while funding flows for 
CSOs help to challenge those elite interests.
Maina Kiai and Maria Leissner further note that governments, when they restrict civil society, apply classic 
divide and rule tactics, playing to an enduring distinction, as noted in our 2011 report, Bridging the Gaps, 
between service-oriented CSOs and change-seeking CSOs: governments tend to have higher tolerance levels 
for CSOs that deliver services, because these supplement or substitute for activities that governments lead 
on, whereas change-seeking CSOs ask difficult questions and expose government shortcomings. The examples 
given above, from our alliance, mostly concern change-seeking CSOs. A divided civil society, where connections 
are weak between service-oriented and change-seeking CSOs, makes a divide and rule approach easier, as 
Maina Kiai and Maria Leissner observe:
Financial controls correlate with perceived threat. A CSO that unquestioningly works to supplement 
a country’s healthcare system seems to provide a direct benefit to the ruling government: it is thus 
less likely to face restrictions on funding. A CSO working to expose corruption, impunity or election 
fraud, despite the immense public good it does, is not seen as slavishly supporting the ruling elite. 
It is more likely to see its funding sources attacked… It remains rare to see a service delivery CSO 
stand up to a government that bullies a civil society cousin in the advocacy field. There’s a prevailing 
attitude of ‘everyone for themselves’. 
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Such a lack of solidarity is short-sighted: we have observed that, as authoritarian tendencies take root, and 
once change-seeking CSOs are subdued, service-oriented CSOs that fail to deliver sufficient elite advantages 
also become targeted. 
Maina Kiai and Maria Leissner locate the pattern of government limitation of funding within a broader 
landscape of civil society restriction. Governments that restrict foreign funding are likely to be those that also 
restrict domestic funding, and limit civil society in other ways, through excessive registration and reporting 
requirements, restrictions on media freedom, verbal and physical attacks on activists and the criminalisation of 
legitimate civil society activity. As with other restrictions, there is also an international culture of imitation at 
work, with governments borrowing laws and regulations from other countries to apply in their own.
This fresh wave of restriction is something that should not only concern civil society; it should also trouble 
donors that provide ODA, as it poses fundamental questions about our expectations of what ODA should do, 
and how development should work. To concede that governments can restrict funding to change-seeking CSOs 
is to accept that development is essentially about delivering services, for priorities defined by elites, rather 
than about enabling citizens to realise their rights and be involved in making decisions that affect their lives
Adam Pickering of the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) indicates that CSOs may, inadvertently, play to this 
problem, when they justify their role in narrow, instrumental terms:
To some extent, CSOs could be seen as partially culpable for this, as often we justify the freedoms 
and financial advantages afforded to CSOs on the basis of the services we provide, rather than based 
on the rights and freedoms within civil society.
The argument for civil society needs to be made in intrinsic, rather than instrumental terms. Civil society needs 
to ensure that donors understand the value of civil society as an amplifier of people’s voices, and an enabler of 
civic potential.
However, a problem, noted by Adam Pickering and Ambika Satkunanathan, of the Neelan Tiruchelvam Trust in 
Sri Lanka, is that official donors may react to government restrictions in contested contracts by backtracking 
into supporting less controversial work. Such moves may be well-intentioned: many donors would like to 
support advocacy, because they want to invest in lasting change beyond that achieved by service provision, but 
could see change-seeking as a waste of resources in highly restricted environments. A retreat into supporting 
safer work, as a way of sustaining civil society in difficult periods, can be a valid strategy, but it will not 
challenge government restrictions.
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How can we respond to restriction?
On the positive side, awareness of state restrictions on civil society resourcing has grown, and international 
efforts have increased to shed light on regressive practices and mobilise solidarity. Maina Kiai has placed the 
issue on the international agenda, and Helena Monteiro, of Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker Support 
(WINGS), relates that philanthropy organisations are convening to work on restriction. Further, increasing 
acknowledgement, among donors and civil society supporters, of the need to improve the enabling 
environment for civil society encompasses the issue of resourcing constraints. Still, there remains a need for 
more acknowledgment that the fundamental freedoms civil society requires - the right to associate, the right 
to assemble and the right to free expression - cannot be exercised without the resources to support them, and 
that any civil society group has a right to receive resources from any source as a key part of this.3 Donors need 
to assert the role of ODA in building civic capacity, as well as delivering services. 
More coalition building is needed, to enable stronger connections of solidarity and support, including between 
service-oriented and change-seeking CSOs, to make it harder for repressive states to pick off individual CSOs or 
types. Coalitions need to work internationally to develop norms, as well as nationally to challenge restrictions.
There is also a need to work internationally and nationally to interrogate and take on anti-money laundering 
and anti-terrorism measures, and the debate about national ownership of development. Legitimate concerns 
and measures need to be separated from those that are spurious. CSOs can do this from a position of strength 
when they demonstrate they hold to the highest standards of accountability and transparency, are not 
connected to extremist or criminal forces, and are autonomous from their donors, including foreign donors. 
This implies CSOs being able to show they are mobilising to respond to citizens’ needs, rather than organising 
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Funding from the state
Where is aid going, and what are the 
problems?
In inputs to this report, the most commonly cited source of support is from the state. In the global north, this 
means support from domestic governments, and in the global south this can entail both domestic and external 
government support, with foreign state support generally coming from ODA. We discuss in later sections some 
other key sources of support for CSOs, and it is important to note that many civil society forms survive without 
external support, but the reality is that change-seeking CSOs in the global south have relied strongly on ODA.
Overall, based on Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reporting, ODA to CSOs 
seems to be holding steady. From 2009 to 2013, the most recent year for which data is available at the time 
of writing, ODA to CSOs from members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which are 
mostly global north states that are long-standing ODA providers, rose in real terms. However, with ODA rising 
as a whole, ODA to CSOs has plateaued in proportionate terms, levelling at around 13% of total ODA. This is 
dwarfed by ODA to states, which made up 55% of the total in 2013, and multilateral bodies, which received 
18%.4
As has long been the case, underneath the headline figures lies wide variance in civil society support: 
France, consistently an under-funder of civil society, put only 1% of its 2013 ODA into CSOs, compared to 
the Netherlands, where the proportion was 30%. In the 2013 figures, the largest state donors to CSOs were 
Norway and the Netherlands, along with the multilateral Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 
while the largest recent growth in support to CSOs was seen from the Global Fund and the UK.
It should however be noted that almost all the ODA that goes to CSOs is classed as aid through CSOs - funds 
that CSOs are asked to channel to programmes and projects that fit donor priorities - as opposed to aid to 
CSOs - funds that have the intent of strengthening CSOs and allow CSOs to define their own priorities. Recent 
growth has been in aid through rather than aid to CSOs, with aid to CSOs having undergone a slight decline. 
This suggests a clue as to how many official donors perceive CSOs: as a pipeline and a contractor, rather than as 
something of value in its own right. 
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Beyond the headlines, Vitalice Meja of RoA Africa sets out a range of frustrations CSOs experience in working 
with donors that are as familiar as they are perennial. CSOs criticise donors for: applying rigid, inappropriate 
policies that are not well-informed about realities on the ground; poor and late communication; unexpected 
reduction of funding and delays in payments; and demands that unused funds be returned to donors or 
deducted from future payments, which does not encourage efficiency or promote sustainability. Concerns 
about lengthy and cumbersome approval processes are common, as Partners-Jordan observes:
Donors require so many documents and details when writing proposals and submitting ideas, and 
the process of applying and getting approval is really long.
Domestic state funders attract similar criticisms. For example, the Voluntary Action Network of India (VANI) 
notes that:
Availing funds from government is a herculean task for civil society, as it involves procedural delays.
Complaints about poor official donor practices are not new, but the fact that they are recurring suggests little 
progress has been made in addressing them. They also add weight to the critique that donors see CSOs as 
delivery mechanisms, to be contracted and monitored accordingly, rather than as equal partners: equals would 
be treated with more respect.
State support: falling and narrowing
Beyond these perennial criticisms, our past reports have documented how the economic crisis, which 
struck much of the world from 2008 onwards, caused profound political repercussions, prompted unilateral 
renegotiations of the state’s social contract with citizens, and brought an enduring wave of civic action in 
response. It has also impacted on state support for civil society.
It is striking that in our annual survey of AGNA members, many of which have received domestic and foreign 
state funding, only in three contexts is the resourcing position for civil society felt to have improved in the last 
year. In most, it is assessed to have worsened. Even in cases where the resourcing situation is seen as having 
improved, there are concerns that this only applies to CSOs that are close to governments or qualify for funding 
streams wholly defined by governments and donors, issues that are returned to below. 
For example, in the UK, national civil society bodies for both England and Scotland, the National Council for 
Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) and the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations (SCVO) assess that the 
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downturn, although those same cutbacks are simultaneously increasing social need and therefore public 
demand for CSO action. Cowan Coventry and Clare Moberly of INTRAC note that some governments 
particularly hit by the economic crisis, such as Ireland and Spain, have reduced their ODA, something of 
concern, since Ireland was known for giving a particularly high proportion of ODA to CSOs, and both have 
reduced their funding for CSOs.
It’s possible that the impact of the economic crisis on civil society funding may pass, but Adam Pickering of 
CAF reports a more challenging scenario, in which ODA to two thirds of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries 
is expected to decline. This is not just problematic from the point of view of those countries’ development 
prospects: as this report’s Year in Review section indicates, many SSA governments are aggressively restricting 
change-seeking CSOs, suggesting that CSOs could be doubly squeezed. 
It seems clear that a structural change is underway, in which official donors are targeting fewer countries. ODA 
seems to be focusing more on fragile countries, or countries experiencing humanitarian crisis, such as Syria. 
In 2013, Myanmar was the country that received the most ODA from DAC members, but its recent history 
means it has little institutionalised civil society, meaning that almost all aid went to its government. This would 
also be the case with Vietnam, which is in the top 10 countries for receipt of ODA but has little tolerance for 
independent civil society. Some of the current prioritisation of ODA therefore does not benefit civil society.
Many donors are withdrawing from countries that have achieved Middle Income Country (MIC) status, once 
per capita gross national income (GNI) passes a certain threshold.5 For example, The West African Civil Society 
Institute (WACSI) reports that in Ghana, where most CSOs remain dependent on donor funding, less funding is 
going into civil society, following the World Bank classifying Ghana as a lower middle income country.
Jose Antonio Alonso, Jonathan Glennie and Andy Sumner, in their joint contribution, caution against donor 
withdrawal from countries, simply because they have passed what is an arbitrary average income threshold, 
which may say little about the reality in which citizens live; our previous reports have documented the 
economic inequality that is often experienced amidst high national economic growth. Chalida Tajaroensuk, of 
People’s Empowerment in Thailand, for example, notes that CSO funding is declining because Thailand now 
has MIC status, but there is still much poverty, and a growing gap between rich and poor.
There is also evidence that tighter donor targeting has seen ODA to least developed countries (LDCs) decline 
in recent years. Suggestions are that this could stem from donor concerns about corruption and state capacity 
to spend money wisely.6 This could, in theory, open up potential to support CSOs as alternate channels, and 
as a means of increasing accountability; similarly, as Vitalice Meja indicates, there is no reason in itself why 
a reduction of donor commitments in MICs should lessen funding to CSOs: donors could decide to withdraw 
major support to governments, but support CSOs as suitable recipients for smaller amounts of funding. Jose 
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Antonio Alonso et al suggest that in MICs, an appropriate response for donors would be to support CSOs 
working on issues of inequality and the resulting social tensions:
As the development problem gradually shifts from absolute lack of resources to their poor 
distribution, the advocacy and accountability roles of civil society, broadly understood, become even 
more important. 
There seems little evidence, however, that donors are thinking along such lines. Rather, they are narrowing 
their rosters of priority countries, and failing to take a nuanced approach that sees the possibilities of a range 
of funding possibilities and partners.
The implications for CSO of this narrowing of focus are already being seen, in a shrinking of CSO capacities in 
affected countries: Vitalice Meja observes SSA CSOs having to reduce staffing, with working in CSOs becoming 
more casual and less predictable. WACSI similarly suggests that the resourcing situation is worsening in West 
Africa, particularly for CSOs working on rights issues, imperilling the sustainability of many CSOs and resulting in 
cutbacks and staff attrition. Kepa Nicaragua reports that lack of resources, caused by the withdrawal of foreign 
donors, has seen many CSOs close, while others have reduced the scope of their work. In Serbia, Civic Initiatives 
sees declining funding from foreign donors impacting on CSOs’ physical resources, which means increasing 
reliance on old technology. In the very different context of New Zealand, shrinking domestic state funding is 
causing staff wages to fall back relative to other spheres, with more roles becoming part time. In Scotland, SCVO 
reports that increased workload amid declining funding is driving people away from working in CSOs.
Looking at shrinking funding from a donor perspective, Darren Walker of the Ford Foundation poses the difficult 
question of whether donors are ducking the issue, unable to countenance cutting some CSOs adrift and focusing 
on supporting a smaller number, for which larger amounts could make a real difference; instead, donors may be 
drip-feeding CSOs just enough to keep going, without ever providing enough to achieve real change.
How does this impact on change-
seeking civil society?
Earlier, it was observed that change-seeking CSOs face greater restrictions on receiving funding than service-
oriented CSOs. It also seems clear, from the inputs received, that it is harder in general to obtain resources for 
change-seeking activities than service-oriented activities.
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To offer one example, the Communication and Development Institute (ICD) reports this to be the case in Uruguay, 
from which ODA has largely been withdrawn. ICD suggests that current funding patterns are having the effect 
of freezing CSO roles, because each funding line only supports a particular role, with most funding available for 
service provision. What this overlooks is that, while a distinction between change-seeking and service-oriented 
CSO activity, as applied in this overview, is an analytically useful one, connections between these two strands 
have potential to bring mutual gains that are often lacking, while the trajectory many CSOs have taken in history 
has been to start in service-oriented work and then build on this to seek more profound change.
Adriano Campolina and Ben Phillips of ActionAid bring out the politics of the situation, suggesting that CSOs 
are being supported to do just enough to ameliorate poverty, and the worst excesses of inequality, but no 
more; they are not supported to help citizens develop their power to challenge existing power structures:
It is about the politics of an ideal in which CSOs respond to the results of poverty, but not tackle the 
causes, and work to help the poor cope, but not to strengthen poor people’s power.
Rasigan Maharajh argues this is no mistake: development cooperation has always largely concerned itself with 
maintaining the fundamental arrangements of the political system; CSOs that seek change need to question 
whether, by working with donors, they are complicit in denying change:
CSOs need to move from being part of the juggernaut, or mere gadflies on it, to becoming agents of 
deep change.
It doesn’t have to be this way, and some brave donors are opting to invest in change more. The Dutch 
government, which provides more of its ODA to civil society than any other DAC member,7 recently announced 
its intent to target ODA towards lobbying and advocacy from 2016. We asked Cornelius Hacking, of the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to explain the thinking behind this, how they intend to measure change, and how 
they feel about supporting potentially controversial work. His answer suggests an unusually tolerant and 
confident attitude towards criticism, and a willingness to experiment with understanding impact:
We felt that, worldwide, there is no lack of funds for programmes in the area of service delivery, but 
a big shortage of funds when it comes to the more sensitive activities of lobbying and advocacy, or for 
building capacities that allow civil society to lobby and advocate. 
Since the results of lobbying and advocacy will be difficult to measure concretely, we will have to 
rely on qualitative data, or information from change processes; it is a challenge when it comes, for 
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We are very much aware of the risks of more support to lobbying and advocacy by local and national 
CSOs. From previous programmes, we know for instance that there were campaigns by Dutch 
CSOs targeting Dutch companies, articles critical of government support appearing in the Dutch 
press, and regularly questions asked in parliament about government support to CSOs critical of 
Dutch government policies or Dutch companies working abroad. We are currently talking with our 
embassies and other departments to prepare ourselves for these criticisms. But Minister Ploumen 
(Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation) has literally said that she likes being 
challenged, and she is indeed willing to ‘finance her own opposition’.
It will be essential to track and document learning from the Dutch experience, in order to encourage more 
brave choices by donors. 
What drives this: domestic pressure, 
private influence
As yet, the Dutch move is a rarity; many official donors are becoming more cautious. To understand why, 
we need to examine the domestic political contexts within which donors work. Contributions from Adriano 
Campolina and Ben Phillips of ActionAid, and from Jose Antonio Alonso et al, draw attention to the domestic 
political calculations that influence ODA decisions. In times when many global north governments are reducing 
public spending, foreign development funding can be hard to defend. The case for ODA is therefore likely to 
be made in narrow terms: that it helps combat extremism, benefits countries or regions in which the donor 
government has strategic foreign policy or trade interests, or delivers spin-offs at home. A recoupling of aid 
and trade agendas can be seen in the absorption of previously autonomous state aid departments into foreign 
affairs and trade ministries, as seen in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The changes tell us that many 
donors are becoming more timid and conservative.
Fraser Reilly-King of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation and Brian Tomlinson of AidWatch 
Canada offer an example. Canadian ODA has been cut back since 2012, but is also being more closely 
attached to strategic interests. Canada’s 2013 Global Markets Action Plan established 20 key countries for the 
advancement of Canadian trade markets, and explicitly states that development programming will be leveraged 
to promote trade interests; the policy was expanded to 25 countries in 2014, on the basis of commercial 
opportunities rather than development need. Fraser Reilly-King and Brian Tomlinson locate this within a larger 
trend where the state is linking development closely to the private sector:
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Since the mid-2000s, the Canadian government has taken a number of measures to increase 
its engagement with the private sector, including through partnerships with Canadian mining 
companies and CSOs to deliver development programming in Latin America and Africa, and 
through support for innovative financing mechanisms that aim to incentivise private sector actors to 
develop solutions to development challenges.
This is consistent with a broader trend, noted in our previous reports, in which governments and multilateral 
organisations, in part prompted by a strain on resources, are turning to the private sector as a co-funder, 
commonly under the rubric of public-private partnerships. The result is that large, private sector concerns 
enjoy high and opaque levels of access to and opportunities for influence over states and intergovernmental 
bodies, in turn reducing the potential for civil society access and oversight.8
Alan Fowler points out that this is not new: ODA policies always, to some extent, reflect the political climates 
of donor countries, which become exported in the form of conditions attached to funding: having restructured 
their economies around privatisation in the 1980s, global north governments, and the intergovernmental 
institutions they strongly influence, exported structural adjustment programmes to recipient countries; now, 
with northern governments seeking to shrink the state afresh and find market-driven, private sector means to 
deliver public goods, this ideology leaks into development policy, expressed in a greater emphasis on the role of 
trade and markets. Harmonisation between trade, diplomatic and development agendas sits uneasily, however, 
with the notion that CSOs are autonomous and may offer a source of critique, particularly when they challenge 
current governance arrangements.
The other implications of the new donor conservatism is a retreat into supporting safe options, such as service 
delivery and humanitarian response, rather than more controversial areas related to human rights; and to 
supporting project activities with clear and quantifiable deliverables, rather than activities with a higher risk of 
failure, or more programmatic, general support. These count against change-seeking CSOs.
It’s important to be clear that there are many good people working in donor agencies who are sympathetic 
towards civil society and aware of problems outlined here, but lack the power to change things. Richard 
Holloway paints a picture of a system in which all are unhappy, in donors and CSOs: relationships are 
characterised by mutual mistrust, and an absence of gratitude. Each complain about the other, and all know 
that the bureaucracy is stifling and the relationship should be better, but no one is empowered to take the first 
steps towards doing resourcing differently.
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The harmonisation agenda
Cowan Coventry and Clare Moberly of INTRAC have documented a movement by official donors into pooling 
funding in multi-donor funds. Such funds can be valuable to civil society. For example, WACSI assesses that 
STAR-Ghana, a multi-donor grant-making body, is the single most significant funder for Ghanaian CSOs. While 
pooled funds can help civil society, in enabling funding to be more predictable and used more strategically by 
CSOs, the drivers of this trend need to be understood: as well as the international development effectiveness 
agenda, which encourages harmonisation of development approaches, donors are seeking to reduce 
transaction costs, and get more for their money: new donor conservatism is a motivation.
Collaboration between donors is not new, but any automatic assumption that collaboration always produces 
better outcomes should be challenged: not all collaborations add value, and funders may have to give up too 
much of what makes them unique in collaborating.9 INTRAC suggests that pooled funds can be complex to 
manage, which can lead to larger donors taking the upper hand, when smaller donors lack capacity or see 
themselves as having less of a stake.
Pooled funds present some challenges for CSOs: their themes can be highly donor-determined, and unless 
they have a specific objective of nurturing a diversity of civil society forms, they may privilege larger, more 
established CSOs, which are best placed to navigate often complex application procedures. A high number of 
applications in very competitive processes also entails an opportunity cost, in wasted civil society time and 
energy for the many unsuccessful applicants, a challenge that Alan Fowler and Darren Walker both observe 
more generally with competitive bidding processes, which can drive division and wasted resources. INTRAC 
also questions the role that private sector, for-profit concerns play in managing some pooled funds: surely civil 
society should be playing such intermediary and brokerage roles?
Projectisation and donor-driven 
CSOs
Adriano Campolina and Ben Phillips of ActionAid have observed some good practice in resourcing, in the form 
of strategic funding partnerships, which take a long term view of cooperation with CSOs but, consistent with 
the new donor conservatism, they see a recent move away from these, towards relationships where CSOs are 
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The consequences of this shift to projectisation are in fact to lessen results (if by results we mean 
real, large scale, lasting change), lessen value for money, increase CSO bureaucracy, as grant 
management and funds acquisition become questions of survival, and reduce real accountability to 
communities, as organisations shift their accountability focus to donors. 
Other contributors share this concern with a return by donors to seeking quick, observable wins, through 
donor-defined, project-oriented funding, which leaves CSOs struggling to find the general, core support they 
need to sustain their operations. The Polish Federation on NGOs states, for example, that while most Polish 
CSO resources come from the European Union (EU), almost all funding is project-based, and there are doubts 
about the long-term impact this might achieve. Darren Walker of the Ford Foundation notes that even CSOs 
that receive substantial project funding still struggle to sustain core operations, because grant provisions for 
overheads are generally too low:
An organisation that the Ford Foundation helped launch, more than four decades ago, called to 
advise they were at risk of shutting down. I was stunned, because it had some US$2m in project-
based funding in the bank. And yet, for all practical purposes, the organisation was broke, with 
substantial overhead and debt.
Vitalice Meja from RoA Africa adds that, while donors often have high delivery expectations of CSOs, they 
provide little support for the core capacities required for effective delivery, such as staff, equipment and office 
costs. Partners-Jordan likewise observes a disparity between high expectations of impact and the relatively 
moderate levels of funding made available. The Samoa Umbrella for Non-Governmental Organisations adds 
weight to this, suggesting it is a constant challenge to access funds to complete capacity-building projects. This 
problem is enduring, and Richard Holloway indicates that donors are simply not helping to support CSOs to 
become more self-sufficient. 
 
The project orientation of much funding combines with a renewed emphasis on ensuring value for money 
(VfM), again inspired partly by the development effectiveness agenda and partly by new donor conservatism, 
with donors seeking to reassure their publics that aid is not being used corruptly or wastefully. Darren Walker 
suggests that the instruments for judging progress from funding to CSOs are essentially those borrowed from 
the market, however inappropriately, drawing attention to:
…the current attachment to - and almost a worship of - market-based solutions that ask 
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And speaking of how donors’
…obsession with quantifiable impact, and frequently dogmatic adherence to discrete deliverables, 
undercuts the expansive purpose of CSOs, miniaturising them in their ambition… This system is 
rooted in transactional short termism - a tyranny of donors - that distorts and inhibits, rather than 
unleashes, the potential of civil society. 
Darren Walker further notes that concern with VfM is driving donors increasingly into contract-based 
relationships with CSOs, while ActionAid identifies the flaw in VfM approaches, in that they can only focus on 
short-term change: they cannot understand the major changes that come when civil society challenges and 
changes power imbalances, because it is hard to prove the impacts of activities that contribute to structural 
change over time, compared to discretely measurable pieces of delivery. Much of the work of change-seeking 
civil society is on-going, and cannot be captured by narrow metrics, which will miss the potential of CSOs 
as sources of innovation and creative solutions. Cowan Coventry and Clare Moberly of INTRAC identify that 
difficulties in assessing impact are driving some of the more open-ended pooled funds back into being more 
tightly defined. These challenges suggest a need for new instruments to measure civil society’s contribution to 
change differently.
Part of the problem with a projectised approach to CSOs is the way that the behaviour of CSOs that receive 
funding is influenced. Richard Holloway points to the energy drain involved when CSOs must put time into 
compliance with bureaucracy and attempting to demonstrate that VfM is being achieved, which subtracts 
from energy that could be spent on delivering real value. More broadly, Avila Kilmurray and Barry Knight, of 
the Global Fund for Community Foundations, suggest that donors are incentivising the wrong kind of CSO 
behaviour; CSOs are rewarded for developing skills in proposal writing and donor reporting, rather than in 
serving their constituents:
Many CSOs have become highly skilled proposal writers, budget jugglers and masters of development 
jargon, and compete with each other to serve the needs of external funders.
CSOs may hop from subject to subject to secure funding, such that they never develop expertise, see 
groundwork come to fruition, or develop a domestic constituency to be accountable towards. For example, 
Partners-Jordan relates that most Jordanian CSOs are donor-driven, and they drop projects as donors change 
priorities. In Serbia, almost all CSO funding is framed around integration into the EU, raising the fear that 
CSOs are being shaped by donors solely around this project, and causing concern about what will happen 
once Serbia has joined. The Polish Federation of NGOs assesses that many CSOs are leaving it to donors to 
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this happens even when donors explicitly try to avoid encouraging dependency: CSOs naturally adapt around 
donor priorities and the availability of funding. 
ActionAid states that it has resolved to take a principled stance on funding, committing not to chase funding 
opportunities as they arise:
We use the term ‘programme-led funding’ to describe an approach that seeks resources for work 
that our analysis and the communities we work with set out as key. We explicitly reject ‘funding-led 
programming’, in which CSOs start by looking at where the money is and offer to provide whatever 
projects that funders say they would like. 
However, ActionAid acknowledges, scarce resources and high competition mean there will always be CSOs that 
are prepared to try to work on whatever terms donors set. When CSOs chase donor funds, they risk raising 
suspicion that they are established purely to claim whatever funding is available, which does nothing to build 
public trust in CSOs and can, Vitalice Meja notes, fuel government claims that CSOs are contracted foreign agents. 
A contracted civil society?
Some current movement, from grants to contracts, is consistent with the suspicion that donors fund CSOs as 
delivery mechanisms, rather than because they see the value of civil society and want to strengthen it.
In the UK, NCVO and SCVO both state that government grants are falling as a proportion of CSO funding, while 
contracts are rising, a shift that may now also be underway in Norway. An anonymous interviewee in New 
Zealand reports that the government has moved away from providing funding for work where communities 
define their needs, and into contracts to deliver central government programmes, while exerting pressure 
on local government bodies to do the same. The donor in this scenario becomes a shopper for the cheapest 
means of delivery, indifferent about whether it contracts a CSO or a business, although businesses may be 
preferred because they are less likely to raise difficult questions. 
VANI makes the point that the contracted approach calls into question the autonomy and identity of civil 
society:
Many believe that neoliberal economics in the globalisation era has turned CSOs into contractors, 
bidding for contract-based service provisions. In a situation where bidding over contracts for services 
becomes a matter of course, it is difficult to distinguish between the non-profit and for-profit sector.
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The concern is that, by seeking the short-term funding on offer, as longer-term, more programmatic funding 
subsides, CSOs are letting donors, rather than their constituents, set the agenda, as Vitalice Meja suggests:
CSOs contracted by government departments and donor agencies have little or no input in the 
outputs and expected outcomes.
Darren Walker also describes a culture in which:
…civil society leaders too rarely have a voice in setting their own priorities, or even articulating the 
problem they aspire to solve. Little wonder that funders too often view themselves as patrons rather 
than partners. 
As several contributors make clear, the problem that arises is that a contracted civil society, which ticks the 
boxes of donor compliance and follows available funding, is accountable in the wrong direction, vertically, to 
donors, rather than horizontally, to citizens, who should be the ultimate judges of whether a CSO is making a 
difference. As Avila Kilmurray and Barry Knight describe it: 
The impact of international funding has created lines of accountability that drive upwards and 
outwards. The result is hefty reports landing on desks in London or Washington, far from the people 
that development is meant to serve.
Domestic state dependency: an 
alternative to ODA?
With ODA target countries narrowing, domestic state aid may seem a plausible alternative. A frequently seen 
consequence, when foreign donors withdraw, is for CSO dependency to transfer to reliance on domestic state 
support. According to ICD, this has happened across Latin America, with domestic state support now the 
predominant form of CSO resourcing in Chile and Uruguay: over 60% of Uruguayan CSO funding comes from 
the state.
Domestic state funding brings its own challenges. In some contexts, it is simply not available, as Vitalice Meja 
observes in many African countries:
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CSOs in most African countries do not receive government funding. Governments do not provide 
subsidies to CSOs even when they have managed to achieve statutory status… there is no legal, 
policy and institutional framework for financially supporting the initiatives of CSOs. 
Even where domestic state support is available, decision-making processes are often assessed to be lacking 
in transparency, as Civic Initiatives notes is the case in Serbia, while the Third Sector Foundation of Turkey 
(TUSEV) states that:
Government support to CSOs remains insufficient, unpredictable and not provided in a transparent, 
accountable, fair and non-discriminatory manner. 
A further risk with domestic state funding, as Zohra Moosa of Mama Cash and Caitlin Stanton of Urgent Action 
Fund relate, is that CSOs become seen as co-opted by governments, while governments are likely to favour 
CSOs that do not advance controversial positions. VANI notes that in India, where foreign funding for CSOs has 
fallen, change-seeking CSOs are less likely to receive state funding than service-oriented CSOs. This can only 
reinforce divisions in civil society noted above.
Adam Pickering of CAF provides a summary of issues that arise in the domestic state funding of CSOs:
An increased reliance on the state for funds places much power in the hands of governments. 
Governments inevitably fund CSOs that deliver against their specific agendas, and as such, the 
CSO community in a nation where much of the funding comes from the state can be distorted, 
to the point where the public perceives the independence of CSOs to have been compromised. 
Some governments are openly using the threat of losing funding as a way of silencing criticism of 
government policy, which has a chilling effect on the advocacy activities of CSOs.
In contested contexts, state funding will always be political. UNITAS in Bolivia reports favouritism similar to 
that identified by TUSEV: in a politically polarised context, the only available public funds are managed in 
accordance with the aims of the ruling party, a situation made worse for CSOs by the loss of international 
funding. Similarly, Kepa Nicaragua states that the government only supports CSOs that ally with its political 
views. In such contexts, to accept state funds is also to risk losing the trust of key sections of the public.
Returning to Turkey, Hakan Ataman, of Helsinki Citizens Assembly, suggests that the government is setting up 
its own pseudo-CSOs (otherwise known as GONGOs) to benefit from public funding, including EU funding, 
which prevents independent CSOs from accessing these funds. He adds that cosmetic domestic political 
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reforms have caused external donors to reduce their support for change-seeking CSOs, which means that these 
CSOs are now facing serious limitations.
In short, in repressive contexts, domestic state support simply cannot be a viable option for change-seeking CSOs.
A shift to the south?
In another trend, countries that previously were only the recipients of ODA are also becoming donors. This could 
suggest new opportunities for CSOs in the global south to access official funding from global south sources.
However, as documented in our previous reports, and in the contribution from Matshediso Moilwa and Neissan 
Besharati of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), growing global south economies, such 
as the BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), tend to favour state-centric 
approaches to development. Many of the largest global south economies, having followed heavily statist paths 
to economic development, seek to apply this template elsewhere. China in particular also seems to be tightly 
combining ODA, trade and the development of commercial opportunity.10 Further, several emerging donors, 
notably China and Russia, are among the worst offenders for restricting civil society at home, and are highly 
unlikely to support civil society in other countries. As Matshediso Moilwa and Neissan Besharati put it:
Despite their increasing international development clout, the reluctance of the BRICS club to 
acknowledge the significance of civil society is a reflection of wider difficulties in civil society-state 
engagement in BRICS countries.
Meanwhile, the Indian and South African governments have recently struck negative stances towards human 
rights, as expressed in regressive voting records at the UN Human Rights Council.11 
Instead, we are seeing a return to an old-fashioned model of support to large-scale national infrastructure and 
economic development projects, which do not generally give scope for civil society involvement, and indeed, 
can bring governments and CSOs into conflict, when infrastructure projects impact on the human rights and 
environmental conditions of affected populations. As Matshediso Moilwa and Neissan Besharati assess:
The scope of the large infrastructure projects and other development initiatives that are a significant part 
of BRICS-led development cooperation can be expected to have significant implications in developing 
countries, on contested issues such as the exploitation of natural resources, land grabs and land 
displacement, labour practices, environmental concerns, agriculture and food security, to name a few.
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CSOs do not get access to BRICS meetings, and the withdrawal of foreign donor funding from BRICS members 
has left change-seeking CSOs in those countries with limited capacity to hold their governments to account, at 
precisely the moment when they need to increase national accountability pressure and internationalise their 
work, given the growing role of their governments.12 While a BRICS development bank – the New Development 
Bank – was established in 2014, many in civil society are concerned that it will continue the trends of state-
centric development and exclusion of civil society, repeating the top-down mistakes of other development 
banks.13
A further outcome of the tilt towards global south ODA is that the potential influence of northern donors over 
recipients of funding is diminishing. While this may seem a reasonable global rebalancing, many northern 
donors tend to attach conditions on the protection of human rights and space for civil society to their funding 
to governments, and although at times this commitment has been undercut by changing funding fashions and 
promotion of market forces, conditionalities have given civil society levers to defend civic space; state-to-state 
funding from China or Russia seeks no such concessions. In Alan Fowler’s estimation, these global shifts are 
also reducing the ability of international CSOs (ICSOs) to protect their southern partners from attack.
However, amid the narrowing of ODA focus countries noted earlier, we should be careful not to miss another 
shift, noted by INTRAC, in the proportion of ODA going to CSOs in the global south, compared to CSOs in the 
global north. According to INTRAC, until quite recently, five times more ODA from DAC members went to CSOs 
in the donor country than to those in the global south, but this has now fallen to twice as much. Clearly the 
situation is still unequal, and indicative of a disproportionate concentration of civil society power in the global 
north,14 but this trend is a positive one, demanding further tracking. At the same time, it challenges global 
north CSOs concerned with development to redefine their role, while suggesting a potential new role for 
intermediary CSOs in the global south.
What this means for large and small 
CSOs
Related to this is the question of how donor funding affects the balance of civil society between large and small 
CSOs. Civil society needs to be understood as a diverse terrain in which small and large organisations, and less 
formal groupings and movements, work at different levels to pursue a range of aims and interests. Because 
these compete, and because complexity brings costs, civil society is often urged by donors to harmonise and 
speak with a common voice. Some powerful impacts have been achieved by civil society coalitions, in which 
different strengths are combined towards a common purpose. But at the same time, the diversity of civil 
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society should be seen as one of its prize assets, as from diversity comes the creativity and fresh thinking that 
we associate with civil society.
It should therefore be a worry that often the situation is one of large CSOs beating small CSOs in the 
competition for resources. This has recently been observed in Jordan, where a sharp rise in refugees from 
neighbouring Syria has generated an international civil society response that may leave domestic civil society 
marginalised, as Partners-Jordan reports:
Local CSOs have to compete with international CSOs who started to work in Jordan to serve 
refugees, and due to the high calibre of these international organisations, their profile was stronger 
than local organisations, which resulted in high and unfair competition.
ICSOs enjoy considerable advantages. OECD figures show that the private funding of CSOs in DAC member 
countries has increased in recent years, while analysis of seven leading ICSOs shows an average annual income 
growth rate of 7%. Most of this income comes from the global north, and ICSOs are spending increasing 
amounts on fundraising to enable their continued growth.15 Alan Fowler suggests many ICSOs are simply unable 
to change their behaviour, because they are tied to a mind-set where the sign of a healthy ICSO is increased 
growth, and success in fundraising is understood as an indicator of wider success. Similarly, while non-state 
funding, discussed further below, comes from a wide range of sources, larger CSOs are best placed to benefit 
from private giving: a handful of ICSOs, almost all in the global north, use their visibility and brand to attract 
most giving from members of the public.
Many contributors, including Avila Kilmurray and Barry Knight, note the tendency of ODA to uphold existing 
civil society power hierarchies, while Vitalice Meja suggests that donors simply do not comprehend the 
diversity of CSOs, or reflect this in their funding decisions. Cowan Coventry and Clare Moberly of INTRAC 
assert that encouraging a diversity of civil society is not something that will happen by accident; it needs to 
be designed into funding approaches. Both Alan Fowler and Ambika Satkunanathan assess that trends noted 
above, of encouraging VfM and development effectiveness, lead donors to gravitate towards larger CSOs, 
because of their ability to demonstrate professionalisation and capacity to plan, deliver and monitor; more 
cynically, this could be seen as funding going towards CSOs that are best placed to regurgitate the latest jargon, 
prepare plausible log-frames and be visible in high-level development forums. Further, Avila Kilmurray and 
Barry Knight suggest there is a growing tendency to see development problems as huge and intractable, which 
translates into an assumption that big problems need large-scale solutions that can only be delivered by major 
organisations. Ambika Satkunanathan notes that donors may also be concerned about the ability of small CSOs 
to manage large amounts of money. 
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As both Vitalice Meja and Ambika Satkunanathan suggest, donor faith in large CSOs can result in a bias against 
CSOs that have not previously received funding, which may be seen as unknown quantities and riskier choices. 
This can also mean that small and new organisations have to clear a series of compliance hurdles to build 
donor reassurance, which they may lack the capacity or knowledge to navigate, compared to larger CSOs that 
have capacity and prior knowledge of donor procedures; an established track record positions a previously 
funded, large CSO as a safe bet in uncertain times, as Ambika Satkunanathan states:
Scarce resources means donors would rather support a known organisation with a track record, 
instead of undertaking time-consuming due diligence exercises to vet a new organisation, and one 
that potentially also requires additional institutional support to apply for, and implement, projects. 
In Malawi, for example, the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR) has observed the growth 
of funding going to consortiums of CSOs, rather than single CSOs, but notes that small CSOs struggle to join 
these. Alan Fowler also suggests that larger CSOs are better able to ride the delays in releasing funds that are 
a frequent occurrence with donor bureaucracies, because they tend to have more than one secure funding 
source and reserves to fall back on.
The problem, if funds go mostly to larger CSOs, is that it will freeze existing power imbalances, locking in the 
privileged access to resources of larger CSOs. Innovation and the birth of new organisational forms to address 
emerging problems will be missed. As Avila Kilmurray and Barry Knight fear, a professionalised civil society class 
could sustain itself by surfing from one project funding round to the next:
A particularly damning complaint is the tendency for one development project to breed another, in 
an endless chain of self-serving job creation projects for development sector elites.
The logical response to this unequal playing field might seem support for capacity building. Smaller CSOs, and 
CSOs in the poorest countries, often face profound capacity challenges, and lack organisational and technical 
skills. WACSI reports this to be the situation with many West African CSOs, with this lack of capacity limiting 
their ability to reduce dependency on project funding. But across West Africa, capacity building that donors 
support is only an add on to project support, and is insufficient for institutional development. Similarly, Cowan 
Coventry and Clare Moberly of INTRAC observe that the capacity building support donors provide often has 
a narrow focus, on developing capacity in organisational systems and following procedures, which essentially 
builds skills for compliance with donor processes, rather than develops capacity to reduce donor dependency, 
which needs more thought:
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There are other aspects of capacity that may be equally, if not more, important in building effective 
CSOs, such as leadership, passion, integrity and the ability to connect genuinely with and support the 
voice of communities. There is often little space in civil society funds for thinking more innovatively 
about the content of capacity development.
INTRAC also notes that, when donors provide support for more nascent civil society groups to develop - 
something donors have been struggling to get to grips with as new civil society forms arise16 - it is usually in 
expectation that they will turn into something that resembles an established, professionalised CSO model, even 
though this may not be the most suitable vehicle:
Outreach activities are designed to reach more emerging expressions of civil society, but the type of 
support offered leads them into a process of formalisation, and then supports them on a trajectory of 
becoming ‘an organisation’.
Part of the response to donor perceptions of smaller CSOs as lacking capacity, suggest Avila Kilmurray and Barry 
Knight, is to take on and challenge notions of what constitutes capacity:
Donors tend to see small CSOs as lacking capacity. But that is often because their donors control 
them and frame capacity in their own terms.
Zoora Moosa and Caitlin Stanton suggest an alternative in the concept of resilience, which goes beyond narrow 
notions of capacity:
Increased resilience in civil society strengthens its capacity both to persevere in the face of backlash 
and threats, and to leverage new opportunities. When resilience is strong, movements are able 
to persist, even in the face of tremendous backlash. Within unstable, constantly shifting contexts, 
adaptive capacities help organisations not only to weather threats, but also to seize windows of 
political opportunity. 
The most resilient CSOs, to adopt this terminology, may be those that have access to deep community support 
networks, which enable access to a range of resources, including non-financial resources, even though they 
may be seen by donors as having weak material capacity.
While our contributors tended to look at CSOs as recipients of funding, there is of course also a need to see 
them as contributors of funding. Chloe Stirk and Sarah Hénon of Development Initiatives assess that the largest 
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proportion of private development assistance (PDA) comes from CSOs, making them more significant in 
development resourcing than private foundations or the private sector.17 Some of this funding passes to other 
CSOs: larger CSOs, as funders of civil society, sit in a complex resourcing chain, where funding relationships 
often overlap with other relationships, of implementation, support and representation. However, data about 
how large CSOs resource change-seeking activities, and what proportion of their resourcing goes to and 
through smaller CSOs, is hard to access, and needs to be made more readily available.
From the perspective of smaller CSOs, large CSOs, when they disburse resources within civil society, may be 
hard to distinguish from an official donor, if they take on the worst characteristics of donors, such as being top-
down, interventionist and concerned with narrow targeting and reporting. Larger CSOs need to see themselves 
as key links in a resourcing chain, and to model best practice. Partnership principles recently developed by 
CIVICUS and the International Civil Society Centre, which call for clarity around key principles, of vision, values, 
expectations, respect, strategy, responsibilities, accountability, flexibility and communication, provide some 
valuable guidance here.18
North to south CSO migration
The question of where ICSOs should sit in a resourcing chain that at least partly channels ODA from global 
north to global south is given renewed relevance by a trend of large ICSOs relocating or devolving to the 
global south. While strong justifications can be offered for this southern shift, in terms of moving closer to the 
challenges on the ground, Alan Fowler notes that such moves raise suspicion that they come in response to 
the movement of ODA towards global south CSOs noted above, and an impulse to follow the money. Concerns 
arise about the impact of southern-shifting ICSOs on the ecology of global south civil society, not least because 
ICSOs tend to use smaller, global south CSOs as recruitment pools. Alan Fowler observes that, despite years of 
rhetoric about changing relationships, global civil society remains characterised by inequality, between large 
ICSOs and the rest; intentions have been well-meaning, but partnerships have not transferred power:
Despite earnest intentions, the notion of ‘partnership’ as mutuality and solidarity, with a gradual 
shift in the weight of action, control and resources from northern to southern entities, has simply not 
happened at a meaningful scale. 
The key test for assessing whether decentralisation by large ICSOs is meaningful will be whether decision-
making power moves closer to the ground in reality.19 Relocation gives ICSOs opportunities to hold onto their 
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new ways of building respectful, enduring and non-hierarchical relationships between ICSOs and global south 
CSOs. Some donors have intervened to try to build stronger relationships between northern and southern 
CSOs, by insisting on joint partnership applications, but Alan Fowler notes that northern partners generally 
initiate and lead these, leaving southern CSOs playing a minor role:
More often their role is that of a sub-contractor, which works against them learning bidding skills, 
budgeting know how and an acquisition track record.
Jose Antonio Alonso et al note that, as global south countries achieve MIC status, a challenge can arise for 
ICSOs: the classic service delivery work undertaken by many ICSOs may no longer become necessary. Since 
ICSOs tend to be successful at generating private giving on the basis of appeals based around the need to 
deliver essential services, this presents new challenges: ICSOs might reasonably transition to work on new 
problems resulting from economic growth, but such work is harder to market for private giving. Further, ICSOs’ 
advocacy activity tends to be justified as being rooted in and informed by their ground level work; if that 
work falls away, ICSOs will need to justify advocacy activity in new terms, such as by demonstrating strong 
partnerships with global south CSOs, to enable them to understand needs on the ground. This may provide 
new opportunities for partnership for global south CSOs, and is a trend worth tracking.
Recommendations for official donors
From the above analysis, an intriguing contradiction appears to emerge: civil society seems to be asking donors 
simultaneously to move into strategic, long-term funding approaches that are predictable and can achieve 
impact - which will privilege large, established CSOs - while asking donors to make funds easier to access across 
a wider diversity of civil society for a broader range of actions. This suggests that two different principles exist 
in tension: predictability and risk. Both of these are clearly important principles for donors to consider, and be 
asked questions about. The solution surely lies in ensuring that there is a diversity of funding sources available 
for different civil society forms and actions at different levels and over different time periods, with different 
levels of risk. Individual CSOs should also be able to access resources from a diversity of sources to develop 
their resilience. To fund diversity implies that donors need to be braver and reassess their tolerance of risk. It 
also implies that they should devolve decision-making about resources as close to the ground as feasible.
But support for diversity should not foster fragmentation: an emphasis should be on building solidarity 
between different civil society forms, to defend and realise civil society freedoms, and expand civil society 
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space. This can only be achieved when some donors opt to support the core funding of CSOs, particularly 
change-seeking CSOs in the global south that struggle to sustain themselves on other sources of funding.
Donors need to acknowledge that funding issues go beyond technical questions of efficiency and effectiveness: 
all funding decisions and transactions have politics embedded in them. Donors should be honest about the 
politics of funding, treat civil society with respect, and take pains to ensure the autonomy of CSOs. Donors 
should accept that one of the roles of civil society is to ask difficult questions and challenge power, and ask 
themselves if they are enabling this role.
Key steps official donors could take in the light of this 
analysis include:
•	 Improve coordination, but do not harmonise funding streams, between different donors; offer 
complementary, rather than pooled approaches. Ideally donors would specialise in different funding 
methods, such that some provide long term, predictable and strategic support to CSOs, while others 
provide smaller forms of rapid response and emergency funding, with varying levels of experimentation 
and risk. This would enable a greater range of civil society to be supported, and enable CSOs to access 
from more than one funding source.
•	 As part of this, support linkages and experience sharing between established and emerging donor 
agencies. 
•	 Recalibrate attitudes to risk, and be brave enough to invest in new organisations and ideas. Accept that 
investing in potential can be as worthwhile as investing in an organisation that is guaranteed to produce 
quantifiable results.
•	 Signal that civil society has intrinsic as well as instrumental value. As part of this, develop, embed and 
monitor indicators in whether the health, ecology and resilience of civil society as a whole is being 
sustained and strengthened through donor support.
•	 Provide more core and institutional support to change-seeking, global south CSOs, including for 
organisational and leadership development, coalition building and advocacy and accountability capacity, 
and allow more flexibility in the use and reallocation of resources by civil society.
•	 Respect the autonomy of CSOs: rather than contracting CSOs to fulfil donor priorities, make more open 
funding calls, and provide space for civil society, in diverse forms, to help define donors’ agendas and 
priorities, and participate in monitoring and accountability over funding decisions and impact.
•	 Devolve elements of grant-making functions as much as possible, to be close to the intended recipients 
of grant-making, in order to better understand local needs and priorities. Where possible, work with CSOs 
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•	 Acknowledge that restrictions on the receipt of funding reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of donor 
support, and support civil society action, and international and national advocacy, to uphold the right of 
all CSOs to receive funding from all sources.
•	 Support the development of skills and capacities that enable CSOs to diversify their resourcing. 
•	 Support and adhere to established principles of development cooperation, as agreed in international 
forums on aid and development. 
•	 Embed the principles embodied in these recommendations in the implementation of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and the future financing for development agenda.
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What are the 
alternatives to state 
funding?
There are few examples of civil society groups rejecting potential donor funding, but Elizabeth Mpofu 
and Ndabezinhle Nyoni of La Via Campesina, the landless people’s movement, relate how they have built 
their reputation, as a respected and autonomous global civil society movement, while refusing to make 
compromises with funders: they make alliances on their terms, and in ways that advance their agendas, 
refusing to take funding from governments that promote neoliberalism. Being choosy about funding only 
seems to have helped them. Similarly, Greenpeace International does not accept funding from governments, 
political parties or companies, and have made this part of their brand. Clearly, these are decisions that are 
easier to take for large ICSOs, when they have a large base of donations from members of the public, which 
can be used without restriction, but they are still brave decisions that some other large CSOs are not taking. 
When they refuse to seek or accept some kinds of funding, CSOs implicitly acknowledge the politics that lie at 
the heart of funding, and the compromises that may be involved in accepting resources.
The main reason that CSOs are seeking to cast the funding net wider is, of course, the increasing uncertainty 
about funding from state sources. Official donors, particularly when they are phasing out funding, are in 
turn urging CSOs to diversify. This is not new: it is customary for reports on civil society resourcing to call on 
CSOs to diversify their funding, and this call gets louder when state funding is tighter. In Finland, for example, 
Kepa observes a recent growth in discourse that CSOs should become less dependent on public money and 
more actively seek to be self-financing. Intriguingly, in Ghana, WACSI notes that debate that civil society 
should become self-financing comes not from external donors or CSOs, but from the state and private sector, 
suggesting the need to understand the politics behind the advice.
But for some CSOs, this is still new territory. Richard Holloway suggests that CSOs that became dependent on 
and expectant of ODA have failed to consider potential domestic sources of support, including encouraging 
giving from domestic citizens, developing their own commercial revenue streams and seeking funding from 
domestic businesses.
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This is not to downplay recent steps that have been taken. Inputs to this report reveal numerous examples of 
CSOs responding to declining state support by pursuing new funding: in Bangladesh, CSOs are branching into 
consultancy; in Finland, CSOs are making greater fundraising use of social media, and seeking in-kind support; 
CSOs in Ghana are charging fees for services and use of facilities, and running income-generating schemes, 
while attempts are underway to establish relationships with high net worth individuals and companies, develop 
endowment funding and connect with potential sources of in-kind support; in both Nicaragua and Norway, 
CSOs are selling services to other CSOs; in the Philippines, there are attempts to generate service fees, and 
develop individual supporter bases, including with Filipino diasporas; and CSOs in Scotland are in the early 
stages of exploring crowdfunding and other digital fundraising methods, as well as shared back-office services. 
In Argentina, perhaps because CSOs have had more time to get used to donor withdrawal, RACI notes a high 
level of diversification, including the growth of individual giving into a wider range of subjects, the use of online 
payment systems and crowdfunding platforms, and the sale of products and services. In Turkey, Hakan Ataman 
believes domestic CSOs lack the staff, resources and visibility to carry out face-to-face fundraising, but observes 
some recent use of mobile phone technology to fundraise.
Most respondents however assess such initiatives to be in the early stages; it remains to be seen what 
difference they make to the funding situation of CSOs. WACSI, for example, notes that their diversification 
attempts currently provide only a very small part of their budget, while Kepa Nicaragua makes the broader 
point that it comes as a major transition, in contexts where donor support used to be routine but is now rare, 
to go from having an assured budget to one that must be stitched together from many different and variable 
sources.
In some contexts, seen in responses from Kyrgyzstan, Samoa and the Solomon Islands, minimal attempts 
to seek funding beyond the state are currently observed, perhaps pointing to the limited institutional 
development of civil society in those contexts, and paucity of other funding possibilities. For example, 
Development Services Exchange in the Solomon Islands notes:
 
The country’s socio-economic circumstances are such that room for new strategies is rather limited, 
and efforts to date with improving resourcing have been of little success.
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The key alternative source of funding identified by our contributors is philanthropy, both domestic and 
international. Interest in philanthropy is growing, partly because the quantum of philanthropy appears to be 
increasing, and also because new kinds of philanthropists, including from the global south, are trying new 
methods of giving.20
The range and scope of philanthropy - which can include individual giving from members of the public, 
and from very wealthy people, philanthropy formalised into institutions, large and small and, discussed in 
a separate section, corporate philanthropy - is vast, and that range makes it hard to understand what the 
financial contribution of giving and philanthropy might amount to. But Development Initiatives estimates 
that private development assistance (PDA) is equal to about a third of ODA from DAC members, and makes 
up a quarter of all humanitarian funding. Over the past two decades, Helena Monteiro of WINGS believes 
philanthropy has become a larger proportion of the overall funding for development and, partly enabled by 
new technology, there has been an increase in philanthropy across borders.
Part of the value of private giving, as opposed to state funding, is that while state funding is usually designated 
for specific purposes, giving from individuals tends to be available to use as a CSO sees fit. Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF), for example, was able to mount an effective response to the 2014/2015 Ebola crisis in part 
because it gets over 80% of its funding from individual donations, giving it flexibility over how it deploys 
resources. Private giving is potentially more nimble, responsive and tolerant of risk than official funding.
CSOs that have traditionally relied on state support can however struggle to get to grips with giving.  Richard 
Holloway notes that CSOs may not find it easy to reorient their language:
For an organisation that has become used to writing proposals to foreign donors, and that is used to 
donor language, the idea of explaining to the public of their country who they are, what they do, and 
what help they need is intimidating.
Kepa Nicaragua likewise states that CSOs are not used to having to market themselves, in a context where 
donor funding was once routine but has now faded. In Ghana, WACSI acknowledges that CSOs need to become 
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better at connecting with the public, making improved use of social media and demonstrating their relevance 
to key topical issues, in order to seek more support from individuals.
Richard Holloway adds that it takes time and effort to build reputation with domestic publics. Trust and 
reputation can also be fragile. M May Seitanidi points to worrying evidence that overall public trust in CSOs, 
which is normally high, seems to have declined, alongside declining trust in government and the private 
sector, while Ambika Satkunanathan makes the point that it may be hardest to develop public trust in CSOs in 
highly repressive contexts, because sustained government demonisation influences public attitudes. TUSEV 
suggests that a broader lack of social trust is being expressed partly in distrust of CSOs in Turkey, which limits 
giving, but can only be addressed in the long term. The Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) 
offers an example of public trust in civil society in the Philippines recently having been shaken by a high profile 
corruption scandal involving politicians and fake CSOs, which also led to officials tightening access to funding 
even for legitimate CSOs. It will take time to rebuild that trust. 
Private giving and philanthropy
More positively, overall private giving remains relatively robust. Adam Pickering of CAF notes that, while a 
slight decline in individual giving corresponded with the economic downturn, giving is on the rise in growing 
economies of the global south. The robustness of private giving is suggested in part by the weak connection 
CAF finds between wealth and generosity: some countries where people give proportionately the most are 
the world’s poorest, suggesting that even in poor countries there is potential for CSOs to develop domestic 
giving. Of course, considerable volatility in the allocation of giving between individual CSOs and causes will lurk 
beneath the headline figures: Development Initiatives assesses that giving from members of the public tends 
to have low predictability. To help predict giving decisions better, and changes in these, we need, CAF suggests, 
to understand better the motivations behind people’s giving decisions. 
Much giving is local in outlook, informed by local values and cultures, and may be informal. Philanthropy 
in each of the BRICS countries, for example, seems to be evolving along quite distinct lines;21 in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA), Naila Farouky of the Arab Foundations Forum (AFF) notes that philanthropic 
institutions are quite distinct from those in other regions. Even the terminology differs from one place to 
another: in African contexts, many philanthropists prefer to talk in terms of giving, charity or Ubuntu, rather 
than philanthropy.22 This rootedness and diversity suggests resilience, but adds complexity. Local knowledge 
is needed to understand variations, and external actors will need to spend time in understanding local 
philanthropic landscapes and developing partnerships.
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In trying to understand giving, there is also a need to examine what causes giving is flowing to. There will 
always be some causes for which it is easier to find resources than others, and they are not necessarily 
change-seeking causes. Ambika Satkunanathan suggests that most giving is for small scale, often religious, 
causes, and oriented towards charitable amelioration of problems. Similarly, Amitabh Behar and Pradeep 
Patra of the National Foundation for India (NFI) note that domestic giving is expanding as India’s middle class 
grows, but this growth is mostly along religiously charitable lines, rather than benefiting change-seeking 
CSOs. VANI suggests that considerable public education is needed to encourage people to give to CSOs.
Similarly, while many have high hopes, in a globalised world, of the power of giving by diasporas to benefit 
civil society initiatives, as Alan Fowler and Ambika Satkunanathan note, diasporic giving tends to be ad hoc, 
cautious and narrow in its focus, with only a small part going towards broader needs. Ambika Satkunanathan 
sees that:
In the conflict-affected north and east of Sri Lanka, it is not uncommon to find the diaspora 
funding ad hoc charity projects that do not really respond to the needs of the population, but rather 
fall within the comfort zone of those donating. 
However, as Naila Farouky of AFF indicates, philanthropy is never static: in MENA, the people’s uprisings 
that have characterised the region since 2011 have challenged existing philanthropic practices, and 
the question now is how to accommodate change while retaining the best of the region’s established 
philanthropic traditions. More broadly, much of the renewed interest in philanthropy is because of economic 
and demographic change: there is excitement about the potential of the global south’s growing middle 
class, which could offer new resourcing opportunities for global south CSOs. Adam Pickering of CAF sees 
young people in the global south as being more inclined to give than their counterparts in the global north, 
suggesting potential to recruit a new generation into civil society. CAF also suggests that the involvement 
of a new class and generation of global south citizens in giving could change the way that accountability is 
exercised, by encouraging more horizontal accountability. As Chloe Stirk and Sarah Hénon of Development 
Initiatives see it, the opening up of global south philanthropy offers potentially a greater diversity of who is 
giving, what funding channels are available and where funding is going, potentially offering a rebalancing of 
power towards the global south. Given changes in ODA, CAF suggests that philanthropy has potential to grow 
to cover the funding gap, but the problem is that restrictions on civil society, and a lack of policies to enable 
philanthropy, are preventing this potential from being realised. 
For example, in MENA, Naila Farouky notes there is a lack of a legal enabling environment to encourage 
philanthropy, while the exclusion of young people from political decision-making in many countries will 
make young people less inclined to give for public good. In Bolivia, UNITAS states that attempts by CSOs to 
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diversify funding are sometimes stymied by tax and regulation requirements, while in Turkey, TUSEV assesses 
that bureaucratic rules make it hard for CSOs to seek donations, tax legislation does not incentivise giving, and 
decisions about which CSOs qualify for tax exempt status are opaque and political. Similarly, Kepa Nicaragua 
reports that the government is introducing a law to levy a 30% tax on donations to CSOs, except those that 
cooperate with the government; more broadly, CAF sees that some governments only provide incentives 
to promote giving to actions that fit government agendas. Even in global north contexts with long histories 
of giving to CSOs, the tax environment may not be enabling: in the UK, NCVO reports that tax rules remain 
unfavourable for many CSOs, while in Finland, Kepa notes that changes in the gambling law could affect CSOs, 
as funds from this source currently benefit them. 
And yet the overwhelming evidence is that legal measures to encourage giving work: CAF finds that, in 
countries that have tax incentives to encourage giving, more giving goes to civil society. The 2015 Rules to Give 
By study, which attempts to overcome the lack of international information about the legal framework for 
philanthropy, finds that, globally, incentives for philanthropy, both individual and corporate, are now the norm 
rather than the exception, and work in countries at all economic levels.23 For example, in Poland, citizens can 
designate 1% of their income to any CSO that has ‘public benefit’ status. In the Philippines, CSOs are attempting 
to get a similar law off the ground, to enable tax-payers to choose a CSO to receive a percentage of their 
income tax payments. In the UK, payroll giving, in which a regular amount of income is deducted to go to CSOs, 
has offered a long-running resourcing stream to civil society.24 The value of these measures is that they suggest 
areas where some potentially uncontroversial gains could be sought, which unlock resources for civil society. 
While the voluntary nature of philanthropy needs to be respected, states can and do intervene to improve 
giving conditions, but they could do more, particularly to enable giving to a more diverse range of civil society 
forms and actions. 
Helena Monteiro of WINGS distils the key elements of an enabling environment for philanthropy: a supportive 
legal framework; incentivising tax structures; accountability structures that build confidence in philanthropy; 
enough capacity in institutions receiving resources to execute activities well; and sufficient resources within 
society. She also sets out some of the characteristics we should expect of philanthropy organisations: that they 
can take risks and support innovation, and seed initially unpopular ideas; respond quickly; provide funding at 
small scales, where appropriate; and be more independent than official donors. These offer some key tests 
to apply when assessing how enabling an environment is for philanthropy, and how geared philanthropy 
institutions are to supporting civil society.
Chloe Stirk and Sarah Hénon of Development Initiatives note that, while philanthropic funding has many 
sources, a small group of large private foundations commands most resources, with the 10 largest private 
foundations providing 60% of all international foundation giving, meaning that their decisions on resource 
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allocation can be disproportionately influential. Given this, it is concerning that Avila Kilmurray and Barry 
Knight see large philanthropic foundations as becoming more closed: 60% of US foundations no longer accept 
unsolicited proposals. This move may be motivated by similar concerns to those that lie behind changes in 
ODA: to use resources strategically, increase efficiency and make development interventions more effective, 
but as with ODA, effects could be that top-down decisions are less understanding of local needs and realities, 
and institutions exclude smaller CSOs, missing opportunities to support emerging and creative ideas.
Helena Monteiro of WINGS asserts that the full contribution of philanthropy is still to be realised, while 
Naila Farouky of AFF affirms there is a need to move from traditional notions of philanthropy to strategic 
philanthropy, which serves causes oriented towards structural change. AFF cautions that to make philanthropy 
more strategic demands a long term, multi-generational shift, but WINGS sees some evidence that this 
strategic shift is happening, along with growing awareness amongst philanthropic institutions of the need to 
be transparent and accountable. WINGS also sees more foundations being set up in emerging economies, 
because of growing wealth, but also in response to the increasing inequalities resulting from economic growth.
New philanthropy
In particular, a new type of wealthy, private philanthropist is on the rise - we describe them here as the new 
philanthropists - who have wealth they want to use; see themselves as having skills and time to donate, alongside 
resources; may seek to apply the skills they honed in developing their wealth to addressing social problems, 
sometimes through hands-on application of charismatic and problem-solving leadership; and are interested in 
different models of funding alongside donations, such as forms of investment-type models of funding.25 
The US, with its long-established culture of philanthropic giving, provides examples of how philanthropy can 
develop and mature, to benefit civil society: a recent study of wealthy US households shows that giving is 
increasing, and wealthy people expect to maintain their giving.26 Wealthy givers are also trying to become 
more strategic, and are motivated by both personal satisfaction and a belief that they can make a difference; 
encouragingly for civil society, they believe that people and CSOs can create change far more than governments. 
At the other end of the spectrum, in South Africa, research suggests that the new philanthropists are loyal 
to causes, sticking with them over years, do not necessarily seek reward from their giving, and are happy to 
support general costs, suggesting that CSOs might benefit from developing steady relationships with new 
philanthropists; new philanthropists also tend to find the causes they support through personal contacts, and 
give locally.27 More generally in Africa, new philanthropists are planning to increase their giving.28 In India, new 
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study suggests that many new philanthropists have a degree of distrust about CSOs, while CSOs are unable to 
break free from short-term, fund-seeking behaviour to establish longer term relationships that are about more 
than seeking resources, leading to ‘disconnected donors’ and limited, conditional CSO support.29
Questions however arise about the content of what new philanthropists support, and the processes they apply. 
While some, mostly long-established foundations, are developing civic capacity, many new philanthropists 
support social causes, typically around education and health, which is likely to mean that key issues are 
missed, and offers change-oriented CSOs few opportunities to connect. Michael Edwards, in his work on new 
philanthropy, suggests there is a distinction between philanthropists that are trying to deliver social goods, and 
those seeking to develop capacities for people to mount challenges and achieve structural change. He suggests 
that both are needed, and can be complementary, but perceives that philanthropy, as with ODA, may be seeing 
a turn back to top-down, project-oriented interventions, after a period in which philanthropic institutions were 
prepared to invest in change processes.
In terms of process, many new philanthropists seem to have a fondness for attempting technocratic 
solutions, and apply narrow, quantitative understandings of how to assess impact, presenting the same 
problems as project-oriented, narrowly evaluated ODA.30 Research indicates that few attempts are being 
made to understand deeply, and there is limited peer learning between new philanthropists, suggesting that 
opportunities for CSOs to work with them to advocate for more strategic philanthropy will be limited.31
Further issues of process relate to how decisions are made and where new philanthropic funding comes from. 
Whatever the faults of ODA, there is a degree of transparency about where funds originate, and a sense that 
ultimately there is some responsibility to donor country taxpayers, while reporting of ODA from DAC members 
has improved in recent years. With much of philanthropy, including new philanthropy, this is much less the 
case. The immense wealth of super-rich new philanthropists may give them an advantage over other funders, 
in being able to offer long-term, sustained giving, but this should not isolate them from scrutiny, and the kind 
of questions about transparency that are routinely levelled at CSOs.
The question of how decisions are made and who has a say is important. Many of Africa’s new philanthropists 
make decisions through consultation with close family members, while super-rich people have founded 
philanthropic foundations where a handful of people make funding decisions in ways that are not exposed to 
scrutiny: it is reported that in the Gates Foundation, a small number of people, mostly family members, decide 
the allocation of a huge proportion of the resources going into global basic health.32
Because giving decisions are personal, influenced by experiences and values, if decisions are exposed only 
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personally identify with. New philanthropists may do this, even when they know there are other, more pressing 
causes, which they do not support because of a lack of a personal connection.33 Given the voluntary nature of 
philanthropy, this may be inevitable, but it will mean that important issues are missed. Civil society needs to 
assert in response that process is important in its own right: participatory decision-making yields better, more 
trustworthy decisions. Michael Edwards has called for the diversification of decision-making as a major step 
towards improving philanthropy. Here, there are examples of community philanthropy, discussed below, that 
place heavy emphasis on process, including the involvement of intended beneficiaries in decision-making, that 
could be learned from.34
Where the money comes from is also important: what does it mean, for those CSOs seeking structural change 
in the interests of social justice, if they accept funds from the wealthy winners of current economic and 
political arrangements? These givers may wish to see improvements, but are unlikely to want profound change. 
Hereditary philanthropist Peter Buffett highlighted these concerns when he spoke of the ‘Charitable-Industrial 
Complex’, in which political, business and philanthropic elites ameliorate but do not solve problems, such as 
inequality, that are intimately connected to their own wealth.35 The big questions will not be on the table, 
and new philanthropy risks looking like discredited trickledown economics under another guise. Further, how 
can change-seeking CSOs work with people who may have benefited from corruption and poor governance, 
without compromising on their values, and without becoming reputation launderers for corrupt interests? The 
rise of private wealth and increase in new philanthropy make this a newly urgent question, particularly when 
the super-rich use philanthropic giving to gain access to global decision-making circles from which CSOs are 
excluded. In this way, new philanthropy can be a means of consolidating, rather than challenging, elite power. 
Philanthropic institutions, and new philanthropists, should open themselves up to scrutiny, and be honest 
about their motivations, sources of wealth and investment decisions, if they want civil society to take them 
seriously.
Community philanthropy
In contrast to the roles of established institutions and the super-rich come the smaller scale organisations 
practising community philanthropy and community-led grant-making. Avila Kilmurray and Barry Knight report 
that community philanthropy organisations are growing in numbers, with small initiatives springing up all over 
the world.
The essential point about community philanthropy is that resources come from the same communities in 
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Murad sets out some advantages of small-scale, community focused grant-making: with funds coming from the 
community, there is a greater sense of responsibility about how funds are used:
Dalia is not a donor: the funds that Dalia mobilises already belong to the Palestinian community. 
Dalia holds them in trust and facilitates transparent, democratic and accountable use of the funds, 
but it is the community’s right and responsibility to decide how they are used.
In this model, horizontal rather than vertical accountability becomes something that more organically occurs, 
because communities are able to develop a sense that they have a right and a responsibility to exercise 
accountability over decisions that affect them. Avila Kilmurray and Barry Knight assert the intrinsic as well 
as instrumental value of this burgeoning of community philanthropy organisations, in that they grow spaces 
for local level empowerment and new civic space, particularly where institutional CSO forms are not well-
established, so can be seen as building democratic practice from the ground up.
Nora Lester Murad’s case study suggests that the need is to focus on the processes by which decisions are 
made, and make these processes as locally owned and inclusive as possible, rather than start as conventional 
donors might, by setting priorities. Sound decision-making processes will tend to produce appropriate and 
well-targeted actions, and build up community confidence and competence. In the example from Palestine, 
grants are open-ended, to enable communities to define their own priorities, and small, to encourage creative 
use of resources and discourage waste. The community is asked to contribute, so that they will value the grant 
received, and also learn to value their own resources, including non-financial resources. At the same time, 
challenges arise: community-level grant-making, in settings where communities are divided, can reinforce, 
rather than cut across, conflict lines, by giving an opportunity for local power-brokers to reproduce patterns of 
factional support and patronage.
The diversity, and ground-up nature of community philanthropy, may present a particular challenge to 
capturing its contribution to civil society resourcing and development. Helena Monteiro of WINGS indicates 
that many community philanthropy organisations do not use language that intergovernmental agencies and 
official donors understand: for example, while work supported by community philanthropy organisations may 
directly address issues covered by the MDGs, and the coming SDGs, because they do not explicitly refer to 
themselves in these terms, they may not show up on the radar:
Philanthropic foundations tend to use a different language from the MDGs, one that is rooted in 
the local context, rather than in universal frameworks. In order to achieve effective cross-sectoral 












to civil society 
resourcing and 
development.
State of Civil Society report 2015: civicus essay
175
This is not to say that community philanthropy organisations need change their language: rather, development 
agencies should get better at spotting relevant work being done on the ground, and ensure they reach across 
the disconnect.
Clearly, there is a limit to how scalable community philanthropy can be. By its nature, it needs to stay small, 
and the need is for many more, diverse local initiatives, rather than for current small initiatives to grow larger, 
although community philanthropy organisations could offer an effective means to devolve donor decision-
making. Community philanthropy is likely to be more sustainable, because it can take a long term view, 
offering potential to advance by many small steps towards change over time, without vulnerability to short-
term changes in funding. This suggests it may only be part of the picture of civil society resourcing, but a vital, 
growing part. 
The trend, noted by Helena Monteiro, towards better documentation of local practices and traditions of giving, 
and attempts to reinvigorate giving traditions when they have fallen into disuse, suggests a way forward: 
by tapping into long-standing motivations to give that are embedded in cultures, combining them with 
contemporary methods, and gradually orienting giving towards supporting change-seeking actions, giving could 
be made more sustainable and strategic.
Faith-based giving
Helena Monteiro notes that almost all faiths, belief systems and traditions have an imperative towards 
philanthropy, and Adam Pickering of CAF relates that in some countries, faith-based giving makes up a major 
part of the philanthropy base. Chloe Stirk and Sarah Hénon of Development Initiatives estimate, for example, 
that around 15% of all international humanitarian civil society funding is faith-based.
Faith-based giving shares characteristics with other forms of individual giving, in that while it seems to have 
huge potential, much giving currently serves small scale, charitable and local causes, rather than more change-
oriented causes. In addition, it is not always easy to know where giving is going; as Naila Farouky of AFF notes, 
for example, Islam places a particularly high value on anonymous giving, which means that it is hard to get 
information on the causes giving serves, and suggests some potential for ineffective use of resources, and 
makes it harder to move towards more strategic, change-oriented giving.
However, one of the strengths Islamic faith-based CSOs have is that they can access the compulsory giving 
mandated in Islam: the fact that most people of Islamic faith must give zakat, alms to the poor, means that 







giving, in that 
while it seems 










State of Civil Society report 2015: civicus essay
176
of private giving. Not surprisingly, in view of this, Development Initiatives observes that development and 
humanitarian organisations are increasingly manoeuvring to tap into zakat.
Sadia Kidwai, of Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW), assesses that having access to faith-based giving has enabled 
IRW, and other faith-based CSOs, to grow, even as other sources of funding have fallen. She identifies other 
key assets faith-based CSOs enjoy: access to faith communities in parts of the world that secular organisations 
and donors struggle to reach, and the trust that members of faith communities place in them, on the basis of a 
shared faith identity.
IRW enables Muslim diaspora populations in global north countries to discharge their charitable duties, 
while being a long way from home, by supporting IRW’s humanitarian and development work. Crucial is the 
combination of its faith-based identity with evident professionalism and the high standards of transparency 
and accountability expected of large CSOs established in the global north. In IRW’s judgement, while giving may 
initially stem from a shared faith identity, it will only be sustained when the giver sees the donation being used 
effectively and efficiently:
Having a shared faith identity can often be crucial for developing relationships of trust with donors, 
and enabling faith-inspired organisations to capitalise on available resources. Yet, in the experience 
of IRW, faith identity is not a silver bullet, and cannot (and should not) be relied upon to secure 
long-term and sustainable funding. Rather, our relative success has immensely relied upon our efforts 
to improve our efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability.
This is underpinned by developing relations with CSOs that are rooted in other faiths, and non-faith-based 
CSOs, as each has advantages in accessing some communities, but there are other communities where their 
identity will count against them. IRW’s work thus suggests a model for collaboration between CSOs of different 
types and origins, to access resources and use them more effectively.
Crowdfunding and online campaigns
There is current interest in the potential for crowdfunding to generate resources for civil society.36 CSOs in 
Argentina, Finland, Scotland, Serbia and Turkey tell us they have taken first steps down this road, although so 
far the results have been quite modest.
The logic of crowdfunding - aggregating funds from many individuals pledging small amounts - is that of giving 
itself, but what is new is the online and social technology that enables crowdfunding appeals to get potentially 
The logic of 
crowdfunding 
- aggregating 
funds from many 
individuals 
pledging small 
amounts - is that 
of giving itself, 
but what is new 




State of Civil Society report 2015: civicus essay
177
wide reach and rapid response. Crowdfunding has so far mostly been used in the creative industries, and for 
enterprise start-ups seeking investment, and it may be something that CSOs are coming to somewhat late. 
Yet while some CSOs could undoubtedly benefit, challenges also need to be noted, including those of finding 
the right crowdfunding platform amidst a profusion of alternatives, and of balancing the funding ask with the 
reward: many crowdfunding models are investment models, where those who put money expect some kind of 
return, and while these are not generally suitable for CSOs, people who donate may expect visible recognition 
or other forms of acknowledgement, which entail a cost. 
To succeed at crowdfunding takes sustained application and the development of expertise over time, 
suggesting that organisations with pre-existing communications expertise are best placed to succeed. Many 
- perhaps most - crowdfunding appeals fail to take off or achieve their target, and it is hard to predict which 
are likely to succeed. Taken together, these suggest that CSOs that have resources and skills to put into 
crowdfunding appeals and have existing strong brands to leverage - the largest, best established CSOs - are 
the ones most likely to benefit. Crowdfunding appeals also work best for one-off asks: it is difficult to see how 
they could be used to generate on-going, core funding, suggesting they might best suit established CSOs with 
core resources seeking additional revenue for specific activities, rather than to sustain smaller CSOs seeking to 
cover core costs. 
Finally, as with all public funding appeals, some issues simply resonate better than others. As Richard Holloway 
observes:
Certain well established topics, such as children with disabilities, will open people’s hearts and 
pockets, if the appeal is well made and the organisation making it is respected, but how will a CSO 
‘sell’ an appeal for help to combat, for example, domestic violence, or refugees, or land expropriation, 
or, indeed, homophobia? It is certainly possible that there are people in the country who are not 
convinced that these are important topics.
Tris Lumley of New Philanthropy Capital (NPC) notes that ineffective CSOs with good marketing can fare better 
than effective CSOs with poor marketing. Crowdfunding may best suit those appeals that speak of a problem 
that can be solved with the application of resources, or present the face of a person who needs help. Change-
seeking CSOs will find it harder to rework their needs into easy fundraising asks, and less able to point towards 
short-term delivery.
Much the same can be said about viral, stunt-based forms of fundraising that make heavy use of social 
media, which have come to prominence and are discussed in our Year in Review’s analysis of 2014/2015 
campaigns. Our analysis points to a disjuncture between the profile a campaign enjoys, and therefore its 
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success in attracting donations, and the need of a cause to attract urgent resources, along with the impact 
those resources can achieve. Further, such appeals can have the effect of diverting potential support from 
other causes, and there is a danger that the public may grow tired of stunt-based fundraising methodologies. 
Celebrity-led appeals, of which there are also now a great deal, share these challenges: they are more likely to 
benefit larger CSOs than small ones, and CSOs that work on easy to articulate issues.
In short, crowdsourcing, and viral online and celebrity-led campaigns, offer value to some CSOs as additional 
sources of funding, but there is a gap between the hype and the reality, and they offer no quick fix to cover 
declining funding from other sources, and little prospect of giving change-seeking CSOs the core support they 
need.
Recommendations on giving and philanthropy
•	 Philanthropic funders need to be encouraged to be braver, take more risks, support a greater diversity of 
civil society forms and actions, and look beyond short-term initiatives.
•	 Civil society and philanthropists should advocate for more enabling laws and regulations for giving, 
including tax incentives, and for more structured, regular individual giving practices, such as payroll giving. 
•	 Attention needs to be given to the process by which philanthropic institutions and wealthy philanthropists 
make decisions on what and who they choose to fund. It should be understood that philanthropic 
initiatives are most likely to lead to change when they are informed by civil society expertise and direct 
input from potential beneficiaries.
•	 Wherever possible, philanthropic decision-making should be devolved to the most local levels. To enable 
this, there is a need to support intermediary organisations and community level foundations.
•	 Philanthropic institutions should open themselves up to scrutiny about their funding bases and 
investment decisions, and the financial investments they make should be scrutinised to ensure that they 
reflect their values and principles.
•	 There should be better connections for learning between philanthropists and philanthropic institutions. 
Civil society should help to identify examples of good philanthropy practice and strong philanthropy role 
models to encourage the adoption of better practice.
•	 Closer connections should be made for joint working, and sharing of funding initiatives and resources, 
between faith-based and secular CSOs.
•	 CSOs should consider employing new fundraising techniques, such as crowdfunding and online 
campaigns, but be realistic about the costs and prospects of these, and apply them as complementary 
methods, alongside other approaches.
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Working with the for-
profit world
A growing number of social enterprises is challenging conventional definitions of civil society and 
demonstrating that the boundary between the for-profit sector and a civil society traditionally defined as 
being not-for-profit sometimes overlaps. At the same time, new wealth in the global south is opening up new 
potential for CSOs to access CSR initiatives, alongside philanthropy.
Ambika Satkunanathan points to hybridity in community philanthropy organisations, which may undertake 
income generating activities in order to generate resources for community good, while Richard Holloway’s advice 
on revenue diversification suggests that CSOs may enter the marketplace to diversify resourcing, by launching 
straightforwardly commercial measures that generate profit for core work, or through extending and marketing 
their services to a wider user base. In Finland, Kepa reports that more CSOs are undertaking commercial activity, 
but there is concern that this could introduce ambiguity into CSOs’ missions and mandates; CSOs are spending 
an increasing amount of energy on commercial activities, which could come at the expense of time for core 
work. The challenge here is for CSOs to stay true to their values as they develop enterprises and commercial 
endeavours, and to be aware that success in commercial expansion could also crowd out other CSOs. 
Nascent attempts by CSOs to establish enterprises are reported in several contexts, including Argentina, New 
Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand, along with a developing social investment market in the UK, but once 
again, the current contribution of these is quite small, and it is too early to tell how successful these will be. 
Further support may be needed. CSOs in Thailand, for example, identify a need for training in marketing and 
enterprise skills. 
As Tris Lumley of NPC suggests, social enterprises can also help address some of the accountability challenges 
of CSOs (when CSOs deliver benefits to a group of stakeholders but are accountable to an entirely different 
group of stakeholders who pay for the work) by meeting their stakeholders in the marketplace, where 
information about what works and doesn’t work quickly becomes available in the form of purchasing decisions. 
TUSEV reports that social enterprises are more appealing to young Turkish citizens than conventional CSOs, 
suggesting potential to improve outreach. However, NPC is quick to counsel that social enterprises are not the 
magic bullet some might believe: they may be an important part of the civil society mix, from which other civil 
society forms can learn, but there will always be some issues that simply can’t be solved while turning a profit:
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Social enterprise can never be a magical panacea for market failure. There are some groups of people 
- as well as some geographies and some issues - for whom the ability to pay for products and services 
cannot determine whether they are able to receive the products and services they need. There will 
always be a need for civil society to do what the private sector or social enterprises cannot.
The other major relationship between civil society and the for-profit world is, of course, that mediated by CSR. 
A challenge is that, as observed in contexts as different as Ghana, Jordan and Serbia, there is often a lack of 
laws and incentives to encourage the corporate sector to support CSOs. Because of this, there is much interest 
in India, where in 2014 a law was introduced that makes it mandatory for companies above a certain size to put 
2% of their profits into CSR. If the law works, its potential to become a model for replication elsewhere would 
seem clear. However, from NFI’s case study on the implementation of the law, concerns arise, both about the 
thinking behind the CSR law, and its workings in practice.
The top-down nature of the CSR law sits uneasily with the essentially voluntary nature of civil society, while 
concern arises about what motivations may lie behind it: is the government attempting to cover up its failure 
to bring many citizens out of poverty as part of economic development, or trying to distract from several recent 
examples of corruption involving political elites and large corporations? It seems that accepting ODA may not 
fit the Indian government’s wish to project itself as a major power internationally, but the absence of ODA 
leaves a gap in resources that CSR is expected to fill. Significantly, unlike donor funding, which might support 
an independent civil society, the resources resulting from the CSR law must be made according to a prescribed 
list of themes, which are strongly oriented towards charitable and service delivery activities, and not towards 
change-seeking activities.
Turning to how it works in practice, NFI has seen significantly fewer funds flow into civil society than expected, 
with the government having to downgrade targets. Large corporations have shown a preference to support 
government-led or government-approved initiatives, which implies that CSOs working on controversial issues 
are unlikely to be favoured:
Many senior leaders, including from companies and corporate associations, acknowledge that 
government priorities have resulted in a very large chunk of CSR money being invested in a handful 
of programmes. To some extent, this is becoming another way for the government to finance its 
programmes, and the qualifying companies are willing to put in what is sometimes their entire 
resourcing for CSR, to win direct or indirect goodwill from the government.
Some Indian companies have responded to the law by setting up new corporate foundations, and while 
VANI reports that some of these are trying to develop positive relations with CSOs, others seem more to be 
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positioning as competitors. Another side effect of the CSR law has been to foster division between CSOs, with 
some CSOs accused of compromising excessively to win short-term funding gains. NFI has also observed that 
some companies abandon their usual corporate strategic practices when it comes to CSR, suggesting they are 
not taking CSR seriously:
Systematic and rigorous needs assessments, and proper designs of intervention strategy, are often 
missing: in other words, one of the key strengths of the corporate sector, when launching business 
ventures, suddenly goes missing in the case of planning CSR strategies.
The Indian experience is echoed by other critiques of CSR practices: Ambika Satkunanathan reports that 
in Sri Lanka, corporate foundations are also reluctant to work on controversial issues that might challenge 
their standing with the government, corporate foundations sometimes become well-connected competitors 
with CSOs, and CSR is often closely linked to corporate marketing and branding strategies. Richard Holloway 
suggests that many businesses have a limited grasp of development concepts, tending to view issues through 
charitable lenses, and being preoccupied with public relations positioning. Kepa Nicaragua notes that in their 
context, it is difficult to obtain corporate support for advocacy, human rights and democracy work, and again, 
many companies have started their own charitable foundations rather than giving to CSOs. In Spain, the NGO 
Platform of Social Action observes that businesses now attract funding from government that might once have 
gone to CSOs, positioning business and civil society as competitors. The Polish Federation of NGOs states that 
many companies are simply reluctant to support CSOs, while in Ghana, WACSI suggests that those corporate 
foundations that currently exist, such as those established by telecoms companies, are inadequate to meet the 
needs of CSOs, and will only support activities in areas such as education and health. In Uruguay, ICD reports 
that only a small number of CSOs have been successful in attracting CSR, and it has not yet become a general 
practice, while Civic Initiatives in Serbia notes that there has been little dialogue to date between CSOs and 
the private sector. Back in India, VANI adds that many CSOs have not learned to speak the language of the 
corporate sector. Ambika Satkunanathan further notes that many CSOs are not good at accessing CSR funds 
when these exist, and may lack the knowledge and connections to do so. 
M May Seitanidi, however, assesses that many in both CSOs and businesses have moved on from once 
adversarial relations, and finds that many partnerships are growing deeper and more strategic. Maina Kiai and 
Maria Leissner suggest that CSOs and businesses could develop further strategic partnerships to seek more 
transparent and predictable environments:
Businesses and civil society - in all of its incarnations - actually do have a strong convergence of 
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Predictability trumps disorder. Fairness is better than corruption. These statements ring as true for 
business as they do for civil society.
M May Seitanidi cautions that it takes time to develop strategic partnerships, not least for CSOs to develop 
partnership management skills. This means that, as with other diversification areas, the largest CSOs are best 
placed to benefit from corporate partnerships:
It is unlikely that CSO income derived from the private sector has increased, but rather a few large 
CSOs are likely to be benefiting from a significant increase in the value of their partnerships.
In some contexts, intermediary organisations, which position themselves between individual companies and 
CSOs, are helping to overcome challenges, including by detaching activities from corporate promotion and 
enabling funding to become more strategic. Richard Holloway reports this to be happening in the Philippines, 
although in India, where some intermediary bodies have recently been established, it is questioned how much 
they share the values of civil society. Such intermediary organisations will clearly be more attuned to civil 
society if they are set up by civil society, or involve civil society heavily in their governance. 
Businesses have lessons for the resourcing debate. Darren Walker of the Ford Foundation suggests that civil 
society funders could learn from the venture capitalist approach, of taking risks and investing in leaders, and 
Cowan Coventry and Clare Moberly of INTRAC similarly propose that models of supporting business start-ups, 
which are tolerant of risk and failure, might be applied to resourcing emerging civil society forms. There are 
also good examples of interaction between CSOs and the private sector. CSR could be an important part of civil 
society’s future funding mix, if CSOs are supported to access CSR better. But as the above examples suggest, 
some CSR activities are more likely to receive corporate support than others, and the motivations behind 
corporate giving need to be unpacked and explored. As with philanthropy, it should be asserted that decision-
making processes are important, and sources of funding should be interrogated, to ensure that civil society is 
not complicit in corporate cleansing of dubiously acquired wealth. Looking forward, change-seeking CSOs are 
unlikely to be able to rely on CSR, and in a context of unequal power, it would be over-optimistic to believe that 
CSR can compensate for shortfalls in funding.
Recommendations on CSOs and the market
•	 CSOs and businesses should document and share learning from successful examples of interaction 
between CSOs and the private sector, but detach these from corporate promotion, and also capture and 
encourage learning from examples of poor CSR practice.
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•	 CSOs should develop relationships with businesses not only to seek funding, but also to work to 
sensitise companies about the value of supporting change-seeking activities.
•	 CSOs should work to promote better business regulation and improved corporate practice, and expose 
poor corporate practice.
•	 CSOs should encourage businesses to channel their CSR activities through CSOs, rather than through 
new corporate entities. 
•	 Intermediary bodies should be established to help improve relations and build trust between CSOs and 
CSR providers, develop routines of good practice, and encourage support for change-seeking activities. 
CSOs should pay a large part in establishing and governing such bodies.
•	 CSOs and their supporters should advocate for an enhanced enabling environment for CSR and the 
development of social enterprise, including incentives to encourage corporate giving and the start-up 
of social enterprises, and tackling the restrictions that hinder CSOs’ receipt of funding. 
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Our analysis so far has concerned itself with the state of financial resources, as for most CSOs it is hard to 
imagine them operating without some level of financial resources to fund activities, staff and overheads. 
However, there is also a need to recognise the non-financial aspects of resourcing, including volunteering, 
contributions in kind and pro bono support.
Many of the citizen-led mobilisations outlined in this report’s Year in Review section had a light financial 
resource base. This suggests that, while it is right to take seriously the growing restrictions on receipt of 
funding, and to assert the right of CSOs to receive funding, restriction does not necessarily make civic action 
impossible. It was not foreign funding that enabled Burkinabe citizens to take to the streets to oust a president. 
Similarly, in Hong Kong’s umbrella protests, activists were quick to disavow government insinuations that they 
received foreign funding, an accusation that was clearly intended to damage the reputation of protestors. An 
anonymous Hong Kong civil society activist told us that the resourcing came from citizens, mostly through 
volunteering and in-kind support:
The protests were resourced by citizens donating in cash and in kind. Cash donations were collected 
by various groups in large scale demonstrations. Almost all materials, including tents, blankets, 
umbrellas, medicines and masks, were donated by ordinary citizens, who also distributed food 
and water in zones occupied by protestors. Most of the work was conducted by citizens and 
student volunteers. Some formed themselves into patrol teams, while others set up medical care 
teams, legal aid teams and counselling teams.
CAF looks beyond financial resources in its World Giving Index (WGI), recognising time spent volunteering or 
helping a stranger as being as valuable as money donated to a cause. Time and energy are therefore recognised 
as resources that citizens possess and can contribute, meaning that even in contexts where many people are 
poor, there can be considerable non-financial resources for CSOs to access. Strategies to attract and diversify 
resources need to take account of this potential. CAF’s work also suggests that giving and volunteering can be 
mutually reinforcing: as giving increases, time spent volunteering and helping strangers also tends to increase, 
suggesting that changes to better enable one form of resourcing will unlock growth in other forms, and that an 
enabling environment for participation and an enabling environment for giving are intimately connected.
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Volunteering, which is seen in some form in every society, is the key non-financial resource in civil society. 
However, while recognition of volunteering has grown, and many CSOs rely on voluntary labour, both the 
International Association for Volunteer Effort (IAVE) and United Nations Volunteers (UNV) suggest the 
contribution of volunteering remains under-reported and under-recognised. IAVE and UNV both note that 
CSOs do not always realise the potential of volunteering, and are not always good at involving volunteers in 
meaningful ways that build mutual capacity. As Kenn Allen and Kathi Dennis from IAVE assess:
It is an open secret that too often CSOs, public sector agencies and community-based groups are 
ill-prepared to engage volunteers effectively in their work. In many cases, they and their paid staff 
members are openly resistant to volunteers. Often this is because they do not recognise volunteers as 
a resource that can help them achieve their missions. 
UNV adds that restrictions on civil society freedoms limit the potential for volunteering, while both IAVE and 
UNV indicate that national policies to support volunteering are inadequate, particularly for change-seeking 
activities. As UNV states:
While national policies and legislation on volunteering have been increasing, some limit the 
definition of volunteering to direct service and philanthropy. But volunteers can also positively 
contribute to monitoring services, strengthening community voice in governance, and enhancing 
cross sector partnering to achieve development results. 
IAVE estimates that there remains underexplored potential in volunteering from the global south, diaspora 
volunteering and online volunteering. Inputs from different contexts suggest some progress, but also obstacles 
that need to be addressed to further realise the potential of volunteering. In Norway, it is suggested that the 
contribution of volunteering is under-reported, but in Finland, some positive moves have been made, such as 
a recent mapping of obstacles and challenges for volunteering. In Ghana, WACSI however reports that CSOs 
struggle to obtain volunteering support, and in-kind support, because there remains a misguided perception 
that CSOs receive large amounts of donor funding. Civic Initiatives in Serbia believes that current laws make it 
hard for CSOs to involve volunteers in their work, while a lack of strong civic education reduces the potential 
for volunteering. Similarly, in Turkey, legislation does not enable volunteering in CSOs, and CSOs working with 
volunteers have been fined for having uninsured employees.
If the value of volunteering is gradually being recognised, then it also needs to be understood that, amid 
a diversity of volunteering forms and platforms, CSOs can be both effective sources of and channels for 
organising voluntary effort. Sharon Ekambaran from MSF contrasts the voluntary willingness of its network to 
put their lives on the line against the 2014/2015 Ebola epidemic with the sluggish response of official agencies:
It is an open 
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What marked the volunteers’ motivation and efforts was their visceral refusal to accept the status 
quo, and their drive to provide access to healthcare to meet the needs of people caught in crisis, based 
on what they witnessed.
The suggestion here is that CSOs have an asset no amount of money can buy: a high level of commitment to 
a cause, and a humanitarian impulse to act to help the vulnerable. The motivations that lead people to act in 
civil society need to be understood as a unique resource that only civil society can access, suggesting that other 
agencies should form stronger partnerships with CSOs to leverage these motivations and fully realise their 
potential. Volunteering, and voluntary commitment, can be seen as offering a multiplier effect to get far more 
out of financial resources than is put in. 
More radically, civil society could challenge existing notions of what is meant by resourcing, capacity and 
organisation. Civil society could be about demonstrating what can be done with few financial resources, as the 
self-organising people’s movements of recent years have shown. La Via Campesina sees itself as having non-
financial assets that enable it not to rely on compromising funding:
The effectiveness and sustainability of La Via Campesina can largely be attributed to its organisational 
structure, internal democratic participation processes and the concept of food sovereignty, as key 
resources for fighting for rights and justice, and offering an alternative to global food markets. 
It was in this spirit that CIVICUS, and other civil society leaders, challenged civil society in 2014 to rethink itself 
around its voluntary nature, and to reject deference to the well-funded,37 suggesting activists should:
 
… fight corporatism within our own ranks. This means re-balancing power dynamics towards the 
less resourced sections of civil society and away from large international civil society organisations. 
It also means recognising the power and importance of informal networks and associations. Our 
resources and might matter but so, too, does the wisdom of the street.
Rasigan Maharajh proposes a radical vision of civil society as an arena where alternatives to resources linked to 
the market can be modelled: 
As civil society explores solidarity and cooperation, and works to break free of the constraints of 
traditional funding sources, it can become a powerful laboratory for the larger project of establishing 
a post-capitalist culture and relations of production for a just, egalitarian and sustainable global 
society.
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If we are redefining what resources mean, then Lucy Bernholz draws attention to a further, emerging 
understanding of resources as encompassing virtual, digital resources:
The resource discussion for civil society can no longer revolve around money. Digital innovation 
means we need to recalibrate our own understanding of how and where we do our work, and what 
we need to do it. Yes, funding is a critical resource, but it is not the only one.
In a world where activity is increasingly online, people who provide data should, Bernholz argues, be regarded 
as donors, and the same priority given to managing relationships with them as with those who donate 
financially. In a context where there is a growing, multi-faceted battle over who owns data and who polices the 
internet, as our Year in Review section outlines, digital skills and responsible data use are capacities that CSOs 
need to develop to do their work better and make the best use of their other resources; these also carry costs, 
and helping to build these capacities may be an area where CSOs need help.
Recommendations on volunteering and non-financial 
resources 
•	 CSOs and volunteering agencies should advocate jointly for the development of more enabling national 
policy environments for volunteering.
•	 There is a need to document and share good practice in CSOs working with volunteers to make 
relationships mutually beneficial.
•	 Fresh impetus could be given to volunteering by advocating for the proper recognition of the 
contribution of volunteering in the SDGs.
•	 CSOs should be supported to develop capacities in managing data and using digital resources.
•	 CSO leaders should lead by example by encouraging a spirit of idealism, self-sacrifice and activism, as a 














Finally, a clear and underpinning need emerges from the various contributions for more and better data, in order 
to make resourcing decisions better-informed and more transparent, and to understand the impacts that result. 
This is particularly the case when it comes to resources other than DAC ODA, although Cowan Coventry and Clare 
Moberly of INTRAC draw attention to inadequate data on the proportion of ODA that goes into pooled funds. 
Categories used in ODA data also make it hard to trace the extent to which ODA supports change-seeking CSO 
activities, rather than service-oriented activities, while time lags offer a challenge across the board.
Helena Monteiro of WINGS notes that there is sound data on philanthropy from only a few countries, and 
hardly any internationally comparable data, since philanthropy practices differ greatly from country to 
country, and there are different reporting practices and data capacities and needs in each country. Even when 
data is available, there may be limited knowledge on how to access and use data, and questions about who 
owns data. Much of what data there is on philanthropy, because it is not necessarily structured to fit into 
global frameworks such as the MDGs and the coming SDGs, is not captured in reports on progress towards 
development objectives. This matters because restrictions on foreign funding and changes in ODA mean we 
need to understand better how CSOs can access and expand alternate sources of resourcing.
Similarly, Chloe Stirk and Sarah Hénon of Development Initiatives report that there is little data on levels 
of faith-based giving going to civil society. And part of the reason why non-financial resources are under-
appreciated is because of a lack of data: IAVE draws attention to the lack of data on, and measurement of the 
impact of, volunteering; most existing attempts to measure are made in narrow terms.
Without better data, Development Initiatives suggests, it is hard to see how we could have transparency and 
accountability over resourcing decisions, and know whether resources are being used well. As Naila Farouky 
from AFF points out:
If you can’t formally map the giving, you can’t effectively identify the gaps and needs. And if you 
can’t do that, you can’t design a sector that addresses the most pressing needs of the society it intends 
to serve. Ultimately this means that the potential power and impact of philanthropy will not be 
realised in the long term.
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Better data, in the view of WINGS, can only result in better-informed giving decisions, improved coordination, 
and greater sharing of lessons of success. Given that the countries that collect the most data are in the global 
north, the scale and shape of resourcing for civil society in the global south is probably being under-reported 
and inadequately understood. The danger this brings, in perpetuating unequal global discourse, is made clear 
by Naila Farouky, who notes that, because distinct MENA philanthropy practices are not well captured, the 
region lacks visibility and voice:
Data counts, and is valuable far beyond the numbers alone. When you don’t own your data, you 
don’t own your narrative; and when you don’t own your narrative, you cannot tell your own story, 
which means that someone else will tell your story for you.
A further challenge with the lack of data is that it makes it harder to understand where and how resourcing is 
leading to impact, particularly beyond narrow understandings of impact. Tris Lumley of NPC suggests that many 
CSOs are not good at assessing impact, and do not always use well the feedback they get on performance. This 
results in part from weak information management and monitoring systems, which CSOs struggle to develop 
in a climate where there is little core funding; when systems are attuned to capturing the detail required to 
comply with reporting to donors on project implementation, they will miss the stories of real change.
The opportunity seems ripe for progress, with increasing attention being paid, in the debate to finalise and 
implement the SDGs, on the importance of data for monitoring SDG progress, including for scrutinising where 
spending is going and whether resources are being used well. This is leading to more interest in open data, and 
the role of citizens in generating, sharing and accessing data, which implies a clear civil society role. Better data 
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We believe the above analysis shows that it is time for a fundamental rethink about the resourcing of civil 
society, particularly the change-seeking activity of global south CSOs. Conventional wisdom can only produce 
conventional results, and conventional approaches are now in danger of subduing civil society’s innovative, 
radical edge through a welter of cuts and compromises. A projectised, log-framed and compliant civil society is 
not the civil society we need, and should not be the civil society we resource. Funders and CSOs now need to 
join together in modelling a different way of working.
CSOs need to assert their autonomy, and civil society’s intrinsic value. This implies developing the access to 
diversified resources, financial and non-financial, and capacity and confidence, sufficient to not compete for 
funding, and to turn down offers of funding if they compromise civil society autonomy, or are distant from a 
CSO’s mission.
Civil society needs to put the political back into resources: no resources come without politics, whether they 
come from domestic or foreign states, multilateral bodies, philanthropy of various kinds, the marketplace, or 
non-financial sources. Every decision to accept or expend resources needs to be opened up to questioning. 
At each stage of the process, both when they are receiving and giving resources, CSOs need to ask where 
resources come from, whether they are needed, what assumptions lie behind resources, who makes 
decisions, and how decisions can be made more inclusive and transparent, and closer to the people whom 
resourcing is ultimately intended to benefit, so that change is likeliest to result. Accountability to citizens 
is the accountability that civil society should prioritise, and the aim should be to develop 360 degree 
accountability, in which providers of resources are as accountable to CSOs as CSOs are to them, both are 
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accountable to citizens, and where CSOs feel free to question their donors and their processes, even as they 
are receiving funding from them.
Civil society should:
•	 Dialogue with donors to seek to influence their priorities; even when CSOs are receiving funding, they 
should provide feedback and try to influence donors, challenge them and seek to change the nature of 
their relationships to become more lateral.
•	 Define and implement clear resourcing policies that align to civil society values, and make clear the 
grounds on which CSOs will not seek or accept resources. 
•	 Challenge current notions of impact. There is a need to develop and assert new theories on how the 
change-seeking actions of civil society contribute to significant, long-term change. 
•	 Urge donors to be braver and take more risks.
•	 Encourage donors to devolve funding decisions as close to the ground as possible. For this, there may 
be a need to establish intermediary bodies to help devolve funding.
•	 Assert and defend the right to receive funding, for all CSOs, from all sources.
•	 Make conscious efforts to better connect, share information and build support networks between 
different civil society forms, and civil society actors engaged in different activities. Particularly needed 
are south-south as well as north-south partnerships, and horizontal partnerships that connect different 
civil society forms. Partnerships must be principled, and should enable international connects of 
solidarity to support civil society when it is threatened.
•	 Demonstrate exemplary transparency, ensure accountability to citizens, and communicate better the 
essential and intrinsic contribution of civil society as a whole.
•	 Seek and publish better data on funding patterns for change-seeking activities.
•	 Develop entrepreneurial capacity, including through collaboration with social enterprises and CSR 
initiatives, but ensure that these are tested rigorously against values.
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Introduction
Middle income countries (MICs) still face considerable 
structural deficits and vulnerabilities that affect their 
development process. Not only do MICs need the 
support of the international community; the interna-
tional community also needs MICs to succeed if global 
development goals are to be met. 
In spite of continuing development problems in MICs, 
many international donors are in the process of re-
ducing financial support to them. This is concerning. 
Nothing automatically changes for a country when it 
crosses a per capita income threshold. While it is true 
that policy coherence is likely to be more important 
for MICs than financial transfers, it does not follow 
that such transfers are unimportant. They remain a 
key part of the global effort to reach sustainable and 
equitable growth.
-Jose Antonio Alonso, 
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We therefore urge the international community to 
reconsider current trends and further plans to reduce 
international public finance for MICs.
‘Traps’ and ‘gaps’ 
– a needs analysis 
Despite the diversity of the MICs category, some 
useful observations can be made about the chal-
lenges faced by countries as their per capita income 
increases. We use the term ‘MIC traps’ to mean those 
constraints to progress resulting from a set of mutu-
ally reinforcing blocking factors. By ‘MIC gaps’, on the 
other hand, we mean those constraints that require 
large financial investments to be overcome. Inevita-
bly, there is some degree of overlap between these 
concepts. 
MIC traps 
As countries rise up the income ladder they tend to 
be affected less by absolute shortages and more by 
asymmetries and bottlenecks in the development 
process, including: 
• Trap 1: productivity and technological change: 
moving from traditional productive specialisation 
towards more dynamic and technological sources 
requires structural change. 
• Trap 2: green technological transformation: im-
proving energy efficiency and an accelerated shift 
to sustainable energy, while preserving the drivers 
of economic growth. 
• Trap 3: macroeconomic stability and international 
financial integration: integrating into international 
financial markets while preserving the macroeco-
nomic stability required for sustained growth.
• Trap 4: social cohesion, governance and institution-
al quality: improving governance within a context 
of high inequality and social fragmentation.
MIC gaps 
Financing estimates depend on a set of assumptions 
about growth and inequality, and notably, on the am-
bitions of the international community: less ambitious 
objectives will require less money because financing 
gaps will be smaller. In our view, the responsibility of 
the international community for the poor and margin-
alised does not end when a family or a country cross-
es a somewhat arbitrary income line. The vast majori-
ty of the world’s poor, and an increasing amount of its 
problems with sustainability, are located in MICs. 
• Gap 1: persistent poverty: even if one is optimistic 
about extreme poverty, projections for the next 20 
years show a burgeoning mass (3-4 billion) of inse-
cure people in the US$2-10 income per day range, 
mostly in MICs. 
• Gap 2: infrastructure: in the long run, the impact 
of infrastructural development can be felt in an 
increase in productivity and energy efficiency, in 
the reduction of transportation and communica-
tion costs, in strengthening regional integration, 
and in a more adequate supply of social services. In 
the short term, however, infrastructure can be very 
expensive, especially if it is to be ‘green’. 
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MICs as recipients: 




As countries climb the income ladder and, in most 
cases, more funds become available domestically or 
from international private sources, countries will rely 
less on external public finance in the form of aid. But 
the fact that countries may not need aid as much as 
before does not mean that aid may not still make a 
very important contribution to development. Devel-
opment cooperation should be oriented to comple-
ment and encourage MIC capacities.
International support can help overcome MIC traps 
more by accompaniment than large-scale funding. 
We identify five key roles of this kind of incentivising 
financial cooperation: 
1. Encouraging improvements in policies/politics. 
Whether the level of cooperation is large or small, the 
incentivising effect has always been a crucial part of 
its effectiveness, and will continue to be so. 
2. Supporting non-government actors. As the devel-
opment problem gradually shifts from absolute lack 
of resources to their poor distribution, the advocacy 
and accountability roles of civil society, broadly under-
stood, become even more important. 
3. Leveraging and adding value to private finance. 
Just as it can at the national level, international public 
money can play a crucial role in bringing private funds 
forward to invest in public-interest projects. 
4. Capacity development (individual and institutional). 
There is not a reduced need for technical capacity 
building in MICs; rather, there is an evolving one. 
5. Risk coverage, including environmental disasters 
and financial shocks. Some MICs are among the coun-
tries most exposed to natural disasters, and they are 
more likely to be at risk of financial shocks than low 
income countries (LICs), as they are generally more 
integrated into global financial markets. 
Many MICs have significant gaps in public budgets for 
reducing poverty and achieving a more sustainable 
path to development. In some, towards the poorer 
end of the spectrum, this is still linked to an abso-
lute lack of resources; in others, it is related to poor 
revenue mobilisation or other governance problems. 
So old-fashioned large-scale financial transfers often 
remain crucial. But there are two objections: 
• First, the perception that MICs can raise the re-
quired resources without recourse to aid or de-
velopment cooperation. We argue that domestic 
taxation is often insufficient to deal even with the 
cost of ending US$1.25 or US$2 income per day 
poverty, let alone end persistent insecurity. There 
may also be significant limitations in terms of ac-
cess to private capital markets. 
• Second, that external funding may slow the pace 
of political change (such as the need to improve 
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tax collection or increase taxes) by reducing the 
pressure on governments to act. We argue that aid 
at low levels relative to the size of gross domestic 
product (GDP) is unlikely to slow progress signifi-
cantly towards a more equitable use of resources; 
on the contrary, in many instances, when it is care-
fully oriented in terms of good incentives, it may 
further the pressure for change. 
In short, MICs can make good use of international 
public funds to complement domestic finance (public 
and private) and international private finance, wheth-
er to respond to traps (quality of funding) or gaps 
(quantity of funding).That funding need not necessari-
ly be grant aid; it could be concessionary finance.
We are aware of the downward pressure on aid funds 
in many Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) member countries, but we do 
not believe that the progress of many countries up 
the income ladder should be seen as an excuse for aid 
reductions, when the real reasons are domestic politi-
cal perceptions in OECD countries. More aid is needed 
for MICs; whether it is provided is one of the major 
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Development cooperation should not only support 
MICs to overcome the constraints that affect their 
own development processes, but also back their ef-
forts to participate more intensely in the development 
agenda regionally and globally. 
Supporting south-south 
cooperation (SSC) 
The progressive participation of all countries, especial-
ly the more wealthy MICs, in international coopera-
tion should be promoted by donors from high income 
countries (HICs) through various forms of triangular 
and regional cooperation: 
• Helping official agencies and their technical bodies 
to strengthen their cooperation systems. 
• Taking part in triangular cooperation. 
• Scaling-up successful innovations. 
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• Backing SSC platforms for technical support. 
Meanwhile, SSC contributors could enhance their 
development cooperation by:
 
• Improving their information systems for better 
transparency and accountability. 
• Encouraging the involvement of non-governmental 
actors. 
• Diversifying modalities of cooperation. 
• Establishing learning mechanisms through more 
intense evaluation and peer review. 
Providing regional and 
global public goods 
The appropriate provision of regional and global 
public goods is crucial for promoting material progress 
and reducing instability and international risks. To 
encourage MICs to assume a committed role in such 
provision, the international community has to define 
the right incentives and supporting measures to com-
pensate costs:
• MICs should actively share their experiences, and 
provide technical assistance and financial and in-
kind support, in response to the most urgent inter-
national public problems (usually environmental). 
• Vulnerability to environmental and global risks 
should be integrated into allocation criteria. 
• All contributors should work together in promoting 
progressive change in patterns of energy produc-
tion and consumption. 
A regional perspective 
A regional focus is more likely to promote inclusive 
mechanisms of voice and representation and better 
adaptation to country-specific problems; several pub-
lic goods are regional in scope, and the stability and 
economic growth of large MICs is a factor of equilibri-
um and progress in their region. International cooper-
ation should focus on: 
• Promoting an ambitious regional connectivity plan. 
• Support for technological cooperation programmes. 
• Encouraging MICs to take leading roles in regional 
integration processes. 
• Strengthening regional development banks and 
bond markets. 
Policy coherence, global 
rules and governance 
Improvements in policy coherence should be promot-
ed in some MICs as well as the established developed 
countries. The monitoring of policy coherence could 
be carried out at regional level, as a part of south-
south cooperation, in order to maintain ownership 
of the process. Voice and representation should be 
adapted in some global governance structures to 
reflect countries’ current weight in the international 
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arena. Without such an enabling international envi-





Two key questions arise for development agencies, 
particularly in the context of current international 
negotiations, on allocation and effectiveness. What 
does the above analysis mean for the prioritisation of 
scarce resources, the means of transfer (modalities) 
and accountability mechanisms? 
Allocation 
It has become commonplace to recognise that the 
income per capita threshold at which LICs graduate 
to MIC status is insufficient and somewhat arbitrary. 
Nevertheless, the main problem is not with the classi-
fication itself but the fact that donors use it to decide 
countries’ eligibility for, and allocation of, aid. Given 
the proliferation of country classifications and the 
likely contentious nature of any new categorisation, 
an alternative is to identify countries by specific issues 
that development cooperation is seeking to support 
or respond to. When the issue is well-defined and the 
support measures well-designed, the problems that 
affect comprehensive (or country-based) categories 
(such as MICs) could be avoided. By way of example, 
we suggest the following three issues: 
An access to credit constraint 
Although most MICs have credit ratings and thus 
access to capital markets in principle, their ratings 
are often the lowest non-speculative grade invest-
ment, and thus concessional lending from donors in 
itself may remain important, particularly for long-run 
development financing. An issue-based classification 
could consider the credit ratings and rates of interest 
on 10-year treasury bonds as one way to differentiate 
between MICs. 
Space for redistributive policies (and the taxable pop-
ulation) 
MICs have very different levels of fiscal space for 
funding redistributive policies, and development 
cooperation should take this factor into account. An 
issue-based classification could use an indicator of 
domestic fiscal space to prioritise different subsets of 
MICs. 
Environmental vulnerability 
Within the MICs group there are countries that suffer 
severe environmental threats. One way to approach 
these threats is through the Economic Vulnerability 
Index, an indicator used in the definition of Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). Many MICs also provide 
opportunities to invest in climate-compatible growth. 
Effectiveness 
There has been strong endorsement for the five 
principles of the Paris Agenda on Aid Effectiveness 
(ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for 
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results and mutual accountability) from a wide range 
of development actors, and they remain useful in 
many circumstances. But there have also been con-
cerns that they are overly focused on ‘traditional’ re-
lationships between western donors and low-income, 
fairly aid dependent countries. Thus, the concerns of 
the MICs, both as recipients and contributors, may 
not have been given enough space. 
As the Paris process morphed into the Global Partner-
ship for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) 
at Busan, South Korea, in 2011, there was a clear 
attempt to expand the purview of the process to 
include the exciting innovations taking place in and 
between MICs. However, there are still some points of 
contention, including the stipulation to “use country 
systems” and to “untie aid”. MICs engaged in south-
south cooperation or as recipients may find alterna-
tive modalities more appropriate to achieve agreed 
results as effectively as possible. More generally, it is 
simply against the instincts of many non-OECD coun-
tries, enjoying their growing influence in international 
affairs, to tag onto an OECD-conceived project, how-
ever valid many aspects of it are. 
It is likely that much of the work will need to be opened 
up again in order to define a new consensus on man-
aging aid that involves these new players without 
renouncing the experience accumulated by traditional 
donors. It is possible that a sliding scale of indicators 
could be built, with some aid effectiveness priorities 
more appropriate in some contexts than others. 
Implications for 
civil society1
In this changing context, the implications for civil so-
ciety are still working themselves out, but are likely to 
be profound. The most significant may relate to sourc-
es of funding. Whereas, in the traditional aid model, 
funds come predominantly from OECD countries, 
this is likely to change as restricted and unrestricted 
income increasingly becomes available in emerging 
economies.
From charity to solidarity
Assuming that the world’s poor countries continue to 
grow relatively well economically, as they have done 
for the past decade, their problems will gradually be-
come less associated with absolute lack of money. But 
while we can expect traditional development indica-
tors, such as access to basic healthcare and education, 
to continue to improve, the same cannot be said for 
social conflict and injustice, particularly as resource 
scarcity comes more to the fore in a context of grow-
ing inequality.
The future challenge for civil society organisations 
(CSOs) may be to discern the new threats to the inter-
ests of the poorest that emanate from an increasingly 
unequal, volatile and resource-scarce world, and to 
align themselves politically, and even physically, with 
marginalised communities. The legitimacy and close-
ness of international non-governmental organisations 
(INGOs) to national level partners will be crucial if 
they are to play this monitoring role.
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The challenge for some INGOs may be that many 
of their core donors do not wish them to engage in 
activities that speak to issues of inequality and margin-
alisation, which they may see as political rather than 
charitable. INGOs that participate in advocacy, at all 
levels, to influence policies that directly or indirectly af-
fect the lives of the poorest have tended to argue that 
experience in field operations is a crucial factor in their 
credibility. This may gradually need to be replaced by 
confidence in partner information and relationships.  
From vertical to horizontal
In the area of sustainability and fair shares, more 
than any other, the perception that INGOs are po-
litically linked to their home countries in the global 
north (which are invariably the major polluters and 
consumers) could damage their long term credibility. 
They need to play a major role in the rethinking of the 
development paradigm, which is currently being led 
by southern CSOs and governments, and which seeks 
to end the breach between the so-called ‘developed’ 
and ‘developing’ countries: to see instead all countries 
as developing, in a new context where sustainability 
is key. International collaboration based on the needs 
of the poorest in all countries, rather than aligned to 
national self-interests, will be needed.
While engaging in independent monitoring activity, 
CSOs may also seek to further integrate themselves 
into global governance arrangements, to support pro-
gressive responses to global public good problems. 
In 2010 Nigel Crisp, a former chief executive of the 
UK’s National Health Service, published a book argu-
ing that the solutions to global health problems are 
now at least as likely to come from unexpected sourc-
es in the global south as from the global north, and 
suggesting that rich countries can learn from poorer 
ones, as much as vice-versa.2 Crisp's talk of ‘co-devel-
opment’, rather than rich-poor international develop-
ment, resonates in this era of shifting power. When 
global north audiences start to look to poorer coun-
tries for solutions in health and in other sectors, they 
will finally have moved on from the era of aid. CSOs 
must contribute to, not resist, this paradigm shift.
1 This final section draws on ‘The 
Changing Aidscape’, an unpublished 
thinkpiece by Jonathan Glennie and 
Neil Gaught for Catholic Relief Services.
2 Nigel Crisp, Turning the world upside 
down: the search for global health in 
the 21st century, 2010 (London: Royal 
Society of Medicine Press Limited).




In Indonesia, an association of new fathers has led 
a robust, ribald and rather successful social media 
campaign to encourage natural childrearing practices, 
using little more than a hashtag. Their goals comple-
ment those of a few civil society organisations (CSOs) 
in their region, whose professional policy advocates 
try to keep track of the irreverent dads via social 
media. Knowing what their informal allies are up to is 
critical for the CSOs in their work directly with fami-
lies, as well as their efforts to influence public policy. 
Keeping track of the Twittersphere, (or Weibo-sphere, 
WeChat-verse, or WhatsApp-sphere, depending on 
where and who you are) is just one small way that dig-
ital tools and infrastructure have changed civil society. 
These tools have given many activists and organisa-
tions new ways to do their work and new conceptions 
of scale. They’ve introduced a new pricing equation 
into our thinking, as we increasingly understand that 
when we’re not paying in cash, we’re likely paying 
in data. And they have, or should have, changed the 
‘where do you work?’ question for individuals and 
organisations, to include both local and digital pres-
ences. Digital environments are a complementary 
context for how and where we do our work, and what 
we need to do it.
Digital infrastructure and data are critical resources 
for civil society. No technology has ever reached glob-
al saturation as quickly as the mobile phone. We use 
our phones, whether smart or basic, for an ever-ex-
panding range of tasks. Far beyond person-to-person 
communication, we are increasingly depending on our 
mobiles for market updates, literacy training, commu-
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and network building. Digital data and infrastructure 
are core mechanisms for public discourse, fundamen-
tal elements of public utility, and instrumental to civil 
rights, information access, medical care, innovation, 
education and countless other dimensions of modern 
life. As we shift more and more services to the mobile 
web, we’ve shifted the nature of digital divides - from 
basic access to broadband access, from basic mobile 
to high speed, and from those who can only consume 
to those who also create. Some countries are success-
fully leapfrogging expensive built infrastructure, while 
others only dream of doing so. 
Promises not 
realised
We once thought that digitisation was cheap. Rapid 
adoption of social media tools by low-resource organ-
isations was at least partly driven by the ability to set 
up and use accounts with no costs other than time 
and energy. But as organisations of all kinds, from li-
braries to museums to local agencies to small commu-
nity organisations, have invested in digitising their ma-
terials, they’ve quickly learned about the hidden costs 
of these tools. These can include everything from 
server costs to security measures, staff time to bene-
ficiary privacy. For cultural organisations in particular, 
the push to make their collections available online has 
made clear the double-edged sword of digitisation. It 
costs money to do it and to maintain once done, but 
no one has yet figured out the how these resources 
might pay for themselves. Instead, online access to 
a museum’s collection or an archive's pictures often 
reduces the very foot traffic that used to (barely) pay 
the bills. Not only is digitisation not cheap, but it may 
also cannibalise existing revenue streams.
The digital age promised us the accelerated democ-
ratisation of everything from information access to 
philanthropy. By many measures, more people from 
more places and from more backgrounds have ac-
cess to information and each other than at any other 
point in history. But we’ve also seen that one result 
of faster, more distributed information access can 
and has been faster, more concentrated exertions of 
existing power structures. The battles between re-
pressive regimes or systems of surveillance and the 
supposed safety of anonymous, dispersed networks 
of activists have led to a new arms race. Governments 
and corporations extend themselves in ways that only 
the well resourced can. Those who seek spaces for 
unmonitored online conversations, ownership of their 
own digital data trails, or choices about how their digi-
tal activities are tracked and by whom, are caught are 
fighting on more fronts at once than ever before. 
Finally, it is becoming apparent that the economics of 
the digital space vastly favour those who own the sys-
tems over those who use them. The creation of enor-
mous wealth for the few who engineer the technology 
comes at the cost of jobs and security for those whose 
work is being automated. The gaps between the 
wealthy and the rest of us seem to be expanding ever 
faster. In the parlance of Silicon Valley, the disruptive 
economics of the digital age have indeed come home 
to roost, but few governments or politicians have yet 
rewritten the elements of the social contracts being 
torn apart by these disruptions. 
Six fundamental principles of civil society are being 
remade in the digital age. These are:
1. Free speech and expression
2. Peaceful assembly
3. Privacy 





Putting these principles into action digitally will be the 
context for and shape of civil society to come. 
Digital is integral
We must put aside the small questions of how to raise 
funds on mobile phones or whether or not to use so-
cial media. Civil society - globally - must recognise the 
existential nature of digital data and infrastructure. 
The questions we must ask about resourcing civil so-
ciety in a digital age are fundamental questions about 
the nature and purpose of civil society:
• How will we assemble peaceably in digital spaces 
that are constantly monitored by corporate and 
government interests?
• What rules of expression will hold across national 
lines, cultural expectations and global network 
systems?
• Who will own the data that we generate when we 
use these systems?
• What forms of governance can we create to protect 
our abilities to act collectively in digital spaces?
How will civil society answer these questions? Compa-
nies are offering free internet access to poor commu-
nities, relieving governments of the cost of building 
infrastructure, but in turn limiting the users to the 
companies’ online sites. Will this practice, known as 
zero-rating, be a boon for low-income populations, 
or a means of shifting basic information access from 
a public to a private resource? Will civil society carry 
a commitment to access and fairness into the digital 
sphere? Doing so will require pushing governments 
and corporations to invest in open digital access so 
that all people have all opportunities. Will civil so-
ciety continue to limit its definition of resources to 
discussions of financial investments, and concentrate 
on policy battles about tax credits or corporate social 
responsibility? Or will we engage in the digital policy 
fights - about data ownership, digital surveillance and 
free expression - that are foundational to the idea of 
civil society? 
The resource discussion for civil society can no longer 
revolve around money. Digital innovation means we 
need to recalibrate our own understanding of how 
and where we do our work, and what we need to do 
it. Yes, funding is a critical resource, but it is not the 
only one. CSOs need to:
• Understand how digital assets, resources, and 
infrastructure work - (hint: it's not the way financial 
assets do) - to advance our missions, and under-
stand when they are working against us. 
• Use the right digital tools for our missions - some 
devices and habits won’t help us achieve our goals. 
• Treat everyone we interact with as a donor to our 
causes - a data donor. And all that data demand 
respect and protection. 
• Recognise the secondary digital resources that our 
work creates that might serve a public benefit, and 
design our work so those benefits can be realised.
• Learn how to use digital data and infrastructure 
safely, securely, ethically and effectively. 
Civil society - globally 
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• Access the growing world of intermediaries for dig-
ital capacity building, which can help organisations 
achieve their missions.
Funders need to:
• Realise that digital is not optional. It is a comple-
mentary space for all civil society actions.
• Integrate digital skill building and organisational 
practices into their core operating support, their 
capacity building efforts and their pursuit of effec-
tive organisations.
• Identify the ways in which digital data are shaping 
public policy on their issue areas, and equip their 
grantee partners to respond appropriately.
• Learn how to use digital data and infrastructure 
safely, securely, ethically and effectively. 
Civil society as a whole needs to consider three new 
kinds of resources for the 21st century:
• Software codes: digital tools - from cell phones to 
satellites, cameras to street sensors, databases to 
drones - run on software. Software is designed by 
people, and often (literally) coded to default to 
certain values. What information gets collected and 
stored, and what choices users can make about the 
log of information on them - these are all software 
defaults. We need robust, diverse, value-driven 
software that doesn’t put protestors in harm’s way, 
that can be used securely in dangerous places, and 
that are appropriate to the built infrastructure that 
exists. 
• Organisational codes: CSOs of all kinds need to 
learn how to use their own digital data safely, 
securely, ethically and effectively. This knowledge 
needs to be informed by policy and programme 
staff as well as technologists and lawyers. The 
rights and privileges of all donors to an organisa-
tion - not just financial donors but beneficiaries as 
well - need to be respected and protected. Digital 
policies will become as important to good gover-
nance as financial and human resource policies. 
Good, informed practice will matter even more. 
• Legal codes: civil society needs to engage actively 
in policy making about digital access and equity, 
civil rights and civil liberties online, data consent, 
data privacy and data ownership. How these issues 
get decided will determine if and how cultural 
expression, protest, organising and philanthropic 
activity take place with digital resources and in 
digital environments. 
The digital technologies that shape our world are only 
going to become more pervasive. It isn’t civil society’s 
job to keep up with the pace of digital innovation. But 
it behoves civil society to lay claim to principles and 
practices for using digital resources that can withstand 
the next waves of change, encompassing embedded 
sensors, 3D printing, drones, pervasive surveillance, 
wearable technologies, artificial intelligence, virtual 
reality, genetic hacking and space exploration. It be-
hoves civil society to include both the informal social 
media networks of concerned Indonesian fathers, 
the professional associations and non-governmental 
organisations that work on their shared issues of child 
and maternal health, and the digital data and infra-
structure that binds them together. 
 It isn’t civil society’s 
job to keep up with 
the pace of digital 
innovation. But it 
behoves civil society 
to lay claim to prin-
ciples and practices 
for using digital 
resources that can 
withstand the next 
waves of change.






Civil society organisations (CSOs) perform an essential 
role in enabling social and economic justice. Their 
role goes way beyond projects for development 
‘delivery’: their largest scale impact, and their longest 
term contribution, is not in the number of items of 
assistance that they provide, but in how they facilitate 
and catalyse development, and how they empower 
people living in poverty to claim their rights.
Traditional project work may be helpful in responding 
to the immediate practical needs of the poorest 
communities, but such responses often have lacked 
a sufficiently clear strategy to tackle the underlying 
issues more widely, not just at a village, or even a sub-
district level, but beyond. On its own, project work 
can never eradicate poverty. Poverty and inequality 
are ultimately a consequence of power relationships, 
and the most important contribution that CSOs 
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An expansive 
role for CSOs vs. 
projectisation
CSOs can’t end poverty by themselves, but they 
can help strengthen the power of the people to 
challenge the people with power. So as well as 
supporting small farmers to earn more, CSOs make 
the most difference when they also support people 
who have lost their land to have it restored; as well 
as helping schools, they make the most difference 
when they also support communities to hold 
education authorities to account, and support those 
who pressure corporations to pay their taxes so that 
the government can pay the teachers. Everyone 
concerned about impact, value for money and making 
the most difference should be keen to encourage 
this expansive approach to development, which 
was perhaps once radical, but is now very much the 
theoretical mainstream. An active and vibrant civil 
society is also a sign of a healthy democratic society. 
When CSOs have space to challenge governments 
and the private sector, it promotes a more inclusive 
development agenda that respects human rights.
This has been recognised by several donors in, for 
example, strategic funding partnerships, which enable 
a much more effective contribution to development 
than more contract-based relationships, typical 
of shorter-term and more project-based, donor/
service contractor arrangements. Strategic funding 
partnerships enable CSOs to innovate and test new 
approaches, generating learning about what works 
over the longer term. They promote adaptive and 
responsive programme management in unpredictable, 
complex and fragile environments, avoiding some of 
the drawbacks with contracts, where the focus is often 
on achieving the easy wins to protect payments by 
results. This broader support to the implementation 
of a strategy is crucial if there is willingness to move 
from fighting the symptoms of poverty towards 
fighting its structural causes. 
And yet we now see pressure on CSOs to retreat 
to being delivery vehicles of assistance projects. 
Amongst the forms of pressure applied is funding. At 
times this funding pressure takes the most crude form 
of threats to deny funds to CSOs that work on issues 
of which the donor, or the regulator, disapproves. But 
there is also a subtler pressure, framed in a notionally 
benevolent language of projects and payment on 
delivery: of merely wanting to achieve results, 
secure value for money, shrink CSO bureaucracy and 
ensure accountability. The consequences of this shift 
to projectisation are in fact to lessen results (if by 
results we mean real, large scale, lasting change), 
lessen value for money, increase CSO bureaucracy, 
as grant management and funds acquisition become 
questions of survival, and reduce real accountability 
to communities, as organisations shift their 
accountability focus to donors. 
Eurodad, the European Network on Debt and 
Development, “assess[ed] the potential of results-
based approaches to deliver long-term and 
sustainable results by measuring the performance 
of different initiatives against the aid effectiveness 
principles developed and agreed by all donors at 
high level summits,” and found that they were a step 
backwards.1 
Poverty and inequality 
are ultimately a 
consequence of power 
relationships, and 
the most important 
contribution that 
CSOs provide is to 
help shift those power 
relationships.
When CSOs have 
space to challenge 
governments 
and the private 
sector, it promotes 
a more inclusive 
development 
agenda that respects 
human rights.
State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
208
This is unsurprising as, indeed, the aid effectiveness 
principles had themselves been:2
“a response to the failure of project-based 
approaches that increased transaction costs, 
failed to have sustainable impact on recipient 
countries’ systems and often collapsed once 
funders moved on. They [had been] an 
important attempt to move away from donor-
driven aid that tended to promote the foreign 
policies of donors rather than focusing on 
poverty reduction.”
In other words, the shift to project based funding is 
less a new approach than a return to an outdated 
one. 
Of course, the drive for projectisation is not really 
about effectiveness. It is about politics. As a 2014 
INTRAC study found:3
“Donors report that working with established 
partners with a track record of delivery over 
a longer period should be a cost effective way 
of having a lasting impact on poverty. Secure, 
flexible funding should enable CSOs to tackle 
ambitious programmes and to innovate. Working 
through strategic partners also enables the donor 
to reach populations it cannot reach itself and 
to benefit from CSO knowledge and expertise. 
On the other hand, strategic funding is more 
sensitive to political changes than programme 
funding and has to be constantly justified 
and explained. It can be more challenging to 
demonstrate the results attributable to strategic 
funding than for programme funding.” 
The shift to projectisation is not just about the politics 
of fear of criticism. It is also about the politics of an 
ideal in which CSOs respond to the results of poverty, 
but not tackle the causes, and work to help the poor 
cope, but not to strengthen poor people’s power. 
What needs to 
change
CSOs across the world are seeing the funding 
environment become more restrictive. Grants are 
becoming more complex, programme periods are 
reducing and reporting requirements are increasing. 
It’s getting harder to focus on the most important work 
of development. 
Rightly, CSOs have raised with donors their requests to 
halt this damaging trend. But we cannot only appeal to 
donors. We need first and foremost to decide what our 
response will be. We need to be clear on how we will 
work. At ActionAid we use the term ‘programme-led 
funding’ to describe an approach that seeks resources 
for work that our analysis and the communities we 
work with set out as key. We explicitly reject ‘funding-
led programming’, in which CSOs start by looking at 
where the money is and offer to provide whatever 
projects that funders say they would like. 
ActionAid’s agenda is one of transformation. As we 
set out recently in a joint statement with civil society 
leaders:4
The shift to 
projectisation is 
not just about the 
politics of fear of 
criticism. It is also 
about the politics 
of an ideal in which 
CSOs respond to the 
results of poverty, 
but not tackle the 
causes, and work 
to help the poor 
cope, but not to 
strengthen poor 
people’s power.
State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
209
“We will work together with others to tackle 
the root causes of inequality. We will press 
governments to tackle tax dodging, ensure 
progressive taxes, provide universal free public 
health and education services, support workers’ 
bargaining power, and narrow the gap between 
rich and poor. We will together champion 
international cooperation to avoid a race to the 
bottom.
“We will work together for a human rights and 
feminist agenda that curbs the influence of the 
corporate sector in defining national development 
agendas. We will champion living wages, the 
redistribution of women’s unequal share of 
unpaid care work, and the tackling of violence 
against women brought on by state repression 
and rising fundamentalism.
“We will work together with others to secure 
climate justice. We will take on the power of 
the fossil fuel companies who are undermining 
efforts which respond to science and protect 
people and planet. We will press for action that 
properly holds accountable those most responsible 
for climate change, and addresses the losses and 
secures the rights of those who are suffering the 
most from its impacts.”
The big changes that civil society has achieved 
have been about challenging power. We’ve won 
some victories over the past 15 years, including 
several over big institutions: the defeat of the World 
Trade Organisation’s Doha round, from which the 
organisation has never recovered;5 the defeat of the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas; the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank’s disavowal of harsh 
economic austerity programmes; and important 
policy changes won on equality, such as new land 
laws in Bolivia and Brazil’s Zero Hunger and poverty 
eradication programmes.6
Of course, there are consequences to CSOs taking 
such an approach. Clarity on the importance of 
challenging power means walking away from some 
resources. But the most important scale is the scale 
of impact an organisation can have, and that depends 
on holding to organisational strategy and values. 
ActionAid’s approach to development involves taking 
sides with the poor, and challenging imbalances of 
power that perpetuate poverty. For ActionAid the 
‘we’ that matters most is the communities we work 
with and our allies at the grassroots, along with social 
justice movements and organisations. 
Anti-apartheid leader Jay Naidoo described how his 
generation’s successful movement was inspired by 
Steve Biko:7
“He didn’t give us a project plan, he didn’t 
give us a log frame, he gave us no PowerPoint 
presentation, and he had no money to give us 
at all. But what he gave us was a direction and 
the confidence to pursue it. Nowadays I hear 
organisations say ‘We have to do something about 
the challenges facing our society, but first we must 
find some funding’ – when organisations talk 
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like this they have forgotten what they for, and 
forgotten how change happens. The truly effective 
CSOs will be those that work out how to organise 
people in the twenty first century.”
Conclusion
The projectisation of donor funding is a threat to CSO 
sustainability. But more importantly, it is a threat to 
the contribution CSOs can make to advancing social 
justice. That projectisation reduces effectiveness is 
clear, but is also clear that the drive for projectisation 
is essentially political. CSOs have rightly urged donors 
to pull back from projectisation. But CSOs also need 
to be robust in their own response. We need to be 
clear on our purpose, clear on our values, and clear 
on how change happens. Then we can seek funding. If 
we get it the wrong way round, we can survive, but as 
shadows only. Bluntly, only those CSOs that refuse to 
be projectised will escape that fate.
1 Eurodad, Hitting the Target? 
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Results-
based Approaches to Aid, 2012.
2 Eurodad, 2012 Ibid.
3 INTRAC, Comparative review of donor 
approaches to unrestricted funding of 
CSOs, 2014.
4 ‘Securing a just and sustainable world 
means challenging the power of the 
1%: a joint call from the leaders of 
ActionAid, AWID, CIVICUS, Greenpeace 
and Oxfam on the eve of the World 
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actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/
whos_really_fighting_hunger_report.
pdf; ActionAid, Success in Reducing 
Hunger: Lessons from India, Malawi 
and Brazil, 2011, http://www.actionaid.
org/publications/success-reducing-
hunger-lessons-india-malawi-brazil; 
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This paper is based on a study conducted by INTRAC 
(www.intrac.org) for Danida, Denmark’s development 
agency, in 2014 on multi donor funds, and a 
subsequent discussion paper produced for Fagligt 
Fokus, an initiative of the NGO Forum, Denmark.
1. The rise (and 
fall?) of joint 
civil society 
funds
Official aid to civil society is 
moving to the global south
Official aid support to civil society in both global north 
and global south countries has steadily increased in 
the last decade.1 Official aid provided to or channelled 
through civil society organisations (CSOs) increased 
from US$14.5bn in 2008 to US$19.3bn in 2011, 
increasing from 13.6% to 17.8% of total Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) during the same 
period.
Global north CSOs continue to be a preferred 
channel for ODA support to civil society in global 
south countries, but there is evidence this is in 
decline. Remarkably, members of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) provided 
around five times more aid to CSOs based in their 
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“We will continue to 
support small and 
medium-sized CSOs in 
developing countries. 
We will increasingly 
do so through direct 
support to CSOs in 
developing countries.”
“The Right to a Better 
Life” -  Strategy for 
Denmark’s Development 
Cooperation, the Danish 
Government, 2012, p35
south countries, but this 
had reduced to only twice 
as much in 2011. This 
proportionate decease in 
official aid to CSOs in the 
global north is reflected 
in significant drops in 
domestic CSO funding in 
some donor countries, 
either as overall aid budgets 
have been reduced in 
response to the financial 
crisis, as in Ireland and 
Spain, or due to changes in 
government policy, as in the 
Netherlands. 
This confirms a trend to decentralise ODA to global 
south countries, whether through multi-donor 
pooled funds (MDF) or other mechanisms - a 
trend that is clearly reflected in the development 
cooperation strategies and civil society policies of 
some donors. 
Joint donor funds for civil 
society have increased
Over the last decade there has been growing interest 
among donors, in line with the Aid Effectiveness 
Agenda, to channel support to CSOs in countries of the 
global south through MDFs. This is driven by a desire 
to harmonise approaches, reach out to more CSOs in 
the global south and reduce transaction costs. 
MDFs supporting CSOs can have a sectoral or a 
thematic focus, or be ‘open’ funds in support of civil 
society more generally. They vary considerably, in 
terms of their preferred partners, types of funding 
and funding windows, types of capacity development 
provided and systems of governance. MDFs can take a 
variety of forms, depending on how explicit the aim of 
national ownership is, ranging from donor-controlled 
funds through to government-aligned funds and 
independent foundations. 
There may be constraints on 
the future growth of MDFs
There are no reliable figures on the proportion of ODA 
that is being channelled through MDFs in developing 
countries. There was clearly an increase in these 
funds over the last decade, but fewer have been set 
up recently, and it is difficult to track whether the 
proportion of funding being channelled to them is 
continuing to grow. 
While donors have both a principled and strong 
pragmatic interest in supporting MDFs as a conduit for 
funding civil society, there may be some constraints 
on their future growth. Setting up and managing 
joint donor funds involves high initial transaction 
costs. Donors may thus be inclined to cede the 
responsibility for the design and active oversight of a 
joint fund to a lead donor. Given both the public and 
internal pressure on the budgets of many donors, 
few continue to have the capacity at a country level 
to take this role on. The push to collaborate will 
continue, but it may be that donors seek a number of 
new and different forms to do this, joining together 
in smaller or more bilateral agreements that are less 
complex to manage.
There remains little 
primary research on 
what the long term 
effect of MDFs have 
been on civil society 
development in the 
countries where they 
have been operating.
State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
213
2. Key lessons 
from multi-donor 
funds for civil 
society 
There remains little primary research on what the 
long term effect of MDFs have been on civil society 
development in the countries where they have 
been operating. The review that INTRAC conducted 
for DANIDA in 2014 showed that experiences vary. 
For example, in some countries, funds have clearly 
democratised funding, extending it out beyond 
capital cities and to a much wider group of CSOs 
than had access previously. In other cases, the high 
entry requirements of funds have benefited more 
established and elite CSOs and have narrowed funding 
opportunities.
There are a number of design choices that will affect 
the way a fund affects civil society. Key to this is a fund’s 
purpose: in particular, to what extent a fund has an 
intention not only to try to maximise results or impact 
in a particular thematic area, but also to support the 
development of an independent, diverse civil society.
The table below shows some of the key choices that 
will affect the impact of a fund. A few implications of 
these are then explored below. It is important to note 
that this represents a range of options, rather than two 
opposing models. Many funds are increasingly trying to 
adopt a mixture of approaches. 
 
Purpose
Strategic impact at 
national level
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Thematic focus or open calls
Some funds target specific themes or sectors, e.g. 
the Legal Services Facility (LSF) in Tanzania, or the 
Tanzania and Kenya Media Funds. Others target a 
broad area, such as human rights and democracy, 
and subsequently identify ‘sub-themes’. Star Ghana, 
for example, has five themes, which were chosen 
as a result of a political economy analysis. This can 
be contrasted with funds such as the Civil Society 
Support Fund in Ethiopia (CSSP) or the Zambia 
Governance Foundation (ZGF), which issue calls for 
proposals that may have broad criteria, e.g. reaching 
‘the hard to reach’, linking action and policy, or 
promoting innovation, but that do not specify a 
particular theme or sector.
There are pros and cons to both options. By funding 
a specific theme, it is possible to stimulate a critical 
mass of organisations working on the same issue and 
potentially to choose complementary organisations 
across a portfolio, for example, by linking community, 
sub-national and national 
organisations, or by joining up 
delivery and research and advocacy 
organisations. The risk is that 
themes become very donor-driven 
and do not respond sufficiently to 
what CSOs’ own priorities are.
In contrast, more open calls give 
CSOs greater freedom to identify 
their own issues. This allows new 
or marginalised themes to emerge 
directly from the grassroots. The 
challenge with this approach, 
however, is that it is much harder 
to find ways to tell a strong story 
about the overall impact of the fund. There is some 
evidence that, precisely because of this challenge, 
donors are turning away from more general civil 
society funds.
Competitive calls – winners 
and losers
MDFs may accept grant applications by invitation 
or through an open, competitive process, normally 
carried out through a call for proposals. The latter is 
particularly favoured, as it allows the fund to be – and 
be seen to be – conducting a transparent and fair 
process.
Calls for proposals encourage a high number of 
applications, and the success rate of CSOs finally 
being awarded a grant tends to be very low. This may 
be unavoidable, but it can be demoralising, and may 
waste limited CSO resources. In general, larger and 
better established CSOs tend to benefit most from 
calls for proposals, since they have a greater capacity 
to formulate winning proposals. 
Supporting a diverse civil 
society requires affirmative 
actions 
Unless MDFs use special funding windows or other 
kinds of affirmative action to extend their reach, their 
principal beneficiaries tend to be more established 
CSOs. Many funds are now taking up this challenge, 
and indeed have been successful at pushing funding 
out to a wider group of CSOs. This requires, however, 
a much higher level of investment and potential risk, 
which donors can find challenging. Some examples of 
affirmative action include: 
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•	 Geography: making sure a fund supports 
CSOs in marginalised districts, for example, 
by: publishing calls in regional newspapers; 
providing regional briefings; targeting 
information sessions in those regions 
previously under-represented in calls; 
establishing quotas on the number of proposals 
from different regions; weighting selection 
criteria in favour of applications from under-
represented regions and ‘hard to reach’ 
populations; establishing local or regional 
offices; or providing outreach through a 
network of coaches or mentors. 
•	 Size: specifically targeting smaller, less 
sophisticated CSOs, for example, through small, 
short term grants, or by having lower entry 
requirements, e.g., by not insisting on audited 
accounts, which may present a challenge in 
some countries. 
•	 Type: reaching out to support informal, 
traditional or emerging actors with the potential 
to drive change, especially in response to 
unanticipated events or topical opportunities. 
Capacity development – are 
we getting the focus right?
Most funds offer capacity development support 
in addition to funding. There are a number of 
challenges around what this support focuses on and 
how it is delivered. These are not necessarily unique 
to MDFs,2 but can be exacerbated because of their 
scale and size.
The support offered to grantees by MDFs is most 
frequently focused on the ‘compliance needs’ 
of donors, in terms of applying project cycles 
and financial management, or on the basics of 
organisational systems and procedures. Yet there 
are other aspects of capacity that may be equally, 
if not more, important in building effective CSOs, 
such as leadership, passion, integrity and the ability 
to connect genuinely with and support the voice 
of communities. There is often little space in civil 
society funds for thinking more innovatively about the 
content of capacity development.
Some funds have a small number of grantees and 
can therefore provide tailored capacity building 
support through intensive accompaniment. This is, 
clearly, ideal, but is resource intensive and much 
harder in many of the funds that are dealing with 
large portfolios of grantees at a time. Donors have 
a tendency, once a fund is set up, to use it as a 
convenient channel for funds, thereby expanding the 
envisaged size of the fund. This can create a tension 
between the pressure to get funds spent ,and having 
the space to really work with and design appropriate 
capacity development support for grantees.
3. Reflections for 
the future
MDFs are likely to continue in some form for the 
foreseeable future. The following areas of reflection 
could contribute to a dialogue about how funds 
should be supported to play a more effective 
role as enablers both of social action and of CSO 
development.
There is a tendency 
within civil society 
funds to look for 
and fund the parts 
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Civil society organisation 
and civil society organising
There is a tendency within civil society funds to 
look for and fund the parts of civil society that 
they recognise: professionalised development 
and advocacy CSOs. A few have explored possible 
relationships with other types of organisation, for 
example professional associations,3 but this is limited 
in scope. Outreach activities are designed to reach 
more emerging expressions of civil society, but the 
type of support offered leads them into a process 
of formalisation, and then supports them on a 
trajectory of becoming ‘an organisation’. Yet many 
so called CSOs are hardly that, except in name. They 
may have few full time personnel, and often expand, 
contract or lie dormant according to the availability 
of resources.4 Funds may need to think of new ways 
to structure their support to take into account that 
reality, and to find ways to support civil society 
organising and social action, without expecting that 
all expressions of that will become formalised and 
permanent.
Using funds to spot and 
develop potential
MDFs could be important channels for spotting and 
nurturing new actors within civil society. To do this, 
however, they need to be more able to accept risk 
and to recognise failure. They might resemble models 
of investment for small business or start-ups. Small 
amounts of funding could be made available to a wide 
spread of actors. This could then be used to identify a 
limited number, who had demonstrated the greatest 
potential to develop and make an impact, for further 
investment. These could then be mentored to expand 
their reach gradually and possibly increase their 
levels of funding. This would imply, however, that 
donors were willing to accept as high a level of risk 
and failure as entrepreneurship funders do in small 
business development.
Looking at impact from a 
different angle
Given the diversity of organisations in fund portfolios, 
there it is often a real challenge for funds to 
demonstrate their overall impact. While focusing 
funds on particular themes is one option for trying 
to assess impact in terms of development results, 
another could be to track better the impact of funds 
on civil society development and on social action. 
Few MDFs are currently tracking what happens to the 
organisations that they fund over time. Key questions 
here would be: how many go on to develop and to 
access other forms of funding within the fund, and 
Given the diversity of organisations in fund portfolios, there it 
is often a real challenge for funds to demonstrate their 
overall impact.
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from others? And what are the characteristics of 
those that have been successful? Equally, few explore, 
in the case that organisations are not able to sustain 
themselves beyond one grant, what happens to 
the social action they were supporting, or what the 
cumulative effect of grants in a geographic area might 
be. Exploring the traces of what funding leaves behind 
in terms of civil society organisation and organising 
could shed more light on the impact of funds, rather 
than trying to find some way to aggregate project 
outcomes.
Sustainability 
Donors often have the expectation of transferring 
funds to national ownership. This is not accompanied, 
however, by realistic plans for supporting their long 
term sustainability. It is noteworthy that some of 
the foundations set up in Africa that have achieved 
a degree of independence and sustainability, such as 
the Kenya Community Development Trust and Trust 
Africa, were established with endowment funds by 
international private foundations. 
This also raises the question of the long term 
sustainability of the CSOs that multi donor funds 
support. Given the likelihood of an eventual decline 
in aid and donor withdrawal, funds should encourage 
discussion amongst their grantees about what a 
sustainable civil society might look like in their context 
in the future, and what more could be done by an 
MDF to support them to develop towards it.
4. Conclusion 
– how can CSOs 
engage?
MDFs are part of a positive effort by donors to bring 
funding closer to CSOs in the global south. They are 
an increasing and influential part of the civil society 
landscape. CSOs, both in the global north and global 
south, need to find ways of engaging with these 
funds. This could include by:
•	 Managing them: many funds are now managed 
by private sector companies. While there is no 
evidence that any particular type of managing 
agent is better than another, CSOs have a wealth 
of expertise to bring, and have the advantage of 
not seeking a profit.
•	 Inputting and influencing their design: CSOs 
should seek to influence donors more on the 
structure and approach of these funds, as this 
affects significantly how they will impact on civil 
society development.
•	 Applying for funding: this raises a dilemma 
between global northern CSOs and southern 
CSOs that needs discussion. Not all funds are 
open to northern CSOs in the donor country, but 
some are. In these instances, northern CSOs can 
support and help partners to apply, or they can 
consider applying jointly, but should northern 
CSOs apply themselves? 
•	 Acting as watchdogs: CSOs should monitor the 
performance of funds and should seek to carry 
out more longitudinal research on their impact.
MDFs are part of a 
positive effort by do-
nors to bring funding 
closer to CSOs in the 
global south. They 
are an increasing 
and influential part 
of the civil society 
landscape.
State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
218
•	 It is only by engaging donors in a discussion 
about how best to decentralise funding that 
CSOs can ensure this is done in a way that is 
appropriate to their needs, and that really does 
support the development of sustainable civil 
society action into the future.
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IAVE – The International Association for Volunteer Ef-
fort – is the only global network of civil society organi-
sations (CSOs), businesses and grassroots leaders that 
exists solely to promote, strengthen and celebrate 
volunteering, in all of the myriad ways it happens 
throughout the world.
At the authors’ invitation, 22 leaders of volunteering 
from 19 countries, from every region of the world, 
and all members of IAVE’s network, contributed their 
perspectives to assist in their preparation of this con-
tribution to the 2015 CIVICUS State of Civil Society Re-
port. They included national volunteer centres, those 
responsible for volunteering in their global companies, 
members of IAVE’s board of directors and its network 
of volunteer ‘national representatives’, all people who 
are on the front line of leadership for volunteering. 
While the authors and the respondents all are associ-
ated with IAVE, this article is, however, not an official 
statement of IAVE’s position on the issues discussed.
Introduction
Volunteering – the willingness of people to commit 
their time, talent and energy, without regard for 
immediate financial rewards, to help others, while 
helping themselves – runs like a river through the 
centuries of recorded history. Like a river, it constantly 
branches and expands, creating new channels, and 
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Thus, what may appear to be today’s trends in volun-
teering most often have their antecedents decades 
in the past. Today’s novelty is often an extension of 
developments that began as early as the 1960s, when 
formal attention to volunteering emerged and the 
development of supportive infrastructure began. 
A fundamental trend, however, is the steady globalisa-
tion of volunteering, and an understanding that it can 
and does appear in some form in virtually every soci-
ety, under every form of government, and as part of 
every religion. Today, more than ever, there is a global 
volunteer community that, if nothing else, agrees on 
the value of people volunteering to help one another.
Volunteering provides significant value as a primary 
non-financial resource for society. Resources are too 
often defined purely in financial terms. Yet major 
contributions to the work of CSOs are made by volun-
teers, pro bono services and in-kind contributions of 
goods and services. Of these, volunteering too often 
is the least acknowledged and underutilised of these 
non-financial resources.
This contribution to the 2015 CIVICUS State of Civil 
Society Report first discusses four dynamic forces, ‘the 
disruptors’, that are already bringing major changes to 
the field, and second, identifies seven major challeng-
es and issues to which the global volunteer commu-
nity must give priority attention. This article is, by 
design, an overview, rather than an in-depth analysis. 
The intent is to stimulate dialogue, rather than to pro-
vide definitive conclusions.
The disruptors 
These four forces are making significant impact. They 
are relevant to every actor in our global volunteer 
community, from the member states of the United 
Nations to leadership and volunteer-involving organi-
sations to individual volunteers.
1. The Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs)
In 2014, there were significant efforts to ensure that 
volunteering is recognised as a strategic asset in the 
post 2015 development agenda and the forthcoming 
SDGs. Responding to the leadership of United Nations 
Volunteers, both the Post 2015 Working Group of 
volunteer involving organisations and IAVE worked to 
mobilise their networks to influence actors at the UN, 
and its member states, to include volunteering in all 
relevant documents on the SDGs. 
As the Lima Declaration of the International Forum for 
Volunteering in Development, held in October 2014, 
stated:1
“…the full potential of volunteers to contribute 
to the achievement of the SDGs can be unlocked 
only by an SDG framework that explicitly recog-
nizes and supports volunteerism….”
If volunteering is clearly recognised as a priority 
strategy for development, then it can be hoped that 
more governments will develop national policies on 
volunteering and invest in developing and sustaining 
infrastructure to support it. 
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The SDGs also may serve as a framework for CSOs and 
businesses to expand and focus their volunteer ef-
forts. For example, in 2014, announcement was made 
of Impact 2030, a coalition of businesses and CSOs, 
intended to do just that for corporate volunteering.
2. Skills based volunteering 
(SBV)
Certainly not new, but increasingly in vogue, is the 
concept of skills based volunteering, particularly in the 
context of employer-supported volunteering. It makes 
sense that, by encouraging and assisting people to use 
their work skills as volunteers, greater impact can be 
achieved.
For many companies, SBV has become the sine qua non 
of corporate volunteering, as it also enables their work-
ers to continue to develop their skills by putting them to 
work in environments significantly different from those 
found in their workplaces. Cross-border SBV schemes 
allow companies to provide short term, rigorously 
planned opportunities for workers to use their profes-
sional skills in the global south, often with significant, if 
localised, impact. But such schemes have also generated 
growing frustration among businesses that see CSOs 
and public sector agencies as often having little or no in-
terest in or ability to engage their volunteers effectively.
Input for this article included suggestions from two 
countries, in different regions of the world, that SBV 
is an important component of diaspora volunteering, 
involving the return of people to their mother country 
to reconnect with their heritage while meaningfully 
contributing their skills.
Unfortunately, too often, SBV is defined solely in 
terms of professional skills, typified in volunteering by 
doctors, lawyers, accountants, engineers and pro-
grammers, for example. When applied rigidly, that 
becomes exclusionary and disrespectful of the myr-
iad of skills that can be found in any workplace. It is 
important that both suppliers (particularly businesses) 
and consumers (CSOs and public agencies) of volun-
teers recognise the broad array of skills that may be 
available, and creatively identify the ways that they 
can be put to work through volunteering.
3. Social media and mobile 
technology
One of those who provided input for this article 
wrote:
“Technology has changed the way paid work is 
done, and indeed [has changed] entire industries. 
Technology is changing volunteerism too. Adop-
tion of wireless and mobile computing increases 
the potential for micro-volunteering and online 
volunteering. Technology also affects how char-
ities, and volunteers themselves, can mobilise 
resources, for example, through location-based 
services, online communities going beyond friends 
and families, crowdfunding, predictive analytics 
and ‘customer’ relationship management.”
Another pointed to this news report:2
“Today’s younger volunteers… perform acts of 
service every day, whether they use their social 
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networks to rack up millions of views for civ-
ic-minded videos or drive fundraising for people 
in need through online platforms… [A]s the ser-
vice movement evolves, we should acknowledge 
that, in many cases, the greatest asset a volunteer 
can offer is his or her ability to quickly mobilize 
thousands of Facebook friends or Twitter follow-
ers to raise awareness or dollars and to inspire 
action.”
A dramatic example of the impact of social media is 
in disaster-related volunteering. Now, because of the 
power it gives people to mobilise others, spontaneous 
volunteers can be on site much more quickly than 
even first responders, let alone humanitarian relief 
agencies. This is rapidly changing the dynamics of vol-
unteer participation in response to disasters, raising 
challenges to those organisations, as untrained volun-
teers who want to help are self-organising. 
It is clear that social media and mobile technology, as 
one of our respondents wrote:
“…will enable people to volunteer in new ways 
and will potentially mean that people who have 
previously been excluded from volunteering are 
able to participate.”
But he also warns:
“However, it may also mean that people without 
access to technology could be excluded.”
Volunteer-involving organisations cannot ignore and 
certainly cannot reverse the impact of social media. 
They must become adept at maximising social media’s 
benefits for them, which means they must prepare 
their volunteer leaders and paid staff to function com-
fortably with it.
4. The coming generational 
change of leadership 
Much of the leadership that has built the concept of 
a global volunteer community has come from those 
who were born prior to 1960, including the authors 
of this article, who thus are comfortable raising this 
topic. That generation is arriving at the point of re-
tirement. The issue is not whether it can be replaced. 
There is no question of that, as younger leaders are 
rapidly emerging throughout the world, particularly in 
the global south. 
Rather, the challenge may be for the older leaders 
to move gracefully out of the way while still finding 
opportunities to contribute. Their legacy must be that 
they helped prepare the next generation of leaders 
for volunteering, offering them increasing opportuni-
ties to be heard and to assume expanding responsi-
bilities. They must demonstrate their openness to the 
ideas and perspectives of the new generation. Their 
relevance will not be in their remembrance of things 
past, although a little historical perspective never 
hurts, but in their ability to make way effectively for 
their successors. 
The new generation of leaders must be encouraged 
and must be willing to undertake fundamental discus-
sions that the current generation may believe are long 
settled. Questions such as, how do we define volun-
teering, what are the values inherent in volunteering, 
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and, as discussed below, what is the appropriate rela-
tionship between paid and unpaid work, must contin-
ue to be discussed. The answers must grow from the 
realities of today’s world, rather than from the way 
things were.
This is why IAVE always schedules a companion youth 




Here are seven significant issues that must be ad-
dressed and, if possible, resolved, in order truly to 
strengthen volunteering as a recognised global force 
for problem-solving and change. In some manner, 
they ran through virtually all responses we received 
from our invited informants.
1. The absence of national 
policies on volunteering and 
infrastructure support
In the vast majority of countries, particularly those 
in the global south, there are no national policies to 
guide the development of volunteering, no significant 
government investment in developing and sustain-
ing appropriate national and local infrastructure to 
support volunteering, and no coordinated efforts to 
create an enabling environment. 
In countries with national volunteer centres or similar 
structures, almost entirely in the global north, there 
appears to be a trend toward reduced financial sup-
port for these from governments, despite the contri-
butions volunteers can and do make to the delivery of 
public services. 
In 2015, IAVE is launching a first ever global study of 
national leadership structures and systems for vol-
unteering, as a way to build a knowledge base about 
them, and to build a strong case for their value and 
impact. 
2. Measurement of impact
Appropriately, there is growing discussion of how to 
maximise the impact of volunteers on specific prob-
lems and needs. This undoubtedly will grow if volun-
teering is formally recognised as an asset to address 
the SDGs. Currently, much of the discussion of impact 
is being driven by global companies that want to be 
able to document the return on investment of their 
volunteer efforts. Unfortunately, there is precious 
little investment being made in developing sensible, 
manageable and cost effective impact measurement. 
Complicating this is an absence of an overall coordi-
nated effort to do so, resulting in disagreement over 
what should be measured and how it should be done.
3. Inclusion
All people have the ability to volunteer. But not all 
people have the opportunity to volunteer. Why not? 
In large part this may be because of stereotypes 
related to the nature of people ‘in need’. People 
who live in poverty, who have physical and emotion-
al disabilities, who are impacted on by disasters, or 
who are very young or very old, are often perceived 
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as people who require help, not as people who have 
skills, capacity and desire to help others and to help 
themselves. 
This is an issue that is rarely discussed. Indeed, vol-
unteering efforts by people in these groups too often 
become used as ‘inspirational examples’ for those 
without challenges rather than exemplars of what 
others in their circumstances could do, if given the 
chance. Nor is there recognition that volunteering by 
marginalised communities, rather than for them, can 
be an effective strategy to empower these groups and 
improve their lives.
Work must be done to ensure that volunteering is 
genuinely open to everyone who wishes to partici-
pate, recognising and reducing barriers that may exist 
because of people’s age, gender, sexual orientation, 
economic status, emotional or physical health, and 
religious or political beliefs.
4. The failure to recognise the 
reality of volunteering in the 
global south
 
For too many in the global north, the global south is seen 
as a place where volunteers go in order to help, not as a 
place where there are millions of indigenous volunteers 
already at work in their communities every day.
The problem is exacerbated by the growth of ‘volun-
tourism’, often undertaken as a commercial endeav-
our, where people from the global north combine 
a holiday with volunteering. Many of these efforts 
are legitimate. But there also are significant negative 
implications that have only recently begun to receive 
attention. For example, the Better Care Network and 
Save the Children UK are in the forefront of identifying 
the negative impacts of volunteering in orphanages by 
visitors to the global south.3
While cross-border corporate volunteering may be 
seen as contributing to the stereotype, it is important 
to note that most global companies that sponsor such 
programmes also create teams drawn from their glob-
al workforce, thus contributing in a small way to the 
growth of south to south volunteering.
As one of our respondents noted, there is not suffi-
cient recognition of the potential of south to south 
volunteering as a way for countries with similar real-
ities to learn from each other’s innovations and best 
practices. Increased investment in such schemes could 
potentially significantly increase impact, while rein-
forcing the value of indigenous volunteering.
5. The lack of readiness to 
engage volunteers
It is an open secret that too often CSOs, public sector 
agencies and community-based groups are ill-pre-
pared to engage volunteers effectively in their work. 
In many cases, they and their paid staff members are 
openly resistant to volunteers. Often this is because 
they do not recognise volunteers as a resource that 
can help them achieve their missions. 
This is a problem that cannot be ignored if volunteer-
ing is to have its maximum impact. Those who are 
promoting skills-based volunteering already express 
frustration at the difficulty of finding appropriate 
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placements for those volunteers. As one respondent 
noted, there is a gap between what volunteers are 
looking for and what organisations are looking for. A 
concerted effort is needed to build volunteer friend-
ly organisations, which are willing to address their 
cultural, attitudinal and practical barriers to effective 
volunteer involvement.
6. The relationship of unpaid 
and paid work
Volunteering is work, albeit unpaid, and like all work 
brings benefits to the worker, such as personal or 
spiritual fulfilment, self-confidence and new social 
connections. Among the most important benefits, 
particularly for young volunteers, are learning and 
practising new skills, gaining experience in a work-
place and building a record of work experience, all 
toward the goal of increasing one’s employability.
In its invitation to develop this article, CIVICUS posited 
that there might be a “growing elitism” in volunteer-
ing based on:
“…how internships and volunteer opportunities 
are sometimes… [seen]… as a means to embel-
lish… CVs and enhance… career prospects rather 
than an end in itself.”
Our respondents firmly rejected this hypothesis on 
three grounds. First, there is a long-standing consen-
sus that volunteering benefits the volunteer as much 
or more as the individuals or organisation served. Sec-
ond, the act of volunteering is not “an end in itself” 
but always the means to another end. Finally, it is not 
“a small group of upwardly mobile or socially well-con-
nected individuals” who potentially can benefit in this 
way from volunteering. It is every volunteer.
Too little has been done to develop and disseminate 
specific strategies for both volunteers and volun-
teer-involving organisations to legitimise and maximise 
these employment-related benefits. Youth volunteers 
may not know how to document their experiences or 
to translate them into terms that support their search 
for paid work. They also may be reluctant to request 
such support from the organisations in which they 
volunteer. Those organisations may be unprepared 
to document the nature of volunteer work, the skills 
learned and the specific contributions made by vol-
unteers in ways that are helpful to their volunteers. 
Finally, employers must be educated to understand 
that volunteer experiences can and should be used in 
assessing potential employees.
7. The values inherent in vol-
unteering and their conflict 
with reality
In its Universal Declaration on Volunteering, issued in 
2001, IAVE made the case that:4
“Volunteering is a fundamental building block of 
civil society. It brings to life the noblest aspirations 
of humankind - the pursuit of peace, freedom, 
opportunity, safety, and justice for all people.”
But is it correct that, generally, those who give lead-
ership to volunteering share a wider variety of values, 
such as those in the IAVE declaration? If they were 
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asked why is volunteering important, would they agree 
with IAVE’s assertion?
To assume that they would is to carry the risk of 
believing that all share what some would argue are 
predominantly western or global northern values. 
These might include values about inclusion, the ways 
in which volunteers not only can but should challenge 
the status quo, and about the rights of people to be 
engaged not only in problem-solving volunteering but 
also in advocacy and social change. 
We rarely discuss whether these assumptions are cor-
rect. For example, does volunteering mean the same 
thing worldwide? Is the rejection of barriers to partic-
ipation – including those rooted in prevailing social, 
cultural or religious mores – a prerequisite for one to 
be recognised as a leader for volunteering? As we call 
for the creation of national policies on volunteering, 
do we accept and value those established by govern-
ments in autocratic countries? Does voluntary helping, 
as a fundamental human activity, stand outside the 
framework of cultural, religious and political norms 
within which it may occur? Are there forms of volun-
teering that should be rejected as not being part of the 
global volunteer community?
Probably because such questions have the potential 
to divide as well as to bring together, they are not 
often on the agenda for discussion. But, if the found-
ers of IAVE almost 50 years ago were correct when 
they saw volunteering as a way to 'build bridges of 
understanding,” then it is incumbent that the risk is 
embraced and that meaningful dialogue on these 
questions is encouraged and stimulated.
Conclusion
Two common needs that run throughout this article 
are the needs for increased dialogue and for greater 
collaboration. These are, of course, intertwined: effec-
tive dialogue leads to greater understanding, which 
can beget a willingness to work together toward 
mutually shared goals. Both demand a commitment 
to investing the time and leadership energy required 
for them to succeed. But it is an investment, if truly 
made, that can pay huge dividends in expanding, 
strengthening and sustaining our rapidly emerging 
global volunteer community.
1 International Forum for Volunteering 




2 ‘The new age of volunteering’, USA 




3 See, for example, Better Care 
Network, Better Volunteering, 








needs that run 
throughout 
this article are 
the needs for 
increased dialogue 
and for greater 
collaboration.
State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
227
One year into history’s largest and deadliest Ebola 
outbreak, the failures and fatal inadequacies of the 
current arrangements for resonse to global health 
crisis have been brutally exposed. The toll of the 
epidemic has been huge: more than 26,000 people 
were infected and more than 11,000 left dead. The 
people of West Africa and the world deserve better, 
and civil society movements need to step up.
The enduring Ebola epidemic has taught the world 
some hard lessons over the last 12 months, which 
we must take to heart. Despite early warnings, and 
the extraordinary efforts of local healthcare workers 
and private medical humanitarian organisations, the 
epidemic has exposed the institutional failures that 
saw the Ebola outbreak spiral far out of control, with 
tragic and avoidable consequences.
In particular, we should reflect on the role civil 
society must play in response, and how it can spur 
on mandated international bodies to shake off their 
paralysis and act decisively during crises, instead of 
leaving it to private organisations, such as MSF, to 
respond.
In March 2015, the downward trend of admissions in 
Ebola treatment centres, was cause for optimism, not 
least in Monrovia, Liberia, previously the epicentre 
of the emergency during September 2014, at the 
height of the epidemic. But as we have seen before, 
the epidemic remains unpredictable, and new Ebola 
cases were diagnosed again, proving the necessity 
to match vigilance with improved in contact-tracing 
(see box two) and efforts to rebuild trust in health 
services, to ensure that all new Ebola cases are 
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On 9 May 2015 the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
officially declared Liberia Ebola-free, after 42 days of 
no new infections. This was a great milestone, but the 
epidemic certainly was not over. It is no time to slow 
down, especially since new cases of Ebola were being 
recorded in neighbouring Guinea and Sierra Leone, 
meaning that the outbreak is not over yet. There is 
now a need to improve cross-border surveillance to 
prevent Ebola re-emerging in Liberia.
What we have learned so far is that stopping the 
epidemic depends on all the different pillars of the 
response being in place, and having experienced 
responders who are well-resourced and able 
to adapt. To take control of the epidemic, the 
people of West Africa need an active public health 
surveillance system at the core of a fully mobilised, 
agile and flexible crisis response that has the trust 
of communities. The continued reluctance of some 
communities in Guinea to engage, coupled with 
sporadic attacks against healthcare workers, pose a 
threat to bringing the outbreak under control.  
Why Ebola 
flourished
Convenient explanations emphasise the Ebola 
epidemic as a perfect storm of a cross-border 
outbreak in countries with weak public health systems 
that had never seen Ebola before.
While the outbreak did thrive on the pre-existing 
weaknesses of the public health system in Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, it was international inaction 
and institutional failures that precipitated an 
avoidable tragedy.
It was not only the legacy of civil war in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone that played a role, but also the corrosion 
MSF Ebola response
o MSF operated eight Ebola case management 
centres, providing 650 beds in isolation, and 
one transit centre until March 2015. 
o In March 2015 the organisation employed 4,475 
staff (local and international) in Guinea, Liberia  
and Sierra Leone.
 • Of these 25 have been southern Afri  
 can medics. 
o At the height of the epidemic, from August to 
November 2014, MSF operated 22 Ebola case 
management centres, including the world’s 
biggest centre: the ELWA 3 centre in Monrovia, 
which had a 250 bed capacity.
o Since the beginning of the outbreak up until 
May 2015, MSF has:
 • admitted 9,446 patients 
 • confirmed 5,168 patients  as having   
 Ebola
 • discharged over 2,449 patients as Ebo 
 la survivors.
o To date, MSF has trained 800 of its own staff 
and 250 people from other CSOs, the UN and 
government agencies in Ebola response.
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wrought by efforts to rebuild these societies. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) programmes that 
bankrolled redevelopment placed priority on debt 
and interest payments, rather than social welfare 
and health spending. These conditions attached to 
IMF and World Bank loans forced Guinea, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone to cap the number of health 
workers they employed and what they could be paid, 
according to an article in The Lancet medical journal.1 
The impact was detrimental. Even before the Ebola 
outbreak, the health systems in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone had less than one doctor per 10,000 people, 
and less than three nurses and midwives per 10,000 
people. Women in Liberia and Sierra Leone were left 
especially vulnerable; they are more at risk of dying 
during childbirth than almost anywhere else in the 
world.2 
The Ebola outbreak worsened their lot, as health 
facilities were closed, since healthcare workers 
abandoned their posts, fearing that they too would 
become infected, given that hundreds of health staff 
had already died while trying to help without the 
necessary protective gear and support. Obscured 
from view by Ebola is the over one million malaria 
cases reported in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and nearly 
800,000 in Guinea.3 But in the wake of Ebola, this 
deadly disease was not prioritised. So far MSF has 
managed to distribute antimalarial drugs to more than 
650,000 people in Monrovia and 1.8 million people in 
Freetown, as well as opening a new maternity unit for 
pregnant women with Ebola in Sierra Leone.
The inefficient and slow response from the 
international health and aid system, led by the WHO, 
which saw a months-long global coalition of inaction, 
provided ample opportunity for the virus to spread 
wildly, amid a dearth of leadership and the urgent 
action that was required.
The WHO is internationally mandated to lead on 
global health emergencies and possesses the know-
how to bring Ebola under control, as does the 
US Centers for Disease Control (CDC), which has 
laboratory and epidemiological expertise. However, 
both WHO in the African Region (WHO AFRO), and its 
Geneva headquarters, did not identify early on the 
need for more staff to do the work on the ground, and 
nor did they mobilise additional human resources and 
invest early enough in training more personnel.
The initial response was left to private organisations 
such as MSF: an untenable situation that stretched 
our organisation and people to the limit to take on 
significant risks to try and save lives.
For MSF, our most significant limitation in the 
beginning was the lack of experienced staff to deal 
with an outbreak on this scale. At the onset of the 
outbreak our own staff complement who were 
experienced in Ebola work numbered only around 40 
people, who had worked on much smaller isolated 
outbreaks during the last 20 years. 
They had to simultaneously set up and run operations 
on the frontline, and coach inexperienced staff. 
MSF embarked on the most extensive knowledge 
transfer operations in its 44 year history. Trainings 
began in earnest at headquarters and in the field, 
with more than 1,000 people trained and more than 
1,300 international staff and over 4,000 national staff 
deployed over 2014/2015. 
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The three countries hit hardest by the Ebola epidemic 
are characterised by a lack of strong traditions of 
organised local civil society. After the conflicts in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone in the early 2000s, the 
rebuilding of these societies and social services were 
hamstrung, leaving authorities with a tendency 
towards knee-jerk reactions when faced with crises. A 
hallmark of this was the use of repressive quarantine 
measures, which masked the paralysis of the state 
authorities while, with deadly irony, trapping Ebola 
inside communities. In Sierra Leone corruption 
thrived, as desperate people resorted to bribing 
officials to let them out of quarantine so they could 
go about their normal business, given that quarantine 
was a euphemism for imprisonment, often without 
adequate supplies for daily existence. But this was 
overshadowed by the alarm, framed by media 
reportage on the outbreak, in Western Europe and 
the United States as Ebola crossed the Atlantic. Some 
of the media coverage reached for sensationalism 
when reporting on the thousands of horrible, 
undignified deaths in West Africa, juxtaposed with 
one of two infections in the EU or US, which resulted 
in calls for isolation and flight cancellations to West 
Africa. 
At the other end of the spectrum, little attention 
was focussed on the WHO - one of the world’s 
largest intergovernmental organisations - since it 
was out of touch with the reality on the ground 
and unable to shift quickly from technical advice to 
taking responsibility with hands-on deployment and 
coordination. 
When the WHO was founded 60 years ago as a 
specialised UN agency, its primary charge, laid out in 
its constitution, was to ensure the “attainment by all 
peoples of the highest possible level of health.” 
How then did the WHO fail to carry out its mandate in 
protecting the vulnerable people of West Africa? 
Six steps to stop Ebola
1. Isolation and care for patients: Isolate patients 
in Ebola management centres staffed by trained 
personnel and provide supportive medical care and 
psychosocial support for patients and their families. 
2. Safe burials: Provide and encourage safe burial 
activities in communities. 
3. Awareness-raising: Conduct extensive aware-
ness-raising activities to help communities under-
stand the nature of the disease, how to protect 
themselves, and how to help stem its spread. This 
works best when efforts are made to understand 
the culture and traditions of local communities. 
4. Disease surveillance: Conduct and promote thor-
ough disease surveillance in order to locate new 
cases, track likely pathways of transmission, and 
identify sites that require thorough disinfection.
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5. Contact-tracing: Conduct and promote thorough 
tracing of people who have been in contact with 
the Ebola-infected. If contacts are not mapped and 
followed up, it undermines all the other activities 
and the disease will continue to spread. 
6. Non-Ebola healthcare: Ensure that medical care 
remains available for people with illnesses and 
conditions other than Ebola (e.g. malaria, chronic 
diseases and obstetric care). 
The problem was a vacuum of leadership. I saw this 
first-hand when I worked in Sierra Leone during the 
peak of the epidemic in August and September 2014. I 
arrived in the capital, Freetown, a few weeks after the 
WHO eventually declared the outbreak a public health 
emergency of international concern on 8 August 2014, 
six months after Ebola was confirmed in Guinea. At 
the time of my arrival, the international response to 
this deadly outbreak left much to be desired, either 
because of fear, lack of expertise or political will.  
During joint response coordination meetings, I sat 
through what was more like a round table discussion, 
while outside in the streets, people were dying 
horrible deaths without dignity, new infections soared 
and healthcare workers struggled to respond. The 
same could be said for top level meetings, where the 
WHO did not manage to take decisions on setting 
priorities, attributing roles and responsibilities, 
ensuring accountability for the quality of activities, 
or mobilising resources on the necessary scale. There 
was little sharing of information between affected 
countries. Only in July 2014 was a regional operations 
centre established in Conakry, Guinea to provide 
the much needed technical and operational support 
critical for an unprecedented outbreak of this nature 
that traversed borders. 
Epidemic response activities (see box) should have 
been coordinated inside and beyond the borders of 
the affected countries. The successful execution of 
these demanded a direct operational approach, which 
the WHO could not sufficiently provide. 
This epidemic also showed the lack of vision and 
capacity to ensure that local community-based 
organisations, which traditionally have carried 
out infection control education for measles, Lassa 
Fever and other poverty related diseases, to play an 
instrumental role within communities to drive change 
in health behaviours to stop Ebola transmission.
From the outset the WHO was out of step with 
the reality experienced by terrified communities in 
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The WHO’s January 
2015 report relates how a “mysterious” disease began 
silently spreading in a small village in Guinea on 26 
December 2013, but was not identified as Ebola until 
March 2014. When MSF responded in March 2014 
to the outbreak in Guinea, calling for international 
support because the spread of the outbreak was 
unprecedented, the WHO in April maintained that the 
outbreak was still “relatively small.”
MSF’s initial Ebola response focused on Guinea from 
March 2014, and another rapid response in Liberia 
during April 2014, where cases numbers quickly 
dwindled. By May 2014, MSF teams had started 
working in Sierra Leone, after being requested to 
intervene in late May.
By June 2014 MSF told the world that the outbreak 
was out of control, and that the response capacity 
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was completely inadequate. We also announced that 
our teams had reached their operational response 
limits, necessitating massive deployment of resources 
from international governments. 
In July the situation in Liberia reached alarming 
proportions, and MSF received impassioned phone 
calls from former Liberian staff, currently members 
of MSF’s Association, who were active in civil society, 
pleading for an MSF response. 
The existing pressures on MSF’s Ebola teams in 
Guinea and Sierra Leone were massive, but we could 
not ignore the distress signal. With internal pressure 
strong, MSF had technical support teams on the 
ground in Liberia during July 2014, and by August we 
had built a massive isolation centre in Monrovia. At 
250 beds, the ELWA 3 case management centre was 
the world’s biggest Ebola centre, compared to the 40-
60 bed facilities previously set up. But within days it 
was overwhelmed with the Ebola sick. In September 
and October, my colleagues there could only open 
the gates for 30 minutes a day, to allow new patients 
in to take the place of those who had died overnight.
In July 2014 these experiences and perspectives 
from working in all three countries pushed MSF 
teams to the limit, and we called on UN member 
states to launch an intervention, since CSO capacity 
was completely outstripped. The WHO eventually 
declared an Ebola Public Health Emergency in August, 
and only in September 2014 did a slow stream of 
foreign aid support start to trickle in, after MSF 
took the unusual step of calling for civil and military 





Unlike civil society movements, the WHO is not built 
on the principles of solidarity with people in crisis, 
and it does not respond to the inequalities in the 
world out of anger and outrage. In the late 1990s, 
at the epicentre of the HIV epidemic, the South 
African government was gripped by AIDS denialism, 
which paralysed its response to AIDS. At the time, 
the disease was killing 1,000 people daily, and in 
the absence of response, grassroots civil society 
organisation (CSO) the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC) stepped in.
TAC built a powerful movement of patients who 
organised themselves as a force to be reckoned with 
in South Africa and to be admired internationally, 
inspiring a new wave in the global HIV solidarity 
movement. TAC was able to empower people living 
with HIV with knowledge of their disease, and 
mobilised them to demand anti-retroviral treatment 
and accountability, and to fight HIV stigma.
This kind of social activism grew against the backdrop 
of ineffective global health leadership. Despite the 
evidence of treatment success in 1996, international 
bodies such as the UN and WHO took five more years 
to produce treatment protocols for resource-poor 
countries. In the midst of the raging pandemic, there 
was little recognition of the gravity of HIV’s social and 
security impact until 2000.
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But unlike the virus that causes AIDS, the Ebola virus 
and its transmission puts people without effective 
available treatment at immediate high risk of dying 
from the disease. The usual methods of mobilisation 
familiar to activists are not possible for people living 
in West Africa. Instead, what is needed is a global 
movement in solidarity with the plight of the people 
of West Africa that keeps the WHO, as well as wealthy 
countries that have an obligation to meet their 
mandates, accountable to people in desperate need. 
Learning the 
lessons
Over the last 20 years reforms have gradually reduced 
the direct operational capacities in the UN system. For 
example, the restructuring of the WHO in Geneva has 
led to the closure of its viral haemorrhagic fever unit. 
UN member states should be held accountable for an 
unceasing reduction of response capacity. 
In the face of a lack of international action, 
desperation in communities drove people to develop 
their own imperfect offering. Volunteer Ebola fighters, 
donning improvised protective gear to treat sick 
family members, and volunteer burial teams, were 
willing to endure stigma and social exclusion.
A destructive spiral materialised, leading to the 
catastrophic situation in West Africa, characterised 
by lack of leadership, deficient coordination and, 
last but not least, a striking absence of operational 
capacity. This was compounded by the fact that 
the international community simply doesn’t feel 
responsible for responding to what is happening 
in regions that are not perceived as politically or 
economically significant. It is left to fragile health 
systems in the affected countries to manage 
international health crises, as well as to private 
organisations that have, by their nature, limited 
capacities to respond to major outbreaks. 
While the WHO Executive Board wants to enact 
reforms for epidemic response and address internal 
incoherence, it seems unlikely that radical reform will 
happen overnight, and there is little interest from UN 
member states in empowering an epidemic response 
body with the power that could potentially challenge 
their own sovereignty.
Without the power of mobilised societies, change 
will not happen. Millions of West Africans have 
lost confidence in the health system, and patients 
suffering from life-threatening health conditions 
not related to Ebola, such as birth complications or 
malaria, still cannot receive appropriate care. Coupled 
with fear, this deepens people’s distrust of health 
services and authorities, as in Guinea. It is urgent 
that access to healthcare is restored as a first step to 
rebuilding healthcare systems in the region that are 
able to face the difficult, uncertain future.
There was a powerful defining feature of the 
response from MSF, aside from the establishment 
of case management centres and effective contact 
tracing: it was the fact that this movement is based 
on an association of humanitarian fieldworkers, 
international and national staff members, who 
volunteered to work in the fight against Ebola, feeling 
compelled to act. Many returned two and three times 
over the course of months because of the enduring 
dire need. This speaks to their humanitarian spirit of 
solidarity with the people of West Africa. The WHO 
is now talking about building a global workforce in 
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preparation for other similar outbreaks, but what 
marked the volunteers’ motivation and efforts was 
their visceral refusal to accept the status quo, and 
their drive to provide access to healthcare to meet 
the needs of people caught in crisis, based on what 
they witnessed.
Today, we know that huge efforts are needed for 
large-scale community mobilisation and health 
promotion, and information sharing, much as was the 
case with HIV. But this process will demand significant 
financial and human resource investments. It’s here 
where CSOs in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone must 
find a meaningful role to play in the mobilisation 
effort, while international civil society should demand 
transparency and accountability from international 
bodies such as the WHO. Without it we are doomed 
to repeat history.
1 Alexander Kentikelenis, Lawrence 
King, Martin McKee and David Stuckler, 
‘The International Monetary Fund 
and the Ebola outbeak’, The Lancet 
Global Health, February 2015, Vol. 
3, No. 2, http://www.thelancet.com/
journals/langlo/article/PIIS2214-
109X(14)70377-8/fulltext.
2 Médecins Sans Frontières, Safe 
Delivery: Reducing maternal mortality 
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Introduction
In 2015, the landscape of philanthropy in the Arab 
region looks decidedly different than it did a mere 
four years ago. To be sure, the practice of philanthro-
py and charitable giving is not new to the region: 
in fact, it is so deeply embedded in the culture and 
fabric of the various societies that make up the 22 
country-strong region that it would be difficult to find 
a point in the region’s history when philanthropy was 
not widely practised. However, the seemingly sud-
den surge of geo-political upheaval in the region in 
2011, widely known as the ‘Arab Spring’ (although it 
appears to have a rather perennial momentum), es-
sentially shocked the region into a new reality across 
all aspects of society, with the philanthropic sector 
certainly being no exception.
With the region in relative crisis, some of the more 
challenging issues that face the philanthropic and civil 
society spheres globally have come to the forefront 
regionally, and these issues merit some evaluation 
and acknowledgment, if only as a way of mapping 
emerging trends, and documenting their trajectory 
for the sake of posterity. This contribution to the 2015 
State of Civil Society Report takes stock of the current 
overall state of Arab philanthropy and its myriad prac-
tices, while paying particular attention to the newer 
models and approaches of giving in the region. In 
some ways, it can be said that the various challenges 
we face in the region have helped to foster an inno-
vative sector, which may not have been motivated 
otherwise.
As a network of Arab philanthropic foundations based 
and working in the region, we at the Arab Founda-
Trends in 
philanthropy 






 Arab Foundations Forum
State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
236
a number of key questions here. How does the Arab 
region move towards a more strategic model of giving 
while preserving its traditions? How does it do that in 
the face of various humanitarian crises that confront 
the region in this moment in its history, and which 
potentially distract from developing a more long term, 
30-to-50 year model of ‘legacy philanthropy’: one that 
instils the values of giving, of wealth and resource 
distribution over time and over the course of genera-
tions, and institutionalises philanthropy in a way that 
allows it to become more strategic and, therefore, 
more impactful over time. How do we move from the 
tried-and-tested model of charitable giving towards a 
model that effects lasting, sustained and much need-
ed social change? In short, how does the Arab region 
go about changing the way we give?
A scan on Arab philanthropy between 2011 and 2013, 
conducted by the John D Gerhart Center for Philan-
thropy and Civic Engagement at the American Uni-
versity in Cairo, Egypt, revealed a number of general 
trends in three key ‘Arab Spring’ countries: Egypt, 
Libya and Tunisia. In Libya, due to the absence of an 
infrastructure for institutionalised philanthropy under 
the old regime, a civil society was being forged from 
a blank slate, from which a number of challenges as 
well as opportunities for developing new paradigms 
emerged. In Tunisia, a shift in focus took place, from 
cultural associations to more developmental associ-
ations, as well as an effort to expand and build on an 
already existing civil society. In Egypt, the process was 
more complicated, considering the breadth and histo-
ry of civil society there, but new initiatives emerged, 
and a restructuring of civil society is now embedded 
within a larger debate regarding religion, the con-
stitution and the drafting of a civil society law that 
tions Forum (AFF) are uniquely positioned to observe 
the region and the landscape, by virtue of the experi-
ence and information gleaned from our membership. 
We have borne witness to a rapidly transforming 
sector, and see the following key trends as having 
emerged in the most recent past.




Ideally, when we talk about strategic philanthropy, 
we like to think that this goes beyond the traditional 
means of giving and hand-outs, and instead ensures 
a more long term and sustained form of giving that 
can somehow help reach the root cause of the devel-
opment issue in any given situation. In order for it to 
do so, and do so successfully, philanthropy needs to 
adhere to certain characteristics that make up ‘good 
philanthropy’. These characteristics include, but are 
not limited to, “being connected beyond simply writ-
ing a check, being thoughtful and reflective, and being 
effective and lasting.”1
When it comes to defining strategic philanthropy, 
however, context is key. In a region with such a rich 
history of charitable giving - and more specifically, reli-
gious giving - the challenge has been to chart a course 
that is strategic, while maintaining the hallmarks and 
motivations of giving, and the tradition of philan-
thropy in this local and historical context. There are 
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would potentially allow for citizen engagement and 
release philanthropic efforts from restrictions.2 What 
is common across all three countries is the focus on 
reforming the regulatory environment and develop-
ing a civil society law that is in keeping with the spirit 
of the Arab awakening. However, the most recent 
draft of the NGO law in Egypt, is a backwards step, as 
it would bring civil society further under state control 
and severely restrict foreign funding, which may have 
serious consequences for the future of civil society.3
The impact of the reforms is yet to be seen. Similarly, 
the consequences of the uprisings that began across 
the region in 2011 may be slow to reveal themselves 
in all their magnitude and final form. The ripples and 
aftershocks of these movements began to appear al-
most immediately, and continue to be seen four years 
later. The region has seen the fall of regimes in spec-
tacular ways in Egypt; we’ve witnessed the changing 
of the guard in Saudi Arabia; and we’ve watched as 
Tunisia manoeuvres its way through unchartered wa-
ters and builds - or rebuilds - a civil society and a rule 
of law that is geared more towards an inclusive gov-
ernment. But we still have a long way to go. We still 
have societies that function largely under antiquated 
laws and governing principles that have no place in 
the 21st century. We still see countries where issues 
of citizenship are steeped in patriarchal bureaucra-
cy; where woman remain in the shadows of society; 
where education maintains its place on the fringes of 
priority; and where unemployment rates soar, while 
opportunities decline and hopes are diminished. For 
a region that is the size of the Arab region, the fall-
out from these issues can be quite catastrophic, and 
not in some far away future, but now.





A very common theme at the forefront of the debate 
about the regional philanthropic sector is the pivotal 
role played by young people as major stakeholders in 
the process of change. The dynamics may be different 
in each country, but the vision of an independent civil 
society remains a goal.4 Let’s consider the regional 
statistics for a moment:
With 22 countries, the Arab region comprises roughly 
10% of the world’s geography. Of the region’s popu-
lation of approximately 395 million5 (which is around 
5.5% of the world’s total population), roughly 30% 
are young people (between the ages of 15-29).6 To 
not harness the collective power of this ‘youth bulge’ 
would be egregiously short-sighted and decidedly 
un-strategic. However, in order to galvanise a youth 
population to contribute to the philanthropy sector 
in any meaningful way - in a region where they are 
largely under-served and generally ignored - a para-
digm shift of huge proportions is required. The prob-
lem is that this takes time, and is certainly not a shift 
we will likely see on a large scale any time soon. 
While we consider the staggering statistics of the 
Arab youth population, we can safely assume there is 
some kind of correlation between the failure to fulfil 
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the needs of that population and some of the seem-
ingly perpetual geo-political crises facing the region. 
It’s not too far a stretch to say that lack of opportu-
nity can lead to the search for meaning and purpose 
elsewhere. With the surge of religious and politically 
fanatical organisations across the region, we are see-
ing this scenario play out in ways that are catastrophic 
- not only in the obvious and immediate present, but 
for generations to come. There are ways to mitigate 
this, and philanthropy has a potentially influential role 
in this sphere, but that potential can only be realised 
when a population is engaged and invested. It would 
not be inaccurate to state that, currently, this isn’t the 
reality across the region, and certainly not amongst 
the youth population. In fact, in many cases across 
the region, we’re seeing engagement dissipate, and 
moving further away from growing an engaged civic 
youth population that is motivated and has a vested 
interest in the betterment of its society. The hallmark 
of philanthropy is the use of private resources to-
wards public good. If a population is not given owner-
ship of its future, why would it bother investing any of 
its resources in a future that is not theirs? What a lost 
opportunity that is proving to be.
To that end, there has been a marked proliferation 
in foundations and other civil society organisations 
(CSOs) that are taking a proactive approach to en-
gaging young people in the Arab region. Among AFF’s 
member organisations alone, we can list several 
notable youth-focused organisations that have creat-
ed innovative programmes to engage the burgeoning 
youth population. In Jordan, INJAZ (Achievement) 
and Ruwwad Al Tanmeya (Entrepreneurs for Develop-
ment) are two well-established organisations working 
on the ground and achieving far-reaching impact on 
youth engagement and skills-building; the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) hosts the Emirates Foundation, which 
states its mission as, “Working in partnership with the 
private and public sectors using venture philanthropy 
and engagement programs to positively and perma-
nently impact the lives of youth;”7 and the Qatar-based 
Silatech is a social initiative that works to create jobs 
and expand economic opportunities for young people 
throughout the Arab region by promoting large-scale 
job creation, entrepreneurship, access to capital and 
markets, and the participation and engagement of 
young people in economic and social development.8 
These examples are but a small sample of the founda-
tions and CSOs in the region that have made it their 
mission to address the fastest-growing and least sup-
ported population in the Arab region today. 
Despite these efforts, and some very encouraging 
gains, the region has a long way to go in achieving a 
more stable and better supported youth population. 
Much of this effort is hindered by the institution that 
is best placed to provide support it: namely, govern-
ment. Although there are instances where we are 
seeing some proactive gains by government entities 
towards addressing the gap in opportunities for the 
youth population, there are many who bemoan these 
gains as meagre and examples of tokenism. One re-
cent example was a regional Youth Opportunities and 
Employment Conference, co-sponsored by govern-
ments and the private sector, held in the region where 
hundreds of experts - both regional and international 
- were invited and the speakers were handpicked from 
the best in the field and the plenaries were plentiful. 
Interestingly, and somewhat disappointingly, one main 
question posed by attendees to the organisers was, 
“Where are the youth? They aren’t on the panels, 
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they aren’t in the audience. How could you miss this 
opportunity?” 
It’s a frustrating situation to behold; one where 
we pose the question, “what do we do about our 
youth?” but then entirely miss the mark by failing to 
engage the exact audience whom we are attempt-
ing to address. In some of the countries around the 
region, the mere fact of being considered a young 
people is to be at a disadvantage. We have not yet 
seen the kind of paradigm shift where our region has 
fostered a sense of belonging, unity, or pride in its 
youth population. In today’s political environment, 
participating in what might be considered civic en-
gagement or engaged citizenship can mean jail time, 
and often with very little due process to speak of. Is 
it any wonder, then, that we find a generally frustrat-
ed youth population across the region, which feels 
entirely disempowered and disenfranchised? And 
yet, we can’t ignore the fact that due to the sheer 
size of this particular demographic across the region, 
the burden of change will ultimately lie very much 
on their shoulders, and it is short-sighted to ignore 
them. We often ask “What is the role of philanthropy 
in addressing the issues affecting youth today across 
the Arab region?” and the answers are plentiful. Is 
there a role? Of course. But, can that role be filled 
exclusively by the philanthropic sector, without the 
active engagement and endorsement of the govern-
ments in question? Of course not. 
Imagine this scenario: recently, there have been a 
spate of proposals and discussions among various en-
tities, both within the Arab region and elsewhere, to 
establish virtual hubs for the exchange of information 
and ideas, and for discussions and thought leader-
ship. As wonderful and idealistic as these ideas are, 
we’ve been facing the same obstacle again and again 
in this discussion: how will you protect those with 
whom you want to engage? If you engage a group of 
young people in Egypt, for example, around issues of 
democracy and civic engagement, how will you guar-
antee the safety and freedom of those participants, 
in today’s environment? Is this a failure of the philan-
thropic sector, in that it cannot protect citizens? Hard-
ly. So what can be done? The solution will ultimately 
lie in working with governments to create enabling 
environments, in which citizens wishing to participate 
in philanthropy and its activities can thrive. 
Beyond the issue of youth, the role of government 
in the facilitation of a vibrant philanthropic sector 
remains critical. Whether it’s a question of education, 
health care, development assistance or socio-eco-
nomic development, philanthropy is only able to be 
effective and sustainable if it is afforded an environ-
ment that enables it to function with minimal red 
tape, and in which it can respected as an agent of 
change that can supplement efforts or fill gaps where 
government may lapse. The challenge that many Arab 
nations face in today’s environment is that the philan-
thropic sector and governments seem to be working 
at odds with each other, rather than collaboratively or 
even complementarily. 
In closed meetings and behind closed doors - partic-
ularly in the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’ - there have 
been expressions of fatigue among some of the more 
influential foundations, essentially bemoaning the 
burden of having the expectation of fixing society’s 
ills placed on the shoulders of foundations, effectively 
relieving governments of their share of the responsibil-
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ity to citizens. It’s an intriguing state of affairs, and one 
that begs the question: if governments relinquish their 
responsibility, and philanthropy doesn’t step in, who 
wins? Frankly, it’s a valid objection, but also the conse-
quence of which is that, ultimately, everyone loses. 
Creating 
incentives: 




The bottom line is that, apart from the priceless value 
placed on charitable giving within a religious context, 
there is little else to incentivise giving - strategic or 
other - in the Arab region. Take Lebanon, for exam-
ple: there are 18 waqf (endowment) laws that govern 
giving in the country, with one waqf per religious 
sect. However, there isn’t a single non-religious giving 
law for charitable donations that fall within a secular 
domain. This is a loophole, to say the least. In other 
cases, you would be hard-pressed to find a law or 
provision that allows for tax incentives to compel the 
average citizen, as opposed to a corporation or cor-
porate foundation, to engage with the philanthropic 
sector in any substantive way. 
There are two consequences of this reality that are 
worth noting for their impact on the sector overall.
Not only is there an immeasurable value placed on 
giving within a religious context, but also, in terms of Is-
lamic giving (whether through zakat, alms or charitable 
giving, which is the third pillar of Islam and obligatory 
for believers; sadaqa, benevolence or voluntary giv-
ing, which differs from zakat in that it is not obligatory; 
or waqf, loosely translated as endowment), there is a 
higher value placed on giving when it is more anony-
mous. Essentially, the flaunting of one’s generosity and 
charity is discouraged and that, in turn, negates the 
need for any incentive, tax or other, since God alone is 
deemed incentive enough. In and of itself, this isn’t nec-
essarily a bad thing, but in the context of designing a 
more strategic, less ad hoc model of giving and targeted 
community development, it does not help encourage 
progress. Rather, it obfuscates it further. Consequently, 
nothing is done to mitigate the duplication of efforts on 
the ground, there is no accountability between donor 
and recipient, and it is difficult to measure impact, 
since it’s almost impossible to trace the trajectory of 
money given. 
The effect of this on the sector in the region is that if 
you can’t formally map the giving, you can’t effectively 
identify the gaps and needs. And if you can’t do that, 
you can’t design a sector that addresses the most 
pressing needs of the society it intends to serve. Ulti-
mately, this means that the potential power and impact 
of philanthropy will not be realised in the long term. 
The lack of data in the Arab region is egregious. More 
importantly, local, Arab-sourced and Arab-owned data 
is practically non-existent. In general, and with glaring-
ly few exceptions, Arab institutions and funders don’t 
fund research. We don’t invest in longitudinal studies 
and we don’t invest in forensic analyses of our region, 
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which would be critical in helping us to determine 
our vision and future; and for vision, we should be 
thinking in terms of multi-generations, rather than in 
the ten-year increments that we’re apt to do. From 
the perspective of allowing a philanthropic and civil 
society sector to thrive, this is catastrophic.
Data counts, and is valuable far beyond the numbers 
alone. When you don’t own your data, you don’t own 
your narrative; and when you don’t own your narra-
tive, you cannot tell your own story, which means that 
someone else will tell your story for you. It doesn’t 
take too much to see how dangerous this can be. We 
need to create an awareness of the value of this data 
throughout the region and, as a sector. We need to 
begin making the investment in aggregating, analysing 
and publishing data, with a view towards reaping the 
benefits of that investment over the long-term. 
Somewhere between the value of ‘giving for God’ 
and ‘giving for good’ lies the balance of creating an 
incentive-based model of giving that doesn’t need to 
forego tradition, but also isn’t hindered by the draw-
backs of that tradition, namely, the inability to create 
a more sustainable, strategic model of giving in the 
long run.
Where does Arab 
philanthropy go 
from here?
The Arab region gives, and it gives a lot. This is un-
disputed. The legacies of generosity, hospitality and 
focus on community are well documented, and well 
worth preserving. Where we need to focus some 
of our attention isn’t on the giving itself, but on the 
issues surrounding it. There is a noted surge in the 
more innovative approaches to philanthropy that are 
prevalent globally, and they have appeared and been 
successfully implemented in the Arab region. Venture 
philanthropy, crowdfunding and other forms of strate-
gic philanthropy have emerged, and they are plentiful, 
to be sure. In the wake of the ‘Arab Spring’, and even 
prior to that, the proliferation of foundations in the 
region is difficult to ignore.
But it should also be noted that, in the Arab region, 
the definition of what constitutes a foundation has a 
relatively more nebulous meaning than elsewhere, and 
is not necessarily described by the western taxonomy 
of a strictly grant-making entity. In many cases, foun-
dations in the Arab region tend to be more of a hybrid 
between a grant-making and a grant-seeking entity. 
This doesn’t diminish from the impact of these organi-
sations, but it does make it somewhat more difficult to 
categorise them in a way that those outside the region 
would understand. 
The lack of data and inadequate mapping of the sec-
tor in the region makes it almost impossible to gather 
the most fundamental information on Arab philan-
thropy. Key questions here are: who is giving what? 
Where are they giving it? How much are they giving? 
And to whom they are giving? Such questions remain, 
for the most part, entirely unanswered at this time.  
Within the Arab context, the issues of accountability 
and transparency remain vague and unaddressed, 
mostly due to the fact that we have yet to determine 
State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
242
Within the Arab 
context, the issues of 
accountability and 
transparency remain 
vague and unaddressed, 
mostly due to the fact 
that we have yet to 
determine the metrics 
by which they are 
defined within a local 
and regional context.
1 These characteristics were described 
by Ms Abigail Disney, Founder of the 
Daphne Foundation, at a meeting in 
New York, USA in 2008.
2 N Farouky, M Khallaf and S Taraboulsi, 
Giving In Transition and Transitions in 
Giving: Philanthropy in Egypt, Libya and 
Tunisia 2011-2013.
3 More information on Egyptian civil 
society law is available from the Inter-
national Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/
egypt.html.
4 N Farouky, M Khallaf and S Taraboulsi, 
ibid.
5 United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Western Asia (ES-
CWA), Population and Development: 




6 Brookings, Middle East Youth, 2015, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/
topics/middle-east-youth.
7 Emirates Foundation information 
available at http://arabfoundationsfo-
rum.org/author/Emirates.
8 For more information on Arab Foun-
dations Forum members, please visit:    
the metrics by which they are defined within a local 
and regional context. However, in order for the Arab 
region’s philanthropic sector to count on a global stage, 
it must adopt and adapt the guiding principles of sound 
governance, of which accountability and transparency 
are paramount. At this point, we metaphorically don’t 
count globally, in a way that is representative of the po-
tential of this region, and that is largely due to the fact 
that we literally don’t count, in terms of getting data 
and measuring and owning our giving.
We need actively to engage globally, in a way that 
highlights the uniqueness of the region, without 
setting it apart from the rest of the world. In the most 
basic sense, if the Arab region intends to have a seat 
at the table, and have an influential voice in the de-
signing and creating of development programmes and 
innovations that affect the global south, then we must 
come to the table with meaningful and constructive 
insights, of which we have no shortage. The poten-
tial of this region is immense, yet it remains largely 
untapped. The time has come for the Arab region 
to gather its resources, share its learning, advocate 
around meaningful change in the policies and laws 
that affect its citizens, and take stock of its standing in 
the global community, for which it can prove immea-
surably useful..





For many years the northern non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) part of international civil 
society has been dedicated to building the capacity 
of southern ‘partners’. Often associated with the 
idea of dependent partners gaining organisational 
sustainability are the decades of strategic 
commitment to level the playing field of built-in 
disparities between north-south NGO power, and 
the unequal access to resources that comes with it. 
Despite earnest intentions, the notion of ‘partnership’ 
as mutuality and solidarity, with a gradual shift in the 
weight of action, control and resources from northern 
to southern entities, has simply not happened at a 
meaningful scale (Fowler 2000; Elbers and Schulpen 
2013). For reasons explained below, such an ambition 
is even less likely to be realised in the future. 
This contribution argues that an ambition of 
levelling what vertical partnership means needs to 
be honestly discarded in favour of horizontal ideas, 
incentives, investments and processes to counter a 
post-2015 reality that southern NGOs, for want of 
a better label, will continue to be disadvantaged by 
northern ‘partners’ and those who support them. 
A radical rethink is needed if the international NGO 
(INGO) community is to stop increasing its own 
resource inequalities, which replicate the expanding 
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A story of enduring resource inequalities can be 
told in terms of quality as well as quantity. We start 
with some indicative numbers. Reliable figures on 
how many INGOs and NGOs exist and what their 
resources are across the world are hard to come 
by. At 1,800 members, Concord - an umbrella 
organisation for European INGOs - gives some idea 
of the scale of organisations accessing northern 
resources. According to a study by Development 
Initiatives (2014), in 2011, NGOs collectively provided 
financial resources of US$26.2bn, accounting for 
58% of private development assistance (PDA). This 
study notes that income distribution is concentrated 
through large, well known organisations. 
“For example, 35 organisations in Canada 
received 79% of all revenue raised by non-profit 
organisations for international development 
in 2011. Over 1,000 organisations shared the 
remaining 21% of revenue in Canada.”
Since 2010, the top 10 INGOs by turnover account 
for some US$10.1bn, equivalent to 38% of the total 
(UNDP 2104:346). 
With the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 
(BRAC) as a notable exception, this biased 
distribution of resource acquisition is replicated 
in the global south. Southern NGOs are financially 
overshadowed by their northern counterparts. For 
example, the CIVICUS background paper prepared for 
contributors to the 2015 State of Civil Society Report 
says that:
“According to organisational data from May 
2014, just under half of CIVICUS members are 
organisations subsisting on annual budgets of less 
than US$75,000, and around 70% of CIVICUS’ 
membership is based in the south.”
What lies behind 
northern NGOs’ 
behaviour?
It is not too difficult to trace the cause of INGOs being 
unable to put into practice what they aspire to in terms 
of building southern NGOs to the extent that they 
gain the major hold in their country’s development 
and non-profit revenue streams. A basic obstacle to 
doing so was and still is an INGO’s economic imperative 
for increasing turnover, pushed by governors and 
underpinned by a caritas legacy where financial 
growth is a proxy for organisational performance. 
These factors, plus an interest in self-sustainability, 
push INGOs to ‘follow the money’ (Albertyn and 
Tjønneland 2010). Over the years, this has meant 
INGOs adjusting to donor decentralisation of funding 
decision-making. Hence the past decade or so has seen 
the establishment of INGOs as locally incorporated 
and governed bodies in the global south (e.g., Gibbs 
2000). It takes a brave and exceptional INGO, such as 
EveryChild, to break this mould and move to a mutually 
supportive network model (Hailey 2014).
An expanding presence of INGOs as southern 
entities has a number of knock on effects that 
shape what southern civil society looks like in terms 
of endogeneity, public trust, government policy 
and domestic support. Of course, no country is an 
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island, but at issue is an externally modelled layer 
in southern civil society ecology that can crowd out 
other more endogenous potentials. And when the 
follow the money mentality meets the practice of 
competitive bidding for aid contracts, local NGOs 
are at a further disadvantage. INGOs from the global 
north can rely on their intra-organisational networks, 
allied to lobbying official donors back home, to create 
preferential conditions. 
Competitive bidding is now being complemented by 
Value for Money stipulations. This ‘quality of resource’ 
combination steers official aid even more strongly 
towards NGOs and INGOs with demonstrated track 
records, reliable reporting systems and high degrees 
of professionalisation. Professionalisation leads to 
INGOs poaching the best staff of local NGOs, with 
salary benchmarks and expectations that further 
challenge the stability and capability of local NGOs. 
On the plus side, INGOs bring in knowledge, skills, 
ideas and connections that improve the availability 
of human resources in a country. Moreover, a 
commitment to the development of local leadership 
seen in many INGOs increases the pool of talent 
that can be applied elsewhere. However, a common 
observation is that the aspiration of highly valued 
indigenous staff to leave an INGO to start or take 
over a local NGO is seldom in sync with their family 
situation - children growing up, costs of education and 
so on - which works against taking the risks involved. 
Staff migration from local to international NGOs - 
even if these are locally incorporated bodies - is more 
common than in the other direction.
Competitive bidding also reduces incentives for NGOs 
to accept coordination, which feeds concerns about 
duplication of effort and waste of resources. Funders 
have tried to counter the disincentive they create by 
requiring joint bidding for contracts, but in these it 
is uncommon for southern NGOs to be in the lead. 
More often their role is that of a sub-contractor, which 
works against them learning bidding skills, budgeting 
know how and an acquisition track record.
Delays in payments make it common for INGOs 
to bridge cash-flow gaps by cross-financing from 
other sources, including strategic reserves and bank 
overdrafts. This option is typically less available 
for southern NGOs. Similarly, both northern and 
southern NGOs must cope with the uncertainties of 
donors’ short-term funding arrangements, drawn out 
decision-making processes and pressures to start up 
too quickly to make up lost time before a curtain falls 
on the financial year. The resilience to do so is partly 
mediated by an organisation’s scale of operations 
and total turnover. This means that a problem with 
continuity is less likely to have a significant disruptive 
impact with financially big, multi-source set ups than 
with smaller ones, which again favours the global 
north. 
These tendencies by nothern NGOs and INGOs to 
follow the money southwards, adhere to Value 
for Money as a performance criterion and follow 
competitive bidding processes offer a potent mix of 
factors that work against resource parity, let alone 
advantage, for southern NGOs.
Many INGOs have been strategically astute in 
establishing themselves as locally incorporated 
entities in countries, such as Brazil, India and Thailand, 
which have a fast growing middle class, who may be 
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motivated to finance domestic development through 
an intermediary. This experience is an advantage 
when looking towards expanding to or in middle 
income countries where the majority of the extreme 
poor are to be found (Sumner, 2010). Without 
comparative experience as a resource - transferred 
when INGO senior staff are moved around - local 
NGOs need to work extra hard to capture the 
‘market’ for domestic private giving, away from 
traditions of supporting welfare and direct gifting to 
maintain personal relational social capital.
Another knock on factor stems from the fact that the 
geo-politics of today and tomorrow are challenging 
and reducing the pre-eminence of Euro-American 
countries and donors on the global stage. For 
developing countries, south-south politics is the 
new game in town. This may be one reason why the 
expansion of INGOs in the south and direct financing 
to local NGOs from abroad is creating an increasing 
number of unwelcome political outcomes. Most 
publicised is the introduction of legislation or rules, 
e.g., in India and Russia, designed to restrict foreign 
financial flows to local NGOs. Whereas a southern 
government might once have exhibited caution in 
the face of northern complaints about NGO rights, 
they now have the confidence to shrug these off. To 
the extent that it was ever real, an assumption that 
income disparity between a poorer southern NGO 
and richer resource-bearing northern counterparts 
could be offset by northern NGOs providing 
‘protection by association’ to southern NGOs seldom 
holds.
Another type of political/policy outcome is restraint 
on advocacy and lobbying activity for NGOs receiving 
more than a certain proportion of their funds from 
abroad, as has been introduced in Ethiopia and 
attempted in Kenya. These restrictive measures 
add to previous laws that, in the name of counter 
terrorism, have already shrunk civic space, as well as 
creating onerous financial reporting requirements 
for a wide swath of civil society organisations that 
are not up to the bureaucratic task. This also adds to 
overheads. 
Looking forward
It can, therefore, be argued that forces which have 
played out over some 40 years of NGO and INGO 
involvement in development cooperation have 
systematically disadvantaged the capability of 
southern NGOs to access aid resources anywhere 
Northern and southern NGOs need each other, and as long as 
there is respect in practice to match the rhetoric, asymmetries 
need not stand in the way of equity in behaviour.
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near on a par with their northern counterparts. In 
addition, northern NGO behaviours have co-shaped 
the evolution of civil society in the global south in 
both intended and unanticipated ways. Positive is 
a capacity to save lives, actions to protect the weak 
and publicity of a government’s abusive behaviour. 
Unwelcome outcomes are the animation of forces 
for restrictive legislation, feeding a regimes’ political 
wariness of their own citizens and public policies that 
push towards a risk-adverse priority for delivery of 
social services. The degree to which this shaping of 
civil society is significant obviously varies from country 
to country, and regime to regime. But this general 
picture largely describes southern NGO experiences.
The resourcing story so far invites two questions. 
First, do significant resource disparities between 
NGOs of the global north and global south matter 
in the south? Second, in a context that will be 
shaped by post-2015 development goals, will NGO 
resourcing history repeat itself? The answer to the 
first question depends somewhat on the timeframe 
one has in mind. In the short term, the nature of 
southern NGO practice will remain vulnerable to 
the danger of disassociation from the mass of the 
population, as identified by CIVICUS’ analysis of 
people’s participation patterns, which found in many 
cases a disconnect between citizens and formal CSOs 
(CIVICUS 2011). This implies that looking around, 
rather than looking up into vertical relations, needs 
to be tomorrow’s strategy to deal with today’s 
challenges.
It can be argued that resource asymmetries energise 
relationships, create synergies between different 
competencies and foster connections that work 
against fragmentation and inefficiencies. Northern 
and southern NGOs need each other, and as long 
as there is respect in practice to match the rhetoric, 
asymmetries need not stand in the way of equity 
in behaviour. On the aid landscape, I have seen this 
quality of relationship, built up over many years of 
trial and error, struggle and debate. But examples of 
this are few and far between. Moreover, even these 
interactions face harder times. Reaching this high 
quality of relations will be more and more problematic 
when tied to official development assistance (ODA) 
that is increasingly privatisation-inclined.1 A climate-
challenged mono-paradigm of economic growth, 
trickledown economics, targeting and social safety 
nets is likely to continue. For hopes of equitable 
resourcing across NGOs, we will need to look beyond 
this singular, official framework. 
Debates about financing the post-2015 development 
agenda offer little prospect that the systemic legacy 
of 40 years will not be carried forward. One indicator 
is the continuation of aid mechanisms that transfer 
donors’ domestic policies into developing countries, 
with the structural adjustment programmes of the 
1980s being a classic example of this. Within Euro-
America, one response to indebted economic collapse 
at the end of the last decade is a reduction in public 
spending. This policy is to be remedied by the magic 
of ‘innovation’, where subsidised non-profits become 
social enterprises. Experiencing this pressure, INGOs 
are enhancing the income diversification capabilities 
of southern counterparts as a way to change the rules 
and expectations of the partnership game. An issue 
is whether or not southern NGOs can turn this north-
to-south policy transmission to their advantage. In 
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and trade, exemplified in the push for ‘responsible’ 
private sector involvement to generate public goods, 
as seen in the proposed SDG Goal 17 (UN-OWG 
2014). 
In my view, it is time to change tack and track, and 
debate NGO resourcing from a southern perspective. 
What might this mean? First, re-value and couple 
to traditional support methods practices of mutual 
support based, for example, on affinities seen 
in diaspora remittances. In 2012, diaspora flows 
amounted to an estimated US$381bn - more than 
twice the value of ODA. However, only US$19bn, 
5%, of diaspora finance funds public services.2 
Though very unevenly distributed across the world, 
exploration by southern NGOs with the southern 
diasporas based in the north that are generating 
this finance stream would draw on the social capital 
and cultural norms which international migration 
brings, in a form of ‘horizontal’ thinking. Put another 
way, unlike the nuclear families of Euro-America, 
much of the rest of the world has vast, transnational 
social capital as a resource to draw on. The issue 
for southern NGOs that have based themselves on 
western organisational models is how to re-inscribe 
these inherent values and knowledges into their 
identity and practices.
Second, there is a need to undo a vertical mindset 
that sees intermediating INGOs, in a rich to poor 
aid chain, as the aspirational model. The EveryChild 
example, which entailed closing down as a separate 
northern entity, and transferring its assets to an 
international alliance with, and governed by, a 
majority of southern-based NGOs, is worth learning 
from. Though perhaps less extreme, the transition 
of some northern owned INGOs to more horizontally 
networked and alliance-governed models offers ideas 
in practice. 
Another horizontality is to learn from how people 
who are poor and marginalised are often their own 
philanthropists (Wilkinson-Maposa and Fowler 2009). 
The norms and rules applied by poor people are not 
just to survive together, but to develop, by collectively 
not succumbing to further deprivation as conditions 
worsen. Sensitivity to context is seen in the adaptable 
growth of small scale community foundations across 
the world, which are not necessarily located in capital 
cities and do not resemble Euro-American civil society 
models. They are increasingly clever about local 
resource mobilisation, and they offer an updated 
prospect on what building on the indigenous can 
look like, as well as providing lessons for the north 
(Marcoux and Kasper 2014). 
The tectonic plates of a vertical political and economic 
order - the west and the rest - are moving towards a 
more horizontal and plural set up. The resourcing of 
southern NGOs needs to ride this wave.
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Introduction
After 9/11, global powers took emergency steps to 
cut off the flow of financial resources to terrorist 
organisations. This effort included sanctions of 
persons and organisations put on terrorist lists, and 
expanded civil and criminal penalties for providing 
funds or other forms of aid to them. Civil society is 
just one of the sectors covered by these laws, but 
because of the unique public benefit and often life-
saving nature of its work, civil society has been among 
the most negatively impacted.
As part of their anti-terrorist financing strategy, the US 
and its allies also turned to the unofficial but powerful 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an multinational 
organisation that sets standards for legal measures to 
combat threats to the international financial system, 
such as money laundering. After 9/11 FATF added 
anti-terrorist financing to its agenda and developed 
special recommendations to address it, including 
one on civil society organisations (CSOs). FATF’s 
recommendation on non-profits adopted the rhetoric 
of the George W Bush administration, finding that civil 
society is “particularly vulnerable” to terrorist abuse, 
and promoting increased government monitoring and 
supervision of CSOs. 
What followed was a chain of events that has had a 
negative impact on civil society operations and access 
to financial resources to support CSO work. While 
FATF has taken positive steps since 2012 to prevent 
abuse or misapplication of its programme, more 
needs to be done to make sure anti-terrorist financing 
laws stop money to terrorists, not to civil society. This 
will require concerted effort by civil society, FATF and 
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This contribution to the 2015 CIVICUS State of Civil 
Society Report explains how FATF’s programme 
works and how it has contributed to the global 
trend of restrictions on civil society, intentionally 
or not. It then describes the civil society response 
and advocacy campaign on FATF. There have been 
important successes, but on-going engagement is 
required if the problematic trend is to be reversed. 
Finally, it suggests ways in which CSOs in all parts of 
the world can engage in the FATF process, globally 
and in their own countries, to prevent enactment of 
new restrictions and to reverse regressive trends.
The most power-
ful agency you 
never heard of 
– what FATF does 
and how it impacts 
on civil society
Ben Hayes, a UK-based civil society analyst, calls 
FATF “the most powerful agency you never heard 
of.”1 It has come as a surprise to civil society 
advocates that they must now focus time and 
resources on a multinational institution focused on 
the international financial system. But defence of 
civil society can lead in unexpected directions, and 
civil society now needs to pay close attention to this 
obscure but influential body. 
Formed in 1989, FATF has 35 member states and 
eight regional associate members and official 
Ten categories of restrictions on resources:
(1) requiring prior government approval to receive 
international funding; 
(2) enacting ‘foreign agents’ legislation to 
stigmatise foreign funded CSOs; 
(3) capping the amount of international funding 
that a CSO is allowed to receive; 
(4) requiring that international funding be routed 
through government-controlled entities;
(5) restricting activities that can be undertaken 
with international funding; 
(6) prohibiting CSOs from receiving international 
funding from specific donors; 
(7) constraining international funding through the 
overly broad application of counterterrorism 
and anti-money laundering measures;
(8) taxing the receipt of international funding, 
including cross-border philanthropy; 
(9) imposing onerous reporting requirements on 
the receipt of international funding; 
(10) using defamation laws, treason laws, and 
other laws to bring criminal charges against 
recipients of international funding.
Aid Barriers and the Rise of Philanthropic 
Protectionism by Douglas Rutzen, International 
Journal on Not for Profit Law, March 2015
observer bodies, such as the World Bank and UN 
agencies. Its member states set anti-terrorist financing 
and anti-money laundering standards that it uses to 
assess the adequacy of laws in almost every country 
in the world. Its recommendations cover a variety of 
sectors, including banking, remittance businesses and 
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CSOs. FATF members meet in quarterly plenaries and 
make decisions by consensus. 
FATF describes itself as a policy making body.2 It is 
not treaty based and has no actual legal authority, 
and hence there is little transparency or public 
accountability. Its recommendations do not constitute 
binding international obligations. FATF’s power and 
influence comes from its evaluation programme, 
which assesses 180 countries for compliance with its 
standards. It publishes a list of countries that it finds 
to be non-compliant or partially compliant. A negative 
rating can have serious economic consequences, 
affecting a nation’s international credit rating and 
ability to attract investment. As a result, FATF wields 
enormous influence over how governments regulate 
civil society. 
FATF’s Recommendation 8 (R8), on non-profit 
organisations (as it describes CSOs), states:
“Countries should review the adequacy of laws 
and regulations that relate to entities that can 
be abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-
profit organisations are particularly vulnerable, 
and countries should ensure that they cannot be 
misused:
“(a) by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate 
entities; (b) to exploit legitimate entities as 
conduits for terrorist financing, including for the 
purpose of escaping asset-freezing measures; and 
(c) to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion 
of funds intended for legitimate purposes to 
terrorist organisations.”
Two key documents outline how FATF expects 
governments to implement this recommendation:
The Interpretive Note (IN) lays out objectives, 
principles and the types of measures countries 
should take to be rated as compliant. 
The Best Practices Paper (BPP) provides more detail 
on principles that should guide governments, and 
how FATF thinks governments should implement R8.
In 2013, after consultation with civil society groups, 
FATF made significant revisions that took a more 
constructive approach. Important principles and 
findings in this revision include:
•	 Clear language on the need to safeguard 
freedom of association and expression;
•	 Caution that R8 should not be misused to 
suppress CSOs; 
•	 The stipulation that oversight by governments 
and measures taken by financial institutions 
should be “flexible, effective and proportional 
to the risk of abuse.”
•	 Recognition that civil society self-regulatory 
organisations can play a role in protecting the 
sector, and that measures to strengthen self-
regulation should be encouraged.
In June 2014 FATF published a report3 meant to 
identify typologies of terrorist abuse of civil society. 
Its key findings include the following:
•	 The terrorism threat to civil society remains, 
and civil society continues to be misused and 
exploited; 
•	 Non-financial abuse, such as the abuse of 
programmes or support for recruitment, 
appeared regularly;
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•	 The CSOs most at risk appear to be those 
engaged in service activities and that operate 
in close proximity to an active terrorist threat 
(e.g. in a conflict area with an active terrorist 
threat or domestically within a population that 
is actively targeted by a terrorist movement 
for support and cover). 
In a move that will have a significant impact on 
how countries are assessed for compliance with its 
standards, in 2013 FATF adopted a new evaluation 
methodology that establishes “a systematic 
assessment of the effectiveness of national 
systems,”4 with a new emphasis on the question of 
‘effectiveness’. In the future, in addition to a check-
the-box technical compliance review, countries will be 
rated on whether their laws are at a high, substantial, 
moderate or low level of effectiveness. This system 
gives civil society a new way to point out the 
counterproductive aspects of unnecessary restrictions 







Authoritarian countries have abused the FATF process 
to infringe on the rights of civil society, including its 
autonomy and ability to receive international support. 
Some governments have exceeded what is necessary 
or reasonable in their eagerness to get a complaint 
rating in the FATF assessment process. Because 
FATF focuses on financial issues, the restrictions on 
civil society that flow from its process impact on 
civil society resources: both resources coming into 
countries, and those going out. 
A 2012 ground-breaking report by Statewatch5 and 
the Transnational Institute examined the effects of 
FATF regulations in almost 160 countries and found 
that FATF rules are being used by governments as an 
“…instrument, to further cut back on the space of civil 
society… freedom to access and distribute financial 
resources for development, conflict resolution and 
human rights work.”
For example, when Paraguay was found non-
compliant with FATF standards, its response was to 
pass the Anti-Terrorist Law of 2010 which “…did not 
clearly define what constitutes terrorism and included 
acts such as ‘dangerous interventions or obstacles 
on public roadways’, ‘noise pollution’ and other 
actions which ‘intimidate Paraguayan citizens’.”6 With 
sentences of up to 15 years for some offences, the 
law is widely seen as a mechanism to suppress protest 
and limit the capacity of civil society.
While some governments cite FATF directly as 
justification for restrictions on CSOs, others cite 
‘anti-terrorist financing’ or ‘national security’ more 
generally. Either way, the impact on civil society is 
negative and fails to take the proportional, risk-based 
approach that is central to FATF policy. 
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tions on sources 
of funding for 
civil society
After the 2014 FATF evaluation, Spain passed a new law 
requiring all donations over €1,000 to be reported to 
the national government. In Uzbekistan, CSOs must get 
approval for foreign grants and report each financial 
transaction using the funds, no matter how small, to 
the Ministry of Finance on the next business day.7
The British Virgin Islands, citing FATF, passed a law 
that requires CSOs with more than three employees 
to appoint a Money Laundering Reporting Officer. 
CSOs with less than three employees are required to 
“…perform the Money Laundering Reporting Officer 
functions” though they need not appoint one. Stiff 
fines are imposed for “…failure to maintain any 
records required to be maintained.”8 
In 2013, Azerbaijan passed amendments to its CSO 
laws that, among other measures, increased penalties 
for CSOs that fail to register a grant, and introduced 
penalties for donors giving cash donations to CSOs 
and CSOs for receiving cash donations.9
Some countries, including Bangladesh and Egypt, 
require prior government approval before a CSO 
can receive international funding. Since 2009, CSOs 
in Ethiopia have been limited to 10% of their total 
income coming from foreign sources. In India, CSOs 
must report all foreign contributions to the central 
government within 30 days of receipt.10
These are just a few examples of the many excessive 
government restrictions recently imposed on CSO 
funding.
Growing prob-
lems with access 
to financial 
services
FATF Recommendations also cover financial institutions. 
Since 9/11, financial institutions have increasingly been 
expected to act as monitoring and enforcement arms 
of governments in order to identify, track and stop illicit 
money flows. Between the cost of compliance and the 
threat of significant sanctions for violations, banks have 
begun ‘derisking’ by dropping low profit customers such 
as CSOs. As a result, charities and grant-makers that 
need to conduct international financial transactions for 
their operations have experienced increasing difficulty 
getting access to financial services. Financial institutions 
may close accounts, refuse to make transfers between 
organisations, or delay them, often for months at a 
time. Remittance services that facilitate fund transfers 
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between diaspora populations and their families are 
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The Statewatch report put a spotlight on FATF, 
generating further scrutiny. In 2013, Maina Kiai, 
UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association, said that FATF “…
fails to provide for specific measures to protect the civil 
society sector from undue restrictions to their right to 
freedom of association…”11 He noted that the right of 
assembly includes the right “…to seek, receive and use 
resources... from domestic, foreign, and international 
sources.” A March 2013 report by the Observatory 
for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders looked 
at 35 country case studies and found that “…in many 
countries the fight against terrorism and money 
laundering is instrumentalised by authorities to 
neutralize NGOs and silence critics.”12
Civil society has also responded. In mid 2012 the 
Human Security Collective, a Dutch group that works 
to protect the operational and political space of 
civil society, approached FATF to ask for a response 
to the Statewatch report. That October FATF issued 
a statement saying, “It will be important that 
regulations and actions in this area do not harm the 
legitimate activities of such organizations.”13 
During this time the Human Security Collective and 
the US-based Charity & Security Network formed 
the Transnational NPO Working Group on FATF, 
which coordinates information sharing and advocacy 
for over 100 CSOs globally. Many of its members 
participated in FATF’s first formal engagement with 
civil society groups in April 2013, and their input was 
incorporated into the June 2013 limited BPP update. 
Since that time, the working group has provided 
substantial input for the 2014 FATF typology study, 
and at time of writing, it was coordinating civil society 
input into the final update of the BPP.
This process involved a formal consultation with FATF, 
but problems arose when it came to sharing the draft 
BPP for comment. FATF only released it to invitees 
to its consultation, and it was only after several FATF 
members, including the European Union and USA, 
released it that it became widely available for sector 
comment. This indicates that more needs to be done 
to make FATF transparent and accountable. 
FATF followed through on its statements about 
protecting civil society in its February 2015 study on 
ISIS financing, noting that, “It is important that efforts 
and measures aiming at combating terrorist financing 
should not affect legitimate provision of humanitarian 
assistance to vulnerable populations…”14
Next steps for 
civil society 
At the time of writing, as well as coordinating input to 
FATF on the final revision of the BPP, the Transnational 
NPO Working Group on FATF is helping civil society 
raise its voice at the national level as the new 
assessment methodology is implemented. The final 
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BPP should guide governments on what they should 
do to take a risk based and proportional approach to 
protecting CSOs from terrorist abuse. It should not 
be used for one-size-fits-all regulations, or turn civil 
society codes and standards into law. 
It will be up to civil society at the national level to 
engage in dialogue with their governments about 
how R8 and the risk based approach it calls for can 
be implemented constructively. In places where 
governments abuse the process to repress civil 
society, both local CSOs and the international civil 
society community must find ways to respond. The 
method will depend on the circumstances, but tools 
such as the UN Human Rights Commission Universal 
Periodic Review process can be considered. 
FATF evaluations of country compliance with its 
standards present another opportunity for civil 
society to raise issues about the appropriateness and 
effectiveness of restrictions and regulations. 
Conclusion
Governments that are serious about protecting 
human security will agree with Maina Kiai, who said 
“...civil society organizations play a significant role in 
combatting terrorism. By their direct connections with 
the population and their prodigious work in, inter 
alia, poverty reduction, peacebuilding, humanitarian 
assistance, human rights, and social justice, including 
in politically complex environments, civil society 
plays a crucial role against the threat of terrorism.”15 
Removing unnecessary and unjustified barriers to 
resources will only strengthen civil society’s ability to 
play this important role.
For more information, and to join the Transnational 
NPO Working Group on FATF, see www.fatfplatform.
org. 
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Private development assistance (PDA) is finance 
from private sources given voluntarily through 
formal channels, including civil society organisations 
(CSOs), and transferred across borders to promote 
international development and reduce poverty. PDA 
is also referred to as international private giving, 
international philanthropy or voluntary giving.
If the international community is to meet the goal 
of ending absolute poverty by 2030, all available 
resources for development - not just official 
development assistance (ODA) - need to be targeted 
to where they are needed most.
Estimating global 
PDA
Twenty-three countries that are members of 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) provide an estimated US$45.3bn 
in PDA annually, equivalent to around a third of all 
aid from these countries (see Figure 1). An estimated 
further US$1bn of PDA comes from emerging 
economies, with Saudi Arabia being the largest 
provider out of seven countries (see Figure 2). 
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However, data on PDA flows is insufficient in terms of 
both coverage and quality.1 PDA data is poor because 
of low reporting levels, a lack of accountability 
structures for private donors and an absence of 
established transparency and reporting standards. 
The absence of data2 is one aspect of a wider 
accountability deficit in philanthropy and CSOs.3 Data 
on volumes and trends in global southern contexts is 
particularly lacking. The data gaps suggest that PDA 
volumes are underestimated. 
Further, a lack of standards impedes cross-
country comparisons. Financial information is not 
standardised at the international level, and diverse 
regulatory environments and legislative classifications 
of charitable organisations, international giving, social 
investments and annual reporting make international 
comparisons particularly problematic. A lack of 
regulation and a sound legal basis for civil society 
in some countries also contributes directly to the 
challenge of data collection and analysis.4 
Based on the best available data for 2011 or the most 
recent year, the United States is by far the largest 
known source of PDA: at US$30.4bn, it accounts for 
67% of total PDA. The UK is the second largest source 
(US$4.9bn, 11%), and after these two, only Germany, 
Canada and Australia give over US$1bn.5
These countries have each developed their own 
legislative frameworks for and incentives to encourage 
private giving, and provide substantial freedoms for 
civil society activity and fundraising, and systems 
for regulating tax incentives and recording income 
and expenditure trends. These stimulate PDA. Tax 
exemption regimes have helped create what Severino 
and Ray (2009) call “open-ended solidarity”, in which 
the contributions of private individuals are subsidised 
by the state through tax exemption. Such incentive 
systems can also result in better measurement, as 
more data is recorded.
Figure 1. Private Development Assistance from 23 
DAC and seven non DAC providers, 2011 estimates, 
US$ billions
Data on PDA from non-DAC countries is available 
for 2011 from seven countries (see Figure 2). Saudi 
Arabia provides US$572m, 41%, of known PDA from 
the seven countries. Saudi Arabia’s contribution 
mainly consists of funds from Saudi public fundraising 
campaigns, channelled through CSOs, and going to 
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Figure 2. Private Development Assistance from seven 
non DAC providers, 2011 estimates, US$ millions
Source: Development Initiatives 20146
PDA and local philanthropy are set to have increasing 
roles in fast-growing developing economies. These 
resources could be more effectively focused on 
reducing poverty, especially as these countries 
receive less aid. Corporate giving and high net worth 
individuals (HNWIs) could be important avenues for 
philanthropy in such countries.
PDA from foun-
dations, CSOs and 
corporations
How PDA is distributed across provider types, 
including foundations, CSOs and corporations, varies 
by country. Further, each PDA provider has different 
approaches to reducing poverty. CSOs are most likely 
to work in countries in crisis, while foundations favour 
more advanced developing countries.7 
As shown in Figure 3, CSOs deliver the largest share 
of PDA, providing 57.8% of total PDA in 2011, an 
estimated US$26.2bn. Additionally, CSOs deliver a 
share of ODA: this share has risen from 13% of ODA 
in 2008 to 17% in 2012, reaching US$17bn. Corporate 
giving represented US$8.2bn, or 18%, of PDA in 2011. 
Foundation giving represented US$7.1bn, or 15.6%, of 
estimated PDA in 2011, mainly from US foundations. 
Figure 3. PDA by provider type, 2011 data or most 
recent year available, US$ billions
Source: Development Initiatives (2014)
PDA is characterised by a high concentration of 
resources moving through large, well-known CSOs 
and a few large foundations. For example, the 
10 largest foundations account for about 60% of 
international foundation giving. At the other end 
of the scale, PDA is fragmented among thousands 
PDA and local 
philanthropy are set 
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of thousands of small actors, including CSOs at the 




Private donors, including individuals, trusts and 
foundations, and private companies and corporations, 
contributed an estimated US$5.4bn of humanitarian 
assistance in 2013, representing 26% of the total 
international finance for the humanitarian sector. 
Over a quarter of all international humanitarian 
assistance came from private donors between 2009 
and 2013.
Individuals contribute the overwhelming majority of 
private funding, providing 72% of the total in 2013. In 
the humanitarian sector, as in development overall, 
CSOs are the largest mobilisers of private funding, 
raising an estimated US$4.7bn in 2013, and almost 
US$23bn in the five years between 2009 and 2013.
Figure 4. Total international humanitarian assistance, 
2009-2013
Sources: Development Initiatives. Based on OECD DAC, 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) and Global 
Humanitarian Assistance’s unique dataset of private 
voluntary contributions
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Private companies and corporations provided an 
estimated US$324.4m in humanitarian funding in 
2013, and US$1.1bn between 2009 and 2013. Their 
role and profile in humanitarian response is changing 
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significantly, with many moving beyond a direct 
donorship role towards a ‘corporate partnership’ 
approach, providing a range of skills and resources, the 
financial value of which is unknown. 
Some innovative examples of non-financial support 
provided by the private sector to support international 
disaster response efforts in recent years include:
•	 Shipment and logistics corporation UPS’ 
Humanitarian Relief Programme uses pre-
approved funds, Logistics Emergency Teams 
and their own expertise and supply chains to 
assist disaster relief efforts around the world.
•	 Legal firm Allen & Overy has developed a 
suite of legal tools that countries can use to 
deal with issues that arise in the aftermath of 
a natural disaster.
•	 Construction company Bouygues UK sends 
volunteers to work with the Emergency 
Architects Foundation, a CSO, following 
major natural disasters. In Haiti, Bouygues 
volunteers used their skills to help local 
people rebuild services and their lives 
following the massive earthquake in 2010.
Growth trends 
estimates 
Overall, PDA grew faster than ODA between 2006 
and 2011, with PDA provided by corporations and 
foundations growing particularly fast (see Figure 5). 
Three trends following gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth are particularly relevant to the growth of PDA 
from source countries:
•	 A rise in private giving by the middle classes: 
In general, as national income increases, 
donations from individuals are observed to 
increase.8 Research into individuals’ donations 
in Canada shows that donations grew faster 
than both GDP and median incomes between 
1984 and 2010.9 The ‘global middle class’ is 
projected to increase, although estimates vary. 
One source suggests that the size of this group 
will increase from 1.8bn people in 2009 to 
4.9bn by 2030, of which 80% will live in non-
OECD economies.10 
•	 High-profile initiatives led by wealthy 
philanthropists, including HNWIs: Initiatives 
such as the ‘Giving Pledge’, initiated by Bill 
Gates and Warren Buffet, and the Clinton 
Global Initiative, are catalysing HWNI giving to 
development. For example, under the Giving 
Pledge, 129 individuals, with a combined net 
worth of over US$400bn, have committed 
to giving ‘the majority’ of their wealth to 
philanthropy either during their lifetime or in 
their wills.11 Numbers of HNWIs in emerging 
economies are also rapidly increasing. One 
report finds that in China, India and African 
countries, the number of people with wealth of 
US$100m or more could increase by 37% from 
2011 to 2016.12
•	 Increased corporate giving: The share of profits 
that private companies or corporations allocate 
to charitable giving also increases with profit 
levels.13 India passed a law in 2013 requiring 
large companies to spend 2% of their post-tax 
profits on social welfare activities. While much 
of this may be allocated to domestic issues 
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within India, and therefore not meet the PDA 
definition, it may become a model for future 
private sector involvement in development.14
Importantly, each of these three sources of PDA - the 
middle class, wealthy individuals and corporations - 
give PDA in different ways: they use different channels 
and give to different sectors and countries. While 
HNWIs may establish their own charitable foundations 
through which to channel their giving, most middle-
class people contribute a share of their private wealth 
through CSOs.15
The number of choices for channels of delivery of PDA 
is growing, as are the number of agencies involved in 
providing development assistance, bringing increased 
diversity among organisations that are involved in 
reducing poverty. 
Figure 5. Estimated growth of PDA overall and by 
provider type over 2006-11, based on indexed 
growth 2006–11 and 2011 volumes in US$ billions
Source: Development Initiatives 2014 
This growing diversity is transforming power relations. 
Today, some large private actors control financial re-
sources of a value comparable to those controlled by 
official donors. Greenhill and Prizzon (2013) found that 
developing countries welcome non-traditional flows, in-
cluding philanthropy and social impact investment. The 
benefits of increased choice are seen as outweighing 
the costs of increased fragmentation of development 
assistance. Another benefit is increased negotiating 
power for the governments of developing countries, 
as they have access to non-ODA grants.16 In turn, this 
can be seen as reducing official donors’ influence over 
development priorities in the global south, as argued by 
Severino and Ray in ‘The End of ODA’ (2009). 
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The role of Zakat in humanitarian assistance
All of the world’s major religions contain some 
element of almsgiving, and faith plays a key role 
in the funding and delivery of development assis-
tance and humanitarian response across the world. 
In 2013, faith-based organisations received and 
delivered between US$420m and US$434m (15-
16%) of all international humanitarian assistance 
channelled through CSOs.17
Islamic countries, and those with large Muslim 
populations, are also becoming more significant 
humanitarian actors, as both donors and recipi-
ents. Between 2011 and 2013, international hu-
manitarian assistance from governments within 
the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation grew from 
US$599m to over US$2.2bn, representing a growth 
in the share of total international humanitarian 
assistance from governments from 4% to 14%. At 
the same time, an estimated 75% of people living 
in the top 10 recipient countries of humanitarian 
assistance in 2013 were Muslim.
Zakat, the mandatory Muslim practice of giving 
2.5% of one’s accumulated wealth for charitable 
purposes every year, is one of the main tools of 
Islamic social financing. It is explicitly intended to 
reduce inequality, and is widely used in Muslim 
countries to fund domestic development and pov-
erty reduction efforts. There are clear parallels to 
be drawn between the eight individual categories 
of eligible recipients of Zakat listed in the Qur’an 
and people in need of humanitarian assistance.
There is no reliable data currently available to 
show precisely how much Zakat is paid by Mus-
lims around the world, or how it is spent globally. 
Yet data collected for Indonesia, Malaysia, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen, which make up 17% of 
the world’s estimated Muslim population, indicates 
that in these countries alone, at least US$5.7bn is 
currently collected in Zakat by formal Zakat-man-
agement institutions each year.
The global volume of Zakat collected each year 
through formal mechanisms can be estimated, at 
the very least, in the order of tens of billions of dol-
lars. If Zakat currently thought to be paid through 
informal mechanisms is included, the estimate 
would be much higher estimate, potentially in the 
region of hundreds of billions of dollars.
There is a growing interest among humanitarian 
and development actors in leveraging greater levels 
of funding through Zakat and other forms of Islamic 
social financing. Organisations outside of the tradi-
tional Muslim aid agencies are beginning to con-
duct Zakat-based fundraising drives, such as United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)’s 
current Zakat Syria Campaign.
The need for 
transparency and 
data to support 
decision-making
There is an urgent need for better data on PDA, to 
allow greater understanding of how it is used, which 
sectors and countries it goes to, and who benefits. 
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This data is essential to support understanding of the 
potential of these flows to reduce poverty, and inform 
resource allocation. There are three main gaps in the 
information that can be extracted from current data 
sources:
•	 The traceability of PDA is particularly poor, 
leading to a lack of data on where PDA goes, 
especially at sub-national level. 
•	 The impact of PDA is still not well understood, 
both in terms of impact and outcomes. The 
lack of comparable data on the impacts of PDA 
providers impedes a wider understanding of 
the value of this resource for reducing poverty.
•	 The predictability of private development 
finance is low, particularly in comparison with 
ODA. Forward-looking data is largely absent.
Data is also lacking on private giving usually 
considered outside the traditional development 
finance area, including crowd-funding, social impact 
investment and Zakat. 
Mapping global PDA is a critical first step towards 
taking full advantage of its potential impact on 
poverty, including understanding how PDA can 
catalyse or complement other resource flows, and 
where it can have most impact. The International Aid 
Transparency Initiative is one initiative that uses a 
common standard to improve data on PDA. This data 
is fundamental for any assessment of the impact of 
investments on poverty. In the humanitarian sector, a 
clear understanding of resourcing capacity and needs 
is essential to underpin effectiveness and coordination 
of live-saving humanitarian finance.
Mapping global PDA 
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potential impact on 
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In 2013 I undertook a consultancy in Uganda for a 
donor consortium that funded Ugandan civil society 
organisations (CSOs), and, in reviewing decades of 
donor project funding to CSOs, and plans to continue 
the same, I asked both the donors and the CSOs if 
they saw the future in terms of more project funding. 
Both answered, somewhat in surprise, “Yes, that is 
how we work.” 
To my question of whether the future might not lie in 
more financially independent CSOs, owning their own 
assets and not needing foreign funds, there was more 
surprise. The donors said that their rules and regula-
tions would not support this, and the CSOs said that 
they always got foreign funding for projects. There 
was very little interest in pursuing alternative resourc-
ing strategies.
And yet there was a surprising amount of bitterness 
on both sides. Donors were saddened, sometimes an-
gry, at the amount of financial auditing they had to do 
to make sure that their grants were not used improp-
erly; CSOs were saddened, but more angry, that they 
had to jump through so many donors’ bureaucratic 
hoops to get their money, and that donors did not 
trust them to use the money properly. 
Very few people had even thought about alternatives 
to donor project financing, let alone had experience 
of using some of these alternatives. For many new 
and growing CSOs, they dreamed only about finding a 
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Not far over the border in Kenya, however, that there 
was a powerful example of a CSO that had gone 
beyond traditional donor project funding: the Ken-
yan Red Cross, which raised millions from Kenyans 
through a telethon in 2011 with the slogan “Kenya for 
Kenyans”, and which regularly raises income from the 
two Red Cross Hotels it owns in Nairobi, as well as its 
annual Fund Raising Gala for the Business Community. 
Philosophy
Is donor project funding inevitable? Let us rethink our 
practices and ask ourselves where we could expect 
CSOs to get their resources from in 2015 and beyond. 
CSOs are organisations that have put themselves 
forward as competent, passionate and committed 
contributors to development in their own countries, 
sometimes in their own geographical communities 
and their own communities of practice. If we put on 
one side the well travelled route of foreign funding, 
what are the possible options?
I would suggest:
1. The public in its own country: a CSO can say to its 
own people that it is addressing important topics 
and issues with which everyone should be con-
cerned, and so they should be prepared to support 
a CSO to do this work.
2. The government in its own country: a CSO can say 
to the government that they have skills and ex-
perience that can complement, supplement and 
support the government’s development work, and 
that it makes sense for the government to think 
of supporting the CSO’s work. A CSO can do things 
that the government may not be able to do, and in 
some cases, can do them better and cheaper.
3. The business sector in its own country: CSOs have 
two options with business. If businesses are not 
active in development, then CSOs have the possi-
bility of persuading business to get involved, and 
suggesting how this could be done; if the business 
sector is active, then CSOs can suggest that they 
support the work of specific CSOs, rather than try-
ing to do development work themselves.
4. The market in its own country, or abroad: CSOs can 
see opportunities for commercial enterprises of 
two kinds: spin offs from their own mission-driven 
work, and purely commercial enterprises that will 
make money for the organisation. A variant on this 
is that a CSO may own or acquire assets that it can 
put to work to help itself, e.g. an endowed trust, or 
buildings, or stocks and shares.
All these options depend upon asking people in a 
CSO’s country to take some responsibility for the 
problems and issues of that country and commit to 
doing something about it, by using CSOs as the means 
and channel to show their commitment, rather than 
expecting foreigners to do it.
5. International donors: what is the rationale for tak-
ing foreign funding? Many CSOs are happy to offer 
themselves as channels for foreign funding to ad-
dress the issues and problems in their country. The 
reasons vary: because it believes that the foreign 
country owes resources to its country for past mis-
deeds; because it has solidarity with organisations 
Is donor project fund-
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in the foreign country addressing the same topic 
globally; or simply because funding is being offered 
for a topic or problem important to the CSO, and it 
is happy to take such offered funds, without wor-
rying about the source. The basic fact is, however, 
that such CSOs are accepting funds from the gifts 
or the taxes of people in another country, not their 
own, to address their problems.
Moving on from 
philosophy to 
strategies
Let us take each of these ideas separately and con-
sider what has done that offer possible models, and 
what problems these have encountered. We can look 
at this from the perspective of a single CSO, or from 
civil society as a whole in a country.1
1. Raising funds from the public
For an organisation that has become used to writing 
proposals to foreign donors, and that is used to donor 
language, the idea of explaining to the public of their 
country who they are, what they do, and what help 
they need is intimidating. Certain well established 
topics, such as children with disabilities, will open 
people’s hearts and pockets, if the appeal is well 
made and the organisation making it is respected, but 
how will a CSO ‘sell’ an appeal for help to combat, 
for example, domestic violence, or refugees, or land 
expropriation, or, indeed, homophobia? It is certainly 
possible that there are people in the country who are 
not convinced that these are important topics.
Even if you have a cause that is relatively easy to 
promote, learning the public relations and fundraising 
skills to promote your cause to the public is a whole 
science in itself, although there are organisations 
ready to teach these skills. 2
A different approach is to concentrate on the organ-
isation – to try and develop its reputation so that 
people will not hesitate long before giving. Though 
this will take time, it could result in the kind of good 
name that the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement has 
acquired in many countries, or the kind of reputation 
that the Edhi Foundation has developed in Pakistan.3 
It should not be so difficult to acquire such a name 
in your own locality of your own country, but it will 
mean educating your potential donors (the citizens 
of your country) about the value of the organisation. 
This means developing innovative informational mate-
rial and channels to tell them what you do, why what 
you do is important, and what more you would do if 
they helped you more. It also means being very trans-
parent with, for instance, annual accounts, to combat 
citizens’ possible suspicions.
2. Raising funds from the 
government of your country
Depending on the government of your country, and 
your CSO’s experience and performance, you may well 
be able to tell your government of your track record 
in the fields in which they are working and your 
belief in your own competence. Some government 
departments may well look favourably at such an 
approach and be prepared to provide you with the 
resources that you need to do this work, if it helps 
them, or gets them out of some difficulties. It does 
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require, however, that your CSO knows its way around 
the government bureaucracy, and is prepared to start 
a dialogue.
I have come across government officials who would 
simply refuse on principle to consider the idea of 
using government money to help CSOs, but there are 
many more who simply do not know the quality of 
the work that CSOs have done and need to be educat-
ed about it. CSOs need to take government officials 
to the work areas of CSOs, and persuade them of 
the quality of their work. It is the CSOs’ job to show 
government that the CSOs can do government’s job 
for them better than they can do it themselves. Both 
India and the Philippines provide many examples of 
governments sub-contracting or even granting funds 
to CSOs, and it is not by chance that both of these 
governments are ones that have publicly championed 
national and local CSOs as partners in development.4
3. Raising funds from the busi-
ness sector in your country
In theory business people, being citizens of your coun-
try, should be concerned with the same issues as any 
other citizen of the country, and should therefore be 
susceptible to the same public fundraising techniques 
discussed above. The difference is that (a) businesses 
may well have more resources to give away, if they 
can be persuaded to do so; (b) businesses are keen 
to be seen by their fellow country men/women as 
good citizens, worthy of respect (and worthy of being 
patronised as customers); and (c) businesses may well 
want to impress the government of the country so 
that they can become preferred contractors. Against 
this are two issues: firstly, business people often have 
a very limited understanding of development, often 
confusing it with charity; and secondly, they often see 
development largely in terms of good public relations. 
There are two strategies that I would recommend 
here. Firstly, find topics and issues that can be ‘sold’ 
to certain businesses because they are in their field of 
work. For example, banks should be interested in pro-
moting micro-finance or youth employment schemes, 
since the people they reach are likely one day to have 
bank accounts; printers should be interested in pro-
moting and supporting literacy work, since the people 
this involves will one day read books. Secondly, ad-
dress the issue that businesses are not experienced 
development practitioners. An organisation in the 
Philippines suggests a good strategy. The Philippines 
Business for Social Progress (PBSP) is a membership 
organisation of more than 150 Philippines businesses 
that all subscribe a small percentage of their profits 
into a foundation that is run as a professional de-
velopment agency in their country. The Philippines 
businesses do not try and do development them-
selves; rather, they contribute to a very professional 
foundation that does development in their name, and 
they make the most of promoting their businesses’ 
contribution to this. 
4. Gaining income from the 
market in your own country, 
or abroad
The income from a profitable enterprise does not 
have to respond to donors’ instructions and guidance; 
it does not have to report against a donor imposed log 
frame or results framework. Its use is for the CSO to 
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decide. This all sounds very attractive, but the catch is 
that very few CSOs seem very competent at running 
businesses, either at all, or at running businesses 
that do not interfere with the main mission of the 
organisation.
There are giants in the CSO business, such as BRAC 
in Bangladesh, or PDA in Thailand, which command 
multi million dollar enterprises, but there are also a 
substantial number that cover their administrative 
costs by running training courses for profit, renting 
out premises, or by running micro-finance operations 
where the return on loans provides a profit.
An Indonesian CSO, Yaysan Bina Swadaya, is instruc-
tive. Originally set up to encourage small agricultural 
cooperatives, it found that other people beyond its 
target group wanted the services it was providing, and 
were prepared to pay market rates for them. They 
started with day old chicks, then chicken feed, then 
produced an in-house magazine, Trubus, to help their 
farmers with agricultural tips and suggestions. They 
then set up a training centre for their target group, 
and finally, realising how many people were inter-
ested in learning from Bina Swadaya, they set up a 
consultancy service to teach other CSOs. In each case 
they worked from a smart appreciation that what they 
were doing for their target group (the main mission of 
the organisation) had spin offs for different markets 
and customers, and these enabled Bina Swadaya to 
make an income to address their core costs. 
In many cases such organisations are led by social 
entrepreneurs who have a business attitude, and cer-
tainly do not see enterprise led income as philosoph-
ically at odds with the work of their CSO. Meechai 
Viravaidya of PDI (famed for the Cabbages & Condoms 
Restaurants in Thailand, which promote family plan-
ning while generating income) says:
Despite the vast differences among many 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
most share the common dilemma of lacking 
sufficient funds. PDI has developed alter-
native sources of revenue to donor support 
that have had a profound impact on our 
freedom to operate. For example, PDA 
(PDI's implementing NGO in Thailand) has 
established 14 for-profit companies to gen-
erate funds for social development work, the 
most successful of which are the Cabbages & 
Condoms Restaurants.5 
Lester Salamon, of the Civil Society Centre of Johns 
Hopkins University, has researched and published on 
what he sees as an a mushrooming growth of organ-
isations that do not see themselves as donors, but as 
social investors that are looking for organisations that 
they can work with to achieve social goals, but which 
are prepared to pursue this in a business like way, 
with funds as loan money on very soft terms, rather 
than grants.6 They are looking for different kinds of 
CSOs to those who live by project funding.
5. Foreign funding to encour-
age financial self-reliance
Most donor funding from overseas is heavily project 
oriented, and is provided to CSOs that are increasingly 
required to accept a considerable amount of guid-
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ance from the donor, such as what field they should 
work in, how they should operate, and particularly 
how they set up their books of account and report. 
Of course, any CSO is at liberty to refuse to join the 
game, but if a CSO has accepted the first injection of 
foreign funding, there are precious few routes except 
increasing addiction.
There are ways, however, in which donors could 
support and strengthen financial self-reliance as well 
as provide project funding. If donors are not thinking 
about such ideas for themselves (and my experience 
in Uganda suggests that they are not) then CSOs can 
educate their donors about these possibilities:
a. Pay for training courses on financial self-reliance to 
orient CSOs to the alternatives to project funding
b. Provide investment funds for CSOs with good enter-
prise ideas to help them develop income streams
c. Set up more endowed foundations to use the 
income from invested funds to support a CSO, or 
a range of CSOs in a particular field, or CSOs as a 
whole
d. Lobby businesses (particularly from their own 
countries) to consider advanced corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) (e.g. institutionalising CSR con-
tributions, as with PBSP in the Philippines).
There are likely to be a hundred bright ideas out 
there, as soon as CSOs get out of the mental 
straightjacket of thinking that CSO funding comes 
from foreign donors.
There are likely to be a 
hundred bright ideas 
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1 This is covered more fully in Richard 
Holloway, Towards Financial Self-Reli-
ance, 2004 (London: Earthscan).
2 The most noteworthy one is the Re-
source Alliance (www.resource-alliance.
org) which has a large annual confer-
ence, and many regional training cours-
es throughout the globe.
3 The Edhi Foundation of Pakistan 
(http://edhi.org) is supported entirely 
and intentionally by freely given Paki-
stani donations. It supplies ambulances 
and immediate health care.
4 For example, ANSA-EAP (www.
ansa-eap.net) in the Philippines of-
fers many examples of Philippines 
government departments helping 
CSOs to carry out social accountabil-
ity work.
5 PDA, www.pda.or.th/e_acpd.asp. 
6 Lester Salamon (ed.), New Fron-
tiers in Philanthropy – a guide to 
the new tools and actors re-creating 
global philanthropy and social invest-
ing, 2014 (Oxford: OUP).
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Ethiopia, in the late 2000s: on one side is civil society, 
emerging after years of subjugation under a succes-
sionof repressive governments and slowly finding its 
feet. On the other is the country’s business community, 
roaring back to life after years of economic stagnation. 
While rates of growth were different, there is no 
doubt that both sectors were on an upward trajectory, 
bolstered by the space engendered by the fall of the 
repressive ‘Red Terror’ regime of Mengistu Haile Mari-
am. Exiles returned, many with new skills and focus 
obtained from many years living abroad, determined to 
ensure that Ethiopia never returned to the dark days of 
political and economic depression. At the same time, 
Ethiopia enjoyed the massive goodwill of the interna-
tional community, both political and economic, with 
Prime Minister Mele Zenawi touted as one of the new 
generation of visionary African leaders.
Then everything changed. 
In 2009, the Ethiopian government enacted a law 
prohibiting domestic civil society organisations (CSOs) 
working in certain rights-based areas, including gen-
der and children’s rights, from receiving more than 
10% of their funding from foreign sources. What hap-
pened next was no surprise. The country’s civil soci-
ety infrastructure collapsed, with one source claiming 
that the number of registered organisations has fallen 
by some 60% since then. Others say that there are no 
more than three independent human rights organisa-
tions left working in Ethiopia.
Meanwhile, the government was implementing a 
completely different approach towards the business 







-Maina Kiai, United Nations Special 
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Foreign cash flooded into Ethiopia, and encourag-
ing more of it became a matter of national policy, 
perhaps best epitomised by the 2010 Growth and 
Transformation Plan, a five-year project to encourage 
billions of dollars of new foreign investment. 
The results of this influx of foreign cash have been no 
surprise. The business sector has boomed. Ethiopia is 
now creating millionaires faster than any country on 
earth, doubling its share from 1,300 to 2,700 in just 
six years. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth av-
eraged 39% a year over the same time. The roster of 
recent foreign investments in the Ethiopian economy 
is too long to list: for example, a Chinese firm just an-
nounced plans to invest US$15m in the textile indus-
try, while in 2012 British beverage company Diageo 
purchased a local brewery for US$225m and invested 
US$119m to expand it. Turkish investors alone have 
poured US$1.2bn into the country over the past 10 
years. Bob Geldof, of Band Aid fame, is even investing 
in the local wine industry.
And of course the government itself has never shied 
away from foreign money: it receives some 40% of its 
national budget via foreign aid, which amounted to 
US$3.2bn in 2012 alone.
These are the best of times and the worst of times in 
Ethiopia. And it’s clear who is getting the short end of 
the stick. Ethiopia’s government and business com-
munity are firmly plugged into the modern network 
of global capital, while civil society has been discon-
nected - and left to whither and die. 
In 2009, the 
Ethiopian 
government 
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funding from foreign 
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A growing trend 
worldwide
At first glance, the business and civil society sectors 
may seem strange bedfellows for comparison. Con-
ventional wisdom tells us that these two entities are 
distinct, warranting separate rules and treatment. The 
basis for this treatment seems to boil down to one 
dividing point: one exists to make a profit; the other is 
non-profit. 
But beyond their dissimilar profit motives, just how 
different are businesses and civil society? And how 
differently should governments treat them? 
The funding aspect of this question is among the 
topics we have been examining for the past year in a 
series of regional dialogues on civic space, organised 
jointly by the Community of Democracies and the 
office of the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. The 
broader topic of sectoral equity - from registration to 
operational rules - will be the subject of the Special 
Rapporteur’s next report to the UN General Assembly 
in October 2015. The report will survey law, practice 
and perception in a number of jurisdictions around 
the world, with a focus on identifying how civil society 
and businesses are treated differently as legal entities, 
for better or for worse.
Obviously, resources are a central issue when it comes 
to differential treatment. They are the lifeblood of any 
organisation, as the Special Rapporteur pointed out 
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in his 2013 report on civil society’s ability to access 
resources. You can’t do much without resources: staff, 
offices, equipment and the implementation of plans 
and programmes all require resources. 
Cutting financial resources off is an easy way for a 
government to silence a CSO that’s a bit too critical, 
or even a business that refuses to toe the line, even if 
that line is the sharing of resources with the power-
ful political elite. And it’s also relatively easy to cloak 
restrictions on funding in the language of national 
security or crime prevention, even when these aren’t 
the true reasons behind the restrictions.
Ethiopia is not unique in treating civil society and 
businesses differently when it comes to their ability to 
look abroad for funds. 
Russia, for example, requires CSOs receiving foreign 
funds and engaging in vaguely-defined ‘political ac-
tivity’ to register as ‘foreign agents’, which carries the 
connotation that they are spies. We are not aware of 
a similar restriction requiring businesses with foreign 
investment to do the same. In fact, as recently as 
2014, Russia was ranked the third most successful in 
the world in attracting capital from abroad. 
India’s Foreign Contribution Regulation Act requires 
every CSO receiving funds from ‘foreign sources’ to 
receive prior permission or to register under the Act. 
Granted, India does place some limits on foreign 
direct investment for businesses, but it is currently 
moving to liberalise investment in several sectors. The 
government recently welcomed investment pledges 
in excess of US$50bn from companies in China and 
Japan, for example. That figure makes quite small the 
Cutting financial 
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US$266,000 in foreign funding that the government 
tried to block over six months, with the freezing of the 
foreign aid for Greenpeace India. 
In Egypt, meanwhile, the government is currently con-
ducting something of a witch hunt against CSOs that 
have accepted foreign funding. But they are headed 
in the opposite direction when it comes to foreign 
capital for businesses: economic reforms have led to 
a wave of recent investment, including US$12bn from 
BP and US$500m from Coca Cola. 
The situation in Hungary is worth noting as well. It has 
no formal restrictions against CSOs receiving foreign 
funding, but the government launched last year what 
some described as an all out attack on a group of CSOs 
that were receiving funding from the government of 
Norway. The police clampdown was subsequently 
judged illegal by the court, but some problems re-
main. Businesses receiving investment from abroad 
do not seem to have been singled out for such treat-
ment. On the contrary, the Hungarian government 
has heavily promoted itself as a leading destination 
for foreign direct investment, with PR videos and the 
creation of a favourable legal environment. 
Dozens more examples of the crackdown on foreign 
funding to civil society can be found in an excellent 
and comprehensive study published in 2015 in the 
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law by Doug 
Rutzen, from the International Center for Not-for-Prof-
it Law.
Moving beyond funding, the differences can be even 
starker. In Rwanda, for example, a business can be reg-
istered in a matter of hours, while CSO registration can 
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Restrictions against 
the non-profit sector 
might be cloaked 
in terms of national 
security and good 
governance, but few 
pass muster under 
close scrutiny.
take months. In Oman, it is forbidden to start a new 
association with the same broadly-defined ‘purpose’ 
as a pre-existing association; no such regulation exists 
for businesses. And around the world, businesses 
- particularly large ones - frequently have superior 
access to the halls of power, when compared to CSOs.
Of course there are nuances to this differential 
treatment, but these wrinkles help explain why the 
distinct treatment persists, and perhaps provide clues 
on how to address the problem. 
Rare is the country, for example, that simply opens the 
floodgates to foreign investment in its business sector. 
It is often controlled and deliberately directed at cer-
tain industries, especially in the case of foreign direct 
investment (e.g., a controlling ownership of a business 
in one country by an entity based in another). 
Ethiopia, for example, is actually considered some-
what difficult for investors, largely because of the lev-
el of state control. Certain sectors remain off-limits to 
foreigners, including banking, insurance and financial 
services. Russia and the United States impose formal 
restrictions on investment in certain sensitive sectors. 
And registration of foreign capital is required in a 
number of jurisdictions. 
But overall the trend in business investment seems to 
be toward liberalisation, with governments typically 
enabling more foreign investment in more sectors 
with fewer restrictions. The trend in civil society is the 
opposite: less foreign funding with more restrictions. 
Restrictions 
on funding as a 
means of control
Why is this?
Our experience and research suggest that restrictions 
boil down to the perceived threats and benefits from 
each sector. The resulting level of control is a direct 
corollary. 
In short, it’s political. Restrictions against the 
non-profit sector might be cloaked in terms of nation-
al security and good governance, but few pass muster 
under close scrutiny. They tend instead to be signs of 
a ruling government’s weakness - an attempt to assert 
control, reduce public criticism, consolidate power or 
hoard the benefits of economic development. 
Businesses pose comparatively few threats to power, 
while the potential benefits they bring are vast. By 
definition, businesses exist to make money; they also 
have money to spend, on anything from political cam-
paigns to lobbying to kickbacks. Their activity stim-
ulates the economy, which creates jobs and makes 
governments look good. Their values are centred 
on profit-making, making them more malleable and 
more likely not to criticise unless their direct interests 
are threatened, regardless of the political structure in 
place. There are always exceptions, but relationships 
with businesses are inherently more comfortable for 
governments, particularly those looking to consoli-
date power.  
State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
276
There may indeed be 
legitimate reasons 
for restricting money 
from abroad on 
occasion, whether 
it is destined for 
businesses or civil 
society. But these 
restrictions should 
never be imposed 
simply to further a 
ruling government’s 
political ambitions 
or grip on power.
Throughout history, the 
progressive changes 
that we enjoy are a 





The civil rights 
movement? Trade 
union movements? The 
women’s movement?
Civil society, of course, does not exist to make money 
and often doesn’t have very much of it. By challenging 
and speaking truth to power, civil society’s relation-
ship with government can also be more antagonistic 
- although not always. And this is where the compari-
son gets more interesting. 
Civil society is diverse, ranging from service delivery 
groups that work hand-in-hand with governments to 
accountability watchdogs that aim to keep power in 
check. Yet throughout history, the progressive chang-
es that we enjoy are a direct result of civil society. Re-
member the anti-slavery movement? The anti-apart-
heid movement? The civil rights movement? Trade 
union movements? The women’s movement?
And it’s telling how treatment diverges for each 
faction, as a sort of divide-and-conquer technique. 
Ethiopia’s law, for example, limits foreign funding only 
to groups working on certain human rights areas. Rus-
sia only targets the aforementioned ‘political activity’, 
which is poorly defined. 
Again, financial controls correlate with perceived 
threat. A CSO that unquestioningly works to supple-
ment a country’s healthcare system seems to provide 
a direct benefit to the ruling government: it is thus 
less likely to face restrictions on funding. 
A CSO working to expose corruption, impunity or elec-
tion fraud, despite the immense public good it does, 
is not seen as slavishly supporting the ruling elite. As 
we’ve found thus far, it is more likely to see its funding 
sources attacked. 
The fact that some governments are cracking down on 
civil society’s ability to access resources isn’t exactly 
news. But putting this trend in the larger, multi-sector 
comparative context illuminates an issue that hasn’t 
received as much attention: in each scenario, the 
government remains firmly in the driver’s seat. Gov-
ernments allow foreign investment and service-deliv-
ery CSOs because they think this benefits them; they 
don’t allow foreign funding of civil society because 
they think this hurts them. 
The way forward: 
sectoral equity
We would like to see a more level playing field across 
the board. 
There may indeed be legitimate reasons for restrict-
ing money from abroad on occasion, whether it is 
destined for businesses or civil society. But these 
restrictions should never be imposed simply to further 
a ruling government’s political ambitions or grip on 
power. They should be fashioned for the benefit of the 
broader population. Political benefit to a ruling party 
is not a legitimate basis for restricting funding, wheth-
er to civil society or business.
That is not to say that businesses and civil society 
should be treated identically. They do have their 
differences. We instead advocate for what the Special 
Rapporteur has referred to in a number of his reports 
as ‘sectoral equity’ - in other words, a fair, transparent 
and impartial approach. 
Such an approach should recognise, of course, the 
many similarities that businesses and civil society 
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share. Both are non-state actors, potential employ-
ers, providers of goods and services, magnets for 
investment, and possible platforms for mobilising 
people and influencing policy. But it should also rec-
ognise the differences. Both civil society and business 
are crucial to economic and political development, 
but in different ways. Government policy and practice 
should give them the space to do this on their own 
terms, not as an appendage operating at the whim of 
a ruling party. 
It won’t be an easy road to reform. For starters, many 
governments have no incentive to level the play-
ing field, as illustrated by the fact that the trend for 
restrictions on civil society funding is growing, rather 
than shrinking. And the sector that wields the most 
potential power in this battle - business - has histor-
ically lacked close links with civil society. There are 
also divisions within civil society itself, fragmented 
and compartmentalised as it has become today. It 
remains rare, for example, to see a service delivery 
CSO stand up to a government that bullies a civil so-
ciety cousin in the advocacy field. There’s a prevailing 
attitude of ‘everyone for themselves’. Divide-and-con-
quer is winning. 
That’s not how it has to be. Businesses and civil 
society - in all of its incarnations - actually do have 
a strong convergence of interests when it comes to 
levelling the playing field. 
The rule of law is preferable to the rule of power. 
Predictability trumps disorder. Fairness is better 
than corruption. These statements ring as true for 
business as they do for civil society. Stable, balanced 
environments are better for everyone, whether they 
be a multinational corporation, a grassroots activist 
group, or a major international CSO working on health 
issues. 
It is time that we acknowledge our similarities and 
start working together to achieve this, for the benefit 
of each sector, and for society as a whole. 
The rule of law 
is preferable to 
the rule of power. 
Predictability 
trumps disorder. 
Fairness is better 
than corruption. 
These statements 
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-Sadia Kidwai, Policy and Research 
Analyst, Islamic Relief Worldwide
Introduction
Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) is an independent 
humanitarian and development organisation present 
in over 40 countries around the globe. Inspired by the 
Islamic faith, IRW has helped millions of the world’s 
poorest and most vulnerable people since receiving 
our first donation from a young Muslim boy in 1984. 
Our projects include responding to emergencies, 
most recently in Syria, Yemen and Nepal, and provid-
ing sustainable solutions to long-term development 
challenges, through our disaster preparedness, educa-
tion, livelihoods, water and sanitation and healthcare 
projects. We also run a number of seasonal projects 
centred on key elements of the Islamic calendar, such 
as Ramadan and Eid. 
Despite the financial pressures placed on civil society 
organisations (CSOs) in recent years, in a context of in-
creasing need and squeezed resources, as fundraisers 
are met with donor fatigue and economic recession, 
IRW’s income has continued to grow. In 2012, IRW 
was the fifth largest private humanitarian fundraising 
organisation in the world, following only Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MSF), UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agen-
cy), UNICEF (the UN Children’s Fund) and the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).1
Arguably, IRW’s continued growth under challenging 
circumstances can be partly attributed to aspects of 
our Islamic identity, which have allowed: access to 
a growing Muslim donor base that sees charitable 
giving as a religious obligation; unique access to ben-
eficiary communities in complex environments, which 
in turn enables us to be the partner of choice for 
Identity-
based giving: 
a case study 
of Islamic 
Relief
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numerous donors agencies; and access to new donor 
markets in the Middle East.
Individual 
donors
Charitable giving – both obligatory and voluntary – 
has an honoured status within the Islamic tradition. 
The payment of zakat, a form of annual almsgiving 
that is obligatory for all Muslims possessing a certain 
amount of wealth, is listed as the third of Islam’s five 
pillars,2 following only faith and prayer. Throughout 
the Qur’an, Muslims are repeatedly exhorted to “es-
tablish regular prayer and to practise regular charity.”3 
This constant coupling of charity (a social obligation) 
with prayer (a spiritual obligation) demonstrates the 
sacred and essential nature of charitable giving as an 
act of worship, one that is central to the role of a Mus-
lim’s sense of self and their relationship with God.
Whilst all charitable giving is encouraged and reward-
ed within Islam, there are particular forms of giving 
which are promoted, emphasised and even mandated 
upon Muslims, such as the annual zakat payment, the 
annual donation of meat to the poor on Eid (qurbani) 
and the sponsoring of orphans. Many Muslim-major-
ity countries have formal or informal social financing 
mechanisms to enable their Muslim citizens to fulfil 
these charitable obligations.4 However, for Muslims 
living as religious minorities in regions such as Eu-
rope or North America, the lack of such mechanisms 
creates a demand for charities that can support them 
to fulfil their religious requirements. IRW conducts the 
majority of its individual fundraising in countries wit
Muslim minorities, such as Australia, Canada, Ger-
many, South Africa, the UK and the USA. Collectively 
the Muslim populations of these countries amount 
to approximately 15 million people (not including the 
Muslim majority countries where we fundraise, such 
as Malaysia or across the Middle East). In many of the 
countries in which we fundraise, we are one of the 
largest Islamic-inspired humanitarian and develop-
ment charities, and thus play a critical role in pro-
viding an accessible and professionalised service to 
enable Muslims to fulfil their charitable obligations. 
Charitable giving – both obligatory and voluntary – has an hon-
oured status within the Islamic tradition. The payment of zakat, 
a form of annual almsgiving that is obligatory for all Muslims 
possessing a certain amount of wealth, is listed as the third of 
Islam’s five pillars,  following only faith and prayer.
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As a humanitarian and development agency, IRW 
abides by the humanitarian principles of humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality and independence, and does 
not discriminate on the grounds of race, political affil-
iation, gender or belief - values which also find their 
roots in Islamic teachings. Nonetheless, our unequiv-
ocally clear Islamic identity, demonstrated by our 
name and logo (a mosque dome with two minarets), 
enables us to build a particular relationship with 
Muslims, through a sense of shared identity. This is 
further bolstered by a sense of shared belief, as IRW’s 
organisational values draw directly from Qur’anic and 
Prophetic teachings: ikhlas (sincerity), ihsan (excel-
lence), rahma (compassion), ‘adl (social justice) and 
amana (custodianship). Focus groups with commu-
nities who donate to us, as well as the anecdotal 
evidence of our own staff, have indicated that people 
who donate feel a greater degree of trust in IRW than 
in non-Muslim agencies, specifically due to shared 
identity, faith and values. Whilst in the past IRW has 
been hesitant about over-emphasising our Islamic 
values, recently we’ve found that our growing confi-
dence in using faith reference points or faith-sensitive 
language has resonated strongly with our supporters. 
The theme of our UK Ramadan fundraising campaign 
last year, Alhamdulillah (‘praise be to God’) received 
overwhelmingly positive feedback from our support-
ers, who identified with the spiritual language of 
charitable giving.
Furthermore, IRW runs a number of projects and 
campaigns that directly correlate with the religious 
charitable obligations and preferences of Muslim 
communities, some of which are outlined below.
1. Zakat
As mentioned earlier, zakat is one of the funda-
mental pillars in Islam. As a compulsory method of 
redistributing wealth from the richest to the poor-
est and most vulnerable members of society, zakat 
is both an obligation for the donor, and a right 
of the recipient. As such, IRW plays a critical role 
as an intermediary, collecting zakat in wealthier 
countries and distributing it to the most vulnerable 
members of society across the world. 
In 2013 alone, IRW collected approximately 
UK£20m of zakat (approx. US$30m) across 11 of 
our global fundraising offices. IRW actively works 
to support Muslims in their efforts to pay zakat, by 
running visible fundraising campaigns, providing 
multiple channels through which zakat can be paid, 
and even disseminating educational resources, 
online and on paper, reminding Muslims of their re-
sponsibility to pay zakat and detailing how to calcu-
late zakat correctly. In countries such as the UK, IRW 
also runs hotlines with scholars and trained staff 
throughout Ramadan, where donors can direct en-
quiries regarding how to calculate and spend zakat 
in accordance with Islamic guidelines.5 Zakat funds 
are subsequently spent in line with Islamic guid-
ance, for example in addressing domestic poverty 
needs, such as in the USA, where zakat is utilised 
to provide emergency food and housing assistance 
to refugee, immigrant and low-income American 
families, or on IRW’s global livelihoods, education, 
healthcare, nutrition and water projects.
IRW takes its role as custodian of zakat extremely 
seriously – through us, the duty of the donor is 
dispensed and the right of the recipient is fulfilled. 
Whilst in the past 
IRW has been 
hesitant about 
over-emphasising 
our Islamic values, 
recently we’ve found 
that our growing 
confidence in using 





State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
281
To that end, IRW is currently developing a Glob-
al Zakat Policy to provide detailed guidance to 
our staff around the world on how to collect and 
distribute our zakat funds effectively. The aims of 
the policy are to ensure that our zakat activities 
are effective in alleviating poverty and suffering, 
and are fully in keeping with Islamic teachings, and 
to ensure transparency and accountability to our 
beneficiaries, donors, staff and supporters.   
2. Qurbani
Qurbani is an annual donation of meat by all 
Muslims who can afford it to those in poverty, 
to enable them to commemorate Eid ul Adha, 
the celebration that marks the completion of the 
annual pilgrimage (hajj). Traditionally, a Muslim 
would be directly involved in selecting an ani-
mal and distributing the meat to those in need. 
However, for many Muslims living in urbanised, 
wealthy communities in the countries in which we 
fundraise, this is logistically impossible. As such, in 
1986 IRW initiated the novel concept of overseas 
qurbani, which sees donors give IRW the funds 
to pay for their qurbani, and IRW carries out the 
slaughter and distribution of meat to communi-
ties in poverty around the world. For donors, this 
offers a vital service in allowing them to dispense 
their obligation to the poor; for communities in 
poverty, the qurbani meat they receive through 
IRW is a critical source of nutrition, and at times 
the only meat they may eat in a week, a month or 
a year. In 2013, IRW was able to distribute qurbani 
meat to over two million people from 30 different 
countries around the world. 
3. Orphan sponsorship
Although not a religious requirement, Islam strong-
ly emphasises the high status given to those who 
protect and provide for orphan children.6 IRW pro-
vides a model of orphan sponsorship that allows 
donors to strive towards fulfilling the teaching of 
Prophet Muhammad, combined with adherence to 
and promotion of strict child protection guidelines. 
Currently, IRW sponsors over 40,000 orphans in 24 
countries around the world, providing shelter, edu-
cation, healthcare and livelihoods opportunities for 
orphans living in poverty.
Institutional 
funding
IRW has built strong relationships with institutional 
funders over the past three decades. In recent years, 
we have received funding from the UK Department 
for International Development (DFID), the European 
Commission (EC), the European Commission for Hu-
manitarian Operations (ECHO), UNICEF, the UN Devel-
opment Programme (UNDP), UNHCR, the World Food 
Programme (UNWFP) and the UN Office for the Coordi-
nation of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). 
Although these relationships have built up incremental-
ly over many years, anecdotal evidence by staff indi-
cates that there was a significant increase in interest in 
IRW following the conflicts in Afghanistan (2001) and 
Iraq (2003). Our experience has indicated that, as com-
pared to secular agencies, IRW’s overtly Islamic identity 
combined with our pure humanitarian mission can of-
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ten assist and enable us to access beneficiary commu-
nities in complex environments, by gaining the trust of 
community gatekeepers. In Somalia, for example, IRW 
was able to make important in-roads in various sensi-
tive regions, partly due to the trust engendered by our 
identity. As such, our Islamic identity may place us at 
an advantage compared to institutional donors, which 
recognise IRW’s ability to access certain communities 
while still meeting relevant global standards on human-
itarian principles, accountability and transparency, and 
financial conduct. 
This privileged access also opens us up to funding part-
nerships with Christian or secular CSOs, which some-
times distribute their funds through IRW in places such 
as Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, where they may face barriers in accessing 
communities themselves. It is worth noting, however, 
that IRW’s identity can equally be a disadvantage in 
contexts such as the Central African Republic, Chechnya 
or South Sudan, where IRW may distribute its funding 
through non-Muslim partner agencies. This symbiotic 
relationship between faith agencies has enabled IRW to 
build formal and practical inter-faith partnerships with 
Christian agencies such as the Lutheran World Federa-
tion, leading to joint projects in Jordan and Kenya. Not 
only does such interfaith partnership pave the way for 
bridge-building in divided communities, but it also cre-
ates new funding opportunities for both organisations. 
Beyond accessing institutional funding, IRW’s faith 
identity and values have enabled us to build strong 
working relationships with various donor and partner 
agencies in the sphere of knowledge-sharing. There is 
growing interest within the humanitarian and devel-
opment sector in the role of faith teachings and faith 
organisations in helping to meet global development 
goals. IRW has been proactively involved in providing 
training and educational resources on Islamic ap-
proaches to development at both the UN and World 
Bank level,7 as well as through our engagements with 
various national governments.
New markets
A third and critical way in which IRW’s faith identity 
has enabled us to attract resources is through our ac-
cess to new and emerging donor markets, particularly 
in the Middle East. In recent years, IRW has placed a 
particular emphasis on engaging with governments, 
institutions and individuals across the Middle East. 
Anecdotally we know that IRW is well-respected in 
the region, particularly for its unique position as an 
Islamic, faith-inspired agency that is based in Europe, 
which is subject to the scrutiny of UK charity legis-
lation. In recent years, this respect has enabled us 
to access funding for relief and development work 
from the Bahrain Royal Charity Organisation, the 
Islamic Development Bank, Qatar Charity and the 
government of Saudi Arabia. However, once again 
our Islamic identity can prove to be a barrier in the 
highly complex and politicised context of the Middle 
East, and has occasionally undermined our ability to 
fundraise in some countries.  
Beyond identity
Whilst IRW’s faith identity has undoubtedly played a 
critical role in our ability to access resources, individ-
ually and institutionally, discussions with staff have 
There is growing 
interest within the 
humanitarian and 
development sector 
in the role of faith 
teachings and faith 
organisations in 
helping to meet global 
development goals.
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made clear that identity is only one aspect of why 
supporters remain loyal to IRW. In the UK, Muslim 
donors may initially be drawn to IRW due to our faith 
identity or values, but the subsequent realisation that 
IRW is a member of the UK Disasters Emergency Com-
mittee (DEC) often plays an important role in gaining 
the trust and respect of donors, particularly when the 
Muslim charity sector is so saturated, as it is in the UK. 
Equally, although our Islamic identity may have initial-
ly gained the attention of institutional funders such as 
DFID or UNDP, IRW staff believe that it is our consis-
tent track record for effective and efficient delivery, 
and the trust this has engendered, that now enable 
us to secure institutional funding continually. Finally, 
as hinted above, donors in the Middle East do not 
fund IRW solely due to our Islamic identity; rather, our 
positioning as a UK-based charity, and the reassurance 
that we are thus subjected to high standards of scru-
tiny and accountability, play a critical role in building 
our credibility and respect amongst Muslim donors in 
the Middle East. 
Faith identity is not 
a silver bullet, and 
cannot (and should 
not) be relied upon to 
secure long-term and 
sustainable funding.
1 Global Humanitarian Assistance, 
Humanitarian Assistance from 
Non-State Donors: What is it 




2 The Prophet Muhammad once stated 
that: “Islam is based on five: testifying 
that there is no god except Allah and 
that Muhammad is the Messenger of 
Allah; establishing the prayer; paying 
the zakat; the pilgrimage; and the fast 
of Ramadan.”
3 Qur’an – see 98:5; 2:43; 2:83; 2:110; 
2:277; 4:77; 5:12; 5:55; 9:71; 21:73; 
22:41; 22:78; 24:37; 24:56; 27:3; 33:33; 
35:29.
4 See the Islamic Social Finance Report 
2014, http://www.irti.org/English/
Research/Documents/Report-2.pdf, for 
a greater insight into this.
5 The Qur’an outlines the eight 
categories of people who are entitled 
to receive zakat: “Alms are meant only 
for the poor, the needy, those who 
administer them, those whose hearts 
need winning over, to free slaves, and 
help those in debt, for God’s cause, and 
for travellers in need. This is ordained 
by God; God is all knowing and wise.” 
(Qur’an 9:60).
6 The Prophet Muhammad once raised 
his hand and placed his forefinger and 
middle finger together and said, “I and 
the guardian of an orphan will be in 
[Paradise] like these two,” i.e. to be the 
guardian of an orphan is so blessed 
that one would attain closeness to the 
Prophet Muhammad.
7 For example, through sessions at the 
annual UN Staff College Training and 
Having a shared faith identity can often be crucial for 
developing relationships of trust with donors, and 
enabling faith-inspired organisations to capitalise 
on available resources. Yet in the experience of IRW, 
faith identity is not a silver bullet, and cannot (and 
should not) be relied upon to secure long-term and 
sustainable funding. Rather, our relative success has 
immensely relied upon our efforts to improve our 
efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and account-
ability. Only then can the trust we engender move 
from being instinctive (and potentially short term) 
to evidence-based and long term. This approach not 
only authentically meets values of accountability and 
fairness, as prescribed within the Islamic faith and 
within IRW’s own values, but also universalises our 
competitiveness as a world-class humanitarian and 
development CSO.
our recent joint statement with the 








Many institutional funders have an instinctive prefer-
ence for bigger, better-resourced civil society organi-
sations (CSOs). The rationale is that such an approach 
leads to better outreach and impact monitoring, due 
to economies of scale. This contribution to the 2015 
CIVICUS State of Civil Society Report challenges this 
pattern of support for larger, more formalised CSOs, 
as opposed to community-based organisations. The 
perspective is derived from the work of the Global 
Fund for Community Foundations, which gives small 
grants to organisations that promote philanthropy in 
local communities, and operates in ways that differ 
markedly from conventional donor support.
The new aid 
architecture
The past 15 years have seen a trend towards a ‘big is 
beautiful’ approach in the funding world. The logic is 
that big problems, such as poverty, inequality and cli-
mate change, need big solutions. Only large scale and 
centrally organised resource distribution and logis-
tics can address the size and scale of such seemingly 
intractable problems.
In 2008, former Ford Foundation Representative in 
East Africa, Tade Aina, described how in the ‘new 
aid architecture’ grants tend to go only to the larger, 
more formal, better-resourced institutions that pos-
sess structures acceptable to donor consortia.1 Funds 
are narrowly allocated to specific programme or proj-
the case for 
strengthening 
communities 
- Avila Kilmurray and Barry Knight, 
Global Fund for Community 
Foundations
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ect purposes. Funders, “do not support investment 
in endowments or property of local institutions,” he 
said, and this means, “less flexible support for issues 
that are determined and adopted autonomously by 
local institutions,” as they will, “have to fit either the 
national development agenda or the increasingly nar-
row focus of the big private donors.” He described an, 
“emerging consensus on procedures and methodolo-
gies, predominantly business and market driven and 
led by the philanthrocapitalists, who are being joined 
by the old philanthropies in their insistence on narrow 
focus, high impact, clear and measurable results.”
Despite some successes in reducing poverty in some 
places,2 the new aid architecture has helped to create 
a global development industry that may not be fit 
for purpose. Many CSOs have become highly skilled 
proposal writers, budget jugglers and masters of 
development jargon, and compete with each other to 
serve the needs of external funders. The impact of in-
ternational funding has distorted our sense of time (a 
five-year development project can be considered long 
term) and created lines of accountability that drive 
upwards and outwards. The result is hefty reports 
landing on desks in London or Washington, far from 
the people that development is meant to serve.
Listening to 
people
There is evidence that this approach does not work 
for local people. In their report Time to listen: hear-
ing people on the receiving end of international aid, 
Mary Anderson, Dayna Brown and Isabella Jean have 
assembled the views of almost 6,000 people.3 Their 
work suggests widespread dissatisfaction. Three 
complaints are commonplace. First, aid creates de-
pendency; second, it reinforces existing hierarchies of 
power; and third, it has little respect for local people. 
A less common, but particularly damning complaint, 
is the tendency for one development project to breed 
another, in an endless chain of self-serving job cre-
ation projects for development sector elites, while 
casting local people as passive bystanders, and often 
denuding community organisations of their most 
skilled staff.
This should not surprise us. We have known since the 
1960s that centrally controlled resource allocation is 
incompatible with local empowerment. In their classic 
study of the US Anti Poverty Programme, Peter Marris 
and Martin Rein showed that rational scientific anal-
ysis of problems, combined with large scale, centrally 
organised resource delivery mechanisms, fail to take 
root in local cultures, and any short term gains are 
difficult to sustain over time.4 Peter Rossi, a leading 
expert on social programme evaluation, has noted the 
difficulties of creating a useful social programme, and 
proposed ‘The Iron law’. This states: “The expected 
value of any net impact assessment of any large scale 
social program is zero.” 5
Moreover, a lack of engagement with the grassroots is 
a noted cause of failure. A 2013 report by the Na-
tional Committee for Responsive Philanthropy argues 
that elite-driven, top-down approaches adopted by 
funders in the battle against climate change in the US 
have not achieved their goals, because of a failure to 
involve those grassroots communities directly affect-
ed by environmental harms that had the energy and 
resolve to take up the issues.6
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As the contribution of local people through their own 
CSOs is downgraded, everyone loses: development aid 
professionals find it difficult to attain their goals, and 
local people experience insurmountable obstacles in 
making any contribution to the wellbeing of their com-
munities. It is these very people who are essential in 
the process, because they know how things work, have 
assets they can use, and are already invested in the 
long term future of their place. Such treasures are pres-
ent in all communities. Harnessing them in develop-
ment activity brings local ownership, greater capacity, 
a long term perspective and a desire for sustainability. 
Donors ignore local civil society at their peril.
The power of 
‘our’ money
Donors tend to see small CSOs as lacking capacity. But 
that is often because their donors control them and 
frame capacity in their own terms. A new model in 
development -community philanthropy - is changing 
the power balance between donor and grantee, and 
this trend is evident in the growth of a new class of 
autochthonous community foundations. While com-
munity foundations vary in their form, they are firmly 
part of civil society, and are organised and self direct-
ed, while being different from most CSOs, in that they 
raise their own assets, both from within the com-
munity and as intermediaries for external funders. 
Typically they use grants to other community based 
organisations as one among a number of strategies 
for building an inclusive and equitable society. Halima 
Mahomed has described how in Africa this puts Afri-
cans at the heart of development: “Over the last sev-
eral years, there’s been a newer wave of community 
philanthropy organizations. They are organic, rooted 
in context, not wedded to a particular concept, and 
they don’t tick the boxes of someone else’s notion of 
community philanthropy.”7
It is the independence provided by money raised by 
local people and given to locally rooted CSOs that 
endows a community foundation with potentially 
transformative power. At a meeting in Bangladesh in 
September 2011, donors were stunned when they 
learned that Tewa, a community foundation working 
As the contribution of local people through their own 
CSOs is downgraded, everyone loses: development aid 
professionals find it difficult to attain their goals, and local 
people experience insurmountable obstacles in making any 
contribution to the wellbeing of their communities.
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with rural women in Nepal, has 3,000 local donors.8 
African Americans in the US south are increasingly 
establishing giving circles so that they form part of the 
answer to the problem of poverty, rather than being 
cast as people who need to be helped to get out of 
their poverty.9 Small grants over many years from the 
Kenya Community Foundation enabled local residents 
of Makutano to design their own development agen-
da, which led to significant progress on water, food 
security and education. We could give many more ex-
amples of community foundations, because they are 
growing fast. The number of community foundations 
across the world has more than doubled in the past 
15 years, from 905 in 2000 to 1,827 in 2014.10
Grant-making 
matters
Grant-making is a central feature of community 
foundations. Grants are particularly important in 
emerging market economies where money is in short 
supply. In March 2014, Alliance Magazine published 
a special feature on ‘grant-making for social change’ 
with contributions from all over the world.11 Many of 
the articles were repetitive, and for magazine editor 
Caroline Hartnell this would normally be anathema. 
However she realised “if people writing independent-
ly are all making the same points, and so forcefully, 
surely this is indicative of something.” And this, she 
concluded, was that “Over and over, the point is made 
that grantmaking is important in countries where 
civil society is not well established.” In the issue Filiz 
Bikmen observed that in Turkey grant-making is about 
increasing the capacity of civil society as “an invest-
ment in democratization.” And Akwasi Aidoo, noted 
that in Africa, for so long dependent on donor aid and 
only just now beginning to experience the reality of a 
developed and indigenous African philanthropy sec-
tor, “grantmaking becomes an essential tool in foster-
ing new and more horizontal and transparent forms 
of mutual accountability between donors and recipi-
ents; it constitutes part of a paradigm shift towards a 
form of development that is driven and resourced by 
Africans.” 
And yet, the idea of grant-making is dying among larg-
er private foundations. Pablo Eisenberg has pointed 
out that 60% of US foundations will not receive un-
solicited proposals. He calls this “a dangerous shift of 
the balance of power in the nonprofit world” because 
this enables donors to “call all the shots and exclude 
nonprofits with great new ideas.”12 Such trends in-
crease the tendency for international aid to be pater-
nalistic, pursuing agendas that are driven by particular 
and specific social and economic performance indica-
tors, without respect for and understanding of local 
realities.
Towards a new 
partnership
There is a strong case for revising the aid architec-
ture. Bringing together aid agencies with community 
foundations would mean that both would gain. While 
aid agencies can bring resources and technical ex-





mean that both 
would gain. While 
aid agencies can 
bring resources and 
technical expertise to 
the table, local donors 
grasp the layers of 
complexity that only 
local people can 
understand.
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complexity that only local people can understand. The 
strength of local donors is that they bring trust and 
mutual accountability into the relationship. By work-
ing together in multi-stakeholder partnerships, includ-
ing through re-granting arrangements, partners can 
adopt a holistic approach to local challenges and build 
on local assets, rather than focus on the narrow range 
of problems identified in most aid programmes.
1 Quoted in B Knight and C Hartnell, 
‘They go ‘round and ‘round’’, Alliance, 
September 2008, Vol. 13, 3, p31-4.
2 United Nations, UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki-moon’s Synthesis Report for the 
post-2015 development agenda, The 
road to dignity by 2030: ending poverty, 
transforming all lives and protecting 
the planet, 4 December 2014, http://
www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol=A/69/700&Lang=E. 
3 M Anderson, D Brown and I Jean, 
Time to listen: hearing people on the 






4 P Marris and M Rein, Dilemmas of 
social reform, 1972 (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 2nd edition).
5 P Rossi, ‘The iron law of evaluation 
and other metallic rules’, Research in 
Social Problems and Public Policy, 1987, 
Vol. 4, p3-20.
6 B Niki Jagpal and K Laskowski, Real 
Results: Why strategic philanthropy 
is social justice philanthropy, 2013 
(Washington: National Committee for 
Responsive Philanthropy).
7 Halima Mahomed is quoted in 
B Knight, The case for community 
philanthropy, 2013, Aga Khan 
Foundation USA and CS Mott 
Foundation. 
8 B Knight, The value of community 
philanthropy, 2012, Aga Khan 
Foundation USA and CS Mott 
Foundation.
9 Affiliated to the Community 
Investment Network. See http://www.
thecommunityinvestment.org. 
10 These and many other facts about 
community foundations can be found at 
http://communityfoundationatlas.org. 
11 C Hartnell, ‘When is repetition a 
virtue?’, Alliance, March 2014. Vol. 19, 
1, p3.
12 Pablo Eisenberg, ‘Strategic 
Philanthropy’ Shifts Too Much 
Power to Donors, 2013, http://
philanthropy.com/article/Strategic-
PhilanthrKniopy-/141263.





In April 2015 I was in Oxford, UK for a dinner during 
the Skoll World Forum on Social Entrepreneurship. As 
the day came to an end, social entrepreneurs from 
across the world spilled out onto the streets, nav-
igating the alleys and cobbled lanes, with the help 
of conference staff, on hand to direct them to their 
lodgings in the university’s venerable colleges. The 
juxtaposition of the old and the new always strikes me 
when the Skoll World Forum comes to town.
Amid the awards, celebration and enthusiasm for 
social enterprise, it can appear sometimes as though 
the new is here to wipe away the old: that the rise of 
social enterprise brings with it the end of outmoded 
vehicles for social change, such as charity and philan-
thropy. The loudest evangelists for social investment 
have been known to utter such proclamations. 
So should civil society be listening to them? And how 
seriously should we take these claims? Is social enter-
prise a new dawn, or is it a bit too good to be true?
The rise of social 
enterprise
Social enterprise is undoubtedly a growing movement. 
Forty years ago the term didn’t exist. Now there are 
dedicated world forums, global networks, incubators 
and investors. It is clear that there is something big 






the end of 
charity?
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what is going on, given that defining what a social 
enterprise actually is remains heavily contested. 
Social Enterprise UK offers the following definition:
“Social enterprises are businesses that trade to 
tackle social problems, improve communities, 
people's life chances, or the environment. They 
make their money from selling goods and services 
in the open market, but they reinvest their profits 
back into the business or the local community.”
Even this definition overlaps significantly with organ-
isations that might otherwise be called charities (and 
indeed, charities can readily be categorised as social 
enterprises, provided that they sell goods or services). 
As important as the trading feature is, the distinction 
is that social enterprises place constraints on the 
distribution of profits, which ensures that they remain 
committed to public rather than private benefit. This 
marks them out from enterprises that are primarily 
for private benefit (of shareholders and owners).
Yet the boundaries between social enterprise and 
for-profit business have become more muddied of 
late. There is a proliferation of different organisation-
al forms: social purpose businesses, or profit with 
purpose businesses, have started to be seen as part of 
the same group as, or at least close relations to, social 
enterprises. Debates about asset locks, or mission 
locks - mechanisms that protect organisations’ re-
sources and focus from drifting away from their social 
aims - have come to dominate this contested territory.
To some extent, it can be argued that these definition-
al debates are unimportant: that what matters is how 
organisations deliver social change and social impact, 
regardless of precisely how they’re constituted. But 
these debates set the stage for a bigger discussion 
about the nature and roles of different sectors in soci-
ety, and the interaction of public sector, private sector 
and civil society.
Social enterprise in all its forms is growing. The next 
question to ask is how fast it’s growing, and to distin-
guish the growth in rhetoric from the reality on the 
ground.
The big picture 
view
A macro view of social enterprise needs to start from 
an understanding of the roles of the public sector, 
private sector and civil society.
The public sector is funded through taxation and run 
by governments on behalf of their constituents. We 
vote to determine society’s priorities, and delegate 
decision-making to politicians and civil servants to 
develop and deliver public services. The private sector 
is funded through sales of products directly to cus-
tomers, and run by boards on behalf of shareholders, 
or by owners themselves. We vote as customers with 
our purchasing decisions.
Civil society organisations (CSOs) are different again. 
These are typically funded through grants, donations 
and fees for products or services, and are run by trust-
ee boards on behalf of their stakeholders or beneficia-
ries. As donors we vote through our giving decisions, 
but as beneficiaries we have no vote.
We can argue that, in democratic contexts, the public 
sector prioritises and addresses needs in response to 
Social enterprise in 
all its forms is grow-
ing. The next ques-
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our voting behaviour; the private sector deals with the 
needs that can be fulfilled profitably by selling directly 
to us; and civil society deals with everything that’s 
left over: the things that aren’t profitable enough to 
constitute a functioning market, nor prioritised highly 
enough to be run by governments on our behalf.
What’s important here is the different relationship 
that unfolds between us as citizens and the products, 
services or activities developed on our behalf. The 
public sector has a clear accountability mechanism 
through the democratic vote. The private sector has a 
clear accountability mechanism through consumers’ 
purchasing decisions. Civil society has neither. This 
gets us into interesting territory when we compare 





CSOs exist explicitly and solely for public benefit, yet 
their accountability mechanisms are often absent. 
Those who fund charities act as proxy buyers for 
the products and services charities offer, which 
are not paid for by their recipients. For CSOs to be 
accountable to those they aim to serve, there needs 
to be a feedback loop between what CSOs say they 
want to achieve for their constituents, what actually 
happens, and how this information guides funders’ 
behaviour. In such a system, effective CSOs would 
attract funding, while ineffective ones would not.
It’s a nice idea, but this feedback loop doesn’t work 
(yet). Many CSOs are far from routinely assessing the 
actual results of their work. Funders are even further 
from using such information to make their decisions. 
Effective CSOs often struggle to attract funding; inef-
fective ones with good marketing often thrive. Much 
more can be said on this: it is the central dysfunction 
of the UK charitable sector that my organisation, New 
Philanthropy Capital, has been committed to tackling 
for the last 14 years. For all our work and progress in 
that time, we certainly haven’t cracked it yet.
Social enterprises, however, offer a tantalising prom-
ise, of combining the information that markets create 
with the public benefit that CSOs are explicitly com-
mitted to deliver. A social enterprise that earns rev-
enue by selling products and services to customers, 
who as a result receive the social benefits the organ-
isation aims to deliver, doesn’t suffer the proxy buyer 
problem. If its products are effective and offer good 
value, customers will buy them. The market tells us 
whether the social enterprise is effective or not.
Unfortunately, it turns out that nothing is quite as 
simple as it seems.
Blurred 
boundaries
Few social enterprises are based on business mod-
els fuelled purely by customers paying directly for 
products and receiving social impact in return. Many 
For CSOs to be 
accountable to 
those they aim to 
serve, there needs 
to be a feedback 
loop between what 
CSOs say they want 
to achieve for their 
constituents, what 
actually happens, and 
how this information 
guides funders’ 
behaviour. In such a 
system, effective CSOs 
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are funded by proxy buyers - often local or national 
governments - to deliver those products on behalf of 
their constituents. In these cases, the purity of the 
market-based model does not hold when it comes 
to information generated by purchasing choices. As 
with CSOs, this means that social enterprises still rely 
on proxy buyers making decisions based on informa-
tion about the effectiveness of the products and ser-
vices procured. And those proxy buyers are no more 
reliable in this regard than CSO funders.
Some would argue that these social enterprises, 
relying at least in part on proxy buyers, do not oper-
ate in the genuinely open market occupied by private 
sector businesses. Yet it turns out that the private 
sector has its own blurred boundaries.
Discussions of the three sectors often overlook the 
role of subsidy, on which many industry sectors rely, 
at least to some extent. Energy, rail, farming and 
banking in the UK would look very different without 
government subsidy. What look like viable markets 
at first glance often turn out to be propped up by 
public funds. In developing markets, subsidy almost 
always has a significant role in attracting investors and 
their money, who would otherwise focus on lower 
hanging fruit. Even the tech sector, current darling of 
investment markets across the globe, is often heavily 
subsidised to make it investable.
Perhaps social enterprise and social investment aren’t 
so different after all. Governments play a huge role 
in subsidising and grant-funding early stage models. 
Some would argue that social enterprise and social in-
vestment in the UK simply wouldn’t exist without the 
support of government to inject capital into its devel-




Ultimately, while it is convenient to paint the tradi-
tional sectors in broad brush-strokes, it is also unhelp-
ful. The boundaries between revenue derived from 
Few social enterprises are based on business models fuelled 
purely by customers paying directly for products and receiving 
social impact in return. Many are funded by proxy buyers - 
often local or national governments - to deliver those products 
on behalf of their constituents.
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customers, investors and proxy buyers are so blurred 
that generalisations mean little. When we think about 
the role of business or enterprise in contrast to the 
role of civil society, this is important.
Civil society exists to complement the public and 
private sectors. (It also exists to challenge both, and 
there is a separate debate to be had about exploring 
that role and how it is funded.) As a complement to 
public and private sectors, the purpose of civil society 
is to address social need when government and 
markets fail, and to empower overlooked citizens and 
consumers.
Sometimes market failure can be addressed through 
mechanisms that will eventually create functioning 
markets. Subsidies to developing industry sectors have 
done this for hundreds of years. Social enterprise can 
offer such a path in some cases that have been over-
looked by the private sector, perhaps through a bet-
ter understanding of potential customers’ needs and 
through models more closely aligned with the lives and 
behaviour of previously excluded customers’ lives.
But social enterprise can never be a magical panacea 
for market failure. There are some groups of people 
- as well as some geographies and some issues - for 
whom the ability to pay for products and services can-
not determine whether they are able to receive the 
products and services they need.
There will always be a need for civil society to do what 
the private sector or social enterprises cannot. That 
does not mean we should overlook the great volume 
of innovation to be found within the social enterprise 
sector, nor the enthusiasm and drive of those 
wishing to build business models that deliver social 
impact whilst generating profit. But it does mean 
that we should bring nuance to our understanding 
of the relationship between different sectors and 
organisational forms.
And if you work for a CSO, the next time a funder asks 
how your organisation is going to guarantee a path to 
sustainability, consider reminding them that magical 
thinking is overrated. Some things that are important 
to do simply can’t be profitable.
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Humankind marks this year as the 2,015th 
circumnavigation of Earth around the Sun, a social 
convention starkly stunted in comparison to the 13.8 
billion years since the Big Bang and the 4.6 billion 
years since our home planet coalesced from galactic 
dust. The myopia of our anthropocentric perspective 
clouds our appreciation of where we are located in 
the long temporal yesterday.
The persistence of the archaic manifests in another 
socially-determined and politically-maintained 
convention. Earth currently hosts 7.2 billion 
people organised into 193 political units called 
nation-states.1 These entities are recognised 
internationally as sovereign entities because they 
are deemed to possess a permanent population, a 
defined territory, a government and the capacity 
to enter into diplomatic relations with the other 
countries. Co-recognition has roots in the 1648 
Treaty of Westphalia, which installed a system of 
political order premised on the territorial integrity 
of states within continental Europe. This regime 
was transposed upon the rest of the world through 
subsequent eras of imperialism and colonialism. This 
configuration would also inform the struggles for 
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21st centuries,2 thereby establishing the contours of 
the current conjuncture.
Taken together, these two idiosyncrasies - short-
termism and nationalism - provide a vantage point 
for addressing the question of the politicisation of 
international development cooperation and its impact 
on civil society. From this panorama, this contribution 
to the 2015 State of Civil Society Report offers a 
materialist account of the historical co-evolution of 
human society, the political economy and the state. 
In particular, international development cooperation 
can be seen as the result of the co-evolution of 
contemporary world systems, and is thus politicised. 
The concluding section of this contribution assesses 
the impacts of this politicisation on civil society, and 
offers alternative pathways to better futures for the 





From Earth’s elemental beginnings, geo-physical 
structuring created a complex planetary system with 
great cycles of water and other chemicals, eventually 
giving birth to astonishingly diverse and complex life 
forms. We have catalogued over 1.3 million species 
of life, a figure which increases with the discovery of 
nearly 15,000 new species each year, but remains far 
short of the statistical estimate of perhaps 8.7 million 
(Mora et al 2011).3 The Living Planet Index reports that 
human activity since 1970 has caused a 52% decline in 
10,000 representative populations of mammals, birds, 
reptiles, amphibians and fish (WWF 2014).  
Of course, it has been long known that human 
beings form a sub-group within a larger kingdom 
of animals, and that we share the planet with at 
least five other kingdoms (bacteria, chromista, 
fungi, plantae and protozoa). Since separating from 
other great apes approximately seven million years 
ago, it is estimated that the human species has co-
evolved mainly through genetic adaptations, intra-
species cooperation, inter-species competition and 
revolutionary social transitions over a span of two 
hundred millennia. Still, our relationship with the 
wider biodiversity remains largely anthropocentric.
Earth comprises eight main biogeographic realms, 
within which are located at least 14 major biomes 
and 867 ecoregions, “relatively large units of 
land containing a distinct assemblage of natural 
communities and species, with boundaries 
that approximate the original extent of natural 
communities prior to major land-use change” 
(Olson et al 2001: 933-934). In addition, a new 
kind of geophysical space has been added, called 
anthropogenic biomes. These are also known as 
‘anthromes’ or ‘human biomes’, and serve to describe 
the terrestrial biosphere in its contemporary, human-
altered form, using global ecosystem units defined by 
global patterns of sustained direct human interaction 
with ecosystems (Ellis and Ramankutty 2008).
While the emergence of the human species correlated 
with our natural adaptation to biogeographic realms, 
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irreversible changes, 
with unpredictable 
consequences for the 
habitability of Earth, 
becomes real.
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our subsequent evolution was heavily influenced by 
social adaptation to environments shaped by our 
own hand through Palaeolithic, Neolithic, Urban 
and Industrial Epochs. The Neolithic Revolution 
transformed hunter-gatherer cultures into societies 
based on settled agriculture. This transition, like 
other epochal transitions, was rooted in changes in 
the material base and social institutions of society. 
In all instances, new regimes emerged from the 
development of the forces of production, reflecting 
evolving technology and social organisation. 
This cumulative history has led to the current 
juncture, where the enhanced scale and wherewithal 
of the human project has generated massive 
environmental degradation, atmospheric emissions 
and water pollution. We are now witnessing mass 
extinctions, ecosystem destruction and climate 
change.4 While the human story has been one of 
great cultural variation, we now share a common 
heritage of violence and risk. Moreover, as the 
resilience of planetary systems erodes, the danger of 
abrupt and irreversible changes, with unpredictable 
consequences for the habitability of Earth, becomes 
real. This situation is compounded by the continued 
extraction of non-renewable resources and the 
dominance of unsustainable consumption patterns. 
Taken together, these factors have led scientists to 
define our current epoch as the Anthropocene, in 
which the human species has become the dominant 
geological force. The precise inception date of this 
epoch remains unclear, but the debate includes an 
origins narrative in the Industrial Revolution and 
the establishment of the current capitalist mode of 
production. 
The requirements of reproducing capitalism 
now shape and influence the direction of human 
development. According to Immanuel Wallerstein 
(2011), the driving underlying objective of capitalists 
in a capitalist system is the endless accumulation of 
capital, wherever and however this accumulation 
may be achieved. The preceding four centuries has 
witnessed expanding capitalist relations of production 
across the globe, through the unleashing of various 
strategies, including the integration between banks 
and industry, the export of capital, the exacerbation 
of inter-imperialist conflict, a reduced life cycle for 
fixed capital, accelerated technological innovation, 
the permanent military economy, the growth of 
multinational corporations and the expansion of 
credit, with resultant global indebtedness. 
According to Lebowitz (2015), capitalism is also 
a system that “… tends to destroy the original 
sources of wealth (human beings and nature) and 
that has an inherent tendency to generate crises.” 
Foster et al (2010) have expanded on the critique of 
contemporary capitalism to argue that the source 
of our present ecological crisis lies in the paradox of 
wealth in capitalist society, which expands individual 
riches at the expense of public wealth, including the 
wealth of nature. In the process, a huge ecological 
rift is driven between human beings and nature, 
undermining the conditions of sustainable existence: 
a rift in the metabolic relation between humanity and 
nature that is irreparable within capitalist society, 
since it is fundamentally integral to the objects of 
capitalist accumulation.
Capitalism has created the conditions of current 
over-production and under-consumption, through 
Capitalism has 
created the 
conditions of current 
over-production and 
under-consumption, 
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its relentless and ultimately self-destructive drive for 
profit. Improvements in the material living conditions 
of humanity have resulted from the extension of the 
provision of various infrastructures, including water 
supply, housing, electricity, transport connections 
and a wide range of essential products and cultural 
activities. This is, however, not universalised, and 
has increasingly become dependent on international 
linkages in global commodity chains of production, 
distribution and consumption for their provision and 
maintenance. As noted by Imhoff (2015: 5), “the irony 
is that we already produce enough calories to support 
10 billion people. Not all of that output reaches those 
who need it most. Nearly one-third is wasted along 
supply chains. Another one-third is fed to cattle. Five 
per cent is converted to biofuels.” 
In a seminal review of the most mature and advanced 
capitalist country of the world, Gilens and Page (2014) 
found that “… economic elites and organised groups 
representing business interests have substantial 
independent impacts on U.S. government policy, 
while average citizens and mass-based interest 
groups have little or no independent influence.” 
This diagnosis is aligned with Mészáros’ (2015: 296) 
determination that we have entered a new period 
of epochal transformation in which capital’s “all-
engulfing catastrophic centrifugality,” as evidenced in 
the current planetary-wide destructive tendencies, 
and this is leading to severe contradictions in the 
command structure of the state, which can no longer 
exist entirely within the nation-state structure. The 
lack of any global alternative is resulting in a more 





The cumulative impact of human activities on the 
planet’s ecosystems and its biodiversity presents an 
existential threat to continued human survival. The 
response of nation-states has been far from adequate. 
They adopt policy frameworks that seek economic 
stimulation or fiscal austerity, with environmental 
sustainability a subsidiary but growing concern, 
without unpacking the contradiction between the 
inherent capitalist requirement for infinite growth 
and the imperative to live within the resource and 
ecological boundaries of a finite planet. It is the 
structural relationship between people and planet 
that requires a revolutionary transformation. Such 
a transformational agenda demands the humble 
acknowledgement by our species that we share the 
planet and that our current political borders are 
historical and cultural arrangements, and thus are 
time-bound and mutable. These borders, no matter 
how violently enforced, offers little respite from the 
impacts of climate change and our further trespass 
beyond safe planetary boundaries (Rockström 
et al 2009), or a sound basis for collectively and 
democratically governing our one world. 
To redress 21st century risks, and to nurture its 
possibilities, our archaic institutions need a root 
and branch upgrade. The very word ‘international’ 
Reclaiming our 
future as global 
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presumes the validity of dividing human society 
according to political boundaries defined historically. 
Murray Bookchin (1989) had warned that the 
“…assumption that what currently exists must 
necessarily exist is the acid that corrodes all visionary 
thinking.”
Development cooperation, by fulfilling its function 
of maintaining the political economy of capitalism, 
has always been politicised. While efforts are made 
to nudge the system to better align with equity and 
sustainability principles, the time is long overdue 
for civil society organisations (CSOs) to see that a 
decisive rupture in the political economy will be 
necessary for a ‘Great Transition’ to a truly planetary 
level of civilisation (Raskin et al 2002).
Reclaiming our future as global citizens requires 
civil society mobilisation against the depredations, 
violence and alienation of contemporary 
capitalism. This larger vision and politics demands 
a corresponding enlargement of the perspectives, 
priorities and programmes of CSOs. They need to 
move from being part of the juggernaut, or mere 
gadflies on it, to becoming agents of deep change. As 
civil society explores solidarity and cooperation, and 
works to break free of the constraints of traditional 
funding sources, it can become a powerful laboratory 
for the larger project of establishing a post-capitalist 
culture and relations of production for a just, 
egalitarian and sustainable global society.
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the CSO enabling 
environment
The coming to fruition of the Global Partnership for Ef-
fective Development Co-operation (GPDEC), adopted 
at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness at 
Busan, South Korea, in December 2011, ushered in a 
new dawn for civil society organisations (CSOs) across 
the world. While for many, it marked the beginning of 
CSOs being anchored in the official development co-
operation agenda, for others, it provided an impetus 
for CSOs to demand accountability over the creation 
of an enabling environment for CSOs. For some, the 
expectation of working closely with their governments 
to create an enabling environment was a motivation 
to engage with the process.
Paragraph 22 of the GPDEC1 reads as follows:
Civil society organisations (CSOs) play a vital role in 
enabling people to claim their rights, in  promoting 
rights-based approaches, in shaping development 
policies and partnerships, and in overseeing their 
implementation. They also provide services in 
areas that are complementary to those provided by 
states. Recognising this, we will:
a) Implement fully our respective 
commitments to enable CSOs to exercise their 
roles as independent development actors, with 
a particular focus on an enabling environment, 
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consistent with agreed international rights, 
that maximises the contributions of CSOs to 
development.
b) Encourage CSOs to implement practices that 
strengthen their accountability and their con-
tribution to development effectiveness, guided 
by the Istanbul Principles and the International 
Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness.
Indicator 2 on the Busan agreement states:
Civil society operates within an environment 
that maximises its engagement in and contri-
bution to development.2
Over three years since its inception, the implemen-
tation of paragraph 22 remains a work in progress. 
Efforts are in earnest to finalise how Indicator 2 will be 
monitored, while the Task Team on CSO Development 
Effectiveness and Enabling Environment, comprised 
of representatives of donor agencies, global south 
governments and civil society networks, including CIV-
ICUS,3 has planned to roll out a voluntary initiative for 
developing guidelines on creating and improving an 
enabling environment for CSOs at the national level. 
These areas of work focus largely on addressing the 
challenges faced by CSOs in the legal, regulatory and 
financing environment, and challenges with the policy 




For many CSOs in Sub-Saharan Africa,4 CSO financing 
is one of the key enabling issues that needs to be 
addressed. African CSOs get much of their financial 
support from official development partners and CSOs 
in countries in other regions.
In recent years, there has been much focus on the 
financing of CSOs in Africa. This can be attributed to 
the following factors: first, many official development 
partners have chosen to use CSOs to implement their 
programmes due to poor governance in the public 
sector; second, as several countries in Africa have 
graduated into being classed as middle income coun-
tries, the magnitude of official development assis-
tance (ODA) is reducing and CSOs are seen as viable 
structures to manage the smaller amounts of funds 
being committed to such countries; and finally, CSOs 
remain the stakeholders that offer the largest network 
outreach to grassroots communities, where develop-
ment investments are largely needed. 
Of late, governments in Africa have paid considerable 
interest to CSO funding. Issues of CSO transparency 
and accountability are often bundled around this to 
hide the true intentions of governments. When gov-
ernments raise this issue, their main objective is usu-
ally to curtail resource flows to CSOs through legal and 
regulatory requirements. In some cases, as detailed 
elsewhere in the CIVICUS State of Civil Society Report, 
For many CSOs in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 
CSO financing is one of 
the key enabling issues 
that needs to be ad-
dressed.
CSOs in most African 
countries do not 
receive government 
funding. Governments 
do not provide 
subsidies to CSOs 
even when they have 
managed to achieve 
statutory status.
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there are also incidences of physical intimidation of 
CSO personnel, arbitrary arrests and association with 
terrorist acts. Here again the objective is to curtail the 
initiatives of those organisations that work in defence 
of human rights and to promote good governance.
Aside from these common challenges faced by CSOs in 
Africa, new forms of impediments have emerged from 
the funders of CSOs that, if they are not addressed, 
could undermine the hitherto strong partnership that 
has existed between African CSOs and their develop-
ment partners. The deterioration of this partnership 
will particularly hamper the delivery of services and 
achievement of development outcomes at the grass-
roots level.
CSOs in most African countries do not receive govern-
ment funding. Governments do not provide subsidies 
to CSOs even when they have managed to achieve 
statutory status. Closer analysis of the legal and regu-
latory frameworks for CSOs in most African countries 
reveals that there is no legal, policy and institutional 
framework for financially supporting the initiatives of 
CSOs. Individual CSOs are left to raise their own re-
sources when attempting to build partnerships with 
governments. 
In other instances, governments are overtly hostile to-
wards CSOs, with accusations ranging from CSOs being 
ineffective or fake organisations that only exist to tap 
into donor money, to questioning of the legitimacy of 
CSOs with regard to representation of the population. 
CSOs are also seen as being too political and accused 
of siding with opposition parties on developmental and 
human rights issues.
There is thus a high dependence of African CSOs on 
donor funding: some estimates that over 90% of CSOs, 
in some countries, are largely dependent on donor 
funding. Donor support to African CSOs is in line with 
international trends, in that funding currently goes be-
yond service provision, to also focus on advocacy and 
the role of civil society in improving governance. Sup-
port towards African CSOs has been one of donors’ key 
measures to deepen democratic ownership, increase 
domestic accountability and improve governance. 
While Africa CSOs are under enormous pressure to 
deliver on behalf of their development partners, 
response to meet the core needs of African CSO is 
very limited and slow. There are many challenges, 
including offices, equipment, staff, transport and 
working conditions, that are responded to by very few 
donors. Donor policy on civil society and aid modal-
ities are seen by some groups as rigid, uninformed 
and sometimes misplaced. They largely seem to fail to 
recognise the dynamism and heterogeneity that exist 
among African CSOs.
Declining 
funding and its 
consequences
Increasingly, funding support to African CSOs is dwin-
dling, with African CSOs having to cut their budgets 
and let staff go. Most support given covers pro-
gramme costs, with little support towards core costs 
and overheads. This funding framework has pushed 
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many African CSO to a state of desperation. Organisa-
tions have had to make internal arrangements with staff 
for them to work on short time or on a part-time basis. 
Should this become a permanent feature of CSO life, it 
has the potential to create unsustainable contractual 
obligations, which will only increase the attrition of Afri-
can CSOs and reduce their capacity to deliver services to 
those who need them most. Further, the current situa-
tion has created staff uncertainty within CSOs. A change 
in the employment relationship, from one of permanent 
employment to the casualisation of labour, has meant 
that employment benefits have been curtailed, such as 
labour and pension benefits. Staff in CSOs can thus ex-
perience greater stress levels, as they are no longer able 
to make long term domestic financial arrangements. 
As desperation picks up, African CSOs are increasing-
ly turning to governments and donor agencies to win 
short term implementation contracts to facilitate their 
survival. CSOs contracted by government departments 
and donor agencies have little or no input in the outputs 
and expected outcomes. One result is growing criticism 
from unfriendly governments towards organisations that 
do contract work for foreign governments and agencies, 
calling into question the credibility of CSOs.
The various sources of funding for programmes and 
projects in Africa apply strict criteria for identifying 
recipients. In most cases, many documents have to be 
completed and compiled before even the shortlisting 
stage for funding is reached, and these are tedious, 
lengthy and not user-friendly, taking considerable time 
away from programme implementation. Many CSOs do 
not have access to state-of-the-art computers and soft-
ware. In some cases the documents are not clear and 
are not accompanied by user notes, which discourages 
many applicants. Lengthy application forms are a 
challenge to most CSOs, and particularly to com-
munity based organisations (CBOs), which have 
lesser capacity and resources and are often based 
at a great physical distance from donor offices. 
Compliance issues, such as submitting reports on 
time, and completing lengthy reporting forms, 
offer challenges to most. Funding criteria are often 
against organisations that are not already fund-
ed, and are not generating income, and easier for 
organisations that already have funds. Larger and 
well connected CSOs are favoured over smaller 
organisations. Further, compliance with national 
level revenue authority requirements are often 
complex and time consuming, and require very 
strict reporting conditions. This is particularly a 
problem when donors require that CSOs comply 
with national auditing provisions in the terms of 
their grant-making contracts.
CSOs often do not receive sufficient funding to de-
liver a programme, or funding is exhausted before 
programmes are completed. Often, their funders 
cut budget allocations, with little consultation with 
their partners. This can probably be associated 
with budget cuts donors are experiencing, or a 
move to mitigate risks on the part of the donor. 
African CSOs are thus not able to expand their 
services or their outreach. In some cases, CSOs in 
Africa are forced to down-size their operations, 
make staff redundant, merge with like-minded 
organisations, or change their focus or mission.
African CSOs are expected to be sustainable, and 
yet they are not allowed by most donors to retain 
surpluses for the future after project completion. 
Increasingly, funding 
support to African 
CSOs is dwindling, with 
African CSOs having to 
cut their budgets and 
let staff go.
African CSOs are 
expected to be 
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for the future after 
project completion.
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Generally, funds must either be returned, or consid-
ered part of the future support to the organisation. 
African CSOs are also not able to retain staff, with staff 
turnover being driven by poor remuneration. Most 
experienced staff are poached by governments or 
International CSOs. 
African CSOs can also experience delays in project im-
plementation due to late payments by donors, which 
causes cash low problems. A lack of timely communi-
cation regarding donors’ system of disbursing funds, 
and adherence to contract conditions, undermines 
the credibility of partnerships. 
Conclusion 
For funding to be effective, development partners 
would need to apply greater flexibility in their funding 
instruments, while still maintaining fiduciary require-
ments. Donors need to reduce bureaucracy in grant 
management and make grant application processes 
easier and accessible to more CSOs. At the same time, 
there is a need for CSO policy space and leadership in 
determining priority areas and projects. For sustain-
able engagement with CSOs in policy dialogue, donors 
will need to consider increasing their funding towards 
lobbying and advocacy initiatives. Other important ar-
eas to support include capacity building, information 
exchange and organisational development. 
Consistent funding from a reliable donor can go a long 
way in sustaining CSOs in Africa for longer periods of 
time, enabling them to deliver better services to more 
beneficiaries. Rational, coherent and sustained forms 
of funding, that offer constant monitoring and sup-
port, and that are multi-year in scope, would go a long 
way towards ensuring the sustainability of African 
CSOs.
1 Agreement of the Fourth High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, 
South Korea, 1 December 2011, http://
effectivecooperation.org/files/OUT-
COME_DOCUMENT_-_FINAL_EN.pdf.
2 Proposed Indicators, Targets and 






3 For more information see http://task-
teamcso.com.
4 The focus of this contribution is on 
CSOs in Sub-Saharan Africa, which for 
shorthand here is referred to as Africa.
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Introduction
The rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa) and other emerging economies 
have challenged the traditional workings of global 
governance. For instance, the formation of the 
BRICS Development Bank in 2014 has emerged as a 
direct response to discontent with failing economic 
reforms imposed by the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The Bank, and the actions of 
the BRICS club, represent an alternative source of 
funding for development in the global south, and 
also the gradual introduction of diverging forms of 
international governance. Belonging to the global 
south, and having been recipients of developmental 
aid, the BRICS alliance are reconfiguring the use of 
aid and development strategies for effective national 
growth and social-economic advancement. This has, 
however, sometimes come at the expense of global 
political norms of democracy, good governance 
and human rights that have informed the foreign 
policy of traditional donors, and underpinned global 
governance institutions. 
Defining 
features of BRICS 
development 
cooperation
Though different in its approaches, and modalities for 
development, south-south cooperation (SSC) does not 
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-Matshediso Moilwa and Neissan 
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(NSC). Instead, SSC should be seen as complementary 
to the efforts of the global north, and is similarly 
aligned to internationally agreed development goals, 
including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and the upcoming Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs).1 The shift in approach to SSC rather comes 
with emerging donors placing a particular focus on 
self-reliance and independence as means to give 
developing countries the tools and capacities to 
achieve their own development success. Support 
from the BRICS places increasing emphasis on 
infrastructure building, industrialisation, social 
welfare, technical support and capacity building. 
The Russian Deputy Minister of Finance, Sergey 
Storchak, captured the basic essence of self-reliance, 
in explaining the Russian Development Assistance 
Concept, in 2006: 
“…The governments of developing countries must 
shoulder primary responsibility for overcoming 
poverty and underdevelopment of their nations 
but a radical improvement of socioeconomic 
conditions in these countries will be possible 
only if the international community takes 
resolute and concerted action to facilitate their 
development.”2
The Russian government has continued to 
acknowledge and promote the belief that developing 
countries should carry the onus of forging their 
own development paths and should be engaged in 
shaping the necessary policies.3
Russia, whose development cooperation has 
historically been based on Cold War politics,4 is the 
only global northern counterpart in the BRICS club. 
Brazil, China, India and South Africa, in comparison, 
have a historical and cultural affinity with SSC, 
evolving over the years and applying key principles 
that emerged out of the 1955 Bandung Conference 
(also known as the Asian-African conference) and 
the 1978 Global South conference on Technical 
Cooperation amongst Developing Countries in Buenos 
Aires.5 In supporting tenets of national ownership and 
the strengthening of national capacities, Brazil, China, 
India and South Africa affirm that they operate on 
the premise of mutual benefit, collaboration through 
horizontal partnership, project alignment with the 
recipient’s national objectives, and cooperating 
through trust, respect, equality, solidarity and 
partnership. They see themselves as development 
partners, in contrast to the traditional discourse of 
donor-recipient relations. Their own experiences 
as recipients of development assistance create 
sensitivity around the use of the term ‘aid’, and the 
debates that surround it.  Russia’s exception as a non-
southern nation is justified by its common critical 
attitude towards aid conditionality, and its claim to 
share the same objectives of preserving sovereignty, 
horizontality and non-interference that are embodied 
in SSC.6 
A distinctive feature of the BRICS’ influence in 
development cooperation, beyond the additional 
sources of resources made available, stems from 
the member countries’ experiences of successful 
economic development.7 SSC has enriching 
characteristics for the aid effectiveness agenda, 
which brings a refreshing approach to development 
Though different 
in its approaches, 
and modalities for 
development, south-
south cooperation 
(SSC) does not 
necessarily seek to 
challenge north-
south Cooperation.
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cooperation policy. With similar experiences and 
trajectories of development, emerging economies have 
rich know-how about good practices and development 
solutions that are more adaptable to the similar 
economic and social conditions of other developing 
countries. Likewise, the emphasis on equality and 
horizontal collaborations creates heightened trust 
levels amongst partners, with formal and informal 
linkages being established and strengthened.8 
Discontent with the ideologies and practices of the 
world’s financial institutions has brewed over decades 
among countries of the global south. Resistance to the 
international financial architecture started to come 
from emerging donors in the early 2000s. In 2003, 
during the Indian budget speech, it was declared that 
the Indian Government would provide debt relief 
packages to Heavily Indebted Poor Countries for 
overdue debts, and the government also linked grants 
and concessions with trade. The Indian Development 
Compact package, offering a mix of lines of credit, 
concessional loans, debt relief, subsidised credit and 
technical assistance, all without conditionality, came 
as a result of the Indian government’s response to the 
approach of Western financial institutions, and acted 
as a counter-narrative to hegemonic global governance 
regimes.9 As was stated by Indian finance minister, 
Jaswant Singh, in 2003:10
“Having fought against poverty as a country and 
a people, we know the pain and the challenge that 
this burden imposes.”
SSC aligns itself with demand-driven assistance, 
tailored to the recipient’s needs. It is in the same vein 
of thinking that southern donors do not necessarily 
attach political or economic conditionalities to their 
assistance. The Bandung Principles highlight the 
importance of respect for sovereignty and non-
interference in national policies. This is an obvious 
contrast to the use of development aid as a soft power 
tool to push reforms in the interest of good governance, 
democracy and human rights, and to promote economic 
liberalisation, which characterises NSC.11
The impact of conditionality is visible in developing 
countries’ “loss of independence and autonomous 
capacity to choose their development course, 
which becomes overwhelmingly determined by 
the development path pushed by the West.”12 
China’s government has always taken a strong 
stance on conditionality, and Brazil’s shares the 
same sentiments. Resonating with its own historical 
experiences as an aid recipient, Brazil’s guiding 
principles on technical cooperation are based on 
horizontal relations and non-conditionality, and 
also reflect its foreign policy principles of mainly 
non-intervention, autonomy, non-violence and 
universalism, which can be seen as ideals consistent 
with the country’s southern identity.13 
In comparison, South Africa’s government has not 
always been consistent with the southern rhetoric 
of non-conditionality, which is often at odds with 
the country’s progressive constitution and history of 
promoting democratic freedom and human rights. 
In repairing its apartheid hegemonic image and 
relationship with other African states, South Africa 
has included, as part of its development assistance, 
debt forgiveness initiatives for countries such as 
Mozambique, Swaziland and Namibia.14 Complications 
A distinctive feature 
of the BRICS’ influence 
in development 
cooperation, beyond 
the additional sources 
of resources made 
available, stems 
from the member 
countries’ experiences 
of successful economic 
development.
Discontent with 
the ideologies and 
practices of the 
world’s financial 
institutions has 
brewed over decades 
among countries of 
the global south.
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and contradictions raise questions about South 
African dualism in upholding good governance 
practices, while also subscribing to SSC principles 
of non-intervention and respect for national 
sovereignty.
For example, during its neighbour Swaziland’s 2011 
financial crisis, South Africa offered Swaziland 
a US$355m bailout loan, on condition that the 
government fulfil financial reform and accountability 
requirements, and other conditionalities related 
to political freedoms and human rights reforms.15 
South Africa and Swaziland signed a Joint Bilateral 
Commission agreement in 2004, which aimed 
to promote economic and social development, 
democracy, human rights and good governance, and 
the development of a strong civil society presence. 
As part of the loan guarantee, the Swazi government 
was urged to further commit to the agreement and 
initiate further engagement with Swazi stakeholders 
and citizens to participate in the process of Swazi 
development. Swaziland’s king eventually rejected 
the loan, casting the impoverished country further 
into economic crisis.16 South Africa’s government 
nevertheless remains Afro-centric, committed to 
promoting accountable leadership on the continent, 
and supporting democracy and good governance 
practices, but using a soft power approach of ‘quiet 
diplomacy’ towards its neighbouring countries. 
South Africa thus slightly differs in southern ideology, 
and can be understood to be taking a bridging role 
between traditional donors and its African peers on 
matters such as good governance and institutional 
building.
The BRICS support 
to Africa’s 
development
The rise of the BRICS means that the governance 
discourse has to change to understand their 
perspectives. Emerging economies emphasise 
the need for infrastructure building as a means 
to stimulate foreign direct investment and spur 
economic growth. The BRICS are themselves 
still trying to address their own socio-economic 
hurdles, for example, by improving health care 
systems, creating sustainable food security systems, 
expanding transportation networks and strengthening 
information and communication technologies. 
These types of investments have resulted in a form 
of economic growth that more closely addresses a 
developing society’s needs.17
In 2012, China and the African Union Commission 
signed an agreement in support of the Programme 
for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), 
a strategic framework that will run through to 
2040. PIDA makes commitments to build much-
needed continental infrastructure across key areas 
such as energy, transport, trans-boundary water 
resources and information and communications 
technologies. The objectives are clear: extensive 
infrastructure building is expected to create a 
catalyst for growth and develop human capital, but 
also decrease transaction costs for cross border 
trade and contribute towards regional integration. 
With an estimated cost of US$360bn for the entire 
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programme, PIDA has been welcomed as providing a 
new development stimulus for the African continent.18
Similarly, in collaboration with the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a regional 
intergovernmental initiative, the government of India 
has pledged to invest in energy, transportation and 
industrial development in the region, in the form of 
hydroelectric plants in Burundi and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, a power transmission project in 
Mali and a trans-border railway to link Djibouti and 
Ethiopia. The Indian government has also signed an 
agreement with Chad to revive its textile industry. 
Accordingly, South Africa has set aside ZAR4.5bn 
(approx. US$380m) in consolidated resources for 
key infrastructure projects that would strengthen its 
position as a regional hub in Southern Africa.19 Russia 
has called for further economic investment in Africa 
through a series of exchanges. Through the Russian-
African Business Forum and Coordinating Committee 
on Economic Cooperation with Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Russia has offered to share technology in military, 
energy and geographical exploration sectors.20
The darker side 
of the BRICS 
cooperation
This is not to say that the efforts of the BRICS 
countries are entirely altruistic. Notwithstanding 
SSC principles, power politics are part and parcel of 
international relations. While it has received some 
praise as a positive southern grouping that other 
developing countries can relate to, there is also a broad 
critique of the BRICS, particularly from a civil society 
perspective, which points out that, despite their non-
interventionist, solidarity and mutual benefit rhetoric, 
cooperation from the BRICS club has been marked 
by similar challenges to those that characterise NSC. 
Fluctuating public opinion about the new club ranges 
from optimism for a changing world order to concerns 
over a new post-colonialist hegemony. The BRICS club 
has been condemned for being “neo-liberalist with 
southern characteristics.”21 Civil society concerns lie 
in the challenges to human rights and development 
brought by the alternative economic agenda, 
particularly because of the absence of clear human 
rights frameworks to guide southern development 
cooperation, trade and investment.22
The scope of the large infrastructure projects and other 
development initiatives that are a significant part of 
BRICS-led development cooperation can be expected 
to have significant implications in developing countries, 
particularly in Africa, on contested issues such as 
the exploitation of natural resources, land grabs and 
land displacement, labour practices, environmental 
concerns, agriculture and food security, to name a 
few.23 Infrastructure investments in the past have seen 
positive outcomes in the transfer of resources and 
technology, but have also introduced sector specific 
reforms and had policy implications for recipient 
countries. Further, human rights, public accountability 
and environmental concerns are rarely addressed in 
government-to-government relations.24
Donor assistance from emerging economies may be 
more attractive to developing country governments 
than that from northern donors, as assistance is 
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provided in a much faster, cheaper and more flexible 
manner. With developing countries opting for southern 
aid, it is not surprising that northern donors question 
the quality of the services, for example by asking 
whether labour, safety and environmental standards 
are being upheld. Northern critics have called 
attention to southern donors’ lack of transparency 
and have accused emerging Asian economies of being 
“rapacious and mercantilist”25 in extracting African 
natural resources. The term ‘rouge aid’ is often used 
to refer to Chinese support to corrupt and autocratic 
regimes, which undermines the emphasis on good 
governance practices that traditional donors have 
tried to establish in their international development 
policies.26
BRICS investment in developing countries has largely 
concentrated on the manufacturing and extractive 
industries. Labour activists have raised concerns about 
inequality, including disparate wages, unregulated 
working conditions and the restriction of economic 
democracy27 for the large majority of the working 
poor in developing countries.28 Chinese private sector 
investment has come under the spotlight, including in 
a 2011 report by Human Rights Watch, which raised 
fears over the poor working conditions of workers in 
Chinese-led enterprises, and Chinese non-compliance 
with environmental safety regulations.29
The BRICS and 
civil society
Further, despite their increasing international 
development clout, the reluctance of the BRICS club 
to acknowledge the significance of civil society is a 
reflection of wider difficulties in civil society-state 
engagement in BRICS countries. The legal frameworks 
and policy contexts for such engagement are highly 
restrictive, with adverse political and regulatory 
environments.30 For example, the Chinese domestic 
institutional framework is so dysfunctional that the 
Minister of Finance need not report to the Chinese 
legislature on Chinese aid expenditure, or whether it 
has been used effectively and accordingly, as assessed 
against both China’s strategic purposes and the 
recipient’s national development objectives.31
Civil society organisations (CSOs) in the global south 
have the advantage of understanding and being 
able to address issues relating to the interests of aid 
recipients, and contribute immensely to development 
effectiveness dialogue. Civil society-led SSC for 
development, between CSOs in emerging powers 
and CSOs in other global south countries, has been 
proven to produce innovative practices in fostering 
social accountability, and in promoting and scaling up 
innovations in participatory development practices.32 
Civil society has also gained increasing international 
importance. Since the Third High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness, held in Accra, Ghana, in September 
2008, civil society has been more actively engaged 
as part of the development effectiveness debate, 
including by campaigning for the inclusion of issues 
of human rights, gender equality, environmental 
sustainability, social justice and broad-based 
democratic ownership in development priorities.33
Unfortunately, the BRICS club is yet to recognise 
these efforts. Due to the state-to-state nature of their 
development cooperation, there is very little space 
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is for civil society’s participation. This is the case in 
the majority of the BRICS governments’ development 
partnerships, with some exceptions in the cases of 
Brazil and South Africa.
South Africa’s government has been quite 
progressive in reaching out to civil society. South 
Africa’s Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation has sought out opportunities to invite 
CSOs, think tanks and businesses through a series 
of lectures and imbizos (discussion gatherings) to 
seek to connect non-state actors with South African 
foreign policy. South Africa also advocates for various 
partner forums, such as the China-Africa Cooperation, 
India-Africa Forum and Brazil-South Africa think tank 
cooperation for academic exchanges.34
The Russian government has also established 
the Consultative Group of Russian Civil Society 
Organisations to engage CSOs on development 
issues, and as a strategic measure to communicate 
how Russia can benefit from foreign development 
activities. The Russian government has been 
active in encouraging the development of civil 
society institutions internationally to contribute in 
development assistance activities.35 Nevertheless, 
similar to its other BRICS counterparts, domestic civil 
society participation within Russia remains restricted. 
Critics have raised concerns about Putin’s repression 
of civil society after a series of repressive laws were 
adopted in 2012 that entailed the curbing of civil 
society’s independence from the state.36
Conclusion
In conclusion, the rise of the BRICS has created 
policy shifts in global governance. Their influence 
on the global financial system and their south-
south cooperation with developing countries has 
had positive effects, with increasing developmental 
impacts. Yet at the same time, this policy shift 
has had direct implications on the politics of good 
governance, human rights and development 
effectiveness. SSC has created a new shared 
understanding of non-interference in international 
development cooperation, whereby development 
partners affirm that they respect state sovereignty 
and merely assist in building the capacity of countries 
to realise their own developmental path. As part of 
this, infrastructure development is prioritised as a 
mechanism for stimulating growth. However, the non-
interference policy raises concerns about weakening 
good governance practices, reducing accountability 
and threatening human rights values.
In order for the BRICS alliance to retain its 
legitimacy and be accepted in international 
development cooperation, the emerging donors 
will need to restructure their CSO engagement. 
In the international development cooperation 
dialogue, CSOs act as strategic actors in bridging 
the gap between socio-economic progress and the 
safeguarding of human rights. Development should 
not come at the expense of basic human rights and 
tenets of social justice The BRICS club and emerging 
donors will have to work more closely with their own 
civil society to strengthen engagement with their 
national and foreign policies. 
State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
312
Bibliography 
N Alexandra and H Loschmann (2014), BRICS Summit Reader: The 
Club in the G20 Club. Berlin: Heinrich Boll Stiftung
N Besharati (2013), South African Development Partnership Agency 
(SADPA): Strategic Aid or Development Packages for Africa? 
Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs
S Chaturvedi, A Chenoy, D Chopra, A Joshi and K Ladhyan (2014), 
Indian Development Cooperation: The State of the Debate. 
Brighton: Institute of Development Studies
Y Chen, J Gu and Y Zhang (February 2015) ‘China’s Engagement in 
International Development Cooperation: The State of the Debate’, 
Rising Powers in International Development. Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies
J Constantine, C Leite, L Navas-Aleman, A Shankland and 
M Younis (May 2014), ‘Brazil’s Engagement in International 
Development Cooperation: The State of the Debate’, Rising 
Powers in International Development, p1-88. Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies
S Griffith-Jones (January 2015), ‘A BRICS Development Banks: 
A Dream Coming True?’, United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (215), p1-21, http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/osgdp20141_en.pdf 
N Grobbelaar (2014), Rising Powers in International Development: 
the State of the Debate in South Africa. Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies
N Grobbelaar and Y Chen (2014), ‘Understanding South Africa’s 
Role in Achieving Regional and Global Development Progress’, 
Institute of Development Studies, p1-4
J Holslag (2006), ‘China’s new mercantilism in Central Africa’, 
African and Asian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, p133-169
L John (2012), Oxfam India Working Papers Series. Oxfam India
M Larionova, M Rakhmangulov and M Berenson (2014), ‘The 
Russian Federations International Development Assistance 
Programme: The State of the Debate Report’, Institute of 
Development Studies, p1-40
T Moilwa (2015), Realising the Potential of Civil-Society-led 
South-South Development Cooperation. Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies
T Mushwana (December 2014), BRICS and the New Development 





N Mwase and Y Yongzheng (March 2012), ‘BRICS’ Philosophies 
for Development Financing and Their Implications for LICS’, IMF 
Working Paper, p1-19
OECD (July 2011), Unlocking the Potential of South-South 
Cooperation: Policy Recommendations from the Task Team on 
South-South Cooperation. OECD Task Team on South-South 
Cooperation, p1-7
U Sarkar (2013), ‘BRICS: Opportunity for a Transformative South?’ 
Reimagining Global Orders: Perspectives from the Global South. 
Delhi: Annual International Studies Convention
United Nations (2014), High-Level Event of the General Assembly 
on the Contributions of North-South, South-South, Triangular 
Cooperation, and ICT for Development to the implementation of 
the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Background Note, p.1-2
B Vickers (2012), ‘Towards a new aid paradigm: South Africa as 
African development partner’, Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4, p535-556.
State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
313
1  N Besharati, South African 
Development Partnership Agency 
(SADPA): Strategic Aid or Development 
Packages for Africa?, 2013 
(Johannesburg: South African Institute 
of International Affairs). 
2 M Larionova, M Rakhmangulov and 
M Berenson, The Russian Federation’s 
International Development Assistance 
Programme: The State of the Debate 
Report, 2014, (Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies), p13.
3 Ibid.
4 N Mwase and Y Yongzheng, BRICS’ 
Philosophies for Development Financing 
and Their Implications for LICS, March 
2012, IMF Working Paper, p4.
5 For more information, see the Buenos 






7 M Larionova, M Rakhmangulov and M 
Berenson, op. cit., p22.
8 OECD Task Team on South-South 
Cooperation, Unlocking the Potential 
of South-South Cooperation: Policy 
Recommendations from the Task Team 
on South-South Cooperation, July 2011, 
p1.
9 S Chaturvedi, A Chenoy, D Chopra, 
A Joshi and K Ladhyan, Indian 
Development Cooperation: The State 
of the Debate (Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies), p8. 
10 Ibid, p9.
11 Besharati op. cit., p19.
12 Y Chen, J Gu, and Y Zhang, 
China’s Engagement in International 
Development Cooperation: The 
State of the Debate. Rising Powers 
in International Development, 
February 2015 (Brighton: Insititute of 
Development Studies), p9.
13 J Constantine, C Leite, L Navas-
Aleman, A Shankland and M Younis, 
Brazil’s Engagement in International 
Development Cooperation: The 
State of the Debate. Rising Powers in 
International Development, May 2014 
(Brighton: Institute of Development 
Studies), p17.
14 N Grobbelaar and Y Chen, 
Understanding South Africa’s Role 
in Achieving Regional and Global 
Development Progress, 2014 (Brighton: 
Institute of Development Studies), p1-
4.
15 Besharati op. cit., p17.
16 B Vickers, Towards a new aid 
paradigm: South Africa as African 
development partner, 2012, Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 25, 
No. 4, p535-556.
17 T Mushwana, BRICS and the New 
Development Bank: An alternative 
model of development for Africa, 









18 N Alexandra and H Loschmann, 
BRICS Summit Reader: The Club in the 
G20 Club, 2014 (Berlin: Heinrich Boll 
Stiftung).
19 L John, Oxfam India Working Papers 
Series, 2012, Oxfam India, p17.
20 Ibid.
21 U Sarkar, BRICS: Opportunity for a 
Transformative South? Reimagining 
Global Orders: Perspectives from the 
Global South, 2013 (Delhi: Annual 
International Studies Convention).
22 Sarkar op. cit.
23 John op. cit., p17.
24 John op. cit., p17.
25 J Holslag, China’s new mercantilism 
in Central Africa, African and Asian 
Studies, 2006, Vol. 5, No, 2, p133-169.
26 Besharati op. cit., p20.
27 The term ‘economic democracy’ 
refers to the economic empowerment 
of all citizens and local communities, 
with the aim of preventing the 
concentration of economic power that 
undermines the power and authority of 
political and economic empowerment.
28 John op. cit., p20.
29 Human Rights Watch, You’ll Be Fired 
If You Refuse, 2011, http://www.hrw.
org/reports/2011/11/03/you-ll-be-
fired-if-you-refuse-0. 
30 T Moilwa, Realising the Potential 
of Civil-Society-led South-South 
Development Cooperation, 2015 
(Brighton: Institute of Development 
Studies).
31 Y Chen, J Gu and Y Zhang op. cit.
32 T Moilwa op. cit.
33 OECD, Aid Effectiveness 2011: 
Progress in Implementing the Paris 
Declaration, 2012, Better Aid, 
OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/9789264125780-en. 
34 N Grobbelaar, Rising Powers in 
International Development: the State 
of the Debate in South Africa, 2014 
(Brighton: Institute of Development 
Studies).
35 M Larionova, M Rakhmangulov and 
M Berenson op. cit. 
36 For more information on public 
discourse of Russian civil society 
representation see ‘Vladimir Putin’s 
goal is to destroy Russian civil 




State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
314
-Helena Monteiro, Executive Director, 
Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker 
Support (WINGS)
Introduction 
Philanthropy can be broadly defined as love of hu-
manity. Through philanthropy, voluntary private 
resources are mobilised to meet human needs, allevi-
ate suffering and tackle the systemic challenges that 
prevent human development.  
Philanthropy contributes to social change mainly 
through the institutions of civil society. Foundations, 
grant-makers and private social investors are an essen-
tial resource for civil society; they are purpose-built to 
invest in the capacities, innovations and initiatives of 
civil society. From small voluntary community foun-
dations to large professionalised grant-makers, insti-
tutional philanthropy exists primarily to nurture and 
enhance the self-organised initiatives of citizens for 
social advancement. Because of their independence, 
these social investors and grant-makers are well 
placed to take risks, respond relatively quickly, provide 
seed funding for new ideas and support community 
development at an appropriate scale. 
The last 25 years have seen a surge in organised 
philanthropy and private social investment around the 
world. Profound shifts in the relationship between the 
state, private sector and civil society have contribut-
ed to the emergence and growth of philanthropy in 
the past decades. In addition, the emergence of new 
wealth has led to the rapid growth in foundations and 
social investment initiatives, especially in emerging 
market economies.  
But the benefits of economic liberalisation have not 
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impact of legal and economic policies on development 
has resulted in growing levels of inequality and social 
tensions. Extreme inequality has limited the oppor-
tunities for many, while expanding opportunities for 
a few. This context of growing inequality is holding 
back development. As pressing global issues - such as 
threats against human rights and democracy, long-
term conflicts and regional instabilities, climate change 
and sustainability - continue to expand in depth and 
complexity, civil society, and the role of philanthropy in 
supporting it, have increased in importance.
Philanthropy has a critical role to play in addressing 
the world’s massive social challenges and in nurturing 
more just and equitable societies. It potentially offers 
complementary approaches and types of funding, ac-
companied by freedom to take risks, and tolerance of 
failure. In addition, philanthropy can test innovation 
and scale up new initiatives, enable rapid action, and 
support civil society organisations (CSOs) that under-
take advocacy and independent policy analysis. 
Philanthropy 
infrastructure
To fulfil its role, however, philanthropy needs an 
enabling environment. Such an environment is usu-
ally regarded as possessing five main features: a legal 
framework that empowers, rather than shackles; a tax 
structure that provides incentives, rather than penal-
ties; an accountability system that builds confidence 
in philanthropy and civil society; sufficient institu-
tional capacity to implement effective activities; and 
enough resources to undertake these activities. 
Organisations that support philanthropy infrastructure 
play an important role in helping to achieve these 
conditions. They provide a necessary support system 
for amplifying the effectiveness of philanthropy, and 
are well placed to have a powerful effect on the un-
derlying cultural conditions that surround philanthro-
py. In addition, philanthropy infrastructure organisa-
tions provide spaces for innovators to come together, 
enabling them to understand each other’s strategies, 
and to work together for mutual benefit. Such efforts 
need to be visible to others apart from the partici-
pants, otherwise the lessons cannot be spread and 
practice in the field cannot be changed as a result.
Philanthropy infrastructure organisations range from 
membership associations to affinity networks, and 
include advocacy, capacity building and research 
organisations focused on the philanthropy field. 
This growing community of institutions dedicated to 
strengthening global giving and social investing take 
a variety of different approaches. However, the most 
common functions are providing services to better 
enable philanthropy, for example, by providing in-
formation and advice; convening people working in 
philanthropy to share learning and foster collabora-
tion; representing the interests of philanthropy in the 
public policy arena; promoting the value of philan-
thropy to policy makers and the public; and encourag-
ing a culture of giving.1
In times marked by ongoing changes and complex 
challenges, philanthropy infrastructure organisations 
are taking leadership on various fronts in support of 
civil society.




After years of growth, global philanthropy is facing a 
worrisome trend as CSOs deal with increased control 
and undue restrictions on funding. In recent years, 
dozens of countries have adopted new laws and 
measures to hinder cross-border funding, often with 
the excuse of protecting security or preserving sover-
eignty.2 As a consequence, in order to transfer funds, 
grant-makers and the groups they seek to support are 
faced with new obstacles and additional administra-
tive requirements. Of particular concern are new laws 
restricting the receipt of foreign funding by CSOs. 
This growing trend has profound implications for 
philanthropy, as grant-makers face increasing ob-
stacles to supporting civil society. Philanthropy in-
frastructure organisations play a leadership role in 
convening concerned actors to explore possibilities for 
further collaboration to protect civic and democratic 
space. For instance, the International Human Rights 
Funders Group, in partnership with Ariadne-European 
Funders for Social Change and Human Rights and the 
European Foundation Centre, host a discussion series 
for funders to address this issue and explore possibil-
ities to move forward. When each participant funder 
shares their experiences, infrastructure organisations 
are able to gain collective knowledge of the situation, 
and identify strategies for action.  
Philanthropy infrastructure organisations also play a 
key role in keeping grant-makers and social investors 
informed and engaged in discussions on the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF), a regulatory framework that 
affects cross-border philanthropy. Grant-maker par-
ticipation in these discussions is essential, in order to 
help ensure a favourable legal environment for the 
work of foundations and their grantees abroad. To 
improve the environment for cross-border philanthro-
py, there will need to be collaboration among foun-
dations and other development actors working in a 
global context, in particular multilateral organisations, 
which can advocate towards governments for more 




As the international community engages in negotia-
tions on the post 2015 development agenda, the role 
of philanthropy is increasingly being discussed. Once 
seen as a marginal player in international cooperation 
dialogue, in the 21st century philanthropy is acknowl-
edged as playing a growing role. Philanthropy flows 
are increasing as a proportion of overall financial 
flows, and new forms of social investing combined 
with grant-making are attracting the interest of devel-
opment agents. 
Philanthropy has much to contribute to development. 
By its nature, philanthropic giving is more indepen-
dent, responsive, nimble and opportunistic than offi-
cial development assistance. Philanthropy institutions 
have more flexibility to take risks in funding short or 
long term pilots and demonstrations, and to support 
efforts that may be cutting edge or even unpopular 
at the time, but which eventually become main-
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stream practice.3 Finally, a distinctive added value of 
philanthropy is its contribution to civil society action, 
through making grants that help communities and so-
cial movements organise for positive change. 
Philanthropy institutions can also benefit in many ways 
from working with development organisations. These 
can help philanthropy to reach greater scale, influence 
public policy and achieve deeper results. It is import-
ant to recognise the force of development actors and 
mobilise this for collaboration with philanthropy. 
Differences in practices exist in each sector, and must 
be understood and addressed. For instance, when 
asked, philanthropic foundations will usually say that 
their work has very little reference to the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). However, they tend to 
work on the same areas covered by the MDGs, such as 
gender equality, child mortality and universal educa-
tion. The main issue is that philanthropic foundations 
tend to use a different language from the MDGs, 
one that is rooted in the local context, rather than in 
universal frameworks. In order to achieve effective 
cross-sectoral cooperation, it is crucial to understand 
these differences between how the official develop-
ment and philanthropic sectors operate.
An interesting initiative that illustrates the building of 
bridges across the philanthropic and the development 
sectors comes from the Global Fund for Community 
Philanthropy (GFCP) and the Global Alliance for Com-
munity Philanthropy (GACP). The GACP brings togeth-
er a cross-section of various institutional donors, each 
of which has an interest in how fostering community 
philanthropy as a specific development strategy can 
enhance development processes and outcomes. Each 
partner is investing resources and staff time towards 
the pursuit of a joint learning and development 
agenda over five years, which will be facilitated by 
the GFCP. If we talk about building bridges between 
philanthropy and development, it is this kind of inten-
tional investment over time that is required.
Another interesting emerging initiative is a cross-sec-
tor collaboration involving foundations, philanthropy 
infrastructure organisations and the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) to create a data-sharing plat-
form to measure contributions to the forthcoming 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The purpose 
is to create a cohesive map of development work, 
with data that can be mixed and combined. Among 
other aims, this initiative promises actively to engage 
philanthropy in the global development agenda. 
Philanthropy 
data    
To have better understanding of philanthropy’s 
contribution to international development, there is 
a need for the improved use of data. However, data 
about philanthropy is difficult to compile, and most 
philanthropy is not planned, monitored or reported 
according to global development frameworks such as 
the MDGs.  
Demand for reliable, globally comparable data on 
philanthropy has never been greater. As philanthropy 
grows around the world, there is widespread belief 
that access to readily available, high-quality data will 
improve philanthropy’s efficiency, influence and im-
pact. Consistent and reliable data helps philanthropic 
Philanthropy has 
much to contribute 
to development. 
By its nature, 
philanthropic 
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actors to establish strategies on what, where and how 
much to invest. It also helps organisations working on 
similar issues, locally or across borders, to share im-
portant insights into what works, and so better coordi-
nate efforts towards maximising impact in the pursuit 
of specific goals. 
The last 20 years have seen a surge in organised 
philanthropy across borders and around the world, 
coinciding with the rise of the internet, social media 
and global movements. As these transformative devel-
opments in information technology unfold, so philan-
thropy organisations increasingly need to build a 
system to identify needs, emerging trends, key actors 
engaging in philanthropy activities and opportunities 
for collaboration to improve impact. Collecting data 
on philanthropy around the world is a huge challenge, 
given the differences that exist between philanthrop-
ic actors across borders, and the constantly evolving 
contexts in which they operate. 
Currently, reliable data on giving can be found in only 
a limited number of countries. Globally comparable 
data is virtually non-existent, and it is hard to find 
a careful analysis of philanthropic giving through a 
global lens. Given the differences among foundations 
in any given country, not to mention across borders, 
gathering global data on philanthropy is no small 
challenge. 
The challenge is compounded by the fact that, when 
it comes to generating, managing and using data, 
countries, and organisations within countries, have 
different needs, and differing capacities to meet these 
needs. A further complication is the lack of clarity on 
intellectual property rights, relating to who owns data 
and the control of its use, something that can lead 
to organisations and individuals not knowing how or 
where to access data even when it is available. 
These challenges point to the need for a statement of 
values and principles that can serve as a framework 
to guide the collection and use of philanthropy data. 
This is the prime purpose of the Global Philanthropy 
Data Charter.4 Developed jointly by WINGS and the 
Foundation Center, in consultation with experts from 
the field, the Charter is a tool and a resource for the 
sector. It promotes a global vision for collecting and 
using data on philanthropy, offers a framework for col-
laboration on data, and provides a forum for assessing 
current data-related needs and capacities. 
Philanthropy and 
transparency
Over the past decade there has been increased em-
phasis on the critical need for greater transparency and 
accountability in philanthropy and private social invest-
ment, on the part of both donors and grantees. Today 
the importance of transparency and public disclosure 
of information about philanthropic giving is widely 
acknowledged. How we use resources and what we use 
resources for are as important as mobilising them. 
As providers of and channels for private resources for 
the public good, philanthropic actors must strike a del-
icate balance between independence and innovation 
on the one hand, and accountability and transparency 
on the other. This is a good argument for philanthropy 
As philanthropy 
grows around the 
world, there is 
widespread belief 
that access to 
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high-quality 
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organisations to be transparent on a voluntary basis.5 
In addition, an effective way to build trust and pre-
serve philanthropic freedom is by openly sharing 
the work of philanthropic foundations. Transparency 
occurs when foundations provide accessible informa-
tion about their work, governance and operations. In 
addition to benefiting grant-seekers, this information 
also helps the philanthropic sector to achieve greater 
impact by engaging foundations in collaboration and 
avoiding duplication. 
The growing demand for transparency in philanthropy 
is generating a good discussion about what informa-
tion to release to the public and how to do it. Philan-
thropy infrastructure organisations worldwide are 
leading this discussion and encouraging foundations 
and CSOs to plan and implement transparency strate-
gies. WINGS has recently published a toolkit describ-
ing these initiatives.6 
Culture of giving
Philanthropy as an expression of human generosity 
exists in every culture, and is reflected in most of the 
world’s cultures and religions. Cultural traditions, 
religious norms, political histories and the econom-
ic strength of individual countries have profoundly 
shaped giving in individual countries and geographical 
regions, creating a rich and diverse global philan-
thropic landscape. This pluralistic approach recognises 
the diversity of philanthropic philosophies and prac-
tices among nations and cultures, as well as the range 
of interests and motivations of individual donors. 
However, some commonalities emerge from the vari-
ous studies on philanthropy, including:
• A recognition that the unique philanthropic heri-
tage of each region needs to be acknowledged. 
• The importance of linking new, institutionalised 
forms of philanthropy with long-standing practices 
and traditions, to ensure that philanthropy is organ-
ised effectively and is sustainable, without destroy-
ing traditional giving motivations and practices.
• The shift away from traditional charitable giving 
to more strategic giving aimed at addressing root 
causes of social ills and advancing social change. 
Of specific relevance to global philanthropy is the 
growing consciousness that the challenges addressed 
by philanthropy are increasingly complex and glo-
balised. As a result, effective strategies and actions 
The growing demand for transparency in philanthropy is 
generating a good discussion about what information to 
release to the public and how to do it.
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supported by philanthropy must be multidisciplinary 
and rooted in local cultures and contexts. 
Many efforts are now underway in various regions to 
document local practices, learn from other regions, 
redevelop local discourse and reinvigorate local tradi-
tions and practices to enable local philanthropy to find 
sustainable solutions to social challenges. Support 
organisations serving philanthropy play a key role in: 
documenting local practices, traditions and discourse; 
learning from and sharing local practices with other 
regions and countries; and sharing this knowledge 
with philanthropy organisations, donors and private 
social investors to enable more strategic action and 
more sustainable results. 
Looking forward
Efforts to strengthen and amplify global philanthropy 
are central to the sustainability of global civil soci-
ety. As new and complex challenges emerge every 
day, philanthropy must draw on its ability to pilot 
new thinking and new approaches, while being wise 
enough to keep the practices and approaches that are 
working. 
We are currently seeing various interesting initiatives 
emerging from the field, ranging from efforts on data 
and transparency to engagement with the develop-
ment agenda. Such initiatives promise to contribute to 
stronger philanthropy and better results. Knowledge 
is something that can and must be pooled and used 
effectively across sectors, for the common good. In 
that regard, the philanthropic sector has to take its 
commitment to data and transparency seriously. 
Today’s complex and interdependent inequalities and 
social tensions are increasingly challenging to address, 
and no single sector can individually deliver results. 
The answer lies in getting the right architecture of 
cross-sector collaboration that works to achieve posi-
tive change.  
Knowledge is something 
that can and must 
be pooled and used 
effectively across 
sectors, for the common 
good. In that regard, 
the philanthropic 
sector has to take its 
commitment to data 
and transparency 
seriously.
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-Zohra Moosa, Director of 
Programmes, Mama Cash and Caitlin 
Stanton, Director of Learning and 
Partnerships, Urgent Action Fund
Introduction
The last few years have seen two related trends: a 
marked shrinking of civil society space in a number of 
countries, and a greater recognition of the need for 
targeted and appropriate resources to support en-
abling environments for civil society to thrive.1 Shrink-
ing space for civil society has entailed severe attacks 
on women’s rights activists, women human rights 
defenders (WHRDs) and women’s rights groups and 
movements. Meanwhile the focus on enabling envi-
ronments has meant that increased attention is being 
paid to the funding mechanisms needed to resource 
civil society, including women’s rights movements, to 
resist these attacks.
This article discusses how the kinds of work women’s 
rights social movements are undertaking exposes 
them to risks in some predictable ways, why a focus 
on resourcing resilience is a responsible and effective 
means of supporting them to handle these risks, and 
the ways in which Mama Cash and the Urgent Action 
Fund are collaborating towards a ‘continuum of fund-
ing’ approach to do this well.
Women’s rights 
activism is risky
Since 2005, the Women Human Rights Defenders 
International Coalition has been generating knowl-
edge and awareness of how WHRDs are subject to 
particular threats “because of their gender and/or the 
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Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
defenders focused her 2011 annual report on this 
topic, to highlight some of the most common threats 
WHRDs face, and make recommendations about how 
governments could better respond.3
The work WHRDs undertake almost inevitably places 
them at risk of attack because they are challenging 
deeply entrenched societal norms, which are then 
perceived as highly controversial, and because they 
are women, whose activism itself may be a challenge 
to prevailing gender roles, e.g. by taking on very pub-
lic leadership roles, rather than being in less visible 
parts of civil society.4
The Urgent Action Fund for Women’s Human Rights 
(UAF) tracks the source of threat experienced by the 
human rights defenders that seek its support, as well 
as the issues that defenders are working on at the 
time they experience the threat. This assessment 
found that activists working on issues of gender-based 
violence and LGBTIQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, 
intersex, queer) equality appear to be most at risk, 
though threats are also context specific. Half of activ-
ists supported by UAF were threatened by a non-state 
actor, most often a religious extremist or fundamen-
talist group. This shows that there are both state and 
non-state actors that seek to shrink the space for civil 
society and attack its defenders.
Some sections of civil society, particularly those 
organisations focused on human rights and social 
justice, routinely experience backlash, and women’s 
rights movements are no exception. Indeed, backlash 
may be an indicator of civil society’s progress. Ask a 
grassroots human rights organisation how they know 
that their campaign is making a difference, and they 
may well answer that they know they are being suc-
cessful when people start trying to hack their website. 
That said, the perseverance of movements in the 
face of backlash is not to be taken for granted. In the 
context of backlash, individual activists lose their lives, 







In her 2014 annual report, the Special Rapporteur 
outlined the elements she felt were needed to main-
tain a safe and enabling environment for human rights 
defenders. These included:5
“a conducive legal, institutional and administra-
tive framework; access to justice and an end to 
impunity for violations against defenders; strong 
and independent national human rights insti-
tutions; effective protection policies and mecha-
nisms paying attention to groups at risk; specific 
attention to women defenders; non-State actors 
that respect and support the work of defenders; 
safe and open access to international human 
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and threats, and 
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rights bodies; and a strong and dynamic commu-
nity of defenders.”
The Women Human Rights Defenders International 
Coalition has elaborated on the need for what it calls 
‘integrated security’ for WHRDs.6 Integrated securi-
ty highlights the importance of violence prevention 
measures; recognises that WHRDs should be and feel 
safe in all areas of their lives (at home, at work and 
on the street); acknowledges that WHRDs are subject 
to different and specific threats, depending on their 
contexts and biological, economic, geographic and 
socio-cultural factors, including age, class, language, 
gender identity and sexual orientation, location of res-
idence, race and ethnicity, and religion; and includes 
psychological well-being as a complement to physical 
well-being, with a therefore necessary additional at-
tention paid to the situations defenders’ organisations 
and families are in.
It is the resilience of activists, groups and movements 
that helps them to sustain and take advantage of en-
abling environments. Integrated security approaches, 
when applied well, also support resilience. Increased 
resilience in civil society strengthens its capacity both 
to persevere in the face of backlash and threats, and 
to leverage new opportunities. When resilience is 
strong, movements are able to persist, even in the 
face of tremendous backlash. Within unstable, con-
stantly shifting contexts, adaptive capacities help 
organisations not only to weather threats, but also to 
seize windows of political opportunity. When resil-
ience is strong, movements adapt to rapidly changing 
political situations, and leverage moments of opportu-
nity for progress toward their goals.
Norris et al (2008)7 provide an exhaustive list of 
research that supports a link between the availabil-
ity, accessibility and diversity of resources and the 
resilience of both individuals and communities. While 
resource availability alone may influence effective-
ness, resource accessibility is critical to resilience. The 
resilience of communities in New Orleans following 
the 2005 Katrina disaster was weakened in part be-
cause, while the United States is one of the wealthiest 
countries in the world, resources were not accessi-
ble to the affected communities. Resource diversity, 
meanwhile, means that if one source of resources 
fails, others are still available. In a civil society context, 
resource diversity may also ward off the risk of co-op-
tion by donors of civil society, by lessening reliance on 






Mama Cash is the oldest international women’s fund in 
the world. With over 30 years of grant-making experi-
ence, it has found that stable, multi-year, flexible core 
resources are key to building resilient, creative organisa-
tions. Many of its partners operate in contexts with high 
levels of discrimination, political repression and conflict, 
and flexible, core, multi-year support enables them to 
adapt strategically and promotes their sustainability.
While long term, 
unrestricted funding 
is the single most 
important type of 
funding to strengthen 
the effectiveness of 
civil society, rapid 
funding provides a 
vital complement 
to strengthen its 
resilience.
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• Core, or institutional, resources cover costs related 
to salaries, rent and utilities, i.e. overheads and 
operational costs, as opposed to project costs only. 
Such unrestricted resources fund organisations as 
an entity, rather than funding any particular set of 
activities. In this way, an organisation is supported, 
even as it changes its activities.
• Flexible resources are those that can be reallocat-
ed during a grant period to respond to changed 
circumstances and unexpected opportunities. That 
is, they are not required to be tied to original plans, 
but can be put to other uses as the organisation 
rolls out its work and its needs change.
• Longer term or multi-year resources are often the 
key for many organisations to be able to pursue 
dramatic social change. With such funding, organ-
isations can consolidate their learning and efforts, 
and plan ahead, as their income is more predict-
able. Having secured funds for a number of years 
also frees up time that would otherwise be spent 
fundraising every year.
Rapid funding, meanwhile, helps activists, groups and 
movements to meet a particular challenge to resilience. 
Having access to flexible resources when they are most 
needed supports organisations in a moment of crisis, or 
when a sudden shift in the political landscape creates 
a window for advocacy. While long term, unrestricted 
funding is the single most important type of funding 
to strengthen the effectiveness of civil society, rapid 
funding provides a vital complement to strengthen its 
resilience. Rapid response funding supports emergency 
interventions when time is of the essence, effecting 
lasting change through fast mobilisation, activism and 
protection of women’s human rights.
Although a number of donors make some emergency 
funds available to their existing grantees or affiliates, 
resilience for civil society overall can only be achieved 
if rapid funds are accessible via processes that are 
open to any activist or organisation, and not solely 
those that have pre-existing funding relationships 
with a donor. A growing group of rapid funders are be-
coming increasingly more networked and accessible. 
These include the network of Urgent Action Funds, 
Frontline Human Rights Defenders, the Euro-Medi-
terranean Foundation, the Observatory for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights Defenders, East and Horn 
of Africa Human Rights Defenders, the Meso-Amer-
ican Women Human Rights Defenders Initiative and 
the Dignity for All Fund for LGBTI Defenders. These 
funders have the capacity to deliver funding to activ-
ists and organisations within very rapid timeframes. 
For some, this can be as quickly as one day to a week. 
Collectively, they deliver over an estimated US$5m 
in rapid funding annually, mostly through very small 
grants of less than US$10,000.
Rapid funding, particularly in security situations, is a 
specialised kind of grant-making. It requires orienting 
the grant-making department differently, and may de-
mand specialised skill sets, such as staffing an emer-
gency hotline, or providing encryption for all commu-
nications with a human rights defender.
Sometimes civil society organisations do not want 
their major donors to know that they are experi-
encing threats, out of the belief, often founded on 
experience, that those donors will get cold feet and 
stop funding in their region if they hear about those 
threats. For these reasons, it is important that there 
be independent sources of rapid funding for civil so-
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the continuum of 
funding
One way to resource both the long term effectiveness 
and the resilience of civil society is through collabora-
tion between funders that provide core support and 
funders that provide rapid support. Mama Cash and 
Urgent Action Fund - Africa (UAF-A) have both funded 
the Women's Organization Network for Human Rights 
Advocacy (WONETHA), a Ugandan sex workers’ organ-
isation, over the past several years, to develop its lob-
bying and advocacy capacities, by providing different 
types of strategic resources and capacity support.
The current political climate in Uganda is conserva-
tive and repressive for women and sexual minorities. 
In recent years, Uganda’s political elite has become 
increasingly conservative, and Christian fundamental-
ist organisations and other right-wing groups have be-
come more influential, opposing the rights of LGBTIQ 
people and sex workers, to name two examples. This 
political focus on maintaining the ‘social fabric’ by 
prescribing rigid gender norms and attempting to con-
trol sexuality is a familiar strategy for diverting atten-
tion from other fundamental political issues, such as 
unemployment, public corruption, inadequate public 
services and a lack of democratic space.
The lives of Ugandan sex workers are tough and 
dangerous. Many women, as well as trans people 
and some men, undertake sex work as a viable job to 
support themselves and their families. However, sex 
work is criminalised in Uganda and, as in most places, 
sex workers experience extreme stigma. Both stigma 
and criminalisation fuel violence and harassment by 
police, clients and others, as well as a culture of impu-
nity. When instances of violence or arbitrary arrest are 
reported to the police, they are rarely investigated, 
and sex workers often experience further violence and 
intimidation for speaking up. WONETHA and other sex 
workers’ organisations have documented police raids, 
violence by clients and public humiliation.
WONETHA has grown since its founding in 2008 to 
emerge as a key sex workers’ and women’s rights or-
ganisation in Uganda, able to act on a national stage. 
WONETHA’s results include:
• Commissioning research on access to HIV preven-
tion, treatment, care and support services for sex 
workers in Uganda;8
• Successful lobbying against provisions most in 
violation of sex workers’ rights in the HIV/AIDS 
Prevention and Control Act of 2014 (proposed 
2010, passed 2014), such as mandatory testing 
of people convicted of drug abuse or possession 
One way to resource 
both the long term 
effectiveness and the 
resilience of civil so-
ciety is through col-
laboration between 
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of hypodermic instruments associated with drug 
abuse, as well as those convicted of offences 
including prostitution; and
• Lobbying against the Anti-Homosexuality Act 
(2009-2014) as part of a broad civil society co-
alition working to promote and secure human 
rights.
Mama Cash has provided WONETHA with flexible 
core funding since December 2010, which has ex-
panded its resource base and enabled it to develop 
professionally, including by growing its staffing, pay-
ing office expenses and building its skills base. Mama 
Cash’s funding has allowed WONETHA to determine 
its own priorities and cover essential operating costs 
that other funders often do not cover. This has pro-
vided the organisation with a vital source of stabil-
ity and sustainability over time, allowing it to plan, 
build, consolidate and resource the areas of work it 
has felt is most critical at any particular time.
UAF-Africa’s rapid response grant-making model 
has, in turn, provided WONETHA with resources to 
enable it to make strategic and urgent interventions 
to address security needs, as well as to move ad-
vocacy work forward. Support from UAF-Africa has 
allowed WONETHA to act quickly, and respond both 
to windows of opportunity and threats in a number 
of instances, including:
• In 2010, securing legal counsel and support to 
prepare a court case in which a police officer as-
saulted a sex worker (a frequent type of violence 
faced by sex workers);
• In 2012, securing legal support to represent staff 
in court after WONETHA’s Gulu office was raided, 
data was seized and staff were arrested on false 
grounds;
• In 2012, increasing security awareness among 
WONETHA staff and members, and developing a 
digital safety plan for the organisation’s informa-
tion, following the police raid and confiscation of 
digital files in Gulu;
• In 2014, participating in a legal challenge to the 
Anti-Pornography Act in Uganda’s Constitutional 
Court.
Combining core funding and rapid response support 
has proved powerful and effective for WONETHA, not 
only because WONETHA has needed the combination 
of both longer term and rapid response funding to 
be an effective advocate, but also because sustained 
core support has allowed the organisation to build its 
capacities to become strong and resilient, enabling it 
to then respond quickly and effectively to opportuni-
ties and threats when they have arisen.
Conclusion
Women’s rights activists, WHRDs and women’s rights 
groups and movements are likely to face threats in 
the course of their work because of who they are 
and the issues they work on. Dedicated attention to 
their specific needs through an integrated security 
response, as well as broader attention to enabling 
environments for civil society to operate, will support 
them to resist and react to these threats. A focus on 
State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
327
their resilience, in addition, will help them to persist 
and continue to pursue their advocacy agendas.
Resourcing for the resilience of civil society needs a 
variety of complementary approaches, including pro-
viding a continuum of funding that both provides flexi-
bility and sustainability to groups, and is responsive to 
their changing circumstances and needs and opportu-
nities. Rapid funding is critical but complementary: it 
supports the resilience of civil society only if that civil 
society has had the core funding to continue to exist 
in the first place. 
Rapid funding is critical 
but complementary: it 
supports the resilience 
of civil society only if 
that civil society has 
had the core funding 
to continue to exist in 
the first place.
This means that collaboration is key. Collaboration 
and partnerships allow funders to maintain indepen-
dence, but ensure complementarity. This contributes 
to greater accessibility of rapid resources and better 
accountability for how they are used, and increases 
the diversity of funding sources, which is in itself a 
factor in strengthening resilience.
1 CIVICUS, State of Civil Society Report 




2 Women Human Rights Defenders 
International Coalition, Global Report 
on the Situation of Women Human 




3 UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the situation of human rights 




4 UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR), Women’s 
Human Rights Defenders, 2014 http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/
WHRD/OnePagerWHRD.pdf. 
5 UN OHCHR, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human 




6 Association for Women’s Rights in 
Development, Recommendations to 
Enhance the Protection and Security 





7 Norris et al, ‘Community Resilience as 
a Metaphor, Theory, Set of Capacities, 
and Strategy for Disaster Readiness’, 
American Journal of Community 




8 Ntumwa Matovu, Sex Workers’ 
Access to HIV/AIDS Prevention, 
Treatment, Care and Support Services 
and the Applicability of National Health 
Policies’ Prescriptions in Uganda, 2011.
State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
328
Elizabeth Mpofu is the current General Coordinator 
of La Via Campesina and Chairperson of Zimbabwe 
Smallholder Organic Farmers Forum (ZIMSOFF). She is 
a smallholder farmer in Shashe, Masvingo, Zimbabwe. 
Ndabezinhle Nyoni also works for ZIMSOFF and is an 
urban farmer. The views expressed in this article are 
those of the authors.
Introduction
The road of struggles and campaigns for rights and 
justice stretches many centuries back. The path has 
been long and rugged, littered with limited but signif-
icant milestones of successes. Just as importantly, it 
abounds in key lessons for contemporary social move-
ments. The last seven decades have witnessed the 
rise of social movements, initially to fight against co-
lonial injustices, mostly in the global south, ushering 
political independence under majority rule, while in 
the global north movements formed to fight against 
racial injustices. The spaces that social movements 
occupied was once limited to national boundaries, 
but global solidarity in various forms has been the key 
to the achievement of an at least partial realisation 
and enjoyment of rights and access to justice.
The character of social movements changed in the 
neoliberal era, when Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (ESAPs) were implemented, under the 
tutelage of the Bretton Woods institutions, causing 
untold suffering of people across national boundaries. 
This led to the formation of regional social move-
ments, some of which grew and became global. Vari-
ous social movements employed or relied on a range 
of resources in their fight for justice and rights.
La Via 
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These resources have included material and non-ma-
terial resources, and had a bearing on the longevity 
and impact of social movements. Financial resources, 
because of their nature, tend towards ephemerality, 
both in the purpose and effectiveness of movements. 
The funding of social movements by donors, in gener-
al, led to quick decline, and a shift from a breadth of 
focus to a single focus, as donors determined both the 
sustainability and focus of social movements, leading to 
a delinking between a movement’s leadership and its 
constituencies.
The capture of social movements by funders and elites 
led to the formation of new kinds of social movements, 
led by the people affected, and with very limited reli-
ance on funding, from carefully selected donors, whose 
funding supports the agenda of the movements. One 
such movement that has grown globally is the interna-
tional peasant movement, La Via Campesina, formed 
in opposition to the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) 
agenda of trade liberalisation under the umbrella of the 
promotion of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).
Birth of a giant in 
1993
Before the birth of La Via Campesina, various new and 
diverse forms of rural activism and social organisation 
had emerged, to forge common ground and solidari-
ty to fight against neoliberalism. These carved out an 
autonomous space, independent of those who had 
paternalistically claimed to represent them, such as the 
church, conservative political parties and existing civil 
society organisations (CSOs). La Via Campesina emerged 
during this period and morphed from a local peasant 
movement to a regional one, and then grew to be what 
it is today, an international peasant movement bringing 
together more than 164 organisations in over 73 coun-
tries in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe. Its con-
stituency numbers over 200 million peasants, small and 
medium-sized producers, landless people, rural workers 
and indigenous people from around the world.
La Via Campesina, unlike many CSOs, established im-
portant criteria for building its membership and setting 
the principles for funding (Martinez-Torres and Rosset 
2010). It does not accept into membership organisations 
that are not true, grassroots-based peasant organisa-
tions. It made a decision not to accept funding resources 
with compromising conditions attached, nor to permit 
any form of external interference in its internal deci-
sions, thus guaranteeing its independence and autono-
my (Rosset and Martinez 2005, cited by Martinez-Torres 
and Rosset 2010). This has allowed La Via Campesina be 
a strong, bottom-up and independent movement, led 
by poor people. Its agenda is defined internally during 
international conferences, which are organised every 
four years, with decisions taken by consensus or voting. 
In contrast, La Via Campesina’s participation in policy 
spaces is more confrontational, engaging in protest and 
aggressive debate. 
La Via Campesina is anchored in promoting food sov-
ereignty and advocating for sustainable, small-scale, 
peasant agriculture as a means of promoting social 
justice and dignity. The concept of food sovereignty 
has proved to be one within which humanity can find 
an enabling and unrestricted space to promote social 
justice and dignity, in a world that is highly centralised, 
and where power is concentrated in a few transna-
tional corporations (TNCs). Food sovereignty is a tool 
The capture of social 
movements by 
funders and elites led 
to the formation of 
new kinds of social 
movements, led by 
the people affected, 
and with very limited 
reliance on funding.
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being used by consumers and food producers to move 
towards a “food democracy” of “co-designed food 
systems…” where people “…participate in shaping 
them, to recapture them,” (De Schutter 2015 p1). It 
has created a space to rebuild the human relations lost 
over decades as a result of globalised food systems, and 
also to redress the ecological crisis of the 21st century. 
The food sovereignty concept seeks the construction of 
new rights and the transformation of society as a whole 
(Martinez-Torres and Rosset 2010). 
Food sovereignty: 
a fight against 
monopoly 
capitalism in the 
21st century 
Farmer and peasant organisations coined the concept 
of food sovereignty as an alternative to food security 
in 1996. They considered the concept of food secu-
rity to be weak, as it lacked fundamental definitions 
about where food is produced, who produces it and 
how they produce it, and thus played to the free trade 
agenda of the WTO, favouring TNCs, the architects of 
monopoly capitalism. 
The rise in the embrace of food sovereignty comes 
in resistance to developed country governments and 
their TNCs, which are on the offensive in pursuit of 
profit maximisation, impoverishing the majority of the 
world’s population as they do so. They are increasingly 
using FTAs to drive the displacement, expulsion and 
disappearance of peasants by promoting a capitalist 
production that is heavily reliant on agrochemicals, fos-
sil energy and exclusionary marketing practices, under 
the guise of promoting development. The truth is that 
FTAs only serve the interests of TNCs and offer a set of 
conditions, measures and rules to protect their invest-
ments. As a consequence, global social and economic 
inequality has reached alarming levels, such that over a 
billion people are considered to be living in dire poverty. 
Continents, regional economic blocs and individual 
countries are now trapped in a crippling FTA web, 
including through the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific agreement with the European 
Union (EU/ACP), the Regional Comprehensive Econom-
ic Partnership (RCEP) in Southeast Asia, and Economic 
Cooperation Agreements (ECAs). As we speak, partic-
ularly aggressive versions of FTA, in the form of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TIPP) 
and Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement 
(CETA) are being finalised between the EU and the 
United States and Canada. These will arm TNCs with 
new, lethal tools - the Investor-State Dispute Resolution 
and the Regulatory Cooperation Council - to manipu-
late regulations, norms and public policies to maximise 
profits. FTAs are enforcing the implementation of Trade 
Related Intellectual Rights (TRIPs) and other repressive 
laws, such as UPOV ‘91 (the International Convention 
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants), which 
criminalises many peasant seeds. 
States are fast losing the power to protect their own 
citizens and environments. For example, the Common 
Market for East and Southern Africa’s (COMESA) seed 
market policy generally intends to promote the free 
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and easy movement of ‘corporate certified’ seeds 
within the region, thereby allowing more penetration 
of traditional agriculture by ‘terminator seeds’, which 
do not produce seeds that germinate. This will create 
dependency on, and more profits for, agribusiness. 
This destructive monopoly by a few TNCs is on the 
rise, and many products of labour or nature are being 
turned into commodities.
The corporate world, particularly under globalisation 
and in the context of climate change, is abrogating hu-
man rights. The current corporate profit driven model 
has shown us that it does not work, and we need to 
move away from the current model of production, 
which is based on fossil energy use and toxic chemi-
cals, and which promotes land, water and forest grab-
bing by TNCs. We thus need a system change if we are 
to promote and protect human rights. The localisation 
of food production and promotion of local industries 
through food sovereignty will bring about social jus-
tice, and an end to the monopoly of the TNCs.
Food sovereignty: 
a dynamic and 
living concept 
built from below 
to fight for 
rights and justice
Industrially produced food from TNCs uses pesticides 
and other harmful agro-chemicals, and relies mostly 
on fossil energy, and is therefore unhealthy. Food pro-
duced locally, by peasant and family farms, organically 
or agroecologically, is better, as it is healthier, provides 
local livelihoods, sustains agro-biodiversity and mir-
rors local culture and religion. This is how we build 
food sovereignty from below (Mpofu 2014). 
Food sovereignty is now an alternative paradigm for 
how we can relate with nature and other people, and 
guarantee the survival of humanity. It prioritises local 
food systems and markets, access to and control over 
productive resources, such as land, water and seeds, 
and recognises peasant rights and protection against 
industrial agriculture. Only through food sovereignty 
can a genuine agrarian reform be attainable and land 
grabbing be guarded against. Real solutions to the cur-
rent economic and ecological crises are found in food 
sovereignty.
The potential strength of the peasantries lies in their 
capacity to establish and secure food sovereignty. 
They hold the potential to drive social and econom-
ic transformation, hinged on agriculture, to anchor 
sustainable development, rolling back neoliberal laws 
that criminalise and destroy peasants. Food sovereign-
ty stops the opening of our borders to cheap, import-
ed, unhealthy food through free trade and investment 
agreements. It calls for policies to support farmer-led 
research on agroecology and the recovery of tradi-
tional farmer seeds. The struggle to keep indigenous 
seeds in Africa, for example, has been sustained by 
traditional knowledge, and is now being taken up by 
organised movements (although some campaigns 
wrongly promote food sovereignty through the use of 
unsustainable industrial agricultural methods, such as 
fertilisers, pesticides and other chemicals, and ma-
chinery driven by fossil-based fuels). 
The corporate world, 
particularly under 
globalisation and in 
the context of climate 
change, is abrogating 
human rights.
The concept of food 
sovereignty has over 
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peasants and poor 
rural populations, in 
particular, with an 
alternative to build 
their world outside of 
capitalist driven 
food markets.
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The concept of food sovereignty has over the years 
presented peasants and poor rural populations, in 
particular, with an alternative to build their world 
outside of capitalist driven food markets underpinned 
by concentration and centralisation under conditions 
of globalisation and neoliberalism. Food sovereign-
ty symbolises resilience in diversity in all spheres of 
agriculture, including in the battles on seed biodi-
versity vs. genetically-modified organisms (GMOs), 
sustainable peasant farming methods vs. industrial 
agro-chemical driven farming methods, the promo-
tion of local food markets vs. global food markets and 
crop diversity vs. mono-cropping.
Looking ahead, we need to promote sustainable 
peasant production methods based on food sover-
eignty principles. We need to adopt practices such 
as agroecology and many other traditional farming 
ways, which have ensured the right to food and sup-
ported development for all over the centuries. Food 
sovereignty is empowering people to self-determine 
their course of development within their local con-
text. It offers a starting point to empower people to 
enjoy and realise full human rights. Thus food sover-
eignty offers a strong tool to tame and regulate the 
corporate world. 
Food sovereignty: 
a fight for rights 
and justice 
from below in 
international 
policy spaces
La Via Campesina’s growth and resilience over the 
last 20 years could be attributed to many factors, 
chief among which is the concept of food sovereign-
ty, as a unifying and rallying ideology. Following the 
frequent waves and shocks in global food markets, 
and the regular food price spikes, particularly from 
mid-2000s, the need for and embrace of food sover-
eignty in policies has grown at national, regional and 
international levels. 
Thus, food sovereignty is being used as a framework 
for intense lobbying for peasant’s rights by La Via 
Campesina and our allies, in Geneva and in Rome (La 
Via Campesina 2014). The concept shapes engage-
ment by La Via Campesina in debates in the public 
La Via Campesina’s growth and resilience over the last 20 years 
could be attributed to many factors, chief among which is the 
concept of food sovereignty, as a unifying and rallying ideology.
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policy spaces, such as the Committee for Food Security 
(CFS) through the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM), the 
Responsible Agriculture Investment (RAI) at the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and engagement 
with the International Fund for Agricultural Develop-
ment (IFAD). In Geneva, the push by La Via Campesi-
na, using the various strands of food sovereignty, has 
yielded a majority vote in support of a peasant rights 
declaration process at the UN Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC). Also in Geneva, the campaign against TNCs 
has opened space for a process to craft an internation-
ally binding instrument to regulate TNCs. 
These gains reflect the growing importance of the food 
sovereignty movement in national, regional and inter-
national policy debates, the strengthening of alliances 
for food sovereignty, the enhanced confidence of the 
movement, and the deepening of the crises that it is 
addressing. Social movements are also increasingly 
aware that realising food sovereignty requires radi-
cally different knowledge from that on offer today in 
mainstream institutions, such as the universities, policy 





In 2007, in Mali, global movements of women, envi-
ronmentalists, unions, indigenous people and others 
joined La Via Campesina in the World Forum for Food 
Sovereignty. The outcome of the dialogue significantly 
broadened the food sovereignty movement, beyond 
dialogue among farmers, and into many sectors.
La Via Campesina appreciates and embraces the 
importance of creating spaces for inter-regional and 
cross-cultural dialogue and mutual learning, and has 
been taking advantage of its diversity to develop 
horizontal networks for knowledge creation (Nyeleni 
2014). This is part of its strategy to build alliances with 
other actors to pressure international institutions such 
as the World Bank, WTO, FAO and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), among others. The movement 
has initiated an important internal self-study research 
process to identify, document and analyse, in order 
to draw lessons to strengthen internal processes and 
structures. This is important in strengthening the co-
hesion of its many networks across the world.
Sustainable peasant production methods are also be-
ing documented to contribute study materials, based 
on members’ own experiences, to the over 40 peasant 
agroecology schools and numerous political training 
schools that are part of La Via Campesina (La Via Cam-
pesina 2014).
The other aim of documentation is to support cam-
paigning directed at public opinion and policy makers, 
with data that prove that alternatives exist, that they 
work, and that they should be supported by better 
public policies.
Scholars and activists are engaging in critical dialogue 
and working together to challenge policy and gover-
nance. The involvement of experts with links to the 
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food sovereignty movement in the High Level Panel 
of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE), and 
also the wider work of the CFS, has led to increased 
networking and collaboration between scholars and 
activists (Nyeleni 2014).
As the number and range of collaborations with 
researchers grow, there is greater awareness of the 
need to develop new and appropriate research meth-
odologies in cases where co-inquirers are rooted in 
different knowledge systems. As opportunities for 
research and collaboration between different constit-
uencies grow, it becomes important to share experi-
ences and draw lessons from these. Thus, face to face 
encounters across cultures, worldviews and knowl-
edge systems are becoming more frequent.
Food sovereignty 





La Via Campesina is a movement that recognises the 
full equality and value of both women and men. La 
Via Campesina guarantees that peasant women and 
men in the movement share responsibilities equal-
ly in seeking structural change, and in working to 
strengthen open and democratic processes in our 
international structure.
La Via Campesina has transformed over the years, 
and women are now playing a leading role in the 
movement. This makes La Via Campesina a unique 
movement, in the history of both peasant and farmer 
movements, and also among social movements and 
international organisations. This is critical in the inter-
national campaign against violence against women, 
as it allows women to shape and contribute fully to 
struggles, and craft initiatives towards the full realisa-
tion and enjoyment of rights as equals. 
This gender parity in all spaces and organs of debate, 
discussion, analysis and decision-making in the move-
ment is important for helping to strengthen exchange, 
coordination and solidarity with and among women 
across the world. Women play a central role in agri-
culture in food production, and have a special rela-
tionship with land, life and seeds. La Via Campesina’s 
internal structure is creating new gender relations, 
to be mirrored in its struggles to eradicate violence 
against women.
Conclusion
The effectiveness and sustainability of La Via Campesi-
na can largely be attributed to its organisational struc-
ture, internal democratic participation processes and 
the concept of food sovereignty, as key resources for 
fighting for rights and justice, and offering an alterna-
tive to global food markets. Its strategy and tactics of 
mass mobilisation, including by weaving and forging 
strategic alliances with likeminded social movements 
and CSOs willing to play supportive, but not direc-
tive, roles, are also crucial. This has enabled La Via 
Campesina to remain entrenched locally, while at the 
This gender parity 
in all spaces and 
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same time flexing its muscles globally, both at protest 
events in and policy dialogue spaces. The principle of 
not accepting funding from institutions supporting 
neoliberalism is also key in keeping La Via Campesina 
self-determined and autonomous, and being able to 
define its struggles without external influence.
Food sovereignty sustains the strategic role of peasant 
production in fighting hunger, and deepens dialogue, 
building solidarity against adversity and cooperation 
against competition, and building alliances across 
national borders. Food sovereignty has created an ur-
gency to develop alternative food systems that allow 
people to democratise and re-localise, rather than be 
ruled by market imperatives. 
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The small Palestinian village of Saffa was the site of 
Dalia Association’s first pilot of community-controlled 
grant-making back in 2008. At first glance, the meth-
odology didn’t make much sense. Why would we give 
small grants when the need was so great? Why would 
we give unrestricted grants when the risk was so 
high? Why would we expect the community to con-
tribute so much when Palestinians are devastated by 
occupation, dispossession and colonisation?
As Palestine’s community foundation, Dalia ap-
proached the problem differently from traditional 
donors who are looking for some kind of return on 
investment. Dalia is not a donor: the funds that Dalia 
mobilises already belong to the Palestinian communi-
ty. Dalia holds them in trust and facilitates transpar-
ent, democratic and accountable use of the funds, but 
it is the community’s right and responsibility to decide 
how they are used.
This might sound like the same ‘participatory ap-
proach’ that is fashionable in development circles, but 
it is not. Dalia’s commitment to community-controlled 
grant-making is based on respect for the right of Pal-
estinians to control their own resources. Community 
controlled grant-making is an expression of resistance 
Community 
transformation 
is local work: 
a case study 
of the Dalia 
Association
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- to the Israeli occupation and to dependence on aid, 
both of which undermine Palestinian self-determina-
tion.
Starting from the premise that Palestinians have the 
right to control their own resources, Dalia Association 
stopped focusing on how communities use grants and 
focused instead on the processes they use to make 
decisions. We realised that decades of occupation and 
aid dependence have harmed self-confidence, trust 
and the social fabric. To build these up, we decided:
• Grants must be small (in Palestine, this means 
US$1,000-4,000). Small grants encourage commu-
nities to mobilise local resources in creative ways 
(rather than by inflating prices to make a ‘local 
contribution’ appear on paper). Small grants don’t 
lend themselves to profiteering and waste.
• Grants must be unrestricted. If grantees have to 
submit a proposal, they will ask for what they pre-
dict will be funded or default to what they know 
how to do already. Unrestricted grants give space 
for groups to grapple with their own priorities, as 
long as they are under no time pressure to decide.
• Grantees must work together. Treating every grant-
ee as a separate entity misses the point of funding 
communities, where people live together. Having 
grantees work together creates discussions bigger 
than those around projects or activities, and opens 
up opportunities to transform relationships.
Learning from 
experience
Much was learned from the pilot in Saffa (document-
ed in a film available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Fu9RHVfKFto), and the community con-
trolled grant-making methodology has been refined 
in each successive implementation. Innovations that 
have been introduced include:
• Dalia now asks for a financial report that shows 
the local contribution alongside the grant. This 
helps communities realise they are far less depen-
dent on aid than they thought.
• Sometimes Dalia asks grantees to put up local 
resources in order to become vested in their grant. 
This helps communities put a value on the local 
resources, such as volunteerism, use of facilities 
and in-kind support, that they have learned to 
devalue. They begin to seek community involve-
ment in order to earn grant funds, thus expanding 
participation.
• Dalia now establishes a community monitoring 
committee made up of villagers. The grantees 
learn that they are accountable to the community, 
and the community realises that it has a right to 
monitor its own community institutions, and a re-
sponsibility to support them. Good practice helps 
community members to trust their own institution 
and paves the way for more local giving.
• After a round of grants (which takes nine months 
to a year), villages are offered a ‘village fund’. If 
Starting from 
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they can raise US$3,000 from local individuals, 
companies or the diaspora, Dalia will match it with 
US$3,000. This gives each village US$6,000, kept in 
a dedicated sub-account at the community foun-
dation, to use according to their own priorities. 
One village decided on a revolving loan fund for 




But there is so much more that needs attention in 
future rounds of grant-making. For example, although 
it is the right of communities to decide how funds 
are used, more attention should be paid to increas-
ing the likelihood of success by traditional measures, 
since this is how grantees judge themselves and are 
judged by other community members. For example, 
if a group of women decides to raise chickens, they 
should visit other chicken projects, both successful 
and unsuccessful, before they commit. The risk here 
is that Dalia expands beyond grant-making to project 
implementation, which could result in duplication 
with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
community based organisations (CBOs).
Also, there needs to be a whole new strategy for 
bringing in the local private sector and diaspora. The 
challenges are huge: lack of trust in local capacity, a 
tendency toward religious giving, a narrow orientation 
towards charity as traditionally defined, anti-terrorism 
policies that make transferring funds risky and expen-
sive, and more.
Finally, there remains room for improvement in the 
decision-making process. Currently, there are two 
community-controlled grant-making programmes. In 
‘The Village Decides’ villagers are invited to an open 
meeting, where they vote on which of their local 
groups they want to invest in, and then they decide 
how to allocate the available funds among the groups 
chosen. The process is democratic and transparent, 
but it doesn’t necessarily transcend traditional lines 
of conflict. Communities need to be challenged and 
supported to move beyond the personal, familial and 
political alliances that divide communities, and in-
stead invest their trust, effort and resources in ini-
tiatives that build community cohesion and capacity. 
In ‘Women Supporting Women’, groups of women 
apply for funds and the applicants select the grantees. 
Again, although the process is democratic and trans-
parent, the women don’t always vote on the basis of 
well thought out criteria. They need to be challenged 
and supported to think about the funds they control 
as a weighty responsibility, and as something to do 
well what they often criticise donors for doing badly, 
rather than as a way to show loyalty.
Local communities can’t address these challenges on 
their own, but fortunately, they don’t have to. The 
global Palestinian community is strong and diverse 
and some enlightened international donors recognise 
the value of supporting community philanthropy. 
Local organisations such as Dalia Association can build 
the visibility and credibility of community philanthro-
py over time, learning as we go. Community transfor-
mation is not a project, and nor can it be packaged 
into a three-year strategy. Local organisations - with 
the commitment to work over generations - are best 
positioned to do this work.
Communities need 
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Changing con-
text of and space 
for civil society 
in India
In the 1990s there were only two known billionaires 
in India, and not a single corporation featured on the 
list of Fortune 500 companies. In contrast, by 2015, a 
record 90 Indians were on the Forbes list of billionaires, 
placing India at fourth place in the world, and eight 
companies were on the Fortune 500 list.1
This rapid growth of private wealth can be ascribed to 
India’s economic liberalisation, which began in the 90s. 
What started as a response to a balance of payments 
crisis has gone on to affect not only the nature of the 
Indian economy but also the very role of the state and 
the way in which different stakeholders engage with 
each other and with the government. It was widely 
believed that liberalisation, as well as being an antidote 
to the absence of economic growth, would also provide 
answers to the lack of good governance, persisting 
high levels of poverty and substandard performance 
on human development indicators. However, while it 
has delivered on the first part, its results in delivering 
on the second set of expectations have been more or 
less disappointing. Moreover, the number of corporate 
scams, corruption, collusion and crony capitalism in 
the allocation of public resources for private gain has 
only increased. For any conscious observer, instances 
of the corporate fraud in Satyam,2 illegalities in the 
allocation of telephone spectrums,3 allocation of coal 
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for industrial projects in Kalinga Nagar5 and Niyamgiri6 
represent only the uppermost manifestations of a deep 
rooted rot that has set in within the government, in 
collusion with the private sector. 
Ironically, in the face of its own continuing failures to 
address developmental problems, the government 
is looking for ways to strengthen legitimacy in the 
corporate sector, on which it must increasingly rely 
for growth and employment. A policy mandate on 
compulsory corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
seems to be the newest mask for the government 
and companies to appear more socially responsible to 
citizens. These developments pose serious questions 
for Indian civil society and the route it must chose to 
respond effectively and forcefully. 
Civil society in India is known as one of the most 
dynamic and independent in the world. It has long 
set an example in standing alongside the poor and 
voiceless. However, over the years, the more that 
Indian civil society has ventured into the political 
sphere to address issues of democratic and governance 
deficits, the more it has found itself being pushed to 
the edges by governments. One of the early examples 
of this governmental crackdown on civil society 
space still exists, in the form of the draconian Foreign 
Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA), which emerged as 
a response to civil society’s voice against the National 
Emergency in 1975, and has controlled the nature and 
extent of the receipt of foreign funding by civil society 
organisations (CSOs) to date. Subsequent governments 
have always had something of a love-hate relationship 
with the civil society, but the speed and extent of the 
crackdown, particularly against CSOs with dissenting 
voices, has been remarkable in the last few years.7 
Restricting the flow of funding into civil society, with 
the objective of financially crippling CSOs’ capacity to 
take up activity against existing government policies, 
has been one of the most frequently used tools. 
Recent times have seen the mass cancellation of 
permission, and temporary suspension of permission, 
to receive foreign donations by CSOs. Along with 
many smaller CSOs, established ones such as 
Greenpeace India have been targeted. 
Coupled with this, India’s domestic philanthropic 
giving, even though growing, has so far remained 
largely based on religious lines, and charitable in 
nature, and so has never really been an asset to CSOs 
advocating alternate policies. 
There are two main factors responsible for the 
changing government attitude towards civil society, 
which is causing civil society space to shrink in India.
First, India is a middle income country, with a 
growing global aspiration to be a superpower, and 
this aspiration does not go hand in hand with being 
portrayed as a net foreign aid recipient. Thus, the 
Indian government has been slowly pushing out 
most bilateral and multilateral aid institutions. The 
explanation has been that these agencies portray 
India in a poor light in international arenas. The net 
inflow of aid has also been very small compared to 
India’s own spending in development interventions 
in recent years. A previous finance minister described 
British aid to India, for example, as “peanuts.”8 
Second, the Indian government has started seeing 
CSOs with dissenting voices as barriers to India’s 
economic development. A leaked 2014 report by the 
Intelligence Bureau (IB),9 India’s highest intelligence 
agency, accused CSOs of “negatively impacting 
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economic progress” of the country. It even specified 
that 2-3% of GDP is affected by CSO activities, which 
are stalling progress on major developmental and 
commercial projects. Sustained protests against the 
Kudankulam nuclear plant in Tamil Nadu offer one 
prime, recent example of this acrimony between 
CSOs and the government. Pluralistic democratic 
values, for which civil society has consistently been 
advocating, seem to be the things to be sacrificed in 
the face of the government’s growing obsession with 





In 2013 India became the first country in the world 
to enact mandatory corporate expenditure on 
CSR related activities, of 2% of profits, by profit-
making corporate entities above a certain size.10 
The objective was to mainstream private sector 
participation in national development in areas not 
immediately related to commerce, and it was widely 
discussed that civil society would be a critical partner 
in implementing these activities. A section of civil 
society was quite excited with this development, for 
two reasons: first, CSR funds seemed to provide a 
potential additional source of funding for resource-
starved CSOs; and second, the CSR mandate also 
seemed as though it might provide a framework for 
wide-ranging civil society-corporate partnerships.
Emerging trends 
in CSR in India and 
implications for 
civil society
However, the devil lies in the details, and a seemingly 
innocuous CSR provision turned sour when the 
detailed rules under the CSR mandate were issued by 
the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, causing an uproar 
by CSOs. Even after a couple of amendments, the 
rules were and still are largely prescriptive in nature, 
with a select number of activities listed under which 
expenditure will count towards CSR. The activities 
listed are in alignment with the government’s 
welfare services, while areas such as human rights, 
participatory governance and accountability are not 
mentioned. The following are some of the trends that 
have emerged in CSR since it was made mandatory:
Skewed and limiting nature of 
CSR investment
Following the lead provided by the CSR rules, most 
qualifying companies have invested in the areas 
listed under the rules. Not surprisingly, many studies 
have confirmed that corporate CSR is concentrated 
in a handful of areas, while other areas are severely 
underfunded. A 2013 study by the National Foundation 
for India found that of the top 50 companies in India, 
39 are focusing their CSR activities on health, 38 on 
education and 23 each on livelihood and environment 
(companies may have more than one focus area). 
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remarkable in the 
last few years. 
The Indian 
government has 
started seeing CSOs 
with dissenting 
voices as barriers 
to India’s economic 
development.
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Few focused on other areas. Further, systematic and 
rigorous needs assessments, and proper designs of 
intervention strategy, are often missing: in other words, 
one of key strengths of the corporate sector, when 
launching business ventures, suddenly goes missing in 
case of planning CSR strategies. The need to invest in 
addressing the root causes of underdevelopment is still 
largely absent; reactive response dominates corporate 
giving.   
Disappointing CSR funds 
flowing into civil society
The flow of CSR funds, at least in the first year, has 
been pretty disappointing. The Ministry of Corporate 
Affairs readjusted total CSR spending for the first year 
to around Rs 5,000 crore (approx. US$790m), instead 
of the initial target of Rs 20,000 crore, owing to, among 
other stated reasons, the lack of preparedness of 
companies to undertake CSR and, interestingly enough, 
the inability of companies to find credible CSOs.11  
While the amount may increase in coming years, the 
actual flow of funds for CSOs may remain significantly 
lower than was initially projected.
A growing trend of 
establishing corporate 
foundations
An increasing number of companies are establishing 
their own foundations to implement CSR activities, 
rather than partnering with CSOs to do so. Most such 
foundations are operational foundations that directly 
implement their activities without the need to partner 
with CSOs, even though CSOs are best placed to work 
with communities, given their years of understanding, 
experience and rapport with local communities. 
In many instances, because companies need to 
have complete control over activities, they may be 
reinventing the wheel of development.
Government policy 
determining nature of CSR 
expenditure
The new government has been actively encouraging 
CSR investments in some of its pet initiatives, such 
as the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan initiative to clean 
infrastructure, streets and roads and the Make in 
India initiative, to encourage manufacturing in India, 
by providing tax incentives and other measures. After 
a call to build toilet blocks as part of Swachh Bharat 
Abhiyan by the Prime Minister of India, this became 
the most popular area for CSR expenditure. Many 
senior leaders, including from companies and corporate 
associations, acknowledge that government priorities 
have resulted in a very large chunk of CSR money being 
invested in a handful of programmes. To some extent, 
this is becoming another way for the government to 
finance its programmes, and the qualifying companies 
are willing to put in what is sometimes their entire 
resourcing for CSR, to win direct or indirect goodwill 
from the government.
Growth of intermediary 
agencies for CSR
A new set of interlocutors have emerged to act as a 
bridge and influence investments. However, they are 
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society philosophy. Service delivery though social 
entrepreneurship seems to be the most attractive 
business model for most such agencies, and they are 
yet to pay attention to issues of social justice and 
democratic policy.  
Increasing focus on 
integrated business 
responsibility by a small 
section of civil society
On the positive side, a few civil society initiatives 
has emerged that are starting to look at the idea of 
corporate responsibility more holistically, beyond the 
focus on 2% CSR. Corporate Responsibility Watch, a 
coalition of nine CSOs, is one such initiative, examining 
CSR on the basis of publicly available documents 
and undertaking policy advocacy.12 The National 
Foundation for India is working towards a Business 
Responsibility Index for the top 100 companies, which 
should help to strengthen such initiatives. 
Response and role 
of civil society
Indian civil society is a large and diverse group. 
Understandably, the response to the CSR mandate 
has been fragmented at best. The resulting changes 
in resource flows for development have sharpened 
the differences in approaches between different 
civil society groups. While CSOs focused on service 
delivery have tended to be fairly optimistic, seeing 
CSR as a new source of revenue for them, CSOs that 
offer dissenting voices to government tend to be more 
cautious, and indeed rather critical at times. This is 
slowly giving rise to a group of CSOs and other agencies 
that are formed with a view to accessing CSR funding, 
which is creating a parallel development discourse to 
the one practised by longstanding CSOs.  
Given the context described above, what positions can 
a CSO take with respect to CSR?  The following seems 
to be the most appropriate: 
Build transparency and 
accountability
Given the fact that the government still remains the 
primary welfare service provider, and civil society can 
only play a gap-filling, complementary role in this, CSOs 
should work to ensure that principles of participatory 
good governance, social justice and human rights are 
upheld.  
In the context of CSR, it is not enough to focus only on 
the expenditure of 2% of profit: more needs to be done 
to scrutinise how those profits are made. One of the 
critical roles of civil society is that of the watchdog, and 
civil society should continue in that role by critically 
assessing business responsibility. More can be done 
by the small but growing number of initiatives in India 
that are critically looking at business responsibility and 
asking questions about transparency and accountability 
in CSR and business responsibility. 
Some tools and approaches here could be indices 
and rankings to focus attention on issues of business 
responsibility. Indices in particular have been a 
convenient tool to communicate complex issues in 
Indian civil society 
is a large and 
diverse group. 
Understandably, the 
response to the CSR 
mandate has been 
fragmented at best.
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a simple manner to a diverse group of stakeholders. 
National Foundation for India is in the process of 
developing a Business Responsibility Index for the top 
100 listed Indian companies, to measure performances 
of these companies on broader business responsibility 
principles. Increasingly a number of organisations and 
civil society coalitions are now taking an interest to 
undertake similar initiatives, which will add immense 
value to strengthening public discourse around the 
issue of business responsibility and CSR. 
Additionally, publicity campaigns and protests have 
always been a popular tool for helping to give a voice 
to the voiceless, and will remain relevant as a way 
of demanding transparency and accountability from 
large companies. Finally, relevant policy research, with 
evidence from the grassroots, is needed to inform 
policy advocacy. 
Build understanding and 
capacity of corporate sector 
on development issues and 
approaches
Given the nascent stage of Indian corporate 
philanthropy, much capacity needs to be built, both 
at the sectoral level and individual company level.  
However, there is a serious dearth of trust and 
confidence between civil society and the corporate 
sector. Many companies do not feel they have much to 
learn from CSOs. Unfortunately, some of the weaker 
CSOs, facing a funding crunch, are acting to implement 
the pre-decided corporate mandates of CSR activities. 
This goes against the principles of equal partnership, 
and is something that CSOs ought to be concerned 
about.
Some of the ways in which partnerships can be made 
more balanced are as follows:
Knowledge building and 
awareness drives
CSOs can develop research briefs, discussion papers, 
case studies and other materials to communicate effec-
tive philanthropic practices and good practice in design-
ing interventions. However the impact of this would 
depend on CSOs’ capacities to reach out to a wider 
corporate audience and build trust with them. Given 
the lack of trust between civil society and the corporate 
sector, this approach could additionally hold immense 
long term value in building their understanding of each 
other for more effective partnerships.   
Building sectoral platforms
One of the key reasons why some areas are 
underfunded is the lack of national level sectoral 
platforms. While such platforms exist in some areas, 
such as education, health and livelihoods, there are 
few platforms in other fields. Sectoral platforms help 
to generate knowledge and insights, and facilitate 
cross-sectoral partnerships. These platforms can reach 
out to corporations in a focused way to influence their 
investment decisions, by building their knowledge in 
those areas.
Strengthen the nature and 
impact of CSR
CSOs that chose to partner with CSR initiatives should 
focus on building high impact interventions based on 
the ethos of civil society and the principles of partic-
Given the nascent 
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ipatory development, to generate learning for other 
companies. CSOs also need to bring out examples of 
poor and failed CSR intervention, to also generate 
learning for companies, and for intermediary agencies 
that channel and manage CSR funds. CSOs also need to 
exercise care when selecting corporate partners. 
Conclusion
This contribution to the 2015 State of Civil Society re-
port has discussed early trends, and the hopes and ap-
prehensions of civil society, on the new CSR mandate. 
Given its relative newness, the full implications are 
yet to be realised and understood. At the same time, 
these apprehensions are not a complete rejection of 
the potential for collaborative space, but an attempt to 
improve and further strengthen it. Civil society in India 
has stood alongside the poor and voiceless in the most 
difficult of times, and in spite of increasingly unequal 
relationships between the government and the cor-
porate sector on the one hand and civil society on the 
other, it will continue to do so. 
The reactions and future strategies of civil society will 
also depend, to a large extent, on whether citizens’ 
movements gather steam and are able to compel the 
government to take a more inclusive position to rebal-
ance power dynamics among the three sectors. Until 
that time, CSR and the changes in development financ-
ing that have resulted need to be viewed with caution. 
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Introduction
2014 was a mixed year in the global environment 
for charitable giving. Rapidly rising engagement 
in charitable activities in some transitioning and 
developing economies raised hopes of a global surge 
in private donations to civil society organisations 
(CSOs). However, a tide of regressive laws that limit 
the financial and operational independence of CSOs 
risks choking the growth of a global culture of giving.
In producing the World Giving Index (WGI), The 
Charities Aid Foundation’s annual report tracking 
participation in charitable activities around the 
world, we have noted a slight overall decline in the 
proportion of people giving money to CSOs. However, 
when we look only at transitional economies, we see 
an increase. The generosity of a new generation of 
young, middle class donors in fast growing economies 
has the potential to plug the gaps left by changing 
patterns in Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
But if current trends for government interference 
through politicised regulation, the choking of 
advocacy and campaigning, and the raising of barriers 
to foreign funding are not addressed, we may look 
back at the current period as a time of missed 
opportunity.
The World Giving 
Index
In the same way that democracy has value to society 
above and beyond the policies of the governments 
it elects, civil society should be about more than the 
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the top spot in the WGI with the USA might seem 
counterintuitive at the surface, but in fact reveals a 
remarkable truth. In Myanmar, 5% of the population 
live monastic lives (known as Sangha), which are 
entirely funded by donations from lay devotees 
(Sangha Dana) of the Theravada school amongst the 
mostly Buddhist (88%) population. Perhaps reflecting 
this, 91% of Burmese people said that they had given 
money to charity in the month prior to being surveyed 
- a clear 13 percentage points ahead of Malta, in 
second place for that measure. In comparison, the 
USA achieved the same overall WGI score of 64% 
by performing well across the board. It was the only 
country to rank in the top 10 for all measures. The 
highest and lowest ranking countries are as follows.













10 Trinidad and Tobago
citizens, either individually or collectively, to commit 
their money, time and energy in the support of their 
chosen cause is fundamental to the existence of 
civil society. It is for that reason that the findings of 
the 2014 WGI, in conjunction with a more in depth 
understanding of global trends in giving and the legal 
environment in which CSOs operate, should be of 
interest to all.
The Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) is an international 
CSO that exists to help improve the environment for, 
and provide services that facilitate, charitable and 
philanthropic giving. The WGI, one of our flagship 
pieces of research, is an annual report that uses 
Gallup World Poll data to assess the proportion of 
people who report having given money to charity, 
volunteered time and helped a stranger in the month 
prior to being surveyed. These three simple measures 
are averaged to produce a WGI score on every country 
where data is available, constituting the world’s only 
index on charitable behaviour. The 2014 WGI, the fifth 
edition of the report, ranked 135 countries.
The methodology is not complex. We do not weight 
our data for economic factors; nor do we attempt 
to factor in country level context. This is deliberate. 
The simplicity of the methodology allows anyone 
who reads our index to understand what is being 
measured, and make their own judgements. In 
addition, though the tendency to focus on wealth 
and the amount of money raised for causes is 
understandable, we believe that the WGI offers an 
opportunity to recognise the importance of mass 
engagement in charitable activities.
Myanmar demonstrates the value of this recognition. 
For a country with a low ranking on the UN Human 
Development Index (150th on the 2014 index) to share 
In the same way that 
democracy has value 
to society above and 
beyond the policies 
of the governments 
it elects, civil society 
should be about more 
than the outputs 
it produces.
The ability and 
willingness of citizens, 
either individually or 
collectively, to commit 
their money, time and 
energy in the support 
of their chosen cause 
is fundamental to 
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Worryingly, the proportion of people giving money to 
charity fell slightly in the 2014 index by 0.6 percentage 
points, which seems to reflect the slight fall in global 
GDP growth rate reported between 2012 and 2013 
(surveys for the 2014 report were carried out in 2013). 
Analysis of global giving over the past five years shows 
that our three measures usually rise or fall in unison, 
dipping in 2009, the year after the 2008 financial crisis, 
recovering in 2010, and then falling again sharply in 
2011, before rising again in 2012 and 2013. Strikingly, 
even though the percentage of people giving money 
to charity has fallen slightly in this year’s index, the 
proportion of people volunteering and helping a 
stranger has improved.
Though fluctuations in the economy clearly seem 
to have an impact on giving on a global scale, the 
2014 WGI also shows that any notion that generosity 
might be directly linked to wealth is deeply flawed. 
While there is a relationship between wealth and 
the proportion of people giving money to charity, 
that relationship is relatively weak. Just five of the 
countries in the top 20 are members of the G20, the 
group representing the world’s largest economies. 
Eleven G20 countries are outside the WGI top 50, and 
three of these are outside the top 100. Meanwhile 
eight countries classified by the World Bank as low 
income nations rank in the top 20 of the WGI. 
So while income is certainly a factor in people’s ability 
to engage in charitable activities, there must be 
deeper underlying conditions driving such divergent 
WGI data. It is of paramount importance that we gain 
an understanding of what, if any, are the universal 
conditions that create an enabling environment for 
giving, if we are to ensure the future health of civil 
society around the world as we undergo one of the 
most dramatic socio-economic transitions in history.
Positive trends
A 2010 report published by the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Development Centre contained a stunning 
projection.1 It estimated that the number of middle 
class people, which they defined as, “households 
with daily expenditures between US$10 and US$100 
per person in purchasing power parity terms,” 
would increase by 165% by 2030, and that 70% of 
this growth would occur outside Europe and North 
America. The first report of CAF’s Future World Giving 
project, which seeks to establish what governments 
can do to create an enabling environment for giving, 
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extrapolated from this figure to calculate that if this 
future cohort of middle class people were to dedicate 
1% of their expenditure to charitable causes, it 
could yield a staggering US$550bn in resources for 
global civil society.2 More important still, such mass 
participation in giving could create a more robust and 
accountable civil society, with the legitimacy to stand 
up to power. 
There is some cause for optimism that such a future 
could come to pass. Transitional economies - nations 
that have developed sufficiently to no longer be 
considered as developing countries but are not yet on 
a par with advanced economies - have seen growth 
in all three measures of generosity in this year’s WGI, 
with the proportion of people donating money to a 
charity bucking the global negative trend and growing 
by 2.6%. Populous transitioning economies such as 
India, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Africa and 
Vietnam have seen strong growth over the past five 
years of WGI data. India has added nine percentage 
points to its score, in terms of the proportion of 
people giving money to CSOs (28%), and has moved 
up in the overall rankings from 71st place in 2010 to 
52nd. South Africa, a nation with a strong cultural 
tradition of giving, on which formal civil society 
infrastructure could one day flourish, has seen the 
number of people giving money increase by eight 
percentage points to 23%, which, added to already 
strong numbers in helping strangers, has seen it rise 
from 76th to 34th on the overall rankings over the same 
period.
There has also been strong growth in charitable 
engagement in a number of former Soviet and Eastern 
Bloc countries. Of the 20 nations that have seen 
the largest increases in the proportion of people 
giving money to charity in the past five years, 11 of 
them were at some point part of the Soviet sphere 
of influence. In most cases these nations have seen 
dramatic rises from a low base, due to the almost 
non-existent status of an independent institutional 
civil society before the 1990s. The creation and 
amendment of laws relating to civil society, 
particularly in nations that have become part of the 
European Union, may well have helped to spur greater 
engagement in giving. 
The role of young people in driving levels of giving in 
fast-growing transitioning economies is worth noting. 
If we look at two groupings often used by economists, 
the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa) and the Next 11 (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, South 
Korea, Turkey and Vietnam), we see that the gap 
between the proportion of 15 to 29 year-olds giving 
money to CSOs every month and the proportion of 
older generations doing the same is no greater than 
five percentage points in any of these countries. 
Contrast that with the rich countries of the OECD, 
where the gap between the 15 to 29s and the over 
50s is 15 percentage points. Whilst this generation 
gap may be a cause for concern in wealthier nations, 
the more balanced contribution of young people 
in transitioning economies may offer a cause for 
optimism about the future of civil society in these 
countries. 
Negative trends
The growth in the proportion of people engaging 
in charitable giving in developing and transitioning 
economies is timely. ODA by governments has now 
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recovered to record levels following a sharp fall in 
the wake of the global financial crisis. However, the 
profile and nature of that aid is changing. Much 
of the recent increases in ODA have come in the 
form of loans rather than grants. Worryingly, aid 
to two-thirds of Sub-Saharan African countries is 
projected to decline over the next few years.3 In 
this changing and less predictable context, many 
CSOs will find it increasingly difficult to find stable 
project funding from foreign aid agencies. As such, 
the health and continuing development of domestic, 
private philanthropy markets will be critical to CSO 
sustainability in many countries.
For some of the poorest nations, the reduction in ODA 
has left CSOs in an extremely vulnerable position as 
they face a funding gap that often threatens their very 
existence. In some countries this gap has been partially 
filled by domestic governments, but this brings its 
own challenges. Government funding for CSOs can 
of course be very positive. If governments recognise 
the additional social value that CSOs can bring, and 
choose to support them with sustainable funding 
so that they continue their work, the relationship 
can be mutually beneficial, not least for those the 
CSO reaches. However, an increased reliance on the 
state for funds places much power in the hands of 
governments. Governments inevitably fund CSOs that 
deliver against their specific agendas, and as such, the 
CSO community in a nation where much of the funding 
comes from the state can be distorted, to the point 
where the public perceives the independence of CSOs 
to have been compromised. And these fears may be 
well-founded: some governments are openly using the 
threat of losing funding as a way of silencing criticism 
of government policy, which has a chilling effect on the 
advocacy activities of CSOs.
The use of public funds to reward CSOs that align well 
with the agendas of governments might seem logical, 
and even democratically justifiable, on the surface, 
but such a conclusion is misguided. Civil society, by 
definition, operates outside the state, at the nexus 
between the public and private spheres. A healthy 
civil society, including CSOs, should be championed by 
the state for the benefits that it provides in societal 
cohesion and wellbeing, and in the improvements 
it brings to policy development and the governance 
environment more broadly.
However, increasingly, governments are attempting 
to take a more narrow view of the value of CSOs, as 
Worryingly, aid to two-thirds of sub-Saharan African countries 
is projected to decline over the next few years.  In this 
changing and less predictable context, many CSOs will find it 
increasingly difficult to find stable project funding from foreign 
aid agencies.
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delivery agents of public services. Some governments, 
for example, force all CSOs to register formally. 
This trend is particularly prevalent in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, where Uganda, to give one example, makes 
registration mandatory, and where the NGO Board 
has full discretion over applications. A number of 
countries have a very narrow list of causes and 
activities that are permitted for registered CSOs, a 
phenomenon that has long been common in the 
Middle East. Mandatory registration, which creates 
the counter threat of deregistration, is also becoming 
prevalent in South East Asia, where a 2013 law in 
Indonesia, which gives the government the authority 
to dissolve CSOs, follows in the footsteps of laws in 
other nations in the region, such as Cambodia. 
The use of tax incentives to encourage individuals 
to give money to CSOs has been shown by Rules to 
Give By, a recent study by CAF, Nexus and McDermott 
Will & Emery, to be both widespread and effective. 
Sixty-six per cent of countries have such incentives 
in place, and those that do see a higher average 
proportion of people giving money to charity (33%) 
than those that do not (21%). This effect is seen at 
all levels of the economic spectrum.4 However, many 
nations, including Brazil, China and Turkey, offer 
incentives only on donations to CSOs that deliver on 
specific government projects or agendas. As stated 
above, while in democratic contexts this might seem 
a legitimate step for a government to take, it has the 
consequence of distorting the financial playing field 
for CSOs and artificially skewing support away from 
CSOs that might challenge the status quo.
Sadly, much of the regressive policies instituted have 
at their heart an intolerance of CSO advocacy, when it 
is critical of government policy. Globally, there seems 
to have been a conflation of political advocacy with 
partisan political and electoral lobbying. To some 
extent, CSOs could be seen as partially culpable for 
this, as often we justify the freedoms and financial 
advantages afforded to CSOs on the basis of the 
services we provide, rather than on based on the 
rights and freedoms within civil society. Any sense 
that this stems from a reticence by donors about 
CSOs engaging in advocacy is, however, not supported 
by evidence. Research by Globescan shows strong 
support amongst the 15 countries it surveyed, 
covering every global region, for environmental 
and social groups ‘publically criticising government’ 
(73%) and ‘influencing public policies’ (67%). Indeed, 
support for these actions increased by 4% and 6% 
respectively between 2008 and 2012.5 Fundamentally, 
while donors are principally motivated by causes, they 
give to bring about change. When they don’t feel that 
CSOs are free to utilise all the tools in their armoury, 
including advocacy, they may be less likely to give.
Finally, one of the most disturbing recent trends in 
the funding environment for CSOs is the crackdown 
on the receipt of foreign funding by organisations 
engaging in advocacy. In 2013, Maina Kiai, UN 
Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association, highlighted “…
increased control and undue restrictions” on funding, 
particularly foreign funding, as one of the issues 
that he was most concerned about.6 As reported in 
CAF’s report, Enabling an Independent Not-for-profit 
Sector,7 the situation has worsened significantly 
since then. Following the lead of Russia, nations 
from across the globe, including Azerbaijan, Egypt, 
Hungary and Kenya, to name but a few, have taken 
steps towards restricting the flow of funds from 
foreign donors to organisations that publicly criticise 
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their policies. In a recent worrying example, India’s 
government attempted to seize international funding 
for Greenpeace India.8 
The way forward
Recently there have been a number of extremely 
negative developments, both in the ability of 
citizens to engage in acts of giving, and in the wider 
funding environment. However, in the long run, 
with increased affluence and access to information, 
people can be expected to be more generous, and 
at the same time, demand improvements in the 
environment for giving. Efforts by governments to 
undermine the financial independence of CSOs may 
ultimately come to be seen as misguided attempts to 
hold back the tide. In this light, despite the mounting 
legal barriers faced by CSOs, the funding environment 
could be set to improve. 
Despite this optimism for the future, there are a 
number of developments that need to occur to 
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ensure that the conditions are in place to engage 
people in charitable giving as they transition into 
relative prosperity. Some of these are continuations 
of existing positive trends, such as improved 
transparency and governance in CSOs, more 
strategic and sustainable approaches by donors, and 
the greater use by CSOs of mass communication 
technologies and media to share information and 
messages about the work that they do. But in 
addition, we need to start a global conversation 
about the value of civil society and the impact of 
government policy on the development of a vibrant, 
diverse and independent CSO community that offers 
more to society than the sum of the services it 
provides.
Finally, CSOs need to reclaim our right to campaign 
for the causes in which we believe, and be willing 
to speak out in solidarity when the independence 
of other organisations - even those with which we 
disagree - is being threatened. 
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introduction
Drawing upon the experience of the Neelan Tiruchel-
vam Trust (NTT), an indigenous grant-maker based in 
Sri Lanka, this contribution to the CIVICUS 2015 State 
of Civil Society Report argues that, in the context 
of diminishing resources for civil society, the role of 
indigenous grant-makers is becoming increasingly rel-
evant, particularly where supporting work on human 
rights and social justice is concerned. 
Setting the 
context
Although government donor agencies have been criti-
cised for using foreign aid as a means of furthering their 
foreign policy agendas, something that can potentially 
result in donor-driven programmes, their importance as 
a source of funding for many groups working on human 
rights and social justice issues cannot be denied. How-
ever, international development is being re-shaped by 
global economic changes, the shifting priorities of gov-
ernments and new and emerging philanthropic foun-
dations that show an interest in supporting civil society 
organisations (CSOs). 
CSOs working on human rights and social justice issues 
in particular are currently facing immense challeng-
es in continuing their work. For instance, a study by 
the Association for Women’s Rights In Development 
(AWID) found that despite rhetoric about ‘investing’ 
in women and girls, financial resources to support 








- Ambika Satkunanathan, 
Chairperson, Neelan Tiruchelvam Trust
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focus of donors has recently narrowed, and often does 
not address local needs. For example, where work on 
furthering the rights of women is concerned, certain do-
nors support only advocacy and lobbying activities and 
show no interest in supporting service delivery,2  while 
other grant-makers focus on direct service delivery, 
which may not align with the needs of local groups that 
prioritise capacity building and women’s empowerment 
programmes.3  The reality is, of course, that women’s 
groups need resources for both, as both elements are 
inextricably linked. 
In countries where local giving in general, and giving to 
social justice and peace-building initiatives in particular, 
is non-existent or is at a nascent stage, or where giving 
consists mainly of charitable initiatives, such as distrib-
uting bicycles and water pumps, or rebuilding places 
of religious worship, it is international development 
donors that have been the main source of funding for 
work on human rights and social justice.
In the past few years, Sri Lanka, which was designated 
a middle-income country in 2010, has witnessed the 
withdrawal of many established donors, principal-
ly official government donors such as the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) and the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (SIDA). Additionally, a repressive government 
that was intolerant of dissent and civic activism re-
stricted the ability of CSOs to work freely, particularly 
on issues of human rights, and post-war issues, such 
as transitional justice. Following the end of the armed 
conflict in 2009, the Rajapaksa government mobilised 
both the civil administration and the security sector to 
restrict the activities of civil society, which resulted in 
the creation of a number of repressive unofficial rules 
and processes that adversely impact on CSOs. This 
was a factor in a move by number of bilateral donors 
to reduce their funding to Sri Lanka, or support pro-
grammes viewed as non-controversial, such as infra-
structure initiatives and livelihood projects.
Although Mahinda Rajapaksa was defeated at the 
presidential election on 8 January 2015, the political 
landscape remains quite uncertain, since parliamentary 
elections are in the offing, which Rajapaksa reportedly 
wishes to use as a vehicle to return to power. While 
funding for work on transitional justice issues, such as 
reconciliation and peace-building, might be expected 
if the political space continues to be more conducive 
to civil society initiatives, it is not likely to be of a mag-
nitude that will address the acute resource shortages 







This section, which analyses the impact of diminishing 
resources on the non-profit sector, is based primarily on 
the findings of a review undertaken by NTT of training 
and capacity building programmes in Sri Lanka to ascer-
tain their relevance and impact. 
Donors increasingly 
provide resources 
only for short-term 
projects, and some-
times only for six 
months of work.
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The study found that due to the lack of funding, do-
nors increasingly provide resources only for short-term 
projects, and sometimes only for six months of work. 
This doesn’t allow organisations to focus on initiatives 
geared towards bringing about long-term social change. 
Instead, such projects typically focus on ‘observable 
change such as infrastructure, livelihoods and some 
capacity building and training’.4 
In Sri Lanka, following the end of the armed conflict in 
2009, a number of community based organisations 
(CBOs) came into existence in response to societal 
needs. Although strengthening nascent community 
groups in areas affected by conflict should be a prior-
ity and an integral part of rebuilding social networks, 
limited energy and resources are dedicated to this 
in an environment in which resources are scarce. 
Instead, donors often expect these nascent groups 
to become professional bodies immediately, but are 
not prepared to provide adequate support to enable 
them to do so. Rather, donors seek partnerships with 
organisations with the capacity to plan, implement 
and evaluate development projects. As a result, CBOs 
that are not considered professional do not have the 
institutional capacity to complete complex proposals, 
and, having no prior relationship with the donor, are 
unable to access funds. In addition, scarce resources 
means donors would rather support a known organ-
isation with a track record, instead of undertaking 
time-consuming due diligence exercises to vet a new 
organisation, and one that potentially also requires 
additional institutional support to apply for, and im-
plement, projects. 
According to the study, the limited absorption capaci-
ty of CBOs is another reason why they do not receive 
bilateral donor support, as many donors do not give 
small grants. If the lack of capacity is ignored and 
considerable resources are provided to an organisation 
with limited experience and capacity to manage and 
absorb funds, inevitably it leads to failure; worse, it may 
tear apart an organisation’s existing structure and place 
excessive pressure on institutional and inter-personal 
relationships. A vicious cycle thus ensues, whereby 
organisations that lack capacity are not able to access 
grants, but without funding they are also unable to 
strengthen the organisation, for example, by hiring 
staff. It is important to understand that in such contexts, 
when systems and processes are weak, it is strategic to 
invest not only in institutions, but also in leaders who 
work close to the frontline,5  who will be able to contin-
ue to function as catalysts for social change. 
Since organisations are desperate to mobilise resourc-
es, there is increased competition for limited funding, 
which in turn can result in ad hoc programming not 
within an organisation’s area of expertise, leading to 
the potential for poor delivery. Hence, although pro-
gramming may not be donor-driven through design, 
it can become so by default. Further, the study found 
that heightened competition has created a perception 
amongst organisations that they need to formulate 
innovative activities to draw the attention of donors, 
whereas in reality, their existing capacities might not 
be capable of making such innovative interventions. 
Alternatives and 
challenges
With funding from bilateral and multilateral donors 
shrinking in Sri Lanka, CSOs are seeking alternatives. 
Organisations that 
lack capacity 
are not able to access 
grants, but without 
funding they are also 
unable to strengthen 
the organisation.
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These range from engaging in income generation 
activities to attempting to raise funds from the corpo-
rate sector. For instance, one local organisation charg-
es an annual membership fee to access its training 
and networking events. Another organisation that 
works to increase gender awareness is considering 
using its land for agricultural purposes to generate an 
income from selling produce and provide employment 
to its female members. Selling jewellery produced 
by local women, and pooling resources with similar 
organisations, are other strategies being utilised. 
Although corporate social responsibility (CSR) ap-
pears to be gaining ground as a concept, corporate 
foundations are reluctant to support initiatives that 
are viewed as controversial, which in many contexts 
includes human rights work or anything that is per-
ceived as a challenge to the status quo. Furthermore, 
CSR initiatives sometimes compete with local organi-
sations for limited resources. For instance, there was 
an occasion when NTT was competing with a cor-
porate foundation for funding from an international 
private foundation. According to the findings of the 
NTT study, CSR programmes are “few and far between 
and in most cases incorporated in existing marketing 
and strategic plans for companies within the private 
sector.”6  It is therefore imperative that CSR initiatives 
are not merely about furthering the agendas of the 
corporates, but impact positively on the most vulner-
able and marginalised people. In most cases CSOs also 
have little knowledge of how to access information 
about available CSR funds.
At the same time, it cannot be denied that some ad 
hoc partnerships that provide innovative solutions ex-
ist. For example, a Colombo-based organisation sup-
ports partnerships by linking the private sector with 
farming cooperatives, with the aim of enabling the 
cooperatives to gain better market access and develop 
negotiating skills. But overall, it is evident in Sri Lanka 
that CSR initiatives will not immediately replace donor 
funds for development projects, especially where 
work on issues that are considered controversial or 
that might earn the ire of the state is concerned.
As in other South Asian countries, the Sri Lankan dias-
pora is increasingly showing an interest in investing in 
civil society initiatives. However, they too err on the 
side of caution, and show a reluctance to fund social 
justice and human rights work with a focus on long-
term change, appearing to prefer to support initia-
Corporate foundations are reluctant to support initiatives 
that are viewed as controversial, which in many contexts 
includes human rights work or anything that is perceived as 
a challenge to the status quo.
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tives that are more charitable than philanthropic. For 
instance, in the conflict-affected north and east of Sri 
Lanka, it is not uncommon to find the diaspora fund-
ing ad hoc charity projects that do not really respond 
to the needs of the population, but rather fall within 
the comfort zone of those donating. 
When it comes to philanthropy, it is pertinent to note 
here a study by Worldwide Initiatives for Grantmaker 
Support (WINGS) on global institutional philanthropy, 
which states:7  
“For philanthropy to flourish in a society, that so-
ciety must value a strong and vibrant role for civil 
society and believe in the role of private actors to 
support it.”
Due to the concerted campaign of vilification, intimi-
dation and harassment employed against civil society 
by the Rajapaksa regime during the past nine years, 
many members of the public now view CSOs with 
suspicion. Among many, CSOs are looked upon as 
self-serving, corrupt entities that are only concerned 
with subsiding their opulent lifestyles rather than 
responding to the needs of the people. This could be 
another reason for the lack of private local philanthro-
py in Sri Lanka, particularly to support CSOs working 
on social justice and peace. 
Finally, while traditional state-funded donors have tak-
en a step back, new international private foundations 
are stepping in and stepping up their involvement. 
Although this is still at a nascent stage, particularly 
since many foundations are yet to expand their remit 
to support organisations outside their geographical 
area of origin, the interest of these entities and their 
willingness to engage with organisations in the global 




remain a rarity. 
However, within the 
changing funding 
environment, the 
role of community 
philanthropy is 
becoming ever more 
important. 
south is a positive development. At first glance, many 
private foundations appear to be more flexible than 
traditional bilateral and multilateral donors, meaning 
that CSOs are not restricted to strictly defined themes 
but are able to focus on the initiatives they feel re-
spond best to community concerns and needs. Amidst 
the widespread phasing out of traditional government 
donors, rising anti-west sentiments in the global south, 
and the imposition of increasingly restrictive policies 
by states to curtail the activities of programmes chal-
lenging the status quo, it will be interesting to observe 
the potential impact that new private foundations 
could have on international development.
The way forward: 
indigenous 
philanthropy 
In South Asia, indigenous philanthropic organisations 
remain a rarity. However, within the changing funding 
environment, the role of community philanthropy is 
becoming ever more important.8  
Indigenous foundations engaged in community philan-
thropy do not stop at providing financial support for 
organisations. Indigenous philanthropic organisations 
can also function as entities through which funds can 
be channelled to smaller organisations, which may 
not have strong managerial and financial systems and 
sufficient capacity to absorb large grants. Through this, 
indigenous foundations can support the capacity build-
ing of community organisations, including by strength-
ening their proposal writing and financial management 
skills, and assisting them to access grants from other 
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donors, including through suggesting and supporting 
visibility activities and introductions. Particularly in 
restrictive contexts, social justice initiatives that pay in-
creased attention to initiatives at the community level 
will also result in greater impact in the long term. 
Local foundations are often viewed as part of the com-
munity and so are expected to be more understanding 
and flexible. This requires them to be conscious con-
stantly not only of the impact of their actions, but also 
of how their actions are perceived. At the same time, 
the ability of local foundations to build strong relation-
ships of trust enables them to understand the context 
better and garner the support of communities, particu-
larly in restrictive and complex environments. The fact 
that NTT is an indigenous organisation, with staff and 
board members who are part of and have established 
relationships with communities, means that a level 
of trust exists that enables NTT to work closely with 
CBOs, even during difficult times.
The particular value of an indigenous grant-maker is 
that they are often willing to take risks to support new 
and pilot initiatives that larger international donors are 
reluctant to support. As local foundations, they are po-
sitioned to gauge the pulse of local political, social and 
security dynamics because of the extensive knowledge 
base and experience they possess, gained through 
working with a variety of CBOs and CSOs. This means 
that indigenous foundations are willing to be guided by 
local organisations in responding to the evolving needs 
and concerns of communities.
However, in order for indigenous foundations to thrive, 
and support communities’ efforts to gain control of 
their own development future, the further encourage-
ment and growth of local philanthropy is imperative. 
In countries such as Sri Lanka, where the local polit-
ical context has coloured the publics’ and corporate 
sector’s views of CSOs, to change perceptions will 
require a change in political context. Further, greater 
awareness of the role of community philanthropy 
might encourage greater local giving, particularly if 
individuals realise their contribution is instrumental in 
changing lives.
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Increasingly, civil society organisations (CSOs) are 
starting to partner with businesses on their corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. While such part-
nerships encourage businesses to support local com-
munities and be responsible citizens, they can also be 
problematic, leading to loss of independence for CSOs 
and causing them to compromise their values. This 
contribution to the CIVICUS 2015 State of Civil Society 
Report examines the pros and cons of CSO-business 
partnerships, and lays down some recommendatory 
principles.
The past 25 years have witnessed significant 
pendulum swings in the relationship between 
business and civil society. In the pre-1990 era, 
relationship dynamics between business and CSOs 
were mostly in the direction of minimum and 
often adversarial interactions, with collaborative 
relationships ranging from philanthropy and cause-
related marketing to sponsorship, and adversarial 
relationships extending from boycotts and protests 
to violent direct action (Seitanidi 2010; Austin 
2000). After the end of the 1990s, the gradual 
disillusionment of each sector’s mono-sectoral 
ability to make a significant difference to social 
issues (Seitanidi 2008), the diminishing levels of 
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empowerment of CSOs (Bovaird et al 2002) swung 
pendulum dynamics in the opposite direction. In 
the early 2000s, levels of trust in CSOs were among 
the highest in the world (Wootliff and Deri 2001), 
which gradually led to more frequent interactions, 
engagement and, eventually, partnerships. Over the 
last 15 years, CSO-business partnerships shifted “…
from being a nice thing to do to being a necessary 
component of strategy and operations. It is difficult 
to find an important company or nonprofit that is 
not engaged in some such alliance. In the world of 
nonprofits and business, collaboration has become 
essential to success.” (Austin and Seitanidi 2014: xv).
The prospects for partnerships remain very positive 
today, with people and organisations on both sides 
agreeing that collaborative action will become even 
more important in the next three years (C&E Advisory 
2014), and with company CEOs globally viewing 
partnerships as a critical element of their approach to 
sustainability (Lacy et al 2010). The high compatibility 
of organisational drivers pulls together both CSOs 
and businesses (Seitanidi 2010), in order for CSOs to 
achieve access to funds (95% of survey respondents), 
people and contacts (73%) and long-term stability 
and impact (71%), and for business to gain positive 
reputation and credibility (92%), increase the 
potential for innovation through collaboration (73%) 
and achieve long-term stability and impact (73%) 
(survey data from C&E Advisory 2014). It is interesting 
that serving the social good remains an implicit aim in 
the motives for developing a partnership. 
Partnerships appear for some almost as a panacea 
for all social ills, and they are “expected to address 
several existing ‘gaps’ related to regulation, 
participation, implementation, resources and 
learning” (Kolk 2014: 15). Over the last decade we 
have begun to witness a ‘partnership society’, with 
a generalised fascination with the word partnership, 
as many organisations try to reap the currency of 
expected mutuality, equal power dynamics and 
distribution of benefits across partners, assuming that 
this is possible in all cases (Seitanidi 2010).
The value of 
partnerships
However, due to the resource intensity associated 
with partnerships, and despite the claims of an 
increase in partnerships, we would expect to observe 
a decrease in the number of true social partnerships 
(Seitanidi 2010). This trend has become visible and 
been verified only recently, due to the availability 
of relevant quantitative studies, suggesting that as 
partnerships become more strategic and their value 
for organisations increases, the overall growth of 
partnerships slows down (C&E Advisory 2014). In 
2014 the value of partnerships that ranged between 
zero and UK£5m (approx. US$7.7m) was 60%, with the 
remaining 40% of partnerships having a value beyond 
UK£5m (C&E Advisory 2014), and with both sectors 
engaging on average in more than five partnerships 
per organisation (C&E Advisory 2010) (Figure 1 and 2). 
The prospects for 
partnerships remain 
very positive today, 
with people and 
organisations on 
both sides agreeing 
that collaborative 
action will become 
even more important 
in the next 
three years.
The past 25 years have 
witnessed significant 
pendulum swings 
in the relationship 
between business and 
civil society.
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Figure 1: Estimates of how much respondents’ or-
ganisations invest in or secure from corporate-CSO 
partnerships (CSOs only)
Source: C&E Corporate-NGO Partnerships Barometer 
2014
Although for a few CSOs the value of partnerships 
can be over UK£10m (approx. US$15.3m) annually, 
for the majority (71%) the value of partnerships is 
under UK£5m, with an observed decline of 14% in 
partnerships of UK£1m (approx. US$1.5m) in value 
or under (C&E Advisory 2014). Hence, it is unlikely 
that CSO income derived from the private sector 
has increased, but rather, a few large CSOs are likely 
to be benefiting from a significant increase in the 
value of their partnerships. In the UK, for example, 
private sector contributions remain the lowest type 
of voluntary sector (to use local terminology) income 
(4.64%), representing a 0.7% increase from the 
previous year (NVCO 2015). More than two-thirds 
of the voluntary sector’s income from the private 
sector in the UK is distributed amongst large or major 
voluntary organisations (NVCO 2015).
Figure 2: Estimates of respondents’ organisations 
investment in or secured from corporate-CSO 
partnerships (both sectors combined)
Source: C&E Corporate-NGO Partnerships Barometer 
2014
In aproximate terms, what is 
your estimate of how much your 
organisation invests in - or secures 
from Corporate-NGO partnerships 
in the UK and elsewhere annually? 
Please include total estimate of 
financial and non-financial value.




Historically, the private sector’s funding was 
associated with credibility and professionalism for 
those CSOs that secured collaboration with well-
known corporations (Bennett and Sargeant 2003). 
Although civil society has consistently enjoyed high 
levels of trust (see Figure 3), dropping occasionally 
only due to scandals in particular countries, 2015 
has seen an alarming global evaporation of trust 
across all institutions, according to the Edelman Trust 
Barometer. In 2015 CSOs were equally affected by a 
general decline in levels of public trust. Despite NGOs 
(to adopt the terminology of the survey) remaining 
amongst the most trusted institutions, the level of 
public trust fell or remained at equal levels (see Figure 
4) in 19 of 27 countries, with notable declines in the 
UK (16 points) and China (12 points) (Edelman 2015). 
Given the above, it is important for civil society to 
reflect on how to preserve or regain lost ground in 
public trust, which is the cornerstone of interactions 
(Fowler 2010), and is, as is suggested above, the 
number one motivation for businesses to partner 
with CSOs. Cross-sector collaborations are highly 
likely to increase in significance and it is expected 
that although they will be multi-actor (with cross-
sector and intra-sector collaborations) CSO-business 
collaborations will remain among the most significant 
(Globescan-Sigwatch 2015). 
Figure 3: Levels of trust in NGOs over the year
Source: Globescan-Sigwatch Webinar 2015
Figure 4: Trust in institutions 2008-2015
Source: Edelman Trust Barometer 2015, Annual Global 
Study
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The above suggests that, although partnerships 
will continue to flourish as a central mechanism for 
organisations to enhance or co-create collaborative 
value for individuals, organisations and society 
(Austin and Seitanidi 2014), CSOs need to become 
more strategic in order to maximise the socio-
economic partnership outcomes and minimise the 
pitfalls that are associated with partnerships.
Pros and cons of 
partnerships
In order to examine the pros and cons of CSO-
business partnerships, the Austin and Seitanidi (2014) 
multilevel partnership outcomes framework will be 
employed, looking at the potential benefits and costs 
within different levels of analysis. The focus in the 
use of the framework in this contribution is on CSOs, 
and the positive and negative outcomes as a result 
of their partnership relationships with business. The 
framework captures the value created internally for 
a CSO and its employees, but also the value created 
externally, to benefit society. Socio-economic value 
can accrue at the organisational or meso level, 
benefiting partner organisations and individuals 
within those organisations. On the societal or macro 
level, benefits accrue to other organisations that are 
in close proximity to the central partner organisations 
(e.g. that have a partnership or a close working 
relationship), to individuals who benefit from the 
partnership (e.g. the target group relating to the 
social issue) and to society at large, referring to other 
organisations that benefit, due to impact achieved by 
the partnership. These latter beneficial outcomes are 
considered systemic level benefits.  
CSOs need to 
become more 
strategic in order 
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Table 1: CSO partnership outcomes - internal value creation / destruction
LEVELS OF OUTCOMES PROS CONS
CSOs organisational pros / 
cons
Internal meso level
Increased visibility, credibility; higher public awareness of 
the social issue; greater support for organisational mission; 
financial support received by the business (in cash or in kind) 
and additional support as a result of the partnership; increased 
volunteer capital; additional complementary and organisation-
specific assets; improved partnership operations; organisational 
opportunities for learning; development of unique capabilities 
and knowledge creation; access to networks; greater technical 
expertise; increased potential to change behaviour; improved 
relations with profit sector; market intelligence; increased 
opportunities for innovation; process-based improvements; 
positive organisational change; shared project leadership; 
increased long term value potential; increased political power 
within civil society, profit sector and society.
Increased management costs; increased need for additional 
funds to leverage the collaboration; potential decrease in 
donations due to the high visibility of wealthy partners; 
increased need for resource allocation and skills in several 
departments; internal and external scepticism in case of 
controversial partner; decrease in volunteer and trustee 
support; reputational costs; decrease in employee productivity 
due to covert resistance; public criticism; decrease in support 
from other CSOs; media criticism; decreased credibility 
due to reputational issues or ability to manage successfully 
the collaboration and deliver outcomes; increased internal 
and external scepticism; increased costs due to unforeseen 
partner’s exit; legitimising ‘greenwashing’; increased risk of 
losing exclusivity of social innovation; potential increase is 
accountability issues.
CSO employees pros / cons
Internal micro level
New or strengthened managerial skills; leadership 
opportunities; technical and sector knowledge; broadened 
perspectives; individual emotional satisfaction, contributing to 
social betterment; developing new friendships with colleagues 
from the partner organisation.
Psychological pressure in case of perceived values mismatch 
between partner organisations; increased needs in skills; 
demotivation and confusion and diminishing trust in leadership 
due to perceived mismatches of missions, goals, strategies, 
value frames; feeling of selling out. 
Table 2: CSO partnership outcomes - external value creation / destruction
LEVELS OF OUTCOMES PROS CONS
Pros / cons of other 
organisations
External meso level
Adoption of innovations that took place originally within 
the partnership and are spreading due to interactions with 
other partner organisations in close proximity. Improved 
partnership operations; benefiting from early adoption of new 
developments - new products, new markets, new processes, 
new insights.
Adoption costs (financial and non-financial) as early adopters. 
Pros / cons of individuals 
External micro level
Increased awareness of social issues promoted/tackled by 
social partnerships; enjoying improved business behaviour 
of consumers, employees, citizens as a result of the change 
delivered by CSO-business interactions. 
No costs involved.
Systemic pros / cons
External macro level
Adoption of institutionalised innovations within sectors or 
industries; adoption of industry standards originally developed 
as a result of a partnerships. New ways of ‘doing business’ as a 
result of industry wide changes originating from a partnership 
(e.g. environmental standards, lending policies). Adopting 
new ways of contributing to the development of community 
infrastructure; improving work-related experiences for 
employees; contributing to the development of new societal 
structures and institutions as a result of a paradigm shift or 
new practices developed originally as a result of a partnership. 
Some adoption costs (financial and non-financial), but much less 
than in the case of early adopters. 
Based on: Austin and Seitanidi’s multilevel partnership outcomes framework (Austin and Seitanidi 2012b)
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Table 1 provides an overview of the types of value 
creation (pros) or value destruction (cons) that can 
occur as a result of a partnership for a CSO (internal 
meso level) and its employees (internal micro level), 
representing the internal value creation potential. 
The generic examples provided are not exhaustive, 
but are indicative of partnership case studies. 
Table 2 provides an overview of the types of value 
creation or destruction that can take place outside a 
partnership, focusing on other partner organisations 
or collaborators of a CSO (external meso level), 
individuals, including beneficiaries (external micro 
level) and systemic benefits or costs (external macro 
level), demonstrating the external value creation 
potential. As can be observed, a CSO-business 
partnership can potentially contribute significant 
benefits, extending the value proposition of a CSO 
by generating financial and non-financial resources. 
Similarly, a partnership may have many financial 
or non-financial costs, including reputational costs, 
depending on the perceptions of a business partner 
held within and outside a CSO. It is obvious that 
the closer organisations or individuals are to the 
partnership, the more the potential benefits they can 
enjoy, but also more of the potential costs.
Although most types of interactions benefit 
almost exclusively the direct participants, what 
is significant about what can be called true social 
partnerships (TSP) is their potential to externalise 
the benefit to those external to the partnership. The 
externalisation of socio-economic value or societal 
benefits (Austin and Seitanidi 2014; Seitanidi 2010; 
Austin 2000; Waddock 1988) is what defines a TSP 
from other forms of interactions: the external value 
created by the partners is significantly more than 
the potential external costs. In other words, a CSO-
business partnership has a high potential to benefit 
other organisations, individuals and society by 
internalising most of the relevant costs. Hence, social 
partnerships are seen as laboratories of change, 
and function as significant sources that can make a 
difference for society. The additional costs to partners 
can, however, be significant, in money but, more 
importantly, in time. A CSO has to invest significant 
time in order to leverage a partnership. Allocating 
partnership responsibilities to members of staff with 
appropriate skills, and developing internal structures 
that will facilitate a partnership’s objectives and 
processes, are part of the partnership requirements 
for which a CSO should be prepared before signing a 
partnership memorandum of understanding. 
Accountability in 
partnerships
One of the central issues of CSO partnerships is 
balancing the internal and external accountability 
of CSOs. As partnerships are attempting to solve 
complex problems that the state or individual sectors 
are unable to solve or choose not to address, the 
politics of this process are significant for the new 
agendas that are being formed (Seitanidi 2010). 
CSOs need to ensure that the process of solving 
social problems with business partners is inclusive, 
and systematically involve internal and external 
stakeholders. The accountabilities of civil society 
are complex (Ebrahim 2003) and characterised by 
many authors as multiple (Mowjee 2001; Commins 
1997; Edwards & Hulme 1995b). Hence, it is 
A partnership may 
have many financial 
or non-financial costs, 
including reputational 
costs, depending on the 
perceptions of a busi-
ness partner held within 
and outside a CSO.
One of the central 
issues of CSO partner-
ships is balancing the 
internal and external 
accountability of 
CSOs.
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ample provision of information to stakeholders has 
increased, rather than reduced, scepticism, associated 
with the critique that such over-demonstration of 
accountability is the result of managerial opportunism 
(Owen et al 2000). Achieving the balance between 
demonstrating and over-demonstrating accountability 
can be difficult, particularly for large CSOs that have 
available resources.
Accountability in CSO-business partnerships should 
be seen as an additional process, i.e. the develop-
ment and nurturing of social relationships between 
a CSO and its internal and external stakeholders, to 
who they proactively need to explain and justify their 
conduct for a partnership. CSOs should expect and 
welcome opportunities to be challenged by their 
stakeholders as a way of sharing the risks involved 
in a partnership. Institutionalising such processes of 
dialogue with all stakeholder groups can be formal or 
informal, depending on the resources available and 
the levels of risk involved (Austin and Seitanidi 2014; 
Seitanidi 2010; Seitanidi and Crane 2009). Formal 
risk assessment is, nevertheless, a best practice that 
allows for a systematic two way communication with 
key stakeholder groups, strengthening the civil soci-
ety mandate for a CSO, which can in effect act as an 
important leverage in negotiations with a business 
partner. CSOs are embedded within communities, and 
have an obligation to keep those communities in-
formed of their decisions, but this is also a significant 
source of strength that can be used for increasing a 
partnership’s accountability and legitimacy, reducing 
the risk of potential costs. If this is the case, in ne-
gotiations between CSO and their partners, they are 
likely to feel more empowered, as they have a direct 
mandate to speak on behalf of their communities and 
important that all partnership decisions strengthen, 
rather than weaken, the internal accountability 
of a CSO, by being aligned with the organisation’s 
mission statement, and the expectations of trustees, 
volunteers, employees and members. Often CSOs 
forget to involve all their internal publics, due to a 
lack of resources and pressing time-frames. However, 
retaining internal trust is paramount in the delivery 
of a CSO’s strategic objectives, while safeguarding 
legitimacy. The inherent flexibility in CSOs can also 
be an obstacle in the development of mechanisms 
for internal accountability. CSOs have an incentive to 
modify their own goals, rather than reject funding 
from a donor, sponsor or a partner when there is a 
disparity between the goals of a funder and a CSO 
(Ebrahim 2003). As a result, CSOs may encounter 
tensions between the different accountabilities 
to funders, communities and other stakeholder 
groups (Ebrahim 2003). Similarly, CSOs need to 
take a proactive approach towards their external 
accountability, involving their external stakeholders 
as much as possible in order to enhance public trust, 
which now seems ever more important, due to 
diminishing levels of trust.
Accountability demands greater transparency 
in the organisational processes of all sectors. As 
Bovens (2005: 183) contends, accountability “has 
become a rhetorical device; it serves as a synonym 
for many loosely defined political desiderata, such 
as transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency and 
integrity.” The increasing number of corporate social 
reporting initiatives, and equally the sophistication 
of civil society reports, could lead to the assumption 
that organisations are more accountable today than 
ever before (Swift 2001). It appears, however, that the 
CSOs should expect 
and welcome 
opportunities to be 
challenged by their 
stakeholders as a 
way of sharing the 
risks involved in a 
partnership.
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beneficiaries regarding a partnership’s programmes 
and processes. 
Conclusion
Despite the central premise of social partnerships 
being the addressing of social issues (Waddock 
1988), until now the starting point of collaboration 
has been “the need and the potential” for benefit 
(Wood & Gray 1991: 161) for the partners, rather 
than prioritising the benefit to society (Seitanidi 
2010). Despite early calls for positive partnership 
outcomes to “encompass the social value generated 
by the collaboration” (Austin 2000: 77), partnerships 
do not necessarily achieve the desired outcomes at 
all times, as they require skills, time and long-term 
commitment from all involved parties, which can 
be challenging. Critics of partnerships (Reed and 
Reed 2009; Biermann, Chan, Mert & Pattberg 2007; 
Hartwich, Gonzalez & Vieira 2005) and partnership 
outcomes, although relatively scarce, have cautioned 
for attention to be paid to the motives, processes and 
delivery of outcomes (Austin 2010; Seitanidi 2010; 
Margolis & Walsh 2003; Brinkerhoff 2002; Austin 
2000). 
In order for CSOs to maximise their benefits and 
minimise the risks associated with partnerships, 
they need explicitly to prioritise the social good in 
their operations and communications, and become 
more strategic in their interactions with business, 
by strengthening their internal and external 
accountability, and developing appropriate processes, 
including institutionalising a formal risk assessment 
process, which will further assist in maintaining or 
increasing their levels of public trust. Putting such 
processes in place can further empower CSOs, 
enabling them to increase significantly their financial 
demands from business for providing a critical 
connection with communities, which is currently 
undervalued. At the same time, CSOs need to invest 
significant time and resources in making sure they 
have appropriate skill sets in place for a new era of 
intense interactions. 
The criticism of partnerships, the retreating levels of 
trust in CSOs and the increasing need for resources 
and effectiveness will signal another pendulum 
swing, which is likely to be associated with a 
paradigm shift in what constitutes collaboration 
value, so that all partners will explicitly prioritise 
the social good in their motivations, processes and 
outcomes. 
References
J E Austin (2000), ‘Strategic collaboration between nonprofits 
and businesses’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 29 
(Supplement 1), p69-97
J E Austin (2010), ‘From organization to organization: On creat-
ing value’, Journal of Business Ethics, 94 (Supplement 1), p13-15 
J E Austin and M M Seitanidi (2012a), ‘Collaborative value cre-
ation: a review of partnering between nonprofits and business-
es. Part 2: Partnership processes and outcomes’, Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 41, p929–68
J E Austin and M M Seitanidi (2012b), ‘Collaborative value cre-
ation: a review of partnering between nonprofits and business-
es: Part I: Value creation spectrum and collaboration stages’, 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 41, p726–58
State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
368
Edelman (2015), Trust in institutions drops to level of great reces-
sion. Press Release. Available from http://www.edelman.com/
news/trust-institutions-drops-level-great-recession
Edelman (2015), Edelman Trust Barometer 2015. Annual Global 
Study. Earning the Right to Innovate. Available from http://www.
edelman.com/2015-edelman-trust-barometer-2/trust-and-inno-
vation-edelman-trust-barometer
M Edwards and D Hulme (1995), ‘Performance and Account-
ability: Introduction and Overview’. In: M Edwards and D Hulme 
(eds.), Beyond the Magic Bullet: Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions-Performance and Accountability, p3-16 (London: Earthscan 
Publications)
A Fowler (2000), The Ties that Bind: Civic Development and the 
Importance of Trust. Keynote Address at Resource Alliance’s 
Building Capacity for Sustainability International
Conference, Nairobi, Kenya, November 2000
P Glasbergen (2007), ‘Setting the scene: The partnership para-
digm in the making’. In: P Glasbergen, F Biermann and A P J Mol 
(eds.), Partnerships, governance and sustainable development: 
Reflections on theory and practice, p1-28 (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar)
Globescan-Sigwatch Webinar (2015), The Shifting Importance 




Globescan (2014), GlobeScan Business for Social Responsibility 
Net Impact Study 2014. Available from
http://www.globescan.com/component/edocman/?view=docu-
ment&id=172&Itemid=591
F Hartwich, C González and L-F Vieira (2005), Public–Private 
Partnerships for Innovation-Led Growth in Agrichains: A Useful 
Tool for Development in Latin America? International Service for 
National Agricultural Research Division Discussion Paper (Wash-
ington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute)
J E Austin and M M Seitanidi (2014), Creating Value in Nonprof-
it-Business Collaboration. New Thinking and Practice (Jossey-
Bass)
R Bennett and A Sargeant (2003), ‘The nonprofit marketing land-
scape: guest editors’ introduction to a special edition’, Journal of 
Business Research, 58, p797-805
F Biermann, M Chan, A Mert and P Pattberg (2007), ‘Multi-stake-
holder Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Does the 
Promise Hold?’ In: P Glasbergen, F Biermann and A Mol (eds.), 
Partnerships, Governance and Sustainable Development: Reflec-
tions on Theory and Practice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar)
T Bovaird, E Loffler and S Parrado-Diez (2002), ‘Finding a Bowl-
ing Partner. The role of stakeholders in activating civil society in 
German, Spain and the UK’, Public Management Review, Vol. 4, 
No. 3, p411-431
M Bovens (2005), ‘Public Accountability’. In: E Ferlie, L Lynne and 
C. Pollitt (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Management 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press)
J M Brinkerhoff (2002), ‘Assessing and improving partnership 
relationships and outcomes: A proposed framework’, Evaluation 
and Program Planning, Vol. 25, No. 3, p215-231
C&E (2010), Corporate-NGO Partnership Barometer Summary 
Report. Available from http://www.candeadvisory.com/sites/de-
fault/files/report_abridged.pdf 
C& E (2014), Corporate-NGO Partnership Barometer Report. The 
Partnering Agenda Grows Deeper Roots…. Available from http://
www.candeadvisory.com/barometer
S Commins (1997) ‘World Vision International and Donors: Too 
close for comfort?’ In: M Edwards and D Hulme (eds.), NGOs, 
States and Donors: Too close for Comfort?, p140-155 (Bas-
ingstoke and London: The Save the Children Fund)
A Ebrahim (2003), ‘Making Sense of Accountability: Conceptual 
Perspectives for Northern and Southern Nonprofits’, Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership, Vol. 14, No. 2, p191-212
State of Civil Society report 2015: GUEST ESSAY
369
A Kolk (2014), ‘Partnerships as panacea for addressing global 
problems? On rationale, context, actors, impact and limitations’. 
In: M M Seitanidi and A Crane (eds.), Social Partnerships and 
Responsible Business: A Research Handbook, p15-43 (Routledge)
P Lacy, T Cooper, R Hayward and L Neuberger (2010), A New Era 
of Sustainability. UN Global Compact-Accenture CEO Study, Vol. 
57. Available from http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_ 
events/8.1/UNGC_Accenture_CEO_Study_2010.pdf 
J D Margolis and J P Walsh JP (2003), ‘Misery loves companies: 
Rethinking social initiatives by business’, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 48, p268–305
T Mowjee (2001), NGO-Donor Funding Relationships: UK Govern-
ment and European Community Finding for the Humanitarian Aid 
Activities of UK NGOs from 1990-1997. Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
London School of Economics, Centre for Civil Society
NCVO (2015), NCVO UK Civil Society Almanac, National Council 
for Voluntary Organisations. Available from http://data.ncvo.org.
uk/a/almanac14/overview-2
D L Owen, T A Swift, C Humphrey and M C Bowerman (2000), 
'The new social audits: accountability, managerial capture or the 
agenda of social champions?' European Accounting Review, Vol. 
9, No. 1, 81-98
A M  and D Reed (2009), ‘Partnerships for development: Four 
models of business involvement’, Journal of Business Ethics, 90, 
p3-37
J W Selsky and B Parker (2005), ‘Cross-sector partnerships to 
address social issues: Challenges to theory and practice’, Journal 
of Management, Vol. 31, No. 6, p849-873
M Seitanidi (2008), ‘Adaptive responsibilities: Nonlinear interac-
tions in cross sector social partnerships’, Emergence: Complexity 
& Organization, 10, p51–64
M M Seitanidi (2010), The Politics of Partnerships. A Critical Ex-
amination of nonprofit-business partnerships (Springer)
M M Seitanidi and A Crane (2009), ‘Implementing CSR through 
partnerships: Understanding the selection, design and institu-
tionalisation of nonprofit-business partnerships’, Journal of
Business Ethics, 85, p413-429
T Swift (2001), ‘Trust, Reputations and Corporate Accountability 
to Stakeholders’, Business Ethics: A European Review, Vol. 10, 
No. 1, p16-26
S A Waddock (1988), ‘Building successful partnerships’, Sloan 
Management Review, Summer, p17-23
Donna J Wood and Barbara Gray (1991), ‘Towards a Compre-
hensive Theory of Collaboration’, Journal of Applied Behavioral 
Science, Vol. 27, No. 2, p139–62
J Wootliff and C Deri (2001), ‘NGOs: the new super brands’, Cor-
porate Reputation Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, p157-65








The value of civil 
society
During my very first days as President of the Ford 
Foundation, I participated in a roundtable on civil 
society with the President of the United States, Barack 
Obama. At that meeting, he said:
“…human progress has always been propelled… 
by what happens in civil society - citizens com-
ing together to insist that a better life is possible, 
pushing their leaders to protect the rights and 
dignities of all people.”  
I could not agree more. 
Imagine what the world would be like without a 
strong, vibrant civil society. Imagine a South Africa still 
repressed under apartheid. Imagine a United States 
without civil rights - or voting rights - for women and 
African Americans. Imagine, instead all of the demo-
cratic movements mobilised, the civil society organ-
isations (CSOs) opened, and the lives saved, these 
stymied, closed, and tragically lost. 
Indeed, we find civil society at the root of any real, 
meaningful, and lasting movement towards social 
justice, anywhere and everywhere on Earth. This 
certainly has been true throughout our history at the 
Ford Foundation, where we have helped to seed and 
support an ‘alphabet soup’ of organisations: HRW 
(Human Rights Watch) and the ICTJ (International 
Center for Transitional Justice), the LRC (Legal Re-
sources Centre) in South Africa, and the CBGA (Centre 
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The fact is that 
around the world, 
activists feel the 
pressure from gov-
ernments, who see 
CSOs as adversaries 
rather than allies. 
for Budget and Governance Accountability) in India. 
The list goes on, and includes organisations that are 
delivering services and achieving impact every single 
day, in areas as diverse and indispensable as the arts, 
economic opportunity and education.
For this reason, civil society remains firmly fixed at 
the centre of how we see, seed and support social 
change. To us, nothing is more powerful than a move-
ment of passionate and principled people, working 
towards a good that is greater than themselves. 
From our perspective, the Ford Foundation’s work has 
long been focused on galvanising social movements 
by investing in institutions, individuals and ideas. I 
think of these as our ‘three I’s’. 
Throughout our history we have seen and supported 
the full range of approaches and shapes civil society 
can take, whether civil society’s relationships with 
government and the private sector are collaborative 
or, sometimes, contentious. From the Children’s Tele-
vision Workshop that brought us Sesame Street, to Dr 
Martin Luther King Jr. leading marches in the street, 
to the deal that brought the city of Detroit back from 
fiscal bankruptcy, to the World Social Forum out in the 
streets around the globe, we have always seen these 
three I’s as the path to progress. They all are inter-
dependent and interrelated, of course. Investments 
in individuals and leadership translate into stronger 
institutions. Stronger institutions yield stronger ideas, 
and ultimately, greater impact. And in each of these 
three cases, civil society remains the strongest medi-
um through which movements and solutions can be 
brought to address the largest challenges we face. 
Civil society 
under siege
Yet, despite their central role - or because of it - many 
CSOs are beleaguered and besieged. At few moments 
since the movement to build CSOs began have these 
institutions been at greater risk, more vulnerable, and 
less resilient. How can this be, given the vital role of 
civil society? I believe there is a combination of rea-
sons, both external and internal.
Externally, we know about the atrocities committed 
by authoritarian regimes, and how civil society has 
been repressed and restricted by those in power, 
and thus severely limited in their ability to operate 
and give voice. For years, troubling laws in Ethiopia 
have constrained the operation, and free association, 
of CSOs with foreign funding.1 In January 2014, we 
watched as the Cambodian government banned all 
public assembly in the face of growing dissent.2 Two 
months later, Human Rights Watch issued a report on 
rights violations in Venezuela, where protesters were 
beaten and shot.3 In January 2015, the founder of the 
Bahrain Center for Human Rights, Nabeel Rajab, was 
arrested for criticising the government on Twitter.4 
These examples are only a few among many. 
The fact is that around the world, activists feel the 
pressure from governments, who see CSOs as adver-
saries rather than allies. In countries where CSOs are 
viewed in this way, human rights abuses are on the 
rise. An increasing number of legal challenges and 
constrictive laws impede important work. We have 
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witnessed cases of censorship and harassment on near-
ly every continent. We have seen persecution, even 
murder, of citizens working for dignity and justice. 
Of course, external pressures are not limited to authori-
tarian, repressive regimes. There also has been uneven, 
tepid support for CSOs in some democracies, despite 
the fact that, according to the 2015 Edelman Trust 
Barometer, NGOs (as it categorises CSOs), remain the 
world’s most trusted institutions. Given the expansion 
of electoral democracy around the world, the shrinking 
space for civil society in recent years seems as contra-
dictory to those values as it is concerning. 
Moreover, even when CSOs have the freedom to oper-
ate, they face a range of challenges from within the 
ecosystem of funders and fellow institutions. 
One such internal pressure comes from the current at-
tachment to - and almost a worship of - market-based 
solutions that ask organisations to measure progress 
as if they were for-profit concerns. Granted, Henry 
Ford II called our foundation a “creature of capital-
ism,” but we need not be its captives. And borne from 
this issue is another: how we relate to one another. 
In 2014, CIVICUS published a powerful call to action, 
signed by many civil society leaders and supporters, 
subtitled ‘Building from below and beyond borders’.5 
This letter says it more potently than I ever could: 
“We are the poor cousins of the global jet set. 
We exist to challenge the status quo, but we 
trade in incremental change. Our actions are 
clearly not sufficient to address the mounting 
anger and demand for systemic political and 
economic transformation that we see in cities and 
communities around the world every day.”
This same letter goes on to state, loud and clear, that 
civil society’s “primary accountability cannot be to 
donors.” And this is just one testament to a series of 
larger, interconnected issues.
To begin with, the entire development ecosystem has 
become distorted. For those CSOs that depend on big 
development agencies such as USAID (United States 
Agency for International Development) and DFID (the 
UK Department for International Development) to 
Our sector’s obsession with quantifiable impact, and 
frequently dogmatic adherence to discrete deliverables, 
undercuts the expansive purpose of CSOs, miniaturising 
them in their ambition. 
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keep their doors open, they often become bound to 
contracts, and burdened by checklists. In the name 
of accountability, these groups have to show bang for 
the buck - and units per dollar - even if that means 
spending valuable time on bureaucratic busywork, 
rather than doing their best work. Of course, we all 
want to get the most value out of our investments, 
but when it comes to measuring that value, and 
holding organisations accountable for it, we need to 
be more thoughtful and flexible. Right now, too many 
organisations are bean counting, rather than problem 
solving. 
In short, development incentives do not reward the 
construction of adaptive organisations, but rather 
a set of donor-focused, piecemeal priorities. Some-
times, those priorities are myopic, if not downright 
perverse, diluting grassroots voices, artificially nar-
rowing policy debates, or worse.
To borrow a phrase from our colleagues, we have 
encouraged this “trade in incremental change,” at the 
expense of challenging the status quo. Our sector’s 
obsession with quantifiable impact, and frequently 
dogmatic adherence to discrete deliverables, under-
cuts the expansive purpose of CSOs, miniaturising 
them in their ambition. 
In other words, this system is rooted in transactional 
short termism - a tyranny of donors - that distorts and 
inhibits, rather than unleashes, the potential of civil 
society. 
The tyranny of 
donors
Of course, we foundations are far from innocent. Not 
only are we unwilling to take responsibility for this eco-
system - an ecosystem we helped create and degrade - 
but, more often than not, we also demand control. We 
want credit. We want to micromanage. Often, we seem 
not to trust the very organisations we support.
I know I am generalising. There are plenty of exceptions 
to this assessment, and certainly the Ford Foundation 
does not always set the best example. My point is that 
the larger donor culture we have collectively created 
speaks louder than the actions of any one funder.
Unfortunately, this culture is one in which civil society 
leaders too rarely have a voice in setting their own pri-
orities, or even articulating the problem they aspire to 
solve. Little wonder that funders too often view them-
selves as patrons rather than partners. 
All the while, we know that any enduring relationship, 
any successful partnership, requires trust. It means 
ceding some control, and listening to what the other 
side needs. 
And in all candour, in some areas, there are too many 
CSOs pursuing the same funding. As funders, we have 
contributed to this phenomenon, and added to the 
asymmetry between the number of CSOs and the 
increasingly scarce available resources. The result is a 
marketplace where we are unable to prioritise effec-
tively. 
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Simply put, we keep cutting the pie into smaller slices, 
and more organisations, often with overlapping inter-
ests, are left underfunded.
No doubt, for the sake of efficiency and efficacy, there 
are times when fewer, stronger institutions can make 
a more powerful impact. But from a foundation per-
spective, we are not yet comfortable saying to CSOs, 
“You should focus on a different part of the solution,” 
or, candidly, “This space is too crowded.” 
In turn, we fund a group at a minimal amount because 
we do not want to tell the truth. Instead of doing no 
harm, or even being able to help, this means that we 
allow organisations to die undignified deaths, chasing 
project grants and grasping to whatever life support 
they can eke out.
At the same time, CSOs are not without their own vic-
es. We certainly have seen a lack of coordination be-
tween organisations working in the same space, which 
results in unnecessary inefficiencies, and even redun-
dancies. Despite having the best intentions, there are 
times when ego and defence of territory come into 
play, and organisations that are meant to improve the 
world act like the world revolves around them. 
The general 
support drought
All of this culminates in two interrelated crises for civil 
society: a lack of general support and an epidemic of 
short termism. I became acutely aware of this when 
an organisation that the Ford Foundation helped 
launch, more than four decades ago, called to advise 
they were at risk of shutting down. I was stunned, not 
only because the organisation was once at the pin-
nacle of influence in policy circles, but also because 
it had some US$2m in project-based funding in the 
bank. And yet, for all practical purposes, the organisa-
tion was broke, with substantial overhead and debt.
This is not an uncommon situation. According to a re-
cent article from the Harvard Business Review,6  global 
CSOs spend more on accounting than comparable 
for-profit companies largely because:
“Most global NGOs today struggle to master the 
complexities of managing efficient, integrated 
operations in large part due to restrictions placed 
on them by funders.”
For all that project-based grants can accomplish, they 
cannot keep the lights on. They do not provide organ-
isations with the flexibility to meet their needs and 
pursue their missions. They focus on a short term initia-
tive, rather than long term institutional health. And this 
is why, going forward, as a general principle, the Ford 
Foundation is committed to increasing general support. 
In my experience, we too often ask what CSOs can do 
on our behalf, and too little about what we can do on 
theirs. When I was a CSO leader myself, I rarely heard 
foundation programme officers begin a conversation 
with the words, “How can we help you create a stron-
ger organisation?” 
And yet this is precisely the question donors should 
be asking.
This report should be a clarion call to change how 
we do our work and where we begin to think about 
For all that project-
based grants can 
accomplish, they 
cannot keep the 
lights on. They do not 
provide organisations 
with the flexibility to 
meet their needs and 
pursue their missions.
If we believe in the 
work that CSOs 
are doing - and we 
should - then we 
must help usher in a 
new era of capacity-
building investment, 
for institutions, and 
the individuals who 
comprise them.
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solving these problems. And where we begin cannot 
be by telling you what we need you to do for us, but 
by asking what we can do for you.
Ushering in a new 
era of institution 
building
If we believe in the work that CSOs are doing - and 
we should - then we must help usher in a new era of 
capacity-building investment, for institutions, and the 
individuals who comprise them.
What civil society needs most, and now more than 
ever, are resilient, durable, fortified institutions that 
can take on inequality, fight poverty, advance justice 
and promote dignity and democracy. 
Lest I be misunderstood, I want to affirm my belief 
that there always will be a need for project support. 
Project support is indispensable and essential, al-
though I do not think the true overhead costs of 
most projects are covered by the inflexible overhead 
formulas of donors, but that is another conversation. 
However, if we are being honest, and if our objective 
is endowing excellent institutions with excellent lead-
ership and infrastructure, then general support ought 
to be our more pressing concern.
I am not always keen to make analogies for the private 
sector, but this is certainly a place where philanthro-
py can learn from it. When venture capitalists invest, 
they invest in leaders and ideas, and they help those 
leaders realise their ideas by providing them with the 
most flexible capital possible. In circumstances where 
organisations need more support, whether financial, 
technical, or in the form of a good old-fashioned in-
troduction, venture capital investors do what they can 
to deliver. This focus on holistically developing organ-
isations and their leaders is what we funders should 
emulate going forward. 
Building this new 
era together
In order to better resource civil society - and in order 
to be better resources for civil society - we all need to 
change our behaviours. Large development agencies 
need to rethink how they invest, and in whom they in-
vest. Foundations and philanthropists need to rethink 
how we allocate resources. CSOs need to advocate 
for general support, and articulate why their organisa-
tion deserves that general support instead of project 
support. And, most importantly, we need to recom-
mit ourselves to building organisations in a different, 
more durable way. 
We know that fulfilling a contract deliverable is not 
the same as delivering social change. It, by definition, 
is too narrow, in both intention and output. We need 
to broaden our approach in order to foster an eco-
system that supports broad impact. This means that 
everyone needs to collaborate more - donors with 
donors, donors with grantees, and, importantly, grant-
ees with donors.
So much of the first wave of this behaviour change 
falls on donors. It is easy to say we need to give more 
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general support. But we also need to be more trusting of 
the ecosystem, to get our individual houses in order and 
then act together. We need to recognise we are not the 
sole investor in the organisations we fund, and remember 
that their budgets reflect different sources of funding, and 
sometimes competing sets of priorities.
More than that, we need to shift the power dynamics of 
our relationship with CSOs, because our traditional ways 
of engaging no longer work. They lack authenticity and 
integrity, and, in some cases, basic respect. 
We need to stop treating grantees and partners as con-
tract workers and project managers. Instead, we need to 
restore balance and honesty to our interactions. We need 
to learn from one another, communicate and iterate often, 
and adapt to the changing needs of both parties as they 
arise. As donors, we must be frank in our observations. 
But, crucially, we also must listen better, so our partners 
do not feel timid when we need them to raise their voices 
and advocate for themselves. 
And for civil society institutions, I hope you will put the 
general support question on the table, not just at the 
margins, but right at the centre. I hope that you will feel 
empowered to be loyal to your principles and your mis-
sion, and to engage with your donors based on the work 
that you are doing, rather than the pressure you 
are currently feeling. At the same time, CSOs also 
need to take responsibility for coordinating, at times 
consolidating, and, as the open letter I referenced 
earlier put it, “insisting that the voices and actions 
of people are at the heart of our work.” This means 
periodically asking the hard questions, and giving 
honest answers: have we really fulfilled the need we 
set out to? Have we drifted from our mission? Have 
we collaborated as effectively as we might? 
Together, we need to reset the system in which 
scrambling for new funding gets in the way of fight-
ing for social change: in which development distracts 
from mission. This is no easy task. 
At the end of the day, we all have to make some 
difficult choices. As ever, we stand ready to work 
with you, to listen to you, and to help you, not just 
for three to five years, but for the long haul. Typical-
ly, the problems CSOs are intended to solve are not 
short term problems. These are multigenerational 
bets. And as we know, from our history and our 
present, the best bets, and human progress itself, 
have always been propelled by a bold, vibrant and 
adaptive civil society. 
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